GSB#2013-0016, 2013-0017, 2013-0018, 2013-0019, 2013-0020, 2013-0021, 2013-0022, 2013-0023, 2013-0024, 2013-0025, 2013-0026, 2013-3014

UNION#2012-0551-0017, 2012-0551-0018, 2012-0551-0019, 2012-0551-0020,

2012-0551-0021, 2012-0551-0022, 2012-0551-0023, 2012-0551-0024, 2012-0551-0025,

2012-0551-0026, 2013-0551-0002, 2013-0551-0007

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Ontario Public Service Employees Union

(Pereira et al)

Union

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario

(Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)

Employer

BEFORE

Daniel Harris

Vice-Chair

FOR THE UNION

Ed Holmes

Ryder Wright Blair & Holmes LLP

Counsel

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Caroline Cohen

Treasury Board Secretariat

Legal Services Branch

Counsel

HEARING

March 11, March 31, 2016

Decision

1These matters involve a number of individual grievances filed by probation and parole officers (PPOs) working in the Guns and Gangs Unit (GGU). The grievances allege violations of article 2, Management Rights and article 9, Health and Safety and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA). The violations are said to stem from the failure of the employer to fill a vacancy in the unit for a probation and parole officer. The position was vacant for approximately a year.

2The grievances, dated in December 2012 and January 2013, state as follows:

I agree that the employer is placing the Probation and Parole Officers at the Toronto Anti-Guns and Gangs Probation and Parole Unit at risk from being harmed directly and indirectly contrary to the Ontario Health and Safety Act. The Employer has violated article 9 of the collective agreement by choosing not to hire, place or assign the vacated position with a Probation and Parole Officer since May 2012. This is a deliberate and calculated act/decision that has caused stress and various unhealthy situations that have extended to affect the public safety of our clients and our staff. The Employer is also unfairly using article 2 of the Managements Rights clause and unfairly targeting this Unit.

3The relief claimed in the grievances is as follows:

That the employer hire, replace or assign a Probation and Parole Officer immediately. Further that all Officers affected be remunerated financially for coverage thus far in the same amount, value and cost of returning the position in its totality. Further that pain and suffering be remunerated as well and the settlement be retroactive to the date the position was vacated.

4Here, the employer brings a motion that the grievances be dismissed because the union’s particulars do not disclose a prima facie case. The union’s particulars, as filed, are attached as Appendix A and Appendix B.

5The gist of the union’s particulars is that in establishing the GGU the employer engaged in significant preplanning, which included consideration of workload issues and enhanced training/orientation of the PPOs. Its particulars set out that the workloads have increased, and the employer failed to promptly fill a vacancy in 2012 to 2013. It was said also to have failed to promptly backfill a position in 2013 to 2014. These failures were said to have overburdened the remaining PPOs causing significant amounts of stress and safety concerns related to the unit’s clients. These actions are said to be a breach of the Health and Safety provisions of the collective agreement (article 9), OHSA and an improper exercise of Management Rights (article 2).

The Submissions of the Parties

6The employer submitted that if all of the particulars were accepted as true they are not capable of establishing the elements necessary to substantiate the violation alleged (see Couture GSB #2008-3329, Para. 6). The employer also relied upon Sager GSB #2000-0377 for the proposition that the particulars must disclose such circumstances as establish that a reasonable probability of serious illness, or actual illness, could/did result from the increased workload due to the failure of the employer to fill the position. It should be noted that Sager is a decision involving a nonsuit motion following the close of the union's case. That is, the union was given an opportunity to call its evidence in that case.

