Ontario Liquor Boards Employees’ Union (Lariviere) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Liquor Control Board of Ontario), 2001 CanLII 25778

GSB#1375/99

UNION FILE#OLB043/99

Under

Before

BETWEEN

Ontario Liquor Boards Employees’ Union

(Lariviere)

Grievor

and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario

(Liquor Control Board of Ontario)

Employer

BEFORE Daniel A. Harris Vice-Chair

FOR THE Craig Flood, Counsel

GRIEVOR Koskie Minsky

Barristers and Solicitors

FOR THE Michael G. Sherrard, Counsel

EMPLOYER Ogilvy Renault

Barristers and Solicitors

HEARING September 25, 2000 and December 4, 2000.

The Proceedings

This matter first came on for hearing on February 3, 2000 in Guelph, Ontario. At that time the parties entered into negotiations with a view to resolving or focusing the issues. The matter resumed April 28, 2000, at which time the employer raised a preliminary objection that the Board had no jurisdiction to hear the matter by operation of either the principle of res judicata or issue estoppel. An interim decision dated May 12, 2000 resolved that aspect of the proceedings.

The matter was resumed September 25, 2000 for argument on this further preliminary issue as to jurisdiction. Those arguments were completed December 4, 2000. The parties agree that this matter raises the following questions and now ask the Board to answer the first question:

1.) Does the language of the collective agreement, on its face, establish the arbitrability of a grievance concerning long-term income protection (hereafter LTIP)?

2.) Is there a patent ambiguity concerning the arbitrability of LTIP benefits?

3.) Is there a latent ambiguity concerning the arbitrability of LTIP benefits?

The Facts

The facts giving rise to the grievance are straightforward. The grievor, Mr. Lariviere was denied LTIP benefits. He filed a grievance, which sought an order confirming eligibility and directing the LCBO to provide him with LTIP benefits. The parties have resolved the grievor’s claims but none the less agreed that the legal questions set out above should be determined. They are to be commended for taking this approach. The grievance alleges a breach of article 20 of the collective agreement, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

ARTICLE 20

Employees’ Group Insurance and Medical Benefits Plans

The summaries contained in Article 20.1 through 20.5 inclusive and 20.7, are intended merely as a convenient reference to the more important terms and provisions of these benefits. The master contracts covering these plans shall be the governing documents.

20.5 Long Term Income Protection Plan (L.T.I.P)

(a) The L.T.I.P. Plan shall be continued and shall be upon the same basis as heretofore in effect.

(b) Plan Details

(i) L.T.I.P. benefits will become payable if while insured the employee becomes “totally disabled” – benefits continue during disability to age sixty-five (65), after an elimination period of six (6) months, or the expiration of accumulated attendance credits, whichever is the latter.

(ii) “Total disability” under this plan means the continuous inability as the result of illness or injury of the insured employee to perform each and every duty of normal occupation during the elimination period, and during the first twenty-four (24) months of the benefit period; and thereafter, during the balance of the benefit period, the inability to perform any and every duty of each gainful occupation for which the employee is reasonably fitted by education, training or experience.

(iii) L.T.I.P. benefits shall be sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the employee’s gross salary, earned on the last day worked, including any retroactive salary adjustment to which the employee is entitled.

(iv) While the employee is receiving L.T.I.P. benefits, the Employer will maintain the employee’s pension contribution in accordance with the OPSEU Pension Plan text.

(v) If the employee becomes disabled again while still insured for this benefit, the income benefits will be payable on completion of the elimination period however, if within three (3) months after benefits have ceased, the employee has a recurrence of a disability due to the same or a related cause, it will not be necessary to satisfy the elimination period again.

(vi) An employee in receipt of L.T.I.P. benefits who is able to resume activity on a gradual basis during recovery, partial benefits may be continued during rehabilitative employment – “rehabilitative employment” means remunerative employment while not yet fully recovered, following directly after the period of total disability for which benefits were received – when considering rehabilitative employment benefits, L.T.I.P will take into account the employee’s training, education and experience – the rehabilitative benefit will be the monthly L.T.I.P benefit less fifty percent (50%) of rehabilitative employment earnings – the benefit will continue during the rehabilitative employment period up to but not more than twenty-four (24) months – rehabilitative employment may be with the Employer or with another employer.

