GSB# 2004-3023, 2005-0302, 2005-0303, 2005-2490
UNION# 2004-0108-0132, 2005-0108-0021, 2004-0108-0150, 2005-0108-0058
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
Under
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT
Before
THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD
BETWEEN
Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Therrien)
Union
- and -
The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)
Employer
BEFORE
Michael Lynk
Vice-Chair
FOR THE UNION
Donald Eady Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP Barristers
FOR THE EMPLOYER
Benjamin Parry Counsel Ministry of Government and Consumer Services
HEARING
January 18, 2008.
Decision
I Introduction
At the beginning of the first day of hearings into the Union’s four grievances on behalf of Laura Therrien against her employer, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, two preliminary issues were raised. Once these two matters were argued, the Union and the Employer agreed to adjourn the hearing pending the outcome of this interim decision respecting the two preliminary issues.
Both preliminary issues have arisen in the context of the estrangement of the Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union (the “Union”) from the grievor. Ms. Therrien has filed a complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code against OPSEU Local 108 and the local union president, related to matters that are broadly related to the same incidents that frame the grievances filed on her behalf.
The first preliminary issue is a request from Ms. Therrien for full party standing at this present hearing, separate and independent from the Union, her bargaining agent. Both the Union and the Employer opposed this request. For the reasons that follow, I have ruled against this request. The second preliminary issue is a request by the Union for this hearing to be adjourned until Ms. Therrien’s complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code has been determined. The Employer opposed this request. For the reasons that follow, I have also ruled against this request.
II The Evidence
A number of documents were entered as exhibits by way of consent by the Union and the Employer. I have drawn the following facts from these documents, with the caveat that they are formally unproven, and that they are mentioned here for the sole purpose of establishing the context for the adjudication of the two preliminary issues.
Ms. Therrien is a correctional officer (CO2) at the Ministry’s Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre in London, and a member of OPSEU Local 108. She has worked for the Ministry since 21 May 1991. Between 2001 and 2004, Ms. Therrien took a several leaves of absence from work as the result of the illnesses and deaths of three close family members. In 2002, Ms. Therrien returned to work from one of her leaves, and the Employer accommodated her by re-assigning her from correctional officer work to the personnel office at the Centre. During the summer of 2004, Ms. Therrien took every other week off as unpaid leave before returning to the workplace full-time on 30 August 2004 to her accommodated position in the personnel office.
On 30 August, David Johnson, the president of OPSEU Local 108 and a correctional officer at the Detention Centre, met with Ms. Therrien in the personnel office. Ms. Therrien subsequently stated that Mr. Johnson “confronted” her that day, presented a number of concerns and allegations from other union members respecting her access to their personal employment files, and acted in a bullying and offensive fashion that left her humiliated, intimidated and disheartened. The Union has maintained that Mr. Johnson had a legitimate union purpose in seeking to speak with Ms. Therrien that day, that he conducted himself in a professional and appropriate manner throughout this meeting, and at no time during the meeting or afterwards did he exhibit any rude, harassing, bullying or otherwise improper behaviour towards Ms. Therrien.
Following her encounter with Mr. Johnson, Ms. Therrien filed a complaint against him under the Ontario Public Services’ Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Operating Policy (WDHP) on 7 September 2004. The complaint was subsequently investigated by a WDHP advisor, who found that no violations of the policy had occurred.
(i) The Human Rights Complaints
On 29 January 2005, Ms. Therrien filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission alleging that OPSEU Local 108 and Mr. Johnson had discriminated against her, contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code, on the prohibited grounds of disability and reprisal. (Ms. Therrien had originally included the names of two other Local union officers, but those names were subsequently dropped.) Her complaint focused on her version of the 30 August 2004 meeting with Mr. Johnson. (At some later point, the reprisal claim was dropped and the ground of marital status was added.) The Union and Mr. Johnson subsequently filed a written response to the Commission, disputing the factual claims in the complaint, and denying that they had breached the Code in any way. By way of remedy, Ms. Therrien sought, among other things: (i) appropriate action/discipline to be taken against the respondents; (ii) the respondents are to be added to the Ministry’s “harassment list” and the appropriate documentation of their harassing behaviour be added to their personnel files; (iii) appropriate education and training for all respondents; (iv) compensation, costs and aggravated damages; and (v) a new employment position elsewhere in the OPS.