7The employer also relies upon Press GSB #2003-1461, at page 45, for the proposition that, “Where an individual grievor is claiming harm, as in the instant case, he must establish direct causation, supported by medical evidence, between the employees’ symptoms and employer's practices." The union was ordered to provide any medical documentation upon which it would rely. The employer submitted that the particulars disclose scant medical evidence for two of the grievors and none for the remaining grievors. The employer here says that the lack of any such medical reports being produced should result in the dismissal of the grievances. The decision in Press was rendered after a full hearing on the merits. That was also the case in Alaksa GSB #1130/84 et al. The employer submitted that there is no need to wait for the union to call its evidence because we know that there is no medical evidence to come. The employer characterized its application to dismiss the grievances as “an anticipatory nonsuit motion".

8The employer submitted in the alternative that this is a matter for the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board as the alleged health issues arose in the workplace. It said that at best the grievors could obtain a declaration.

9The employer relied on the following authorities: Occupational Health and Safety Act; OPSEU (Bousquet) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources), GSB No. 541/90 – 543/90, March 1, 1991 (Gorsky); OPSEU (Couture et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Government Services) GSB No. 2008-3329, April 7, 2011 (Dissanayake); OPSEU (Sager et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Transportation), GSB No. 2000-0377, October 6, 2004 (Mikus), OPSEU (Alaksa et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General), GSB No.1130/87 et al., September 27, 1985 (Brent); OPSEU (Baron et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), GSB No. 2968/95, June 28, 1995 (Kaplan); OPSEU (Laframboise) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), GSB No. 2268/95, March 24, 1997 (Roberts); OPSEU (Press) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long Term Care), GSB No. 2003-1461, October 9, 2007 (Mikus); OPSEU (Martin et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), GSB No. 2013-3579, August 12, 2015 (Anderson); OPSEU (Monk et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), GSB No. 1995-1694, April 29, 2010 (Gray); Decision No. 2157/09, [2014] O.W.S.I.A.T.D. No. 1048; Decision No. 1945/10, [2014] O.W.S.I.A.T.D. No. 231.

10The union submitted that the particulars are to be taken as true, including the employer's concerns expressed at the outset of the programme regarding appropriate caseload levels, training etc. to ensure a healthy and safe environment for the PPOs. It said that the general increase in the caseload and the further increase due to the failure to post the vacancy created a stressful situation for the staff as well as the potential for harm to the clients. The union quantified the caseload increases in its particulars. It said that the facts in issue are whether the government took reasonable precautions to the fullest extent possible to prevent accidents and promote safety in the context of its expressed concerns as part of the implementation of the programme.

11The union summarized the employer’s submissions as having three branches. The first is that there is no prima facie case, because there is a lack of medical evidence of actual harm. The second is that the employer’s application to dismiss the grievances as an “anticipatory non-suit” is inappropriate because it calls for the weighing of evidence, which has not been heard. The third is that the WSIB has exclusive jurisdiction. In the latter regard, it said that the employer conceded that the Board has the jurisdiction to issue a declaration.

12The union submitted that it need not establish actual harm. Rather, it must establish that the working conditions suggest a real or serious possibility of harm (Moulton at p.12) or, "an unacceptable risk of harm" (Ferrill at page 17). In Moulton, the Board issued a number of directions to the employer. The union submitted that the Board has on a number of occasions considered work-scheduling issues in the context of whether or not they amount to a breach of the Health and Safety provisions of the collective agreement, and it should be permitted to call its evidence on such issues in this case.

13The union said that the first branch of the employer's argument should be rejected because the proof of actual harm is not necessary and medical evidence is but one factor for the board to consider. It conceded that the physicians’ reports produced were not extensive, but it anticipated that medical evidence from the attending physicians might well be more extensive in terms of dealing with the nexus between the employer's actions and the health and safety of the grievors.

14As for the employer's submission that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, it said that neither party had ever treated these allegations as WSIB matters. Neither the employer nor the grievors had filed the reports required of them by the Act. In any event, the employer conceded that the Grievance Settlement Board has the jurisdiction to issue a declaration and/or directions and at least to entertain the union’s claims for damages in this matter.