(vii) L.T.I.P. was optional for employees appointed up to June 30th 1971 – these employees may opt out of the L.T.I.P. plan in the future if they so desire – employees appointed July 1, 1971 and subsequently, do not have the privilege of opting out the L.T.I.P. benefit.

(viii) The L.T.I.P. benefit under (iii) will be increased for each employee who commenced to receive L.T.I.P. benefits:

(a) from and including January 1, 1981, to and including December 31, 1982, by eighty dollars ($80.00) per month;

(b) from and including January 1, 1983, to and including December 31, 1984, by sixty dollars ($60.00) per month;

(d) from and including January 1, 1987, to and including December 31, 1988 by forty dollars ($40.00) per month;

(e) from and including January 1, 1989, to and including December 31, 1990, by twenty dollars ($20.00) per month;

(f) from and including January 1, 1991, to and including December 31, 1992, by ten dollars ($10.00) per month;

In respect of each month the employee continues to receive L.T.I.P. benefits under the plan.

(ix) The L.T.I.P benefit to which an employee is entitled under (iii) and (viii) above will be reduced by the total of other disability or retirement benefits payable under any other plan toward which the Employer makes a contribution except for Workplace Safety and Insurance Benefits paid for an unrelated disability.

(d) (i) When an employee, who has been receiving L.T.I.P benefits, is able to return to full time employment the Employer may assign the employee to a vacancy which is in the same class or position as the employee’s former class or position, for which he/she is qualified.

(ii) Where there is no such position the employee may be assigned to a lower classification for which he/she is qualified, in the work area.

(iii) An employee who is assigned under this clause shall be paid at the same step he/she had attained in the salary range of the classification of the position he/she occupied prior to disability for a period of six months. At the end of that period he/she shall be paid at a rate within the salary range of the classification of the position to which he/she has been assigned.

(iv) Where there is no available position in the work area for which the employee is qualified, he/she shall be declared surplus subject to the provisions of Article 5.

(v) Where an employee does not accept an assignment under this clause he/she shall be laid off and the provisions of Article 5.7 shall not apply.

(vi) It is understood that when it is necessary to assign an employee under this section the provision of Article 21 shall not apply.

20.6 Joint Insurance and Benefit Committee

(a) The Committee shall be referred to as the Joint Insurance Benefits Review Committee.

(b)

(i) The purpose of this Committee is to facilitate communications between the Employer and the Union on the subject of Group Insurance including Basic Life Insurance, Supplementary Life Insurance, Supplementary Health & Hospitalization Insurance (including vision care), Long Tern Income Protection Insurance, Dental Plan and such other negotiated benefits as may from time to time be included in the Group Insurance Plan.

(ii) It is understood that the Group Insurance benefits to be provided to employees and the cost sharing arrangements between the Employer and its employees shall be as set out in any applicable collective agreement or arbitration award, and the matters for consideration by this Committee shall be only as set out in these terms of reference.

(c) The Committee shall be composed of an equal number of representatives from the Employer and the Union with not more than eight (8) representatives in total. At meetings of the Committee, each party may be accompanied by an actuary and/or consultant to provide technical advice and counsel.

(d) (i) The duties of the Committee shall consist of the following:

(a) development of the specifications for the public tendering of any negotiated benefits which may be included in the Group Insurance Plan (to cover the bargaining unit only);

(b) determination of the manner in which the specifications will be made available for public tendering;

(c) consideration and examination of all tenders submitted in response to the specifications for tender and preparation of a report theron;

(d) recommendation to the Government of Ontario on the selection of insurance carrier or carriers to underwrite the Group Insurance Plans;

(e) review of the semi-annual financial reports on the Group Insurance Plan; and,

(f) review of the contentious claims and recommendations thereon, when such claim problems have not been resolved through the existing administrative procedures.

(ii) The specifications for tender will describe the benefits to be provided, the cost sharing arrangement between the Employer and its employees, the past financial history of the insurance plans, the employee date, the format for the rentention illustration for each coverage and the financial reporting requirements. Tenders shall be entertained by the Committee from any individual insurance carrier acting solely on its own behalf. This shall not preclude such carrier from arranging reinsurance as may be necessary.

