Citation: Razavi-Ebrahimi v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2016 ONFST 6 Decision No. I0569-2014-1 Date: 2016/03/15

IN THE MATTER OF the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, as amended (the “Act”), in particular sections 441.1, 441.2 and 441.3;

AND IN THE MATTER OF a Notice of Proposal to Impose an Administrative Monetary Penalty against Minoo Razavi-Ebrahimi dated July 25, 2014 issued by the Superintendent of Financial Services;

AND IN THE MATTER OF a Hearing in accordance with subsection 441.3(5) of the Act.

and

BEFORE:

Ian McSweeney Chair of the Panel and Member of the Tribunal

Florence A. Holden Member of the Panel and Chair (Acting) of the Tribunal

Jill Wagman Member of the Panel and Member of the Tribunal

For the Applicant – Minoo Razavi-Ebrahimi (self-represented)

For the Superintendent of Financial Services – Douglas Lee, Counsel

DATE HEARD: February 2, 2016

1The Applicant in this matter, Minoo Razavi-Ebrahimi (“Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi”) has been licensed to carry on business as a life, accident and sickness insurance agent since October 20, 2000. Her most recent renewal was for the period October 20, 2012 to October 19, 2014, following which her licence expired without further renewal. On July 25, 2014, the Superintendent of Financial Services (the “Superintendent”) issued a Notice of Proposal (the “NOP”), which proposes to impose an Administrative Monetary Penalty (“AMP”) of $1,000 on Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi for failing to fulfil her statutory obligation to give the Superintendent requested information about her activities related to the business of insurance pursuant to subsection 442.3(1)(4) of the Act. Specifically, the proposed AMP relates to Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s failure to respond, despite repeated requests from the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”), to a mandatory online market conduct questionnaire (the “Questionnaire”) of licensed insurance agents conducted by the Superintendent in 2013.

2The Applicant filed a Request for Hearing within the prescribed period of time and, following a pre-hearing conference held on June 19, 2015 and July 6, 2015, this Tribunal convened on February 2, 2016 to hear the matter.

3Having heard the evidence of the Superintendent and the Applicant, we direct the Superintendent, pursuant to subsection 441.3(6) of the Act, to carry out his proposal for an AMP of $1,000 without changes. The reasons for our decision follow:

II. BACKGROUND

4Effective January 1, 2013 AMPs were introduced under the Act to allow FSCO, as regulator, to address contraventions in the law more efficiently, to promote compliance and to prevent financial benefit to violators. AMPs can be imposed for breaches of orders, undertakings and licence conditions, as well as for contraventions of statutory provisions. The Superintendent’s powers to use AMPs were publically communicated to the insurance industry.

5There have now been a number of cases before the Financial Services Tribunal (“FST”) in respect of various alleged contraventions under Section 442.1 of the Act by insurance agents and related impositions of AMPs.

6This case is one of many similar fact cases before the Tribunal relating to the failure of selected insurance agents to respond to the Questionnaire despite repeated reminders and deadline extensions. The Questionnaire was sent by e-mail to a random selection of life insurance agents in October 2013. In a sample e-mail provided to this panel, recipients were advised that the on-line survey was mandatory and that failure to respond could result in regulatory action. Two distinct links were provided for online completion of the Questionnaire.

7Helpful background on the development, purpose and communication of the Questionnaire was entered as evidence before us in an affidavit of Ms. Elena Schneider, a Regulatory Discipline Officer of the Licensing and Market Conduct Division (“LMCD”) of FSCO. Details in this respect have been clearly described in several previous decisions of this Tribunal. One of FSCO’s prime purposes in the regulation of the insurance industry is to “provide regulatory services that protect the public interest and enhance public confidence in the regulated sectors”.¹ The purpose of the Questionnaire was to assist FSCO and the insurance industry, using evidence-based results, in assessing the process insurance agents used in making recommendations and selling life insurance policies and products at the point of sale.² The Questionnaire was meant to assist the Superintendent in fulfilling FSCO’s legislated obligations to the public, through the development of a comprehensive regulatory approach that would formulate and promote best practices on product suitability of life insurance products.

8As noted in Sarai v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 35 (at para 4), a useful summary of cases decided by the FST in 2015 stemming from the Questionnaire can be found in, Sotoudeh v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 34 (“Sotoudeh”).

III. THE ISSUES

9The following three issues were before the Tribunal at the hearing for determination:

a. Did Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi fail to provide the Superintendent with the information requested via the Questionnaire initially sent on October 15, 2013, contrary to subsection 442.3(1)(4) of the Act?

b. Is the imposition of the proposed AMP appropriate to serve one or both of the purposes set out in subsection 441.2(1) of the Act?

c. What is the appropriate amount of the AMP, taking into account the criteria contained in subsection 4(2) of Ontario Regulation 408/12?