15The union relied upon the following authorities: OPSEU (Moulton) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), GSB No. 230/88, October 7, 1991, (Watters); OPSEU (Ferrill et al.) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Health), GSB No. 1665/90, January 9, 1992, (Kaplan); OPSEU (Union) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services); GSB No. 1190/89, November 13, 1990, (Stewart); OPSEU (Union) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services); GSB No. 69/84 et al, August 24, 1984 (Samuels); OPSEU and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), GSB No. 0161/2002, May 19, 2005, (Gray); Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997; Toronto (City) and CUPE Local 79 (Charles) (2014), 241 L.A.C. (4th) 56 (Herman); Toronto (City) and CUPE Local 79 (Charles) (2015), 124 C.L.A.S. 125 (Herman).

16In reply, the employer submitted that the union's claim is an attempt to make a workload issue a Health and Safety issue, relying on the employer's action plan at the outset of the program. It said that the employer's action plan was not a promise or a commitment or a cap on workload. It said that there was no allegation in the particulars that the employer had required the grievors to work through their breaks etc. Rather, it appears that they must have put pressure on themselves to complete their workload by depriving themselves of their breaks, vacations etc. It emphasized that the details of the action plan were not an enforceable commitment, nor an admission because the government would never make such a commitment or admission.

Analysis and Decision

17I agree with the decision in Ferrill where the Board rejected the employer's submission that medical or scientific proof was required for the union to prove its case. It said at page 24, in part, as follows:

. . . the union must persuasively demonstrate that the schedule and working conditions will more likely than not result in the possibility of unnecessary risk to the health and safety of its members. This evidence need not be given by "experts", but what evidence is brought forward must be compelling . . .

It is not an essential element that the union be required to particularize such evidence. The employer has conflated the provision of particulars with the production of documents. In essence, the employer is asking the Board to weigh this evidence, as opposed to accepting it as true. The union has alleged as a fact that the employer’s actions in increasing the workload beyond its stated standards has resulted in a breach of article 9 because of the undue stress visited upon the PPOs. That fact is to be taken as true.

18It is also clear that it is not essential that the union demonstrate actual or real harm. In Union [GSB 1190/89] Vice-Chair Stewart said the following, in part, at pages 18 to 19:

While, as Mr. Costen has pointed out, the evidence did not establish an instance in which an employee has been injured while working alone in the high intensity house or the environmental management unit, we agree with Mr. Wells that the lack of such instances is not fatal to the union's case. As was recognized by this Board in Ministry of Correctional Services (Jolliffe), [GSB [1252/85], the Union is not required to prove actual or real harm in order to establish that reasonable provisions for the health and safety of employees have not been made.

19As for the jurisdiction of this Board vis-à-vis the WSIB, I agree with arbitrator Herman in City of Toronto and CUPE Local 79 (Charles), at paragraph 51, which reads in part as follows:

“while arbitrators could not award damages for injuries otherwise compensable under the WSIA, they could potentially award of monetary remedy for breach of health and safety provisions of a collective agreement, such as for property loss or damage. And in Toronto Transit Commission av. A.T.U. Local 113 (Grievance of Yosvany Mirabel) (2012), 227 l.a.c. (4th) 1 (Howe) the arbitrator had to decide whether additional relief could be awarded under a collective agreement when an employee had received benefits under the WSIA for a workplace injury. The arbitrator concluded that the WSIA precluded an arbitral award for damages in respect of the compensable injury but not a declaratory award or directory remedies. While there may be limitations on the remedial authority of an arbitrator, issues of jurisdiction toward certain types of remedial relief to not deprive an arbitrator of the jurisdiction to consider whether a breach has occurred.