(iii) The basis for recommendation of an insurance carrier(s) will include the ability of the carrier(s) to underwrite the plan, compliance of the carrier’s quotation with the specifications for tender, the carrier’s service capabilities and the expected long term net cost of the benefits to be provided.

(e) (i) The Committee will also meet every six (6) months to review the financial experience under these coverages. The specifications for tender will describe the information to be included in the semi-annual financial statements to be prepared by the insurance carrier(s). These statements will include paid premiums, paid claims, changes in reserve claims, incurred claims, the retention elements of commissions, taxes, administrative expenses, contingency reserve charges and interest credits on claims and other reserves. The insurance carrier(s) will also be required to report on the level and method of administering the Employer’s and employee’s deposit accounts.

(ii) The Committee shall request the insurance carrier(s) to provide such additional information for the Committee’s consideration as may be required by either the Employer or the Union.

(iii) If the Joint Insurance Benefits Review Committee fails to agree on a recommendation to the Government of Ontario on the selection of insurance carrier(s) to underwrite the Group Insurance Plan, the members of the said Committee nominated by the Employer and the Union may each make a recommendation in writing to the Government of Ontario on the selection of the insurance carrier(s) supported by reasons for their respective recommendations.

(iv) It is understood that the Government at all times retains the right to select whatever carrier(s) (to underwrite the Group Insurance Plan) it may consider what would best serve the “public interest” and, in so doing, is under no obligation to select a carrier(s) that may be recommended by the Joint Insurance Benefits Review Committee.

The Submissions of the Parties

The employer argued that the terms of the collective agreement do not impose on it an obligation to determine eligibility of any employee to receive LTIP benefits. It is only obliged to pay the cost of premiums to obtain the necessary coverage, and there is no allegation that the employer failed to secure appropriate benefit coverage through insurance.

The employer argued that the appropriate legal framework for considering this matter has been laid down by the Ontario Court of Appeal in London Life Insurance Co. v. Dubreuil Brothers Employees Assn., a Division of IWA Canada, Local 2693 (2000), 2000 CanLII 5757 (ON CA), 49 O.R. (3d) 766 (leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed, March 15, 2001). Paragraphs 10 and 37 of the Court of Appeal’s decision read as follows:

10 On judicial review the Divisional Court approached the matter differently. It acknowledged the arbitration jurisprudence has over the years developed a well understood method of deciding the arbitrability of benefit entitlement claims. This involves determining into which of four categories the language of the particular collective agreement falls. These four categories were originally identified in Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 3rd ed. (1988) and are as follows:

where the collective agreement does not set out the benefit sought to be enforced, the claim is inarbitrable;
where the collective agreement stipulates that the employer is obliged to provide certain medical or sick pay benefits, but does not incorporate the plan into the agreement or make specific reference to it, the claim is arbitrable;
where the collective agreement only obliges the employer to pay the premiums associated with an insurance plan, the claim is inarbitrable; and
where an in insurance policy is incorporated into the collective agreement, the claim in arbitrable.

37 In the result, the decision of the Divisional Court quashing the arbitration award is correct and the appeal must be dismissed with costs including the costs of the motion seeking leave to appeal.

The employer submitted that the preamble of Article 20 is a promise to buy insurance and does not incorporate the contracts by reference. Accordingly, the essential character of this dispute is the grievor’s entitlement to LTIP benefits, which this collective agreement provides is a determination to be made by the insurance carrier. The denial of entitlement is a matter for the courts to decide at the suit of the grievor.

