2025 ONFST 6
FST File No. I1074-2024
FST File No. I1074-2024
FINANCIAL SERVICES TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER OF the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, as amended (the “Act”), in particular sections 392.4 and 407.1;
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Notice of Proposal to Refuse to Renew Licence dated November 4th, 2024 issued by the Director, Licencing by delegated authority from the Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services Regulatory Authority;
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Request for Hearing in accordance with subsection 407.1(2) and 407.1(3) of the Act.
B E T W E E N:
ISHAAN AHUJA
RESPONDING PARTY (APPLICANT)
and
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER of the FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY
MOVING PARTY (RESPONDENT)
Decision and Reasons on Motion for Stay (Hearing Videoconference held on June 12, 2025)
BEFORE:
Panel Chair: Mr. Paul Farley, Vice-Chair, Financial Services Tribunal
Panel Member: Mr. Ian McSweeney, Chair, Financial Services Tribunal
Panel Member: Mr. Martin Guest, Member, Financial Services Tribunal
APPEARANCES:
The parties were represented as follows:
Moving Party (Respondent) – Ms. Jillian Siskind and Ms. Nicolle Pace, Counsel, Siskind Doyle LLP for the CEO of FSRA
Responding Party (Applicant) – Ms. Jacqueline Houston, Counsel, Adair Goldblatt Bieber for Ishaan Ahuja
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2024, the Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (“FSRA”) issued a Notice of Proposal (“NOP”) to “…refuse to renew the insurance agent licence issued to Ishaan Ahuja.” Mr. Ahuja filed a Request for Hearing within the time allowed by Statute.
The hearing took place before Paul Farley, Vice Chair of the Tribunal, over three days, March 13, 14 and 19, 2025.
On April 11, 2025, the Tribunal issued a decision requiring the CEO of FSRA to issue licences to Mr. Ahuja on conditions. The order required that:
- The Respondent withdraw the Notice of Proposal dated November 4, 2024, and issue a Life Insurance and Accident and Sickness Licence and a General Agent Licence to Mr. Ahuja subject to the following conditions.
a. Mr. Ahuja will be subject to close supervision by his sponsoring firm, Co-Operators Life and Co-Operators General Insurance companies for a period of one year from the date his Life Insurance and Accident and Sickness Licence and General Agent Licence are issued. During this period Mr. Ahuja will not supervise other insurance agents.
b. The sponsoring firm will appoint a supervisor, satisfactory to FSRA, who will prepare and submit to FSRA, on a quarterly basis, confirmation that all insurance activities carried out by Mr. Ahuja, including client interactions and policies applied for and issued through the involvement of Mr. Ahuja, have been supervised and that there have been no complaints or, in the alternative if there have been complaints, the nature of the complaints received.
c. Mr. Ahuja will pay a monetary penalty in the amount of $10,000 within sixty days of the date of this decision. A licence will not be issued until the monetary penalty is paid.
The order further provided that, if the Parties were unable to agree on an appropriate supervisor, they may contact the Registrar who will arrange a date for the Tribunal to hear submissions on the matter.
On May 12, 2025, FSRA filed with the Divisional Court, a Notice of Appeal asking that the decision and order of the Tribunal made April 11, 2025, be set aside and that FSRA be ordered to carry out its Notice of Proposal to refuse the insurance agent license of Mr. Ahuja. The appeal is scheduled to be heard October 8, 2025.
On May 22, 2025, FSRA filed with the Registrar of the Tribunal a Notice of Motion for a stay of the order of the Tribunal pending the outcome of the appeal before the Divisional Court.
On May 28, 2025, on agreement of the Parties, the Tribunal ordered that the decision and order of the Tribunal requiring a licence be issued to Mr. Ahuja on conditions be stayed on an interim basis pending a final decision on the Motion for Stay.
The Motion for Stay was heard by the Tribunal on June 12, 2025. After hearing the submissions of the Parties on the Motion for Stay, the Tribunal has determined that it is appropriate, in all the circumstances of this case, to order a stay of the decision and order of the Tribunal made April 11, 2025, until the conclusion of the appeal before the Divisional Court. Our reasons follow.
II. Analysis
The Parties agree that, in deciding whether a stay pending appeal should be granted, the Tribunal should adopt the three-part test set out in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)1. Although RJR MacDonald was a Charter of Rights and Freedoms case (and this case is not) the court noted that the principles set out in RJR MacDonald apply to applications for stays in both private law and Charter cases.2
The three-part test set out in RJR MacDonald requires the applicant for a stay to demonstrate (i) a serious question to be tried, (ii) that irreparable harm will result if the relief is not granted, and (iii) the balance of inconvenience to the parties. All of these criteria must be met to satisfy the test.