20In my view, the absence of or limited existence of physician's written reports is not dispositive of these grievances. There may be other medical evidence put before the Board. There may also be other evidence called regarding the alleged nexus between the employer's actions in deviating from its a priori working condition standards for the PPOs and the possibility of unnecessary risk to the health and safety of the PPOs. That remains to be seen. On this application to dismiss the grievances because the union’s particulars do not disclose a prima facie case, the employer is asking the Board to weigh the evidence. It self-described the application as an anticipatory non-suit application. The case law is clear that on an application such as this the particulars must be taken as true. Particulars are not evidence. There is nothing to weigh. We only have the facts as alleged by the union.

21The union has alleged that at the outset of this programme the government of the Province of Ontario established, after consultation with the stakeholders, various training, workload and other considerations in the operation of the programme, to which it subsequently did not adhere. Further, the union has alleged in the grievances and the particulars provided of the claims in the grievances that these alleged failures breached the health and safety of the PPOs involved and the unit’s clients.

22There is sufficient detail in the particulars provided, if taken as true, to establish a prima facie breach of articles 2 and 9. The employer’s motion is dismissed.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 13th day of May 2016 Appendix A

1. On January 5, 2006 the Ontario government announced a number of gun violence reduction initiatives. One initiative was to create a Provincial Operations Center (POC) in Toronto which would house a number of stakeholders including probation and parole officers.

2. On or about March 17, 2006 the MCSCS issued a summary of best practices for P&P for the Guns and Gang unit (GGU). MCSCS advised that they had approval for and were in the process of recruiting 12 PPO’s, 1 Mgr and 2 support staff for the unit. These members would be housed at the POC.

3. In and around September 2006 the MCSCS issued the Integrated Project Model / Action Plan. It identified: that the initial planning was essential for a number of reasons including “identify sufficient resources and reinforce a sustained commitment”; the plan was developed in a consultative process with Ministry stakeholders; it would identify the capacity of the unit for a number of clients; established a caseload of 25 – 30 per PPO; noted staffing concerns including burn out potential and unit stability and mentoring of “potential G&G PPO’s. This denotes a level of specialty and enhanced training / orientation required by the G&G PPO’s;

4. The PPO new hires into the GGU were to be hired on a temporary contract lasting for a two year period. The start date of employment in the specialized unit was November 27, 2006. 6 of the Grievors started on November 27, 2006 – Paula Bonacci, Ivan Endrizzi, Cecilia Kok, Jarrett Muldoon, Alec Cymbalista, Anthony Weekes;

5. Mr. Cole replaced Judy Baker approximately 6 months into the temporary assignment.

6. In an Update of the Unit Activities December 2007 the Employer advised that permanent funding for the unit had been received for 15 FTE’s – 12 of which were PPO’s;

7. At the end of the two year temp posting period the Employer engaged 6 lateral transfers into permanent positions for Weekes, Bonacci, Endrizzi, Cymbalista, Pereira and Mattiassi. They also posted for 6 additional FTE PPO positions to maintain the total of 12 PPO’s. These positions were also filled;

8. The PPO’s worked out of two offices. One in the East and one in the West. Each office had 6 assigned PPO’s;

9. The Manager at the start of the GGU was Donata Calitri-Bellus. She remained in the position until approximately 2009. Under Donata vacancies were promptly filled. She was replaced by Jessie Andrews. He remained in the position until approximately May 2012. He was replaced by Wayne Munroe. Under Jessie and Wayne positions were not promptly filled;

10. Near the end of Donata’s tenure the MCSCS added additional firearms cases / clients to the GGU. This started to increase the workload for the Unit beyond the 25 – 20 filed per PPO. It was also an expansion of and ran contrary to the mission of the special gangs and guns task force;

11. The Employer also created the WAT system during the life of the GGU;

12. Prior to Mr. Andrews departure Judith Esposito, June 20, 2010 on Maternity leave until approximately June 2011, a PPO in the West office, was seeking a lateral transfer out of the GGU. In and around May, 2012 Ms. Esposito was granted a lateral April 27, 2012 to another PPO office outside the GGU. She was backfilled on a temporary basis by Laura McAndrew comes May 10, 2012 and left the position in August 2012. This position remained vacant until approximately April 2013 at which time another temporary assignment was initiated for Ryanne Yeung. Mr. Yeung had no experience or training in the GGU;