IV. THE FACTS

10The parties did not file an Agreed Statement of Facts. An Agreed Book of Documents was filed on the consent of the parties at the hearing. Based on all of the evidence presented at the hearing, including the testimony of Elena Schneider and the Applicant, we find the following key facts:

a. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi has been licensed under the Act to carry on business as a life, accident and sickness insurance agent since October 20, 2000. Her most recent renewal was for the period October 20, 2012 to October 19, 2014, following which her licence (“licence”) expired without further renewal. At all material times, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi held this licence. According to Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s evidence, during the period of her last licence renewal, she did not meet with clients regarding their insurance needs, nor did she provide advice to clients resulting in their completion of applications for life insurance products on which she could have earned commissions. In short, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi was not actively engaged in the insurance business and earned no income therefrom during the period.

b. In an effort to accumulate information from the insurance industry about the process that life insurance agents use when making recommendations to clients about life insurance products, the Superintendent formulated the Questionnaire to be directed to a large, randomly selected sample of insurance agents.

c. The Questionnaire itself indicated that it would take about 30 minutes to complete.

d. On September 27, 2013, the Superintendent sent an email to all licensed agents, including Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi, informing them that FSCO would be launching the online Questionnaire on October 15, 2013, and that they may be selected as part of the sample to complete it. Agents were informed that selected agents would be notified via email and that, if selected, completion of the Questionnaire was mandatory and that failure to respond could result in regulatory action.

e. The September 27, 2013 email, and all of the emails and the registered letters described below, were sent to Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi using her email address or mailing address, as the case may be, as such addresses appeared in her most recent licence application and as reflected in FSCO’s licensing records applicable to her. No updated email address was received by FSCO prior to the closing of the Questionnaire.

f. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi was randomly selected to complete the Questionnaire and FSCO sent several communications in an effort to get her to respond. Those communications, and Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s responses thereto, were as follows:

i. Initial Email requesting completion of the Questionnaire. This email was sent by FSCO on October 15, 2013 to Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi and other selected agents informing them that they had been selected to complete the online Questionnaire. The email included an internet link to the Questionnaire, stated that the deadline for completion was November 15, 2013, and advised that responding to the Questionnaire was mandatory pursuant to sections 442.1 and 442.3 of the Act. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi did not respond.

ii. Two reminder e-mails before the November 15, 2013 deadline. Two reminder emails were sent by FSCO on October 28, 2013 and November 4, 2013, reminding Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi of the Superintendent’s request to complete the mandatory Questionnaire and the November 15, 2013 deadline for so doing. These reminder emails also included the internet link to the Questionnaire. Again, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi did not respond. Both reminders advised that failure to respond could result in regulatory action.

iii. Third reminder email sent after the November 15, 2013 deadline passed extending the deadline. A third reminder email was sent by FSCO on November 18, 2013, reminding Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi that the mandatory Questionnaire had been due by November 15, 2013 and advising that FSCO had received no response from her. The email indicated that, as result, the Questionnaire deadline had been extended to November 19, 2013 and warned that if no response was received by that date, regulatory action may be taken. Again, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi did not respond.

g. On December 2, 2013, FSCO sent a registered letter to Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi to her last known mailing address according to FSCO’s records. This letter recapped the purpose of the Questionnaire, the fact that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi was selected to respond to the Questionnaire, that several emails reminding her to complete the Questionnaire had previously been sent to her by FSCO, that to date FSCO had not received any response from her, nor had the online Questionnaire been completed. The registered letter reiterated that completion of the Questionnaire was mandatory under the Act and advised Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi that the Superintendent was considering the imposition of a penalty, subject to her providing an explanation regarding her previous failures to respond. A response to the registered letter by December 17, 2013 was requested.

h. In response to the registered letter, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi sent an email to FSCO on December 5, 2013. In her email, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi states that she had previously completed a survey required by her employer, World Financial Group Canada (“WFG”), and that she had been under the impression that WFG’s survey was the same as the Superintendent’s Questionnaire. In the email, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi apologized for the “mix-up” and advised that she looked forward to completing the Questionnaire.

i. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi sent a second email to FSCO on January 6, 2014. In this second email she inquired as to whether FSCO had received her December 5, 2013 email and again apologized for missing the Questionnaire deadline. She indicated that it had been a mistake and stated that she “was not in a very good mindset and very much relied on my company’s instructions, since I was involved with the lost (sic) of my family member in an accident”.