(i) a serious question to be tried
Whether there is a serious question to be tried will be based on “…common sense and an extremely limited review of the case on the merits.”3 “Unless the case on the merits is frivolous or vexatious…a judge on a motion for relief must, as a general rule, consider the second and third stages…”4
In determining this first question the Tribunal is not entitled to review the decision of the Tribunal in the first instance as if sitting on appeal of that decision. We are not entitled to decide the grounds of appeal advanced by FSRA before the Divisional Court.
Mr. Ahuja argues that the appeal brought by FSRA is “frivolous” because “…it is devoid of merit or has little prospect of success…”. Mr. Ahuja further argues that the appeal is vexatious because “…it is intended to annoy or embarrass the respondent…”.
In reviewing the grounds of appeal, however, we cannot conclude that the appeal is devoid of merit or that it is frivolous. There is no evidence that the appeal is intended to annoy or embarrass Mr. Ahuja.
We conclude that there is a serious issue raised in the appeal. This leads us to the second and third parts of the test.
(ii) Irreparable harm if the relief is not granted
Both Parties argue that irreparable harm will result to them if a stay is not granted. Mr. Ahuja argues that it is the Party seeking the stay that must demonstrate irreparable harm and that FSRA has failed to do so.
FSRA, submits that, as a public authority, the onus on FSRA of demonstrating irreparable harm is less than that of a private litigant. Justices Sopinka and Cory, writing for the Court in RJR MacDonald, stated: “…in the case of public authority, the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public interest is lower than that of the private litigant; the test will nearly always be satisfied simply upon proof that the authority is charged with the duty of promoting the public interest and upon some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation or activity was undertaken pursuant to that responsibility.5
There is no question that FSRA is charged with promoting the public interest. There is also no question that the activity undertaken by FSRA (the issuance of a Notice of Proposal to refuse a licence) was undertaken pursuant to its responsibility to promote the public interest and to protect the integrity of its process to determine suitability for licensing.
It is important, we believe, not to lose sight of the fact that Mr. Ahuja has not been found to be blameless with respect to the facts set out in the Notice of Proposal. The hearing Tribunal determined that there was significant misconduct on the part of Mr. Ahuja that required the imposition of a fine and conditions as the basis for protecting the public after ordering the issuance of a licence.
We conclude that the facts here support the finding that FSRA has established irreparable harm within the meaning ascribed to that term in RJR MacDonald should a stay not be granted.
(iii) the balance of inconvenience to the parties
When considering the balance of inconvenience in the context of irreparable harm, if a stay is not granted FSRA will be required to carry out the terms of the order of the Tribunal issued on April 11, 2025. The inconvenience to FSRA lies in the fact that FSRA will be required to issue a licence to a person that FSRA believes to be unsuitable where the decision finding that person to be suitable (on conditions) is being challenged, all within the context of FSRA’s legislated mandate to protect the public interest.
The Appeal is scheduled for October 8, 2025. The inconvenience to Mr. Ahuja if a stay is granted is primarily in the lost ability to sell insurance for a further three and one-half months, and the attendant loss of income. In considering the degree of inconvenience to Mr. Ahuja it is relevant to consider that, in argument before the hearing Tribunal, counsel for Mr. Ahuja submitted that an alternative to refusal to issue a licence would be a licence suspension. While suspension for three and one-half months is an inconvenience to Mr. Ahuja, in our view, the balance of inconvenience tips towards FSRA, primarily because of its legislated mandate to protect the public.
The fact that Mr. Ahuja has been without a licence since February of 2024 does not affect our decision on whether a stay should be granted. In deciding whether a stay should be granted the Tribunal considers forward-looking inconvenience or harm.
Finally, we do not accept Mr. Ahuja’s arguments that the reputational damage of the Notice of Proposal being available on FSRA’s website results in irreparable harm to Mr. Ahuja causing the balance of inconvenience on this stay Motion to move toward Mr. Ahuja. Regardless of our decision with respect to a stay, the publication of the Notice of Proposal on the FSRA website will not be affected. In addition, the decision of the Tribunal issued April 11, 2025, sets out in considerable detail findings of fact with respect to Mr. Ahuja’s misconduct. This is a published decision which is available online which is likely to have far more impact than unproven allegations set out in a Notice of Proposal on the regulator’s website.
We have concluded that it is in the interests of justice to grant a stay for the short period of three and one-half months until the Divisional Court can hear the appeal.
III. Costs
Both Parties have asked for costs.
The circumstances under which the Tribunal can order costs are constrained by the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Tribunal.6 In this case the conduct of neither Party has been unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious. Neither Party has acted in bad faith or engaged in conduct that constitutes an abuse of the Tribunal process.
There will, therefore, be no Order as to costs.
IV. Order
- IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: the decision of Vice-Chair Paul Farley released April 11, 2025, is stayed pending the hearing of the appeal to the Divisional Court.
Dated at Toronto, this 18th day of June, 2025.
Paul Farley
Ian McSweeney
Martin Guest
Footnotes
- 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311
- Ibid., para. 82
- Ibid., para. 54
- Ibid., para. 56
- Ibid., para. 76
- Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 41.01