13. The position was vacant for a significant period of time. There can be no dispute that a vacancy existed since funding was approved for 12 FTE PPO’s;

14. The Union filed a grievance claiming that the non filling of this vacancy created a health and safety issue for the remaining staff;

15. The workload of the GGU did not get reduced during the period of time the position was vacant. Rather, the workload had increased since the number of caseload had been increasing over time. The workload of Esposito had to be distributed amongst the remaining 5 PPO’s. This created significant work pressures on the remaining staff;

16. In and around October 7, 2013, Ms. Mattiasi succumbed to these pressures going off on sick leave. She remains on sick leave presently. Her position was also not backfilled until January 2014 creating additional workplace pressures;

17. At the same time that the PPO GGU was short staffed the Crown increased its staffing compliment two fold in order to address the workload pressures;

18. The impact on the remaining PPO’s was significant including:

a) Each PPO had to absorb approximately 10 additional cases;

b) The duty assignment was divided amongst the 6 PPO’s located at the West and now was taken on by the remaining five. Each person had to assume a greater number of duty officer days which resulted in an inability to work on their already high workload. In addition, with one less PPO the duty officer would more frequently not have the opportunity to take breaks and lunches away from their duties, being forced to eat at their desk without relief time.

c) The PPO’s in the GGU are the liaison with other stakeholders across the province. With one fewer body the remaining staff had to increase the amount of time addressing these issues

d) When a temporarily assigned person was placed into the position the staff had to expend significant time training and mentoring the new temporary person. A significant part of the GGU is maintaining and fostering relationships with the other stakeholders. These stakeholders contact the permanent staff and not the temporary staff when needing assistance;

e) Almost every regular PPO office has a Psychologist assigned to the office to assist with the clients as needed. The GGU does not have a Psychologist assigned. This increases the workload generally and when they are short a body further enhances the workload and stress to meet deadlines and obligations;

f) Due to assuming a greater workload the POOs had to work significant additional hours – putting off vacations, taking a lot of work home for completion, doing work while on vacation;

g) With the increase in workload the communication essential to this unit was deficient. The unit needs to be in constant communication to ensure the health and safety of themselves, the clients and the public. Scheduling of meetings with clients is one example. Clients must be scheduled with extreme care to ensure that rival gang members do not come in contact with one another resulting in the potential of significant harm;

h) With the increase in workload due to assuming the caseload of the vacant PPO the ability to focus on the tasks to avoid performance issues was effected. Paula Bonacci had a negative note made to her performance appraisal for the first time because she could not keep up with the workload. Mr. Pereira received discipline because he could not keep up with the workload. The stress associated with making potential errors was very high and further affected the staff;

i) A regular PPO meets clients 1 time per month. The GGU meets clients twice per month. With one fewer PPO the staff assume an additional 60 meetings divided amongst the remaining 5 PPO’s in the office as well as all the post meeting collaboration and reporting with the stakeholders;

j) Safety of the PPO’s is jeopardized by having temporary PPO’s backfilling as they are not trained on what areas of the city are safe for entry without police involvement / assistance;

k) The workload significantly increased for the PSR’s when the staff had to assume the responsibility of the vacant position. A GGU PSR takes 1 ½ the time of a regular PSR so any increase in PSR activity is a significant burden and results in a significant amount of stress.

l) The GGU PPO are also assigned as a liaison for the regular PPO offices for the purpose of contact and assessment whether a client referred to a regular PPO should be taken over by the GGU. The duties of the vacant position had to be assumed by the remaining PPOs;

m) With the added workload the PPOs are constantly worrying about burn out. This was noted in the original roll out of the program as a staffing and health and safety issue;

n) The unit was created on the premise of fostering teamwork. The constant adding of duties due to staff shortages has resulted in less teamwork and to a certain degree a development of conflict as the staff try to avoid assuming extremely burdensome workloads. By doing so, others have to take the load. Conflicts arise over this distribution of work undermining a teamwork approach;

o) Incident reports normally have to be done within 48 hours for a regular PPO. For the GGU they must be done by the end of the day during which the incident occurred. Assuming the caseload of the vacant position increases the number of IR’s that must be filled on an emergency basis.

