Financial Services Commission of Ontario / Commission des services financiers de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2016 ONFSCDRS 193

FSCO A13-013340, A13-013342, A13-013936 & A13-015098

BETWEEN:

CYNTHIA LEVY, ELISSE PRICE, JOSE LOPEZ & VICTORIA ODZENMA

Applicants

and

WAWANESA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

REASONS FOR DECISION

Before: Arbitrator H. Michael Kelly, Q.C.

Heard: In person at ADR Chambers on May 19, 2016

Appearances: Ms. Cynthia Levy, Ms. Elisse Price, Mr. Jose Lopez and Ms. Victoria Odzenma did not participate Ms. Sarah Brown participated for Ms. Cynthia Levy and Ms. Victoria Odzenma No one participated for Ms. Elisse Price and Mr. Jose Lopez¹ Ms. Sarah Deol participated for Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company

Issues:

Each of the Applicants, Ms. Cynthia Levy, Mr. Jose Lopez, Ms. Victoria Odzenma, and Ms. Elisse Price, claims that she/he was injured in a motor vehicle accident on June 27, 2011, and sought accident benefits from Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company ("Wawanesa"), payable under the Schedule.² The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and the Applicants, through their representatives, applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, as amended.

The issues in this Hearing are:

1. Is Ms. Olga Kanevsky and the Kanevsky Law Office (“Kanevsky”) entitled to be removed from the record as the representative of Ms. Cynthia Levy and Ms. Victoria Odzenma in this Arbitration Proceeding, and, if granted, when is the removal effective?

2. Were the Applicants, on July 27, 2011, injured in a motor vehicle accident, as defined by the Schedule, and thereby entitled to the statutory accident benefits claimed in their respective Applications, or should their claims in this Arbitration be dismissed?

3. If the "accident" were staged, constituting fraud, is Wawanesa entitled to recover repayment from any of the Applicants, of any Schedule benefits paid by Wawanesa to that Applicant with respect to the June 27, 2011 incident?

4. Are any of the parties entitled to expenses of the Arbitration proceeding?

Result:

1. Kanevsky is removed as representative of Ms. Cynthia Levy and Ms. Victoria Odzenma, effective as of the commencement of the Hearing on May 19, 2016.

2. The Applicants were not, on June 27, 2011, injured in a motor vehicle accident, as defined in the Schedule, and their claims advanced in this Arbitration are hereby dismissed.

3. Wawanesa is entitled to repayment of benefits paid by Wawanesa, as follows:

a. Mr. Jose Lopez: $2,200.00 for Medical Benefits;

b. Ms. Elisse Price: $3,485.56 for Medical Benefits;

c. Ms. Victoria Odzenma: $8,521.16 for Medical Benefits and $7,734.74 for Income Replacement Benefits.

4. Ms. Cynthia Levy, Mr. Jose Lopez, Ms. Victoria Odzenma and Ms. Elisse Price shall forthwith pay to Wawanesa, costs of this Arbitration proceeding, inclusive of taxes, as follows:

a. Cynthia Levy: $2,200.00

b. Jose Lopez: $2,200.00

c. Elisse Price: $2,200.00

d. Victoria Odzenma: $2,200.00.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

None of the Applicants personally attended the Hearing despite receiving the requisite notice of the date and location. No oral evidence was called by either side. The only evidence received at the Hearing related to the substantive issues was the documentary materials filed by Wawanesa, entered as Exhibits, as follows:

Exhibit 1: Repayment Brief Index (re. Levy)

Exhibit 2: Repayment Brief Index (re. Odzenma)

Exhibit 3: Repayment Brief Index (re. Price)

Exhibit 4: Repayment Brief Index (re. Lopez)

Exhibit 5(a): Document Brief of the Respondent - Tabs A-D

Exhibit 5(b): Document Brief of the Respondent - Tabs E-N

Exhibit 6: Cost Submissions Index of the Respondent (for all four Applications)

In addition, I had the benefit of the contents of the FSCO/ADR Chambers files to assess the procedural compliance of the parties.

Removal of Counsel

Initially, Kanevsky represented all four Applicants. By Pre-Hearing Orders of Arbitrator DeGuire, dated December 23, 2015, Kanevsky was removed as the solicitors for Mr. Lopez and Ms. Price.³ On March 31, 2016, Kanevsky initiated steps seeking removal as representative of Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma. By an Order, dated May 4, 2016, Arbitrator DeGuire refused Kanevsky's application for removal from the record, on the basis that the Hearing was imminent, and that the removal issue should be addressed by the Hearing Arbitrator.

