Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Faulkner/Singleton) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2009 CanLII 66568

GSB#2006-2070, 2006-2071

UNION#2006-0530-0064, 2006-0530-0065

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT

Before

THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD

BETWEEN

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Faulkner/Singleton)

Union

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)

Employer

BEFORE

Felicity D. Briggs

Vice-Chair

FOR THE UNION

Stephen Giles Ontario Public Service Employees Union Grievance Officer

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Greg Gledhill Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services Staff Relations Officer

HEARING

May 28, 2009.

DECISION

1In September of 1996 the Ministry of Correctional Services notified the Union and employees at a number of provincial correctional institutions that their facilities would be closed and/or restructured over the next few years. On June 6, 2000 and June 29, 2000 the Union filed policy and individual grievances that alleged various breaches of the Collective Agreement including Article 6 and Article 31.15 as well as grievances relating to the filling of Correctional Officer positions. In response to these grievances the parties entered into discussions and ultimately agreed upon two Memoranda of Settlement concerning the application of the collective agreement during the “first phase of the Ministry’s transition”. One memorandum, dated May 3, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “MERC 1” (Ministry Employment Relations Committee)) outlined conditions for the correctional officers while the second, dated July 19, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as “MERC 2”) provided for the non-correctional officer staff. Both agreements were subject to ratification by respective principles and settled all of the grievances identified in the related MERC appendices, filed up to that point in time.

2While it was agreed in each case that the settlements were “without prejudice or precedent to positions either the union or the employer may take on the same issues in future discussions”, the parties recognized that disputes might arise regarding the implementation of the memoranda. Accordingly, they agreed, at Part G, paragraph 8:

The parties agree that they will request that Felicity Briggs, Vice Chair of the Grievance Settlement Board will be seized with resolving any disputes that arise from the implementation of this agreement.

3It is this agreement that provides me with the jurisdiction to resolve the outstanding matters.

4Both MERC 1 and MERC 2 are lengthy and comprehensive documents that provide for the identification of vacancies and positions and the procedure for filling those positions as they become available throughout various phases of the restructuring. Given the complexity and size of the task of restructuring and decommissioning of institutions, it is not surprising that a number of grievances and disputes arose. This is another of the disputes that have arisen under the MERC Memorandum of Settlement.

5When I was initially invited to hear theses transition disputes, the parties agreed that process to be followed for the determination of these matters would be virtually identical to that found in Article 22.16.2 which states:

The mediator/arbitrator shall endeavour to assist the parties to settle the grievance by mediation. If the parties are unable to settle the grievance by mediation, the mediator/arbitrator shall determine the grievance by arbitration. When determining the grievance by arbitration, the mediator/arbitrator may limit the nature and extent of the evidence and may impose such conditions as he or she considers appropriate. The mediator/arbitrator shall give a succinct decision within five (5) days after completing proceedings, unless the parties agree otherwise.

6The transition committee has dealt with dozens of grievances and complaints prior to the mediation/arbitration process. There have been many other grievances and issues raised before me that I have either assisted the parties to resolve or arbitrated. However, there are still a large number that have yet to be dealt with. It is because of the vast numbers of grievances that I have decided, in accordance with my jurisdiction to so determine, that grievances are to be presented by way of each party presenting a statement of the facts with accompanying submissions. Notwithstanding that some grievors might wish to attend and provide oral evidence, to date, this process has been efficient and has allowed the parties to remain relatively current with disputes that arise from the continuing transition process.

7Not surprisingly, in a few instances there has been some confusion about the certain facts or simply insufficient detail has been provided. On those occasions I have directed the parties to speak again with their principles to ascertain the facts or the rationale behind the particular outstanding matter. In each case this has been done to my satisfaction.

8It is essential in this process to avoid accumulating a backlog of disputes. The task of resolving these issues in a timely fashion was, from the outset, a formidable one. With ongoing changes in Ministerial boundaries and other organizational alterations, the task has lately become larger, not smaller. It is for these reasons that the process I have outlined is appropriate in these circumstances.

9Ms. Laurie Faulkner and Ms. Samantha Singleton were declared surplus on June 1, 2006 while working at Invictus Youth Centre. Both opted to be re-deployed and they were sent to the Toronto Jail effective August 14, 2006. During the period awaiting their redeployment both were scheduled to work Monday to Friday on the day shift. They filed grievances alleging that various provisions of the Collective Agreement were violated because of this schedule change which resulted in lost shift premium, overtime and statutory holiday pay.

10These grievances must be dismissed. The Employer is entitled to schedule employees so long as the schedule is not contrary to a provision of the Collective Agreement. There is nothing in the Collective Agreement that prohibits the Employer from scheduling an employee to work eight hours from Monday to Friday.