j. At the time of the Superintendent’s December 2, 2013 registered letter and Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s subsequent emails, the extended November 19, 2013 deadline for responding to the online Questionnaire had passed and had not been further extended by the Superintendent.

k. On March 10, 2014, FSCO sent a second registered letter to Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi at the same mailing address in FSCO’s records. This letter again recapped the purpose of the Questionnaire, reviewed the prior emails and other correspondence and advised Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi that her response (and explanation) to FSCO’s December 2, 2013 registered letter had been received and considered. FSCO further advised Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi in this second registered letter that, as a result, she was being provided with another opportunity to complete the Questionnaire, with a response deadline of March 26, 2014. This second registered letter was subsequently returned to FSCO as “unclaimed”.

l. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s evidence is that when she received no reply from FSCO to her December 5, 2013 email, she followed up with her January 6, 2014 email to ask whether the December 5th email had been received and to enquire about the Questionnaire. On February 24, 2014, not having heard anything further from FSCO, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi travelled to a remote area of Iran (Kahnuj County, Kerman Province) to care for her ailing mother, where she remained until returning to Canada on May 15, 2014. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi testified that she lived alone and that during her stay in Iran, she had arranged for her children to periodically “check” her mail, although they were not living at her residence and were not authorized to open any mail she received. Apparently, the March 10, 2014 registered letter from FSCO did not arrive while anyone was at Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s residence and any notification that may have been left was not responded to. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s evidence is that FSCO sent her a March 24, 2014 email reminding her about the new March 26, 2014 Questionnaire deadline. However, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi testified that she did not have access to the internet while in Iran and that she only discovered the email upon her return to Canada. A copy of this email was not introduced into evidence by either party.

m. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi did not complete the Questionnaire before the March 26, 2014 deadline and thereafter the Questionnaire was closed.

n. On July 25, 2014 the Superintendent issued the NOP to Ms. Minoo Razavi-Ebrahimi for failing to comply with her obligation under subsection 442.3(1)(4) of the Act to provide the Superintendent with the requested information regarding her insurance business activities.

o. On August 8, 2014 Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi filed a Request for Hearing.

V. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS

11In previous cases this Tribunal has observed that life insurance agents have voluntarily chosen to participate in a business that requires a licence and have thereby agreed to subject themselves to a regulatory regime under which the Superintendent must, in the course of discharging his regulatory functions, be able to question agents and insurers with respect to their business activities.

a. Issue 1: Contravention - Did Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi fail to provide the Superintendent with the information requested via the Questionnaire initially sent on October 15, 2013, contrary to subsection 442.3(1)(4) of the Act?

12In Sarai³, the Tribunal pointed to the succinct summary of the applicable statutory framework in similar cases relating to contravention set out in Sotoudeh, as follows:

“The 2013 Life Insurance Agent Questionnaire was prepared and administered in conformity with the discretionary powers conferred upon the Superintendent by section 442.1 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8. Subsection 442.1(1) allows the Superintendent or a person designated by the Superintendent to “direct an inquiry” to various entities and individuals, including licensed life insurance agents, about their acts and practices or about such matters as may be specified by the Superintendent.

Once an inquiry has been made within the meaning of subsection 442.1(1), a statutory duty is triggered; the entity or individual to whom the request for information has been directed must respond. This duty is recognized in two distinct provisions. The first is subsection 442.1(5), which reads as follows: “A person to whom an inquiry is directed shall answer promptly, explicitly and completely and shall do so in the manner and within the period specified by the Superintendent or the designate.” The second source for the duty to respond is subsection 442.3(1). Summarized for present purposes, this provision requires a person who holds a licence under the Insurance Act to give “full information” about activities related to the business of this person, upon the request of the Superintendent or a person designated by the Superintendent.”

13Based on the facts of this case, it is clear that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi failed to comply with her statutory duty imposed under subsections 442.1(5) and 442.3(1) of the Act. Following the initial inquiry sent to her on October 15, 2013, she was given a number of reminders via emails and registered letters, along with two extensions (February 19, 2014 and March 26, 2014) to the original Questionnaire response deadline of November 15, 2013. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi did not respond “promptly, explicitly and completely” as is specified in the Superintendent’s request for information. As such, we find that the answer to the question posed under the first issue is “yes”, the Applicant did contravene subsection 442.3(1)(4) of the Act.

b. Issue 2: The Appropriateness of a General AMP - Is the imposition of the proposed AMP appropriate to serve one or both of the purposes set out in subsection 441.2(1) of the Act?