The hearing of the Motion for removal, with respect to Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma, was scheduled to be addressed, in person, at the Hearing on May 19, 2016. The Notice of Motion in each file, and the supporting Affidavit of Ms. Sarah Brown, sworn April 29, 2016, and the Kanevsky letters to Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma confirming the return date, time and place, were properly served upon both Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma, respectively. Ms. Brown made oral submissions consistent with the said materials. That material, combined with the failure of the said Applicants to attend the Hearing on May 19, 2016, despite repeated notice thereof (by both Pre-Hearing Letters and correspondence from counsel), satisfied me that the solicitor/client relationships had broken down, and that Kanevsky had complied with Rule 9.7 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code. As no witnesses were in attendance at the Hearing, and as, clearly, Ms. Brown was there without instructions, I exercised my discretion to remove Kanevsky from the record, effective at the commencement of the Hearing. In the circumstances, I did not feel that a further adjournment to provide opportunity to Ms. Levy and Ms. Price to retain new representation was necessary. Wawanesa did not oppose the removal.

I therefore ordered, orally, that, effective at the commencement of the Hearing, Kanevsky is removed as the legal representatives of Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma, in these proceedings, and hereby confirm that order with this decision.

Wawanesa's Claim for Repayment

Were the Applicants involved in an Accident?

In their Applications, the Applicants contend that they were involved in a motor vehicle accident in the early evening of June 27, 2011 on Islington Avenue, north of Steeles Avenue, in the Township of Vaughan, and suffered resultant injuries. The vehicles involved were a 2005 blue Chevrolet owned and operated by Ms. Safiyo Ali ("the Ali Chev"), and a 2000 Lincoln LS, owned and operated by Ms. Levy ("the Levy Lincoln"). The Levy Lincoln, in addition to the driver, allegedly had three passengers - Ms. Price (front passenger seat), Mr. Lopez (left rear seat) and Ms. Odzenma (right rear seat). The Ali Chev, in addition to the driver, allegedly had two female passengers (both identified in the Giffin Koerth Report referred to below). The Ali Chev was insured by State Farm. The Levy Lincoln was insured by Wawanesa. Wawanesa asserts that the accident was staged, and therefore did not constitute an "accident" as defined by the Schedule.

The Schedule defines an accident as follows:

3 (1) "accident" means an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment or directly causes damage to any prescription eyewear, denture, hearing aid, prosthesis or other medical or dental device.

The relevant jurisprudence is clear that if a collision between two automobiles is deliberately caused, i.e. staged, the collision is not an accident under s. 3(1).⁴

Section 52 (1) of the Schedule states:

Subject to subsection (3) a person is liable to repay to the insurer,

(a) any benefit described in this Regulation that is paid to the person as a result of an error on the part of an insurer, the insured person or any other person, or as a result of wilful misrepresentation or fraud.

Section 52 (2) of the Schedule states:

If a person is liable to repay an amount to an insurer under this section,

(a) the insurer shall give notice of the amount that is required to be repaid

Section 52 (3) of the Schedule states:

If the notice required under subsection (2) is not given within 12 months after the payment of the amount that is to be repaid, the person to whom the notice would have been given ceases to be liable to repay the amount unless it was originally paid to the person as a result of wilful misrepresentation or fraud. (my emphasis)

To address the claim of Wawanesa for repayment of benefits, I must determine whether or not Wawanesa has satisfied its onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that the accident was staged - i.e. fraudulent. The evidence presented by Wawanesa confirms that the Ali Chev and the Levy Lincoln were in contact, and that each suffered resultant damage. However, Wawanesa asserts that the accident was staged.

Wawanesa relies primarily on the following sources:

(a) The transcripts of the Examinations Under Oath of Ms. Price, Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma, dated February 29 and March 1, 2012;

(b) The report of Mr. Sam Kodsi, P. Eng. and Ms. Jillian LeBlanc, H.B.Sc., both of Kodsi Engineering Incorporated ("Kodsi"), dated April 20, 2012,⁵

(c) The report of Mr. Michael J. Jenkins, B.E.Sc., P.Eng. of Griffin Koerth Inc. ("Griffin"), dated July 3, 2014;⁶ and

(c) The Police Accident Report.

