Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2017 ONFSCDRS 18

FSCO A15-007003

BETWEEN:

FUZAIL AHMED Applicant

and

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY Insurer

DECISION ON A PRELIMINARY ISSUE

Before: Arbitrator Benjamin M. Drory

Heard: By written submissions completed November 4, 2016

Appearances: Mr. Shahen Alexanian for Mr. Fuzail Ahmed Ms. Paige Schubert for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Issues:

The Applicant, Mr. Fuzail Ahmed, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on May 2, 2013 and sought accident benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), payable under the Schedule.¹ The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation and Mr. Ahmed, through his representative, applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”) under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, as amended.

The issues in this Preliminary Issue Hearing are:

1. Is Mr. Ahmed’s Application for Arbitration barred for failure to mediate pursuant to s. 281(2) of the Insurance Act?

2. Is either party entitled to expenses respecting this Preliminary Issue Hearing?

Result:

1. Mr. Ahmed’s Application for Arbitration is not barred for failure to mediate pursuant to s. 281(2) of the Insurance Act.

2. I defer a decision on expenses respecting this matter to the Hearing Arbitrator.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

Submissions of the Parties

State Farm

Ms. Schubert, on behalf of State Farm, advised that State Farm sought a dismissal of Mr. Ahmed’s Application for Arbitration for failure to mediate pursuant to the Insurance Act and the Dispute Resolution Practice Code, 4th Edition (“the Code”).

Section 281(2) of the [Insurance Act]² states as follows:

No person may bring a proceeding in any court, refer the issues in dispute to an arbitrator under section 282 or agree to submit an issue for arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1991 unless mediation was sought, mediation failed and, if the issues in dispute were referred for an evaluation under s. 280.1, the report of the person who performed the evaluation has been given to the parties.

FSCO’s Code adds the following:

17.1 Parties to the mediation and their representatives (if any) must participate in good faith in the mediation process and provide all relevant documents within the time frames set out in these Rules.

17.3 Where a party does not comply with Rules 17.1 and 17.2 the mediator may: (a) adjourn the mediation on such terms as he or she considers appropriate; or (b) report to the parties that the mediation did not take place.

21.1 Mediation has failed on an issue when: (a) the mediator is of the opinion that mediation will fail and notifies the parties; or (b) the time limit for mediation, including any extension, has expired and no settlement has been reached.

State Farm submitted that Mr. Ahmed completed an Application for Mediation (Form A), dated May 12, 2015. The parties were notified via email from FSCO, dated May 15, 2015 that the file was ready to be scheduled for mediation and assigned to a Mediator.³ The notification email stated:

The parties must endeavor to agree, within 20 days of the date of this notification to a mediation date and time that is within prescribed 60 days and for which a mediator is available.

Rule 19 of the Code provides that a mediation must be concluded within 60 days of the filing of an Application for Mediation. As such, the parties were to have concluded mediation by July 14, 2015. The mediation was not scheduled, and as such, did not take place. A failed Report of Mediator was never issued.

Mr. Ahmed then completed an Application for Arbitration (Form C), dated August 24, 2015. FSCO registered the Application for Arbitration on October 6, 2015.⁴ On April 7, 2016, Mr. Alexanian (Mr. Ahmed’s counsel) advised Ms. Schubert that he was told by FSCO’s Arbitration Unit that in situations where a mediation has not taken place within 60 days, the mediation is deemed failed. A standard form email FSCO sent to the parties, dated August 20, 2015, stated the following:⁵

M15-009769 Fuzail Ahmed – The file has been closed. DO NOT REPLY TO THIS EMAIL.

This file has been closed for one of the following reasons:

1. A report will be issued.
2. A letter has been issued.
3. No activity on the file post the 60 days.

If settlement has not been achieved for the issues on this application, the issues in dispute for the purpose of this application have been deemed failed.

State Farm’s position is that FSCO’s preamble⁶ to the Code states that mediation is the first step in the dispute resolution process. The preamble also confirms that mediation is mandatory in Ontario, and that mediation must be conducted before the dispute can proceed to arbitration or court.