Appendix B

Particulars RE : Grevance Hernani Pereira Et.al.

1. The Toronto « Anti Guns & Gangs » Probation and Parole Unit was designed in response to the 2005 “Year of the Gun” which repeated itself in 2012. The formation of the unit from a Probation & Parole Perspective required careful and methodical allocation of specific experienced staff with diverse skill sets to undertake the unique task of working within an integrated Law Enforcement model in collaboration with provincial and federal stakeholders all housed under one roof, “The Provincial Operations Centre”. Three working projects were utilized to develop the unit; The Intensive Supervision Office Project authored by Paul Paradis (2001), The High Priority/Intensive Supervision Project authored by Paul Fleury June 2005) and a draft of Intensive Supervision (presented to ACC March 10, 2006) and in conjunction with existing Ministry policies regarding High Risk offenders and intensive supervision. [see G&G Best Practices March 17, 20105 Page 5].

2. The unit was designed to have three locations:

“The Provincial Operations Centre” an undisclosed location where all stakeholders work as an integrated team; TPS, MAG, VWAP, P&P, CBSA, OPP and other Provincial and Federal Corrections Stakeholders.

Two reporting centres were selected to service the entire Toronto catchment area with Yonge Street being the dividing line between east and west offices. The east office was housed within the Scarbrough Probation Office and the west office was housed within the Black Creek Probation Office.

The model is based on a funded compliment of 12 probation and parole officers; six allocated to the west end office and six to the east end office.

The Unit’s Offices though constructed within existing offices specific attention to security was employed. Fax machines, printers and telephones completely separate from the host office. The necessity of having three different vehicles [unmarked] so that officers would be able to undertake home visits, institutional visits or general tasks to minimize personal vehicles being damaged and/or tracked by the gangs or organized crime.

Special training was provided to ensure anonymity, confidentiality and safe information exchange and specific techniques were adopted to safeguard gang intelligence and information regarding ongoing investigations not to be shared outside of the unit. TAGGU Probation and Parole Officers have access to information sharing which no other Probation and Parole Officers in the province and in particular, Toronto has access to.

The preparation and formation of this unit was designed to undertake clients through a referral and admissions protocol that has remained in place since its inception with some administrative updates.

It was recommended that the initial allotment and assignment of cases be substantially lower than the provincial average and consistent with the Intensive Supervision model. According to the Toronto Anti-Guns and Gangs Best Practices document caseloads were to be between 30-40 clients per staff. [see G&G Best Practices March 17, 20105 Page 5].

GGWT

of Officers

Clients

Average

Over

Aug. 2012

5 of 6

212

42.4

12.4

Sept. 2012

5 of 6

214

42.8

12.8

Oct. 2012

5 of 6

214

42.8

12.8

Nov. 2012

5 of 6

Dec. 2012

5 of 6

218

43.6

13.6

Jan. 2013

5 of 6

224

44.8

14.8

Feb. 2013

5 of 6

230

46.0

Mar. 2013

5 of 6

231

46.2

16.2

Apr. 2013

5 of 6

225

45.0

15

3. The caseloads increased substantially since 2005; especially commencing in 2011 when the unit expanded its focus to include offenders convicted of firearms. By 2012 some officers were attempting to manage up to 52 cases. [Please refer to Appendix I – PPO Caseload stats]