Kodsi had been retained by State Farm and Griffin was retained by Wawanesa. Kodsi inspected the Ali Chev on July 14, 2011 and the Levy Lincoln on July 15, 2011. Kodsi analyzed the damages, took a number of photographs, and analyzed the data recorded by the Ali Chev's Sensing Diagnostic Module ("SDM"). When conducting its investigation, Griffin had a copy of the Kodsi Report, and reached the same conclusions.

The Kodsi Report reviewed the Police Report and the details provided by Ms. Ali in her statement to State Farm and deposed in her Examination Under Oath ("EUO"), as well as summaries of the Examinations Under Oath of Ms. Levy, Ms. Price, and Ms. Odzenma. Neither Ms. Ali’s statement nor the transcript of Ms. Ali's EUO was produced in evidence before me.

Griffin was engaged by Wawanesa on September 17, 2013 to investigate the physical circumstances of the incident. The materials it relied upon are listed in Appendix A to its Report.

No evidence was presented as to the dates that specific payments were made by Wawanesa for which Wawanesa seeks repayment. Section 52(3) of the Schedule imposes a 12-month limitation for recovery of a payment, made in error, unless the payment was induced by wilful misrepresentation or fraud. For Wawanesa to be successful in its claim for repayment, it must satisfy me, on a balance of probabilities, that the accident was staged - which would constitute wilful misrepresentation and/or fraud.

Neither expert report stated specifically that the accident was staged. However, the reports revealed that the accounts given by Ms. Ali and the occupants of the Levy Lincoln were substantially different as to the time and location of the accident, direction of travel of the vehicles, speeds at impact, and information given to police. The police did not attend at the scene, and became involved the next day, at the Reporting Centre. The foundation and thrust of the expert opinions was that their respective analyses of the physical damages to the vehicles rendered impossible the accounts provided by those involved. Of importance, both experts found that the physical damage to the two vehicles, as confirmed by the Ali Chev's SDM, was persuasive to their conclusion that the Ali Chev was stationary 5 seconds before impact and accelerated to the point of impact, and that the Levy Lincoln was either stationary or moving at only 5 km/hour at impact.

The Police Report described the location of the accident as being on Islington Avenue at its intersection with Friuli Court in Vaughan, Ontario. Friuli Court is the first street north of Steeles Avenue (an east-west arterial road), and intersects Islington Avenue (north-south road) from the east (a "T intersection"). The Police Report,⁷ drafted the day following the accident, described the Levy Lincoln as proceeding southbound on Islington Ave., at normal speed (approximately 50 km/ph), when suddenly the Ali Chev, making a left turn onto Islington Ave from Friuli, ran into the driver's side of the Levy Lincoln. In her EUO, Ms. Levy stated that she had picked up her passengers on Friuli, at Islington, turned right onto northbound Islington, and was travelling northbound for approximately five minutes at normal speed, when the Ali Chev came out of nowhere on her left and struck her driver's door. Ms. Price, in her EUO, confirmed that version. However, Ms. Odzenma, in her EUO, stated that the Lincoln may have turned left from Friuli onto Islington and started to proceed south, when it was struck on the driver's side by the Ali Chev. The experts questioned Ms. Odzenma's account on the basis that it was inconsistent with the damages to the vehicles, and if the Levy Lincoln had completed a left turn, there was no driveway or access point on the east side of Islington to admit Ms. Ali's entrance onto Islington.

Ms. Ali stated that she was driving northbound on Islington and came to a stop for a red light at Steeles Avenue. When the light turned to green she accelerated normally and proceeded at normal speed northbound on Islington. When she reached Friuli (approximately 150 metres north of Steeles), the Levy Lincoln suddenly came out of Friuli, making a left turn to go south on Islington. She did not have time to brake and her vehicle struck the left side of the Levy Lincoln. She stated that her front-seat airbag deployed. However the experts' examination of the Ali Chev, and its data recorder, confirmed that the airbag was not deployed.