State Farm submitted that a failed Report of Mediator was not issued, but rather FSCO dismissed the action on the basis that the file had been inactive. It submitted that it would defeat the clear object of the dispute resolution regime if Applicants are allowed to proceed to arbitration by simply filing an Application for Mediation, without taking any further steps to negotiate settlement through the process of mediation. When FSCO advised the parties that the file was closed on August 26, 2015, State Farm had received no correspondence from Mr. Alexanian regarding mediation, and there had been no claim activity since October 2014.

State Farm relied on the 1994 Couraud and Co-operators⁷ decision for the proposition that where an Applicant does not participate in a mediation proceeding in good faith, the Mediator is entitled to conclude that the mediation never took place. There, Arbitrator Rotter stated:

In my view, parties to a mediation have a concomitant obligation to participate in the process in good faith. I conclude that if a party frustrates and attempts to short-circuit the process, a mediator is free to form the opinion, not that mediation has failed, but that it did not take place.

I find that the parties’ obligations under that requirement must include more than simply filing the designated application forms. I conclude that they are obligated to participate in the mediation process. … Otherwise, mediation is reduced to an empty and meaningless formality: a result which surely was not intended by the legislators.

State Farm submitted that Couraud was recently cited with approval in Pararajasingam and State Farm,⁸ where Arbitrator Reilly held that to allow an Applicant to bypass the mediation process would be an abuse of process.⁹ State Farm submits that Mr. Ahmed’s failure to participate in mediation proceedings means that mediation did not fail, but rather it did not take place at all, which is contrary to the provisions of the Insurance Act and the Code.

Mr. Ahmed

Mr. Alexanian, on Mr. Ahmed’s behalf, asked that State Farm’s Motion to dismiss his Application for Arbitration be dismissed with costs.

He submits that the issue is the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Insurance Act. He referred to s. 281(2), which states:

No person may… refer the issues in dispute to an arbitrator under s. 282… unless mediation was sought [and] mediation failed.

Section 10 of Ontario Regulation 664¹⁰ provides that:

10. A mediator is required, under s. 280(4) of the Act, to attempt to effect a settlement of a dispute within sixty days after the date on which the application for the appointment of a mediator is filed.

He noted that while s. 280(4) of the Insurance Act requires a Mediator to “attempt to effect settlement of a dispute”, there is no requirement under the statute that either the insured person or Insurer participate in a mediation, in good faith or otherwise.

Section 280(7) of the Insurance Act provides that:

Mediation has failed when the mediator has given notice to the parties that in his or her opinion mediation will fail, or when the prescribed or agreed time for mediation has expired and no settlement has been reached.

Mr. Alexanian submitted that in Hurst et al. v. Aviva et al.,¹¹ the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted the “prescribed time for mediation” to mean the 60-day time limit set out in s. 10 of Ontario Regulation 664 (the “prescribed time limit”), and it found that the prescribed time limit begins to run from the date the Applicant files an Application for Mediation with the Commission.¹² The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that s. 280(7) of the Insurance Act required that mediation between the parties actually be attempted and fail prior to commencement of a court action or an Arbitration Application.¹³ It adopted the plain meaning of the requirements of s. 281(2), stating “all that is required [by s. 281(2)] is that mediation has been sought and mediation has failed.”¹⁴ The Court reiterated that one of the ways in which mediation can fail is that the 60 days prescribed for mediation expire.¹⁵

Mr. Alexanian submitted that both Mediators and Arbitrators are creatures of statute,¹⁶ and cannot override the statutory provisions without express authority thereunder. Logic and ordinary grammatical meaning would dictate that any of the issues identified in the Application for Mediation that are not resolved prior to the time when mediation fails would be considered “issues that remain in dispute”.

Mr. Alexanian submitted that arbitral jurisprudence has confirmed that the Code is subordinate to the provisions of the Insurance Act.¹⁷ He suggested it is not clear what is meant when the Code refers to a Mediator reporting to the parties that “a mediation did not take place”; but in either event, the Insurance Act must prevail over the Code to the extent of any inconsistency. Mr. Alexanian submitted that the Pararajasingam decision was wrongly decided; he advised that the decision is currently under appeal.