On the same day, Ms. Therrien also filed a separate complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code against her employer, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Western Regional Office. The essence of this second human rights complaint was that the Ministry had taken inadequate steps to protect her in the aftermath of her 30 August 2004 meeting with Mr. Johnson, that it had improperly dismissed her workplace harassment complaint against Mr. Johnson, and it had not found her suitable alternative employment. Ms. Therrien alleged that the Ministry’s actions and failures amounted to discrimination on the grounds of disability and reprisal. (Subsequently, the reprisal claim was dropped and the ground of marital status was added in this complaint as well.)
The Ontario Human Rights Commission conducted an investigation into the Therrien complaint against OPSEU Local 108 and Mr. Johnson. In December 2007, the Commission’s Manager of Investigation Services, Christopher McKinnon, wrote to Caroline Jones, counsel to the Union, to state that the staff of the Commission would be recommending to the Commission that Ms. Therrien’s complaint with respect to the ground of disability should be referred to the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal in order to hold a formal hearing into her allegations. (The Commission staff recommended to the Commission that Ms. Therrien’s complaint with respect to the ground of marital status not be referred to the Tribunal.) As of the date of the Grievance Settlement Board hearing with respect to the four Therrien grievances, the Commission had not yet made a decision as to whether to accept the staff recommendations.
The Ontario Human Rights Commission also conducted an investigation into the Therrien complaint against the Ministry. It subsequently decided that, because Ms. Therrien was subject to the collective agreement between OPSEU and the Government of Ontario, and that she had filed three grievances under the collective agreement that related to the events complained about in her human rights complaint against the Ministry, her complaint could be more appropriately dealt with under the grievance process of the collective agreement. In doing so, the Commission was exercising its discretionary powers under s. 34 of the Code. Ms. Therrien then filed an application for reconsideration with the Commission. In January 2007, the Registrar of the Commission, Roxanne Kalimootoo, wrote to Chris Donszelmann, counsel at the Ministry of the Attorney-General (and representing the Ministry), to inform her that the Commission had reconsidered its original decision respecting this complaint, and saw no reason to change this ruling.
(ii) The Grievances
The Union, on behalf of Ms. Therrien, filed a total of four grievances against the Ministry between November 2004 and October 2005. These grievances are now before me.
The first grievance was filed on 10 November 2004, and alleged that “the employer made me expend all of my time credits after I made a WDHP [Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Policy] complaint.” The grievance is referring to her WDHP complaint filed on 7 September 2004 against Mr. Johnson.
The second grievance, initiated on 1 December 2004, grieved that “the employer has failed to act upon information I have supplied to facilitate a medical re-assignment per the collective agreement and applicable policies.” The grievance goes to Ms. Therrien’s request to seek a new work location within the Ontario Public Service (OPS) after her encounter with Mr. Johnson in late August, based on her belief that she could no longer work at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre due to the growing hostility by her work colleagues towards her accommodation.
The third Therrien grievance, filed on 25 February 2005, stated that: “management failed to follow the WDHP Policy by not completing the investigation they started into my complaint originated on August 30, 2004.”
The fourth grievance was initiated on 20 October 2005. Ms. Therrien grieved that: “Paula Pipe, Human Resources MGS in conjunction/co-operation with Michelle Amiln, Human Resources MCSCS, failed to follow government policies with respect to my medical reassignment (relates to reassignment initiated while with Corrections).” This grievance refers to Ms. Therrien’s request to seek a new accommodation and work location in the OPS because of what she viewed to be an intolerable work atmosphere at the Detention Centre.
(iii) The Collective Agreement
The relevant provisions of the governing Collective Agreement are as follows:
Article 22.1:
It is the intent of this agreement to adjust as quickly as possible any complaints or differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contravention of this Agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable.
Article 22.10.1:
All employees covered by this Agreement have a right to freedom from harassment in the workplace because of sex by his or her Employment or agent of the Employer or by another employee. Harassment means engaging in a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.