14Subsection 441.2 authorizes the Superintendent to impose a general AMP under section 441.3, either to promote compliance with the requirements established under the Act or to prevent a person from deriving, directly or indirectly, any economic benefit as a result of contravening or failing to comply with a requirement established under the Act. Section 441.5 of the Act establishes maximum penalty amounts, subject to the lesser maximum amounts and criteria prescribed under Ontario Regulation 408/12 (sections 3 and 4 respectively) and Schedule 1 (items 44.1 and 44.2). Provided that a monetary fine would promote at least one of the two statutory objectives listed in subsection 441.2(1), a general AMP would be an appropriate response for the Applicant’s contravention. So, the question for determination by the Tribunal on this issue is, would a penalty promote compliance with requirements established under the Act and/or prevent Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi from deriving an economic benefit from her non-compliance?

15The case law dealing with the Questionnaire recognizes that there may be special circumstances in which it would be inappropriate to impose a general AMP on someone who has failed to comply with an inquiry – i.e., Sengmanee v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 27 at paras. 22-29. In this case, however, there is no evidence of any unusual or rare circumstance that would support a finding that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi should be absolved of her contravention without imposition of a general AMP. Rather, on this point, the Applicant’s case is virtually identical to the precedents in which the Tribunal has found that a general AMP promotes compliance with the statutory duty imposed by subsection 442.1(5) and 442.3(1) of the Act.⁴

16Accordingly, we find that the answer to the question posed under the second issue is “yes”. Even though the Applicant did not derive any economic benefit from her contravention, a general AMP would encourage her to fulfill her statutory obligations, and it would also send a clear message regarding the importance of compliance to other licensees to whom a request for information may be directed in the future.

c. Issue 3: The Amount of the Penalty - What is the appropriate amount of the AMP, taking into account the criteria contained in subsection 4(2) of Ontario Regulation 408/12?

17In determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed upon the Applicant up to the prescribed maximum, the Tribunal must consider the following five criteria listed in section 4(2) of Ontario Regulation 408/12:

a. The degree to which the contravention or failure was intentional, reckless or negligent.

b. The extent of the harm or potential harm to others resulting from the contravention or failure.

c. The extent to which the person or entity tried to mitigate any loss or to take any other remedial action.

d. The extent to which the person or entity derived or reasonably might have expected to derive, directly or indirectly, any economic benefit from the contravention or failure.

e. Any other contraventions or failures to comply with a requirement established under the Act or any other financial services legislation of Ontario or with any jurisdiction during the preceding five years by the person.

18Having reviewed the evidence, we make the following findings with respect to the application of the relevant criteria to the circumstances of this case:

a. To what degree was Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s contravention of the Act intentional, reckless or negligent? We find that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi was negligent, bordering on reckless, in failing to respond to the Superintendent with respect to the inquiry directed to her, in the manner and within the specified timeframe. We have reached this conclusion after considering Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s testimony and other evidence, including her December 5, 2013 and January 6, 2014 emails responding to FSCO’s December 2, 2013 registered letter requesting an explanation for her failure to respond to FSCO’s initial email and reminders. In her emails, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi apologizes for the “mix-up” and acknowledges her “mistake”. Rather than respond to FSCO’s initial and reminder emails regarding the Questionnaire, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi chose to ask her employer, WFG, what to do and erroneously concluded that she need not respond based on her completion of an internal survey for WFG. Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s inquiry within WFG was directed at an administrative assistant, rather than her immediate supervisor, and that she relied on the response of that administrative assistant, rather than attempting to obtain confirmation from her supervisor. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi testified that she clearly knew the difference between FSCO (the regulator) and WFG (her employer) in the context of the Questionnaire inquiry. We find Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s conduct in this regard to be negligent.

Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi was given a final chance to respond to the Questionnaire and was notified of the March 26, 2014 deadline extension by a registered letter sent by FSCO on March 10, 2014 and, according to her testimony, a March 24, 2014 reminder email from FSCO. Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s explanation for not responding in time to this extension was that when FSCO did not reply to her December 5, 2013 and January 6, 2014 emails, she assumed the matter was resolved. She left the country on February 24, 2014 to care for her ailing mother in Iran without making any further contact with FSCO, leaving instructions with her adult children (who did not live with her) to periodically check (but not open) her mail. The result was FSCO’s March 10, 2014 registered letter was returned to FSCO marked “unclaimed”. In addition, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi testified that, due to her remote location in Iran, she did not check her emails while away. We also find that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s conduct in this regard to be careless and negligent in the circumstances.