The above is a short summary of some of the inconsistencies in the accounts provided by the deponents. What is of paramount importance is the opinions of the experts that the versions given by both Ms. Levy and Ms. Ali were completely impossible, given the analysis of the physical damage to both vehicles, and the data recorded by the Ali Chev SDM. The experts concluded that the accident was a "T-Bone" collision, with only slight angulation. The experts concluded that prior to impact, the Levy Lincoln was either stationary or travelling at not more than 5 km/ph. The Ali Chev (according to its SDM), was stationary approximately five seconds before impact, and then accelerated to between 17 and 22 km/ph at impact. The brakes of the Ali Chev were not engaged during the last two seconds prior to impact. That evidence, if accepted, would make Ms. Ali's account impossible as she could not have reached Friuli from Steeles in five seconds (a distance of 150 metres), since she was starting from a stopped position. Similarly, Ms. Levy's account that she was travelling northbound on Islington at the speed limit, at the time of impact, was completely inconsistent with the damages analysis. According to the experts, if the Levy Lincoln were travelling at normal speed immediately before impact, the Lincoln would have suffered significant left side damage, from the driver's door, all the way to the left-side rear - which it did not.

If the vehicles were stopped or moving slowly within seconds of the impact, a strong inference arises that the impact was planned. In the various accounts provided by both drivers since the accident, neither driver claims that she observed the other vehicle prior to impact, and that immediate braking slowed both vehicles substantially before impact. The Examinations Under Oath of both drivers made no mention of braking. Instead, each described the collision as sudden and unavoidable. The SDM of the Ali Chev recorded that the Ali Chev was in a stopped position five seconds before impact, and expert examination of the damage to the two vehicles satisfied the reconstruction engineers that the Levy Lincoln was either stopped or travelling at no greater than 5 km/ph at time of impact.

No expert was retained at any time by the Applicants, notwithstanding that Wawanesa articulated its intention to seek repayment, as early as October 2014,⁸ and that copies of the expert reports were furnished to Kanevsky in October 26, 2015, while Kanevsky was still on record as the representative of all four Applicants.

Wawanesa did not call the tow truck driver, to provide evidence as to the location of the accident. That evidence would have been helpful. Ms. Levy stated in her EUO that Friuli Court was the first street north of Finch Avenue and that after turning right onto Islington Avenue, from Friuli, she was proceeding northbound toward Steeles Avenue, to access a gas station near Steeles. All the evidence supports the finding that Friuli is the first street north of Steeles, not Finch. Nor was a police officer called to confirm who first attended at the Collision Reporting Centre to provide details of the accident. As well, no evidence was presented as to whether or not any of the occupants of the Ali Chev knew, or had contact with, any of the occupants of the Levy Lincoln prior to the accident.

Wawanesa is not seeking repayment on the basis that a payment was made by mistake as set out in s. 52(1) of the Schedule. Rather, Wawanesa asserts that it has satisfied its onus of proving on balance of probabilities that the accident was staged, and that the claims of the Applicants were consequently fraudulent. Where fraud is alleged, the onus needs to be somewhat stronger than balance of probabilities. The fact that a person is a passenger in a vehicle involved in a staged accident is not proof in itself that the passenger was aware of the fraud. The wording of s. 53 is not precise as to whether the words "wilful misrepresentation or fraud" are an objective or subjective test - in other words, if the accident were fraudulent, but the passenger did not know of the fraud, is the passenger subject to repayment? What if he later learns of the fraud?

However, in a case such as this, where one vehicle was stopped five seconds before impact and then accelerated into the other vehicle, and the other vehicle was either stationary or was moving at approximately 5 km/ph at impact, the occupants of the two vehicles are likely to have known that the accident was being staged. For Wawanesa to be successful in its quest for re-payment, Wawanesa may have the onus of showing on the balance of probability that each Applicant from whom Wawanesa seeks repayment, knew that the accident was staged. Or perhaps, under s. 52(3) of the Schedule, Wawanesa may simply be required to prove that a fraud provoked payment, and any innocent passenger would have to seek his remedy directly against the fraudsters. I need not make a ruling in that regard because I find that the accident as reconstructed by the experts, would have appeared to everyone involved, as a staged accident. I do not just automatically assume the validity of the conclusions flowing from expert accident reconstruction. However, in the case before me, there is no contradicting evidence, and the reports were, in my opinion, reliable. As well, I recognize that persons involved in a genuine motor vehicle accident can often make mistakes as to precise location, direction of travel, speeds, distances, nature of impact, and the like.