Article 22.10.3.3:
Where it appears to the GSB that an employee who is a grievor under Article 22.10 has made a complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code relating to the conduct which is the subject of the grievance, the GSB may, as it sees fit, adjourn the grievance, stay the grievance, or dismiss the grievance.
III The Request for Full Party Standing
(i) Argument
At the opening of the hearing, Ms. Therrien, through her agent Murray Laird, requested that she should be granted the status of full party standing at this arbitration hearing. This would provide her with the ability to submit evidence, question the evidence and witnesses being presented by the Union and the Employer, and to make her own representations to me. The basis for her request was that the union was in an adversarial position to her interests, because the heart of both her four grievances and her human rights complaint against the Union and Mr. Johnson go to their discriminatory and harassing behaviour towards her. Consequently, accordingly to Mr. Laird, there has been a complete break-down in trust and responsive communication between Ms. Therrien and her bargaining agent, and the Union is not in a position to represent her fairly or dispassionately. Without the full party standing at the arbitration hearing, Ms. Therrien will be unable to preserve her important employment interests.
The Union opposed her request for full party standing. Mr. Eady for the Union argued that the Union, statutorily and contractually, has full carriage rights over all aspects of the grievance process. This includes the full right to file, advance, withdraw, settle, and to proceed to arbitration, subject to the fair representation duty and to the prevailing human rights obligations in statute. Mr. Eady acknowledged that there is presently an adversarial relationship between the Union and the grievor, but maintained that this conflict is resolvable through an adjournment in order to await the outcome of the human rights complaints process.
Mr. Parry for the Employer also opposed Ms. Therrien’s request. He submitted that there are two, and only two, parties to a collective agreement: the union and the employer, and this long-standing jurisdictional boundary is established in our present case by Article 22.1.
(ii) Ruling and Reasoning
At the hearing, I ruled orally that Ms. Therrien did not have the right to full party standing or any other sort of independent standing with respect to these grievances. I now confirm this ruling.
I am satisfied that, in law and in practice, a union operating under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act has exclusive carriage rights with respect to grievances filed under the collective agreement governing Mr. Therrien’s employment rights. This was established by the Grievance Settlement Board in Blake et al and Amalgamated Transit Union and Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority (GSB # 1276/87, 3 May 1988), where the Board found that exclusive carriage rights are necessary to allow a union to consider the larger interests of all of its members when evaluating the merits of an individual grievance: “Thus, it is important that the union which is responsible for the collective interests of the members of the bargaining unit control access to arbitration.”
This principle was recently re-affirmed in OPSEU and Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Group Grievance) (11 January 2005), where Vice-Chair Petryshen stated that: “The Grievance Settlement Board has consistently held that the Union has carriage of a grievance at arbitration and that it alone has the right to decide who will represent grievances at arbitration.”
There is much industrial relations sense in these rulings. Unions are permitted in law to evaluate the merits of individual grievances, and decide whether any particular grievance fits well with their larger interests. They are able to conserve and allocate their resources for those grievances that are either important individually, or that matter collectively. Conversely, they are able to withhold or withdraw those grievances that are too trivial, too expensive or too ill-suited to the wider objectives of the union. As well, they are able to speak with a single voice at arbitration. The result, in most cases, is a more effective and efficient grievance resolution system, which permits a union to bargain from a position of strength with the employer by processing only those grievances that matter. The benefit to the employer is that it is not expending huge amounts of resources to defend itself against unworthy grievances, and it is able to focus its attention on those industrial relations issues that the union has identified as pressing and worthy. The benefit for employees is that their grievance system is not clogged with meritless grievances that would hinder the progress of their own complaint, if accepted as worthy. For dissatisfied union members, the law provides a check against sloppy, indifferent, discriminatory or bad faith behaviour by unions in their grievance determination through the fair representation duty in labour law and through human rights statutory obligations.