GGET

of Officers

Clients

Average

Over

Aug. 2012

6 of 6

252

42.0

12

Sept. 2012

6 of 6

255

42.5

12.5

Oct. 2012

6 of 6

252

42.0

12.0

Nov. 2012

6 of 6

Dec. 2012

6 of 6

247

41.1

11.1

Jan. 2013

6 of 6

242

40.3

10.3

Feb. 2013

6 of 6

249

41.5

11.5

Mar. 2013

6 of 6

253

42.1

12.1

Apr. 2013

6 of 6

258

43.0

13

4. The escalation of criminal activity in the West End of Toronto started to climb since the onset of Project Corral on May 4, 2010 followed by Project Marvel on December 15, 2011. The preparation for these projects involves the assignment of specific staff to liaise with our partners and participate in the information and intelligence sharing months before the “take-downs” that involved hundreds of police. Project Corral was 1100 officers from all over Ontario, Quebec, Vancouver and abroad. The police and probation services work to confirm addresses, names and associations and non-associations of targeted gang members along with other related data that is collected and entered on OTIS and other data systems. This input into these investigations is unique to The Guns & Gangs Unit both in terms of the extent and intensity of the involvement. The selected officers also attend the court bail proceedings and do further checks and investigations for the Attorney General Office ensuring the sureties have no criminal history or involvement with community services. Also the screening out of potential professional sureties.[Please see attached News and articles Appendix III]

5. The “Year of the Gun” once again named because of the total number of shootings represented itself in 2012. The number of shootings in 2012 = 155, 2013 = 116, 2014 = 106 and 2015 we are at 147. [Please see attached News and articles Appendix III] This spike in shootings also gave rise to further investigations that culminated in the well-known Projects Traveller and Brazen which involved an extensive investigation into former Mayor of Toronto Rob Ford.

6. PSRs The increased requests from the Toronto and surrounding courts shows an elevated assignment of Presentence Reports. The year 2012 was also a time when the earlier projects from 2008 and 2009 started a demand for Pre Parole Investigations as inmates attempted to be paroled.

PSRs

2011

2012

2013

GGWT

46

61

48

GGET

45

36

45

7. WORKLOAD areas distinct to G&G as identified by management requiring time allowances over and above the regular field P&P Offices.

• Mandatory to meet with clients every 2 weeks

• Most PSR’s are gang focused and high profile and require in-depth analysis requiring additional research, investigations and numerous collaterals

• PPI’S would require analysis of gang activity in the area, to conduct threat assessment, to ascertain potential gang related security risks for offender release (for e.g. Parole sponsor residing in rival gang controlled territory)

• Guns & Gangs research / monitoring using Social Media

• Enforcement, including laying charges, issuing summons or warrant, court appearances, etc. Case note entries.

• Expedited enforcement based upon victim/public safety concerns due to high risk/ high profile offenders

• Collateral contacts, including victims, and justice partners

• Comprehensive gang /stg specific assessment/reassessment and case management plan.

• Program referrals and related administrative tasks

• Case conferencing

• Accessing ministry resources e.g. special needs funding

• Transfers

• Client crisis response

• Correspondence

• E-mail

• Offender interviews, contacts, rehabilitative interventions (excludes group facilitation)

• Ongoing assessments and reviews

[See Appendix – IV]

8. Duty Coverage entails answering telephone calls, seeing clients when officers are on vacation and it is allotted for the full day of business including. In G&G the work would include completion of Offender Incident Reports which is a common occurrence and attending to any walk-ins when clients are released from jails. During the period from August 1, 2012 – May 2013 The west office covered 1/6th more Duty to compensate for the vacant position.

[See Appendix II A and II B]

The Toronto Anti Guns & Gangs Probation and Parole Unit has undergone of change of 4 managers since its inception. The decision making process has changed since Donata Calitri-Bellus’s period with each subsequent managers’ view of how to run this unit and how to accomplish their goals whilst the original mandate stands.