Given Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s emails once she realized her mistake and her forthrightness, we would not go so far as to describe her contravention of the Act as “intentional”. However, we do find that her assumption that the matter had been resolved when she had not heard back from FSCO in January/February 2014 was unreasonable and that her behaviour in leaving the country without confirming the status of her case with FSCO prior to departure, combined with the inadequate arrangements she made for checking her mail and email, was negligent and borders on reckless. As a result, this case is not clearly distinguishable from many precedents in which the licensee was found to have a higher degree of moral culpability justifying the amount of the AMP proposed by the Superintendent: see Notta, supra at para. 30(a) (“reckless or negligent”); Pirapakaran, supra at para. 29 (“intentional, negligent and egregious”); Qin, supra at para. 20(a) (“reckless or negligent”); Weaver, supra at para. 19(a) (“intentional”); Lubay, supra at para. 18(a) (“intentional”); Groeblacher, supra at para. 20(a) (“intentional”); and Sekhon, supra at para. 21(a) (“negligent or, more likely, reckless”).

b. To what extent did Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s contravention of the Act cause harm or potential harm to others? We accept that, while Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi was a licensed insurance agent throughout the relevant period, she was not actively engaged in the business. While the evidence does not disclose any direct or potential harm to clients, we find that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi’s contravention did cause harm or potential harm to the Superintendent, the insurance industry and the general public. As noted in many precedents dealing with the Questionnaire, a licensee’s failure to respond to an official request for information entails indirect costs for FSCO, the regulated sectors and the public in general: see Notta, supra at para. 30(b); Molenda, supra at para. 25(b); Qin, supra at para. 20(b); Weaver, supra at para. 19(b); Lubay, supra at para. 18(b); Groeblacher, supra at para. 20(b); and Sekhon, supra at para. 21(b).

c. To what extent did Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi take any remedial action? As described in paragraph 18a. above, while the Applicant took some steps to mitigate the indirect harm identified in paragraph 18b.,by acknowledging her failure to complete the online Questionnaire and ask for another opportunity to submit the requested information, her subsequent actions of leaving the country without further contact with FSCO and her failure to make adequate arrangements to ensure reasonable monitoring of her mail and email during her absence, resulted in expiry of the final deadline extension without her completion of the Questionnaire. As such, through Ms.Razavi-Ebrahimi’s own actions/omissions, she precluded herself from any potential to mitigate following completion of FSCO’s review of her explanation for not responding to the initial information request and reminders. While we have no reason to doubt that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi would have completed the Questionnaire by the March 26, 2014 extended deadline had she been aware of it, the fault for being unable to do so is clearly her own.

d. To what extent did Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi derive any economic benefit from her contravention of the Act? Counsel for the Superintendent submitted that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi obtained, at most, a minor economic benefit. In our view the evidence does not support that she received any economic benefit from her contravention of the Act. In keeping with the relevant precedents, we find that Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi did not derive any financial benefit from her failure to complete the 2013 Questionnaire, in the manner and within the timeframe specified by the Superintendent: see Notta, supra at para. 30(d) (“no economic benefit”); Pirapakaran, supra at para. 32 (“no financial benefit”); Qin, supra at para. 20(d) (“no economic benefit”); Weaver, supra at para. 19(d) (“no evidence [of] an economic benefit”); Lubay, supra at para. 18(d) (“no evidence [of] an economic benefit”); Groeblacher, supra at para. 20(d) (“no evidence [of] an economic benefit”); and Sekhon, supra at para. 21(d) (“no economic benefit”).

e. Has Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi committed any other contraventions of the Act during the previous five years? This criterion has no application in this case. There was no suggestion that the Applicant has, in the past, failed to comply with any other requirement under the Act or with any other financial services legislation.

19Based on these findings, we find no reason to interfere with the Superintendent’s proposal in this matter.

VI. ORDER

20We hereby order the Superintendent to carry out his proposal and impose an administrative monetary penalty in the amount of $1000 as against the Applicant, Ms. Razavi-Ebrahimi.

Dated at Toronto, this 15th day of March, 2016.

“Ian McSweeney” Ian McSweeney

“Florence A. Holden” Florence A. Holden

“Jill Wagman” Jill Wagman

Footnotes

Financial Services Commission of Ontario Act, 1997, section 3(a)
Qin v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 22
Sarai v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 35, para. 11.
See Notta v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 2 at para. 23; Molenda v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 18 at para. 17; Pirapakaran v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 20 at paras. 25-26; Qin, supra at para. 16; Weaver v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 23 at para. 15; Lubay v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 25 at para. 14; Groeblacher v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 30 para. 16; and Sekhon v. Ontario (Superintendent Financial Services), 2015 ONFST 32 at para. 17.