Ms. Therrien and the Union have presently a strained and difficult relationship, arising out of the incidents of 30 August 2004 and Ms. Therrien’s subsequent human rights complaint against the Union. This is a subjective factor that has no meaningful bearing on the question of the union’s carriage rights at arbitration. In unique circumstances that may present themselves in some future case, there may be facts related to an objective conflict of interest between a union and an employee that are sufficiently compelling to justify the granting of separate standing for a grievor at a grievance arbitration hearing, where the continued representation of a grievor’s interests by his or her union at arbitration is utterly incompatible with natural justice and industrial relations fairness. This is not the case here. As I discuss in more detail below, there is not a strong, direct factual nexus between Ms. Therrien’s human rights complaint and the four grievances. As well, there are separate legal issues at play in the two proceedings, starting with the fact that the complaint is against the Union while the grievances allege violations of the collective agreement by the Employer. Notwithstanding the human rights complaint and the rocky nature of their present relationship, these are insufficient objective reasons to conclude that the Union cannot and should not continue to represent Ms. Therrien at these grievance arbitration hearings.
IV The Request for an Adjournment
(i) The Arguments
Mr. Eady, counsel for the Union, requested that the Board hearings into the four grievances filed on behalf of Ms. Therrien should be adjourned until her complaint against the Union has been resolved through the Ontario Human Rights Code process. The human rights complaint is focused on the events of 30 August 2004, where Ms. Therrien asserts that Mr. Johnson, the president of Local 108, acted towards her in a discriminatory fashion based on her disability and marital status. Mr. Eady stated that the Union has denied her version of the facts, and plans to defend itself vigorously, but it is now in an impossible position because the evidence that it is attacking in the human rights complaint process overlaps significantly with the evidence that it has to consider when advancing her four grievances before this Board. He noted that all four Therrien grievances have a direct nexus to the disputed events of 30 August 2004. Although the grievances are filed against the Employer, they allege that the Employer failed to take appropriate actions in the aftermath of the purported misconduct by the union. Consequently, a number of the facts that Ms. Therrien has alleged against the Union in her human rights complaints would have to be led by the Union in advancing her grievances, facts that are presently in significant dispute in the human rights process.
As such, Mr. Eady submitted, the best way of protecting the Union’s interests and Ms. Therrien’s interests before the Grievance Settlement Board would be to adjourn this hearing until the human rights complaint has been fully and finally determined.
Mr. Parry, for the Ministry, opposed the Union’s request for an adjournment for three reasons. First, there is no particular overlap with the human rights complaint process, and there is therefore no efficiency to be gained by an adjournment. While the four grievances stem from the 30 August 2004 incident, they are not about whether discrimination occurred during that incident, and the human rights process will not resolve the issues that are contested in these grievances. The Therrien grievances will have to be dealt with by this Board, regardless of the outcome of her human rights complaint. He also noted that the employer is not a party to the human rights complaint. Second, these grievances stemmed from incidents that purportedly occurred between the autumn of 2004 and the autumn of 2005. They have taken between two and three years to get to the Board. Therefore, further delay will not serve the interests of industrial relations justice. And third, given the seriousness of the allegations, it is wholly inappropriate not to proceed. Human rights issues in the workplace should receive priority in dispute decision-making. The Employer denies the validity of the grievances, but it recognizes the importance of dealing with them expeditiously. All parties have a responsibility to deal with the possibility of a poisoned workplace in as timely a fashion as possible.
Mr. Parry noted that arbitrators have been granted jurisdiction over human rights matters by the Supreme Court of Canada (Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157), and the Grievance Settlement Board is the only decision-maker that can resolve the issues in these four grievances. The Union does not want to defend itself against Ms. Therrien’s allegations in front of this forum, and wishes the benefit of testing the legal waters in the human rights process before deciding on the veracity of her grievances. These grievances should not be shelved before this Board, he maintained, because the Union cannot shirk its responsibilities just because a human rights complaint has been filed. As well, he submitted that the Employer would be prejudiced if an adjournment was granted because it would not know whether it has an issue of discrimination or harassment in the workplace on its hands.