The employer relied on the following authorities: London Life Insurance Co. v. Dubreuil Brothers Employees Association, a Division of IWA Canada, Local 2693, (supra); Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. National Automobile Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada, 2000 CanLII 1338 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 2608 (C.A.); Re Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Burkett (1997), 1997 CanLII 1078 (ON CA), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 159 (Ont. C.A.); Re Esselte Canada Inc. v. G.C.I.U., Local 100-M (1998), 1998 CanLII 30125 (ON LA), 76 L.A.C. (4th) 32 (Nairn); Brown and Beatty, Collective Labour Arbitration, 3rd ed. (Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 1999) at ¶ 4:1400; Re Coca-Cola Bottling v. U.F.C.W. (Boud) (1994), 1994 CanLII 18671 (ON LA), 44 L.A.C. (4th) 151 (Swan); O.P.S.E.U. (Hooey) v. Ministry of Health, (November 15, 1982, GSB #348/81, unreported Weatherill, Craven, Reistetter); Re Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Alliance Employees’ Union (1998), 1998 CanLII 29993 (ON LA), 77 L.A.C. (4th) 47 (Burkett); Re Dominion Tanners and U.F.C.W., Local 832 (1996), 1996 CanLII 20324 (MB LA), 56 L.A.C. (4th) 392 (Hamilton); Re Abbott Laboratories and R.W.D.S.U. (1998), 1998 CanLII 30005 (ON LA), 74 L.A.C. (4th) 331 (R.Brown); Re SKD Co. and C.A.W. – Canada, Local 89 (Pereira) (1999), 1999 CanLII 35865 (ON LA), 82 L.A.C. (4th) 248. (Williamson); Re Renfrew (County) and O.N.A. (1995), 1995 CanLII 18385 (ON LA), 49 L.A.C. (4th) 270 (Fraser, Herbert, Pearlman)

The union argued that the issue before the Board is the extent to which the LTIP benefit language is arbitrable. The union said that the provisions of Article 20.5 are a commitment to provide the benefits listed, bringing this collective agreement within the second category set out above. The union pointed to the extensive recitation of the benefits covered as a promise to provide the benefits and an indication that the parties intended that entitlement be arbitrable. On that basis, the failure to provide the benefits is arbitrable.

Further, and in the alternative, this collective agreement has elements of category four because there is sufficient reference to the insurance documents as to incorporate them by reference and thereby render their terms arbitrable.

The Union said that the Board must be careful not to impose rigid categories upon the collective agreement. Rather, the essential character of the collective agreement is to be determined. In so doing, there are elements here of categories 2, 3, and 4, which indicates an intention to impose upon the employer enforceable promises beyond the mere payment of premiums. By way of example, the union noted that the collective agreement contains anti-discrimination provisions that may be abridged by the provisions of the insurance contracts. There was said to be a residual arbitrability that allows the Board to assure itself that the policies are in compliance with the general law, such as human rights and equality law. That is, arbitrable gaps in coverage do not stop at the benefits provided by the insurance but include a quasi-constitutional rights analysis. Therefore, whatever the answer to question one, the Board may always assess whether there are gaps in coverage. At stake are the rights of disabled workers. It is article 2.1 (b) that deals with discrimination. It reads as follows:

2.1 (b) There shall be no discrimination or harassment practised by reason of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status, or handicap as defined in the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The union also submitted that Article 20.6 supports a finding that the intention of the parties was that the employer is liable for the provision of benefits not simply the payment of premiums, since that article provides for comprehensive joint administration.

The Union relied on the following authorities: Gibbs v. Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. (1996), 1996 CanLII 187 (SCC), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 1; London (City) (Dearness Home) and London & District Service Worker’s Union, Loc. 220, Re (1991), 1991 CanLII 13303 (ON LA), 19 L.A.C. (4th) 213 (Hunter); A.E. McKenzie Co. and U.E.C.W., Loc. 832, Re (1993), 1993 CanLII 16803 (MB LA), 37 L.A.C. (4th) 129 (Hamilton); British Columbia Rapid Transit Co. and Office & Technical Employees Union, Loc. 378 Re (1989), 1989 CanLII 9254 (BC LA), 6 L.A.C. (4th) 310 (McColl); Domglass Inc. and United Glass & Ceramic Workers, Local 201, Re (1985), 1985 CanLII 5374 (AB GAA), 22 L.A.C. (3d) 355 (Beatty); ICG Utilities Greater Winnipeg Gas Co. and E.C.W.U., Loc. 681, Re (1989), 1989 CanLII 9248 (MB LA), 8 L.A.C. (4th) 289 (Freedman); Coca-Cola Bottling Ltd. and R.W.D.S.U., Loc. 1065 (Colpitts) (Re), (1998), 1998 CanLII 29984 (NB LA), 76 L.A.C. (4th) 105 (Christie); Longlac (Town) and I.W.A. – Canada, Loc. 2693 (Abernot) (re) (1999), 1999 CanLII 35836 (ON LA), 82 L.A.C. (4th) 368 (Haefling); Atlantic Packaging Products Ltd. and G.C.I.U. Loc. N-1 (Ramnarine) (Re) (1997), 1997 CanLII 25079 (ON LA), 68 L.A.C. (4th) 174 (Carrier); Oakville (Town) and C.U.P.E., Loc. 136 (Pillon) (Re) (1997), 1997 CanLII 25056 (ON LA), 68 L.A.C. (4th) 117 (O’Neill).