I find as well that the failure of the Applicants to attend certain Pre-Hearings, maintain contact with their representative and failure to attend the Hearing, can give rise to an adverse inference with respect to the fraud issue.

Decision

Dismissal

I find that the "accident" of June 27, 2011 was staged and in consequence was fraudulent, and the Applicants’ Applications for Arbitration are hereby dismissed. As well, the failure of the Applicants to attend the Hearing, and offer evidence in support of their respective claims, constitutes failure on their parts, individually, to prove on balance of probabilities, the validity of their respective claims, and their claims are therefore dismissed.

Repayment

Wawanesa, pursuant to s. 52 of the Schedule, seeks repayment of benefits paid, as follows:

Ms. Levy:

no claim

Ms. Odzenma:

$8,521.16 for Medical Benefits

$7,734.74 for Income Replacement Benefits

Ms. Price:

$3,485.56 for Medical Benefits

Mr. Lopez:

$2,200.00 for Medical Benefits

Wawanesa filed in evidence a separate "Repayment Brief Index" referable to each Applicant as set out above. Each of the said Exhibits contains a copy of a letter from Bell Temple to Arbitrator DeGuire and to Kanevsky, dated November 25, 2015, setting out the amounts referable to benefits allegedly paid, for which Wawanesa is seeking repayment. That letter was sent in response to Arbitrator DeGuire's Pre-Hearing Letter, dated September 29, 2015, requesting specifics of the repayment claims, and Kanevsky was still the representative of all Claimants at that time. Kanevsky did not contest those figures. The repayment amounts for Mr. Lopez and Ms. Price were also set out in the summary of added issues contained in the letters of Arbitrator DeGuire, generated in April 2016.

Wawanesa, after receiving the engineers' reports, advised each of the Applicants in October 2014, by registered mail (copied to Kanevsky), that Schedule benefits were then terminated, and that Wawanesa was seeking repayment of benefits paid until then.⁹ The repayment issue, with respect to all four Applicants, was added as an issue to the Arbitration by Orders of Arbitrator DeGuire, in April 2016.

I am satisfied that the figures below reliably disclose the benefits paid by Wawanesa, and I hereby order that the Applicants shall repay to Wawanesa the following sums:

Ms. Odzenma: $16,255.90

Ms. Price: $3,485.56

Mr. Lopez $2,200.00

EXPENSES:

I find that Wawanesa is entitled to its expenses of the Arbitration, pursuant to Section F of the Expense Regulation¹⁰ and Rules 75 to 78 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code. I have carefully reviewed Exhibit 6 (Costs Submissions Index), as well as the extensive documentation contained in the other Exhibits, and my notes of the oral submissions of Ms. Deol at the Hearing.

My overview is this: relatively early on, Wawanesa flagged the fraud issue and stated same in the Form E filed in each Arbitration. In the materials before me, I have no evidence that Wawanesa engaged in any significant medical investigation. The defence primarily concentrated on the expert reports and the EUOs of the Applicants and the four files were addressed together. There was no novel issue involved. Wawanesa's counsel attended two Pre-Hearings at which the Applicants did not appear. In October 2015, each of the four Applicants withdrew her/his claims for Attendant Care Benefits and Housekeeping and Home Maintenance Benefits.¹¹ Wawanesa made a settlement offer in November 2015 with respect to the claims of Ms. Levy and Ms. Odzenma, but same was conditional, and for that reason, I am not giving it substantial persuasive value on the expense issue.

At the Hearing, Wawanesa filed the brief entitled "Costs Submissions Index" as Exhibit 6. The tables in the brief give the hourly contributions of senior and junior counsel and staff, including HST. Ms. Deol advised that the hourly contributions were separately recorded with respect to each of the files. As well, the brief contains a table of disbursements attributed to each Applicant. It did not come to my attention during the Hearing that Ms. Deol had not signed the certificate at the bottom of each Bill of Costs, but as she had advised me at the Hearing that Exhibit 6 was accurate, I am prepared to treat it as such. I am not satisfied that the disbursement for "independent adjusting fees" is a recoverable disbursement. As well, I question the figure related to photocopies/prints ($577.61 each file). Otherwise, I am satisfied that the disbursement summary for each file is reliable.

Wawanesa is seeking expenses from the Applicants, as follows