Mr. Alexanian further noted that in the more recent Gilliland and Echelon¹⁸ decision (issued August 2016), Arbitrator Robinson took the position that the Applicant before him was permitted to proceed to arbitration notwithstanding the fact that a Report of Mediator had not been issued, finding (relying on Hurst et al.) that the only requirements to be met by the Applicant to proceed to arbitration were that “an application for mediation was actually commenced and that the 60 days prescribed for mediation have expired.”¹⁹

Mr. Alexanian submitted that the Applicant was unaware of any Ontario court decision, and particularly from the Ontario Court of Appeal, adopting any of the propositions set out in Couraud. He suggested it is time to see the Couraud decision for what it is—a 22-year old decision by an Arbitrator of the Ontario Insurance Commission that is no longer good law in light of recent case law by the Ontario Court of Appeal to the contrary.

State Farm’s Reply

State Farm asserted that there is no conflict between seeking mediation and participating in good faith. To permit insured persons to commence arbitrations without participating in mediation in good faith would effectively gut the statutory scheme for the resolution of disputes about entitlement to accident benefits. It reiterated that the parties’ obligations under that requirement must include more than simply filing the designated application forms and waiting for a time period to lapse.²⁰

State Farm submitted that the Hurst et al. and the State Farm and Leone²¹ cases were distinguishable from the present case. Hurst et al. and Leone dealt with mediations that were sought at a time when there was a substantial backlog of mediations at FSCO, resulting in Mediators not being appointed within 60 days of the filing of the Application for Mediation. In Hurst et al., the Court specifically stated:²²

It is not that the plaintiffs don’t want mediation but that they want it in a timely manner so they can get their SABS.

In Leone, a Mediator was not appointed until 382 days after the Application for Mediation was filed. State Farm submitted that Hurst et al. and Leone should stand for the proposition that an Insured should not be prevented from proceeding to arbitration or a court action where, through no fault of their own, the legislative requirements had not been complied with as a result of administrative delay. Administrative delays or backlog were not at issue in this case, and the Applicant should be accountable for his failure to participate in the mediation process as mandated by the Insurance Act and the Code.

State Farm submitted that the basis for the appeal in Pararajasingam was not an issue in the present case, and also that Pararajasingam was factually dissimilar to the present case. At issue in Pararajasingam was whether a failed Report of Mediator was properly issued under s. 280(8) of the Insurance Act. There, an unrepresented Applicant failed to attend two scheduled mediations, and the Mediator issued a failed Report of Mediator despite the Insurer’s request to re-schedule the mediation. In the present case, Mr. Ahmed had counsel, but neither he nor his counsel took any steps to schedule the mediation, and as such, it never took place—instead, FSCO dismissed the action on the basis that the file had been inactive.

State Farm also submitted that Gilliland was distinguishable from the present case. In Gilliland, the issue was whether the Applicant was precluded from applying for arbitration without a Report of Mediator showing items remaining in dispute. Here, mediation did not occur at all, and as such, mediation did not fail.

State Farm submitted that, per Couraud, “parties cannot be allowed simply to ‘go through the motions’ of filing for mediation without making a genuine and reasonable effort to settle the dispute”.²³

Further Submissions Respecting FSCO Practice since Hurst et al.

I invited the parties to provide further submissions respecting the administrative practice that has developed at FSCO since the release of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Hurst et al. Since that time, it became a common practice at FSCO to allow mediations to be failed upon the unilateral request of either party at least 60 days after the date of the Application for Mediation, which was a practice I advised the parties I may take notice of.

State Farm

State Farm submitted that Hurst et al. is distinguishable from the present case. In Hurst et al., the four Applicants wanted mediation but FSCO was unable to accommodate them due to backlog. In this case, the Applicant was trying to circumvent the alternative dispute resolution regime, which was not only contrary to the purpose of the legislation, but also prejudiced the Insurer’s right to resolve the dispute at first instance. Surely the Court of Appeal did not intend to permit Applicants to avoid mediation by submitting an application and sitting on their hands for 60 days.

State Farm stated that in essence, this dispute revolves around whether the term “mediation” in s. 281(2) of the Insurance Act should be interpreted as a noun or a verb. It submitted that Mr. Ahmed was begging an interpretation that sees “mediation” as a noun, describing simply a technical procedure (i.e., by filing an application the process was “sought” and the pre-condition for litigation or arbitration fulfilled). State Farm’s position was that this interpretation guts the alternative dispute resolution scheme of any substance, and is contrary to the purpose of the legislation and the legislature’s intent. State Farm submitted that its interpretation of “mediation” was as a verb—involving a good faith attempt to resolve a dispute, as the term “mediation” generally connotes in plain language.