The employer said in reply that the cases relied on by the union dealt with gaps in the insurance coverage provided. It conceded that an allegation of a gap in coverage would be arbitrable; however, there is no gap alleged here. Also, in this matter there is no allegation of a breach of human rights or the anti-discrimination clause of the collective agreement, which would also be arbitrable. Finally, with respect to article 20.06, the employer said that the scope afforded to joint administration was very limited and did not support the argument concerning the arbitrability of benefit denial.

Reasons for Decision

Leave to appeal the decision in Dubreuil (supra) was denied by the Supreme Court of Canada on March 15, 2001. Accordingly, the four well-known and long-established categories under which benefits are provided in a collective agreement continue to give the labour-relations community a framework within which the parties are taken to operate. As submitted by the union, the categories are not hard and fast compartments into which a collective agreement must be press-fit. Rather, they are a compendious statement of how a great many collective agreements have chosen to express benefit provisions. Now, as always, the source document for determining the parties’ intentions is the collective agreement, not Brown and Beatty’s text, as helpful a tool as it is.

In Dubreuil (supra), the Court of Appeal settled the controversy engendered by Pilon v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp. (1966), 1996 CanLII 1178 (ON CA), 31 O.R. (3d) 210 by reviewing the benefit provisions of the collective agreement in light of the analytical framework of Weber v. Ontario Hydro 1995 CanLII 108 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929. The proper application of the common law led the Court of Appeal to the conclusion that the dispute in Dubreuil did not arise out of the collective agreement and was therefore beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The collective agreement and the disputes that arise from it are the core of that exclusive jurisdiction.

In Regina Police Association Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners 2000 SCC 14, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 360. Bastarache J., in paragraph 25, elaborated on the analytical approach of Weber. There are two elements to consider: the nature of the dispute, that is, its essential character, and the ambit of the collective agreement Bastarache J.’s comments are cited in Dubreuil at paragraph 21 and read as follows:

To determine whether a dispute arises out of the collective agreement, we must therefore consider two elements: the nature of the dispute and the ambit of the collective agreement. In considering the nature of the dispute, the goal is to determine its essential character. This determination must proceed on the basis of the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties, and not on the basis of how the legal issues may be framed: see Weber, supra, at para. 43. Simply, the decision-maker must determine whether, having examined the factual context of the dispute, its essential character concerns a subject matter that is covered by the collective agreement. Upon determining the essential character of the dispute, the decision-maker must examine the provisions of the collective agreement to determine whether it contemplates such factual situations. It is clear that the collective agreement need not provide for the subject matter of the dispute explicitly. If the essential character of the dispute arises either explicitly, or implicitly, from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of the collective agreement, the dispute is within the sole jurisdiction of an arbitrator to decide: see, e.g., Weber, at para. 54; New Brunswick v. O'Leary, supra, at para. 6.

It is agreed that the essential character of this dispute is the grievor’s entitlement to LTIP benefits. Is that a dispute that the parties intended to settle between themselves at arbitration? That is, does the collective agreement govern that dispute? It is important to note that I am here asked specifically to consider the plain meaning of the words of the collective agreement.

Article 20, entitled “Employees’ Group Insurance and Medical Benefits Plans”, includes the important preamble set out above and again reproduced for convenience as follows:

A “plain-meaning” parsing of that paragraph neither indicates neither that the employer is obliged to provide those benefits nor that the employer is obliged only to purchase insurance. Further, the reference to Articles 20.1 through 20.5 and 20.7 being merely convenient references “to the more important terms and provisions of these benefits” also does not speak to the obligation of the employer to either provide the benefits or purchase insurance to provide them. Also, it cannot be said that the reference to the “master contracts” plainly intends to incorporate those contracts. They are said to be the governing documents, but their status as part and parcel of the collective agreement is not clearly expressed. They are not defined with such precision as to be capable of incorporation by reference. The preamble simply sets out that the provisions that follow are the benefits that have been negotiated. It does not say how eligibility will be determined.