The Employer submitted the following decisions in support of its arguments on adjournment: Graham v. Richmond School District No. 38, [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 520; Ministry of Finance and O.P.S.E.U. (Greenbank et al) (GSB # 2003-2771) (Mikus, 1 June 2005); Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services and O.P.S.E.U. (Gillis et al) (GSB # 2003-1520 et al) (Abramsky; 7 February 2005); Foothills Medical Centre and U.N.A., Local 115 (Re) (2004), 2004 CanLII 94803 (AB GAA), 136 L.A.C. (4th) 176 (Power); Bingley (Re), [2004] C.I.R.B.D. No. 32; Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157; U.F.C.W., Local 401 v. Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission, 2003 ABCA 246, [2003] A.J. No. 1030 (Alta. C.A.); Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing and A.M.A.P.C.E.O. (Charles) (GSB # 0668/01) (Abramsky; 30 July 2002); O.J. Pipelines Corp. and U.A., Local 488 (Hansen) (Re) (2001), 2001 CanLII 62166 (AB GAA), 96 L.A.C. (4th) 388 (Lucas); Ministry of Correctional Services and OPSEU (McKinnon) (GSB # 905A/92) (Gray, 28 June 1993); Geiger International and C.J.A., Local 2679 (Re) (1990), 1990 CanLII 12720 (ON LA), 10 L.A.C. (4th) 120 (O’Shea); Hamilton Spectator and S.O.N.G., Local 87 (Re) (1989), 1989 CanLII 9302 (ON LA), 8 L.A.C. (4th) 415 (Springate);
In reply, Mr. Eady maintained that it is impossible for the Union to proceed with these grievances on the basis of the grievor’s version of what happened on 30 August 2004. The Employer’s arguments for opposing the adjournment request are flawed because they do not account for the genuine conflict that the Union has been placed in. It makes no industrial relations sense to untangle the grievances in front of the Grievance Settlement Board without the benefit of the final resolution of the human rights complaint. When the potential prejudice of granting the adjournment is weighed, there is only a small degree of prejudice to the Employer, but potentially significant prejudice to the Union.
(ii) Ruling and Reasoning
This request by the Union for an adjournment presents a unique procedural issue. In their submissions, the parties were unable to point to any case-law precedents that were on all fours with the particular question raised in this case: when would it be appropriate, if ever, to grant an adjournment request by a union with respect to grievances it has filed on behalf of a grievor and union member, on the grounds that the union member has also filed a complaint through the human rights system against the union based on facts that have a nexus to the grievances?
The starting point to answering this question is the assemblage of the relevant procedural principles on arbitration adjournment, concurrent hearings, multiple forums and human rights issues. Having listened to the arguments of both counsel, and having surveyed the submitted case-law, I have identified the following principles as pertinent to addressing the particular question before this Board:
Adjournments are a general exception to the arbitral rule that grievances are to be resolved as expeditiously as possible and hearings are to proceed as speedily as possible until the matter is finally adjudicated. The requesting party bears the onus for satisfying the accepted arbitral criterion for granting an adjournment.
The authority to grant an adjournment rests within an arbitrator’s inherent powers to control and manage the arbitration hearing. This inherent power is limited only by the rules of natural justice and the express provisions in a collective agreement or a governing statute.
The arbitrator’s power to grant an adjournment is discretionary, shaped by whether it would be fair in all the circumstances. Determining the issue of fairness involves balancing whether the prejudice that an adjournment might cause to one or more of the parties is outweighed by the prejudice faced by the requesting party if an adjournment is not granted.
The length of the delay, the costs, the acquisition or preservation of evidence, the quality of notice given to the other side, the particular circumstances of the grievor, the availability of witnesses or counsel, the ability to fairly present or defend a case, the integrity of the arbitration process, and the opportunity to tailor interim remedies to offset the adverse impact of an adjournment are among the prejudicial factors that an arbitrator will consider. Real prejudice is more persuasive than possible prejudice.
As adjournments are an exception to the expeditious hearing rule, the longer that the adjournment would potentially be in effect for, the greater the onus on the party seeking the adjournment to justify the fairness of the request.
Where issues before an arbitration hearing appear to overlap with those in another legal forum, the relevant factors to be weighed by an arbitrator when considering a request for an adjournment would include:
(i) Which forum has the broader jurisdiction to resolve all of the issues at play;
(ii) Which forum is further ahead in the proceedings;
(iii) Which forum has more expertise;
(iv) The likelihood of inconsistent decisions and duplicative efforts;
(v) The degree of overlap in the issues;
(vi) The existence of human rights issues, and the particular importance attached to their efficient resolution;
(vii) The degree of prejudice to the parties; and
(viii) The impact on the efficient determination of fact-gathering and legal issues.
The onus in this case is on the Union to establish that fairness is ultimately on its side, based on the factors above, in order to grant the request for an adjournment. I bear in mind that the parties have expressly stated that collective agreement differences between the parties should be adjusted as quickly as possible: Article 22.1.
The resolution of this adjournment request has not been easy. There are compelling factors on both sides of the argument, compounded by the existence of human rights issues and the estrangement between the Union and Ms. Therrien. I have carefully considered the degree of prejudice that each side might face, and the likelihood that the GSB process is likely to finish earlier. As well, I believe that the possibility of inconsistent decisions coming from the two forums is quite small. I say this because, while the four grievances and the human rights complaint overlap, in that they stem from the original allegations of purported unlawful behaviour on 30 August 2004, they raise different issues: The Therrien human rights complaint goes to the allegations of harassment and discrimination against the union local and its president which are said to have occurred on that date; the union grievances, on the other hand, go to the purported breaches of the collective agreement by the Employer over the year following the allegations of harassment and discrimination. In my mind, the weighing of these factors leans towards the Employer’s position to deny the request for an adjournment.
Beyond these factors, however, the critical question in this preliminary matter boils down to this: is the adjudication of the four grievances dependent upon the outcome of the human rights complaint, or can they be fairly arbitrated before this Board without the final resolution of the human rights complaint? After reviewing the evidence, I have concluded that the grievances can be dealt with through the arbitration process without the final resolution of Ms. Therrien’s complaint in the human rights system. I say this for the following reasons.
The four grievances do not require a factual determination of the events of 30 August 2004 in order to be adjudicated, which is the evidentiary issue at the heart of the human rights complaint. The November 2004 grievance goes to a claim by Ms. Therrien for time credits following the initiation of her WDHP complaint. Similarly, her February 2005 grievance deals with the purported failure of the Employer to complete the WDHP investigation. Nothing significant turns on what purportedly occurred on 30 August. The December 2004 grievance and the October 2005 grievance are concerned with whether the employer has accommodated Ms. Therrien by re-assigning her to another position. The issues here appear to go to whether Ms. Therrien and the Union can establish the medical and factual foundations for the need for an accommodation, and, if so, whether the Employer has met the requirements of the accommodation duty, short of undue hardship. Again, the events of 30 August may well hover in the background, but the authoritative determination of what actually happened that day is not necessary in order to judge the worthiness of the grievances.
Had I been persuaded that the evidentiary and legal issues in the human rights complaint would be significantly influential in the determination of all, or most of, the grievances, I would have granted the adjournment request, notwithstanding the other factors which favoured the Employer’s argument. If the outcome of the grievances was sequentially dependent on the determination of the human rights complaint, then the Union would have been in an impossible, or close to impossible, representational position, and an adjournment would have been the fairest procedural option. That, however, is not the factual case here.
In deciding to deny the Union’s request for an adjournment, I am well aware that the relationship between it and the grievor is presently marked by tension and strain. This state of affairs may likely continue should the human rights complaint against the Union proceed to a hearing under the Ontario Human Rights . This is unfortunate, and I have considered this factor when assessing the merits of the adjournment request. Weighed with all of the other factors, however, it simply is not compelling enough to justify an adjournment that could turn out to be quite lengthy, given the standard progress of complaints through the Ontario human rights system. As well, there is no guarantee that the state of the relationship will be dramatically different once the human rights process has been completed, either with a settlement or with a determination going one way or the other. However, as these four grievances head towards a hearing on their merits before this Board, the Union and the grievor will no doubt reflect on the fact that it is in their respective interests to cooperate as much as possible, in order for the Union to fulfill its legal duties and its strong sense of professionalism, and for the grievor to create the best possible conditions for her grievances to succeed.
V Conclusion
The grievor, Ms. Therrien, has requested that she be granted independent or full party standing before this Board. I have decided to decline her request.
The Union has requested that the Board hearing into the four grievances filed on behalf of Ms. Therrien should be adjourned, pending the outcome of Ms. Therrien’s complaint against the Union under the Ontario Human Rights Code. It is my decision to decline this request.
The parties are requested to contact the Grievance Settlement Board to set hearing dates regarding the merits of these grievances.
Dated this 5th Day of June, 2008, in the City of Toronto, Ontario