Unlike Hurst et al., in this case FSCO was willing and able to accommodate the Applicant’s request to mediate. It was the Applicant’s own failure to act in setting a date for mediation that resulted in the lapse of time. Mediation could have occurred within the time limits in place had the Applicant been willing to mediate in good faith, as prescribed by the Rules.

Mr. Ahmed

Mr. Alexanian disputed State Farm’s suggestion that the Applicants in Hurst et al. “wanted” mediation, and that Mr. Ahmed, by contrast, was “trying to circumvent the alternative dispute resolution regime”. He suggested that the only finding made by Sloan J. (at the Superior Court level—Cornie et al. and Security National) was that all four of the Hurst et al. Applicants were seeking confirmation that mediation had failed after applying for mediation, implying that they wished to proceed to court after the prescribed time period had elapsed.²⁴ Sloan J. was simply stating that whether or not the Applicants “wanted” mediation was irrelevant to the determination of the issue before him, and that the overarching consideration was a “timely” mediation—namely a mediation that takes place within the prescribed time period.

Mr. Alexanian added that State Farm had failed to demonstrate whether Mr. Ahmed “wanted” mediation or not, even if such a fact mattered. The only thing that could be inferred from State Farm’s version of the facts is that neither Mr. Ahmed nor State Farm took steps to schedule a mediation within the 60-day period. By State Farm’s own evidence, its first attempt to schedule a mediation allegedly occurred 106 days after Mr. Ahmed had applied for mediation.²⁵ In any event, nothing in either Hurst et al. or its lower-level decision indicated that an Applicant’s subjective intentions with respect to mediation are relevant to the determination regarding whether the Applicant can proceed to arbitration or court. Further, nothing in the Insurance Act obligates an Applicant to do anything other than file an Application for Mediation with FSCO.²⁶ Arbitrator Robinson specifically found in Gilliland that for mediation to have been “sought and failed”, it was only required “that an application for mediation [have been] commenced and that the 60 days prescribed for mediation have expired”.²⁷

State Farm’s Reply

State Farm replied that the issue is not whether parties “want” to mediate, it is whether parties have made efforts to mediate. The legislation does not deal with subjective intention, but sets out a process that requires parties to attempt mediation to resolve their dispute prior to resorting to litigation and/or arbitration.

It noted the wording of s. 280(5) of the Insurance Act:

Extension of Time

(5) The parties may by agreement extend the time for the completion of the mediation process, even if the time for completion has expired.

It suggested the inclusion of the phrase “even if the time for completion has expired” signals that the legislature intended the “60-day” period or “time for completion” of a mediation to be an elastic timeframe that permits fulsome attempts at early resolution through mediation. It permits the parties to agree to an extension to continue negotiations, and where such is canvassed and refused; the Mediator can then fail the mediation, in accordance with ss. 280(6) or (7).

Analysis

I find that the subjective intention of an Applicant respecting whether they “wanted” mediation or not is irrelevant to the disposition of this case. Nothing in the Insurance Act would support such a proposition. The question before me is a simply a technical matter of interpreting the Insurance Act and the Code. That said, I suspect that what Applicants to the dispute resolution system generally want isn’t specifically “mediation” or “arbitration”, nor any other particular process—what they want is the insurance benefits they are claiming, and they will resort to whatever processes are mandated to seek that.

I believe what this case is truly about is a challenge to FSCO’s recent practice of closing mediations and deeming them failed, in cases such as this where neither party took any active steps to schedule the mediation prior to the closing. That to me is the distinguishing factor of these facts relative to previous applications of the Hurst et al. rule, whereby mediations have commonly been deemed failed without the parties and a Mediator actually convening together. So the present question is whether FSCO was entitled to unilaterally deem a mediation file failed in the absence of any action taken by either party. For the reasons that follow, I find that it was.

The legislation is clear, per s. 281(2) of the Insurance Act, that no Applicant may refer their issues in dispute to either a court or arbitration unless mediation was sought and failed. So when has mediation been sought and failed?

I find that “mediation”, as understood in s. 281(2) of the Insurance Act, is sought simply upon the filing of an Application for Mediation (Form A). This is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s finding in Hurst et al. that the prescribed time limit begins to run from the date an Application for Mediation is filed with FSCO.²⁸ “Mediation”, as understood in s. 281(2), means a specific identifiable process administered by FSCO, and nothing in any more generalized sense.

What does it mean for a mediation to “fail”? There is, in my opinion, only one definition in the legislation that specifically addresses what it means for a mediation to “fail”. That definition is in s. 280(7) of the Insurance Act, which I reiterate:

(7) Mediation has failed when the mediator has given notice to the parties that in his or her opinion mediation will fail, or when the prescribed or agreed time for mediation has expired and no settlement has been reached.

[emphasis mine]

A number of references were made by the parties to other provisions in the Insurance Act and Code. I agree with Mr. Alexanian’s submission that the Code is subordinate to the provisions of the governing legislation, which is the Insurance Act. But I find there is no meaningful conflict in the first place. There is only one definition in the Code outlining what it means for mediation to “fail”, and it is Rule 21.1, which I also reiterate:

21. FAILURE OF MEDIATION

21.1 Mediation has failed on an issue when:

(a) the mediator is of the opinion that mediation will fail and notifies the parties; or

(b) the time limit for mediation, including any extension, has expired and no settlement has been reached.

[emphasis mine]

It is quickly apparent that Rule 21 of the Code nearly mimics exactly the wording of s. 280(7) of the Insurance Act. There is no conflict between them about what it means for mediation to fail—one was derived from the other. And given the “or” provision that I have highlighted in both, it is clear there are two ways that mediation can fail—one of which is simply that the prescribed time for mediation has expired and no settlement has been reached. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Hurst et al. was unequivocal that mediations could be failed on the mere basis that 60 days had expired since an Applicant had applied for mediation—and this has become a common practice.

While I accept State Farm’s argument that mediation is an important part of the dispute resolution process, the Court of Appeal’s ruling found that the timely resolution of disputes was also a key priority, fundamental to the legislative scheme. The Court of Appeal, in stressing the importance of a plain reading of s. 280(7) of the Insurance Act, stated all of the following:

[29] … [T]he appellants’ identification of the statute’s purpose is incomplete. No doubt, it is an important purpose of the legislative framework to make mediation mandatory. That, though, is not the whole story. Reading the provisions in their entire context makes clear that the purpose of the legislation is to make mandatory a mediation process that is timely and effective.

[30] The purpose of the legislative scheme of dispute resolution is to mandate a speedy mediation process, conducted and completed on a strict timetable … When the legislative purpose is properly characterized to include the timely resolution of disputes, there is no reason to resist the grammatical and ordinary sense of the legislation.

[33] … As noted by the motion judge, the only prescribed time for mediation in the regulations is 60 days. If the appellants’ interpretation is accepted, it would render meaningless the part of s. 280(7) requiring mediation to be completed in a prescribed time period.

[43] I would not give effect to the appellants’ argument that the 60-day time limit is merely directory. Nor do I accept their argument that the failure to adhere to the 60-day time limit is merely a technical or procedural breach. The 60-day time limit, as I see it, is an integral part of the legislative scheme that aims to provide a speedy mediation process.

[47] As can be seen, the section does not require that a person await the receipt of a mediator’s report before commencing a proceeding. All that is required is that mediation has been sought and mediation has failed. I reiterate that s. 280(7) provides that one of the ways in which mediation can fail is that the 60 days prescribed for mediation expire.

Therefore, it is clear from Hurst et al. that mediation can “fail” simply upon the expiry of the prescribed time of 60 days from the date of filing of the Application for Mediation. I concur with Arbitrator Robinson’s decision in Gilliland—i.e., that the only requirements to be met by an Applicant to proceed to arbitration are that “an application for mediation was actually commenced and that the 60 days prescribed for mediation has expired.”

If 60 days had passed and settlement had not been reached, then on that basis alone the mediation could be deemed failed under s. 280(7) of the Insurance Act. In terms of communicating this, I take guidance from a statement in Hurst et al. respecting how a failed mediation might be communicated by FSCO if not via a traditional Report of Mediator. The Court of Appeal stated as follows:

[45] In his thoughtful reasons, the motion judge suggested there is no reason why FSCO could not issue a report stating that mediation had failed because the prescribed time period had expired. The report could set out the information listed in s. 280(8), to the extent that such information is available at the time of the report.

The Court then stated in paragraph [47] (see above) that a person need not await the receipt of a Mediator’s report before commencing a proceeding, and all that is required is that mediation has been sought and mediation has failed.

Looking at the August 20, 2015 email FSCO sent to the present parties stating the mediation file had been closed, it conformed closely to the Court of Appeal’s decision, and was in fact above and beyond the legislative requirements, since as the Court of Appeal indicated, no “report” is even needed at all in cases where mediation fails on the basis that the prescribed period for mediation has expired.

I agree with State Farm’s submission that the Pararajasingam case is distinguishable from this case. Pararajasingam dealt with the duties incumbent upon a Mediator in determining that a mediation has failed. But any duties upon Mediators are only relevant when dealing with the first prong of s. 280(7) in the first place—i.e., failed mediations based upon the Mediator forming the opinion that mediation will fail and informing the parties of such. The duties upon a Mediator are irrelevant to the second prong of s. 280(7)—i.e., cases where mediation fails because of an expiry of the prescribed time limit, where no Mediator is needed at all. I also distinguish this case from Couraud, as I find there were no attempts by either party to either frustrate or short-circuit the mediation process.

In summary, Mr. Ahmed’s Application for Mediation was validly deemed failed by FSCO, and is not barred from proceeding to arbitration on the issues in dispute in his Application for Mediation.

EXPENSES:

I defer a decision on expenses respecting this matter to the Hearing Arbitrator for the case.

January 23, 2017

Benjamin M. Drory Arbitrator

Date

Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2017 ONFSCDRS 18

FSCO A15-007003

BETWEEN:

FUZAIL AHMED Applicant

and

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY Insurer

ARBITRATION ORDER

Under section 282 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, as it read immediately before being amended by Schedule 3 to the Fighting Fraud and Reducing Automobile Insurance Rates Act, 2014, and Ontario Regulation 664, as amended, it is ordered that:

1. Mr. Ahmed’s Application for Arbitration is not barred for failure to mediate pursuant to the Insurance Act.

2. I defer a decision on expenses respecting this matter to the Hearing Arbitrator.

January 23, 2017

Benjamin M. Drory Arbitrator

Date

Footnotes

1. 1The Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010, Ontario Regulation 34/10, as amended.
2. 2Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8.
3. 3Tab 6 to State Farm’s submissions, dated April 25, 2016 (“Insurer’s Submissions”).
4. 4Ibid., Tab 8.
5. 5Ibid., Tab 4.
6. 6https://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/drs/DRP-Code/Pages/preamble.aspx#.
7. 7Couraud and Co-operators General Insurance Company, FSCO 738 (A-006346; October 31, 1994).
8. 8Pararajasingam and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, FSCO 4669 (FSCO A13-012792; October 30, 2015; Appeal pending at the time of this decision).
9. 9Pararajasingam, at p. 23.
10. 10R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 664 (“Automobile Insurance”).
11. 11Hurst et al. v. Aviva Insurance Company et al.; Insurance Bureau of Canada et al., Intervenors, 113 O.R. (3d) 331, 2012 ONCA 837 (November 29, 2012). This case is often also alternately referred to by its indexed name, “Cornie v. Security National Insurance Co.” For ease of reference, I will refer to it by its Hurst et al. name throughout this decision.
12. 12Ibid., at para. [38].
13. 13Ibid., at paras. [28]-[30].
14. 14Ibid., at para. [47].
15. 15Ibid.
16. 16Sections 8 and 9 of the Insurance Act.
17. 17Webber and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (FSCO A06-002695; December 10, 2007), at p. 7.
18. 18Gilliland and Echelon General Insurance Company (FSCO A15-004947; August 16, 2016).
19. 19Gilliland, at p. 4.
20. 20Couraud, at p. 8. 1
21. 21State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Leone (FSCO P12-00004; July 31, 2012).
22. 22Hurst et al., at para. [66].
23. 23Couraud, at pp. 5-6.
24. 24Cornie et al. and Security National, 2012 ONSC 905, at para. [6].
25. 25Affidavit of Brandon Blackmore (student-at-law, Pavoni Patton DiVincenzo LLP), dated April 25, 2016, at para. [13].
26. 26Insurance Act, s. 280(2).
27. 27Gilliland, at p. 4.
28. 28Hurst et al., at para. [38].