Article 20.5 deals directly and comprehensively with LTIP benefits. The LTIP plan is said to continue. There is no description of its form, which is neither a clear indication of its enforceability at arbitration nor incorporation by reference. The article does go on to clearly define the various benefits to be accorded covered employees. Covered employees are described as “insured” employees. Article 20.5 (b) (i) provides in part that “LTIP benefits will become payable if while insured the employee becomes ‘totally disabled’ ” and in article 20.5 (b) (ii) reference is made to the “insured employee”. These are clear indications that benefit coverage is intended to be achieved through insurance. Article 20.5 (c) also clearly requires the employer to pay “one hundred percent (100%) of the premium”. The rest of the article goes on to provide for the employer’s and employee’s rights and obligations on return to work after having received LTIP benefits.

The union relied on article 20.6 “Joint Insurance and Benefit Committee” as an expression of the parties’ intention that the employer itself is liable for the benefits promised to the members of the bargaining unit. It submitted that such a comprehensive joint administration is inconsistent with devolving entitlement questions to an outside insurance company.

Article 20.6 (b) describes LTIP benefits as negotiated benefits. However, that does not amount to a promise to provide benefits rather than purchase insurance to cover the enumerated benefits. Of particular interest is article 20.6 (b) (ii). That article bears repeating:

It is understood that the Group Insurance benefits to be provided to employees and the cost sharing arrangements between the Employer and its employees shall be as set out in any applicable collective agreement or arbitration award, and the matters for consideration by this Committee shall be only as set out in these terms of reference.

That provision is a clear expression that the “Group Insurance benefits” are as defined in the collective agreement.¹ There is no reference here to any master contracts, or incorporation of contracts by reference. That is, the agreement sets out a list of benefits to be provided by “Group Insurance”. The subsequent provisions lay down a comprehensive joint procedure for obtaining the “Group Insurance” being the purchase of insurance to provide the benefits set out in the “collective agreement or arbitration award.”

In my view, taken as a whole, the language of article 20, on its plain meaning, indicates an intention by the parties that specific enumerated LTIP benefits will be provided to eligible members of the bargaining unit by means of insurance. That is the ambit of this collective agreement. The ambit does not include an obligation by the employer to directly provide those benefits nor does the collective agreement incorporate the insurance contracts by reference. It would require clear language to do so and that language is absent. Indeed the language of Article 20.6 is completely consistent with, and indicative of, an intention to create contracts of insurance that are distant from the collective agreement. It is the Government of Ontario that ultimately selects the carrier. It is free to ignore the recommendation of the Joint Committee if it is in the “public interest” to do so.

The present dispute over the grievor’s denial of entitlement is not within the ambit of the collective agreement. The union has expressed other concerns, examples and situations such as potential human rights violations. Those are different disputes with different facts and essential characters that may or may not fall within the ambit of the collective agreement and the exclusive jurisdiction of this Board. In such cases the issue would be whether the employer has purchased a lawful insurance policy that covers the enumerated benefits. That is, whether or not there is a gap between the insurance obtained and all of the promises of the collective agreement, considered within the context of the general law. In this case there is no allegation that there is a gap between the insurance purchased and the benefits promised by the collective agreement. If the employer fails to purchase the insurance necessary to provide for the benefits negotiated in the collective agreement, that failure would be arbitrable. In my view, this is an example of Brown & Beatty’s third category.

The Decision

The employer’s obligation is to pay the premiums associated with an insurance plan for defined benefits. The language, on its face, does not establish the arbitrability of a grievance concerning eligibility for long-term income protection.

Dated at Toronto, this 10th day of April, 2001.

Footnotes

There is also a reference to benefits set out in an arbitration award. I take that as the potential for an interest arbitration award, in view of this Board’s exclusive jurisdiction over rights matters and the standard prohibition contained in Article 27.10 against altering, modifying or amending the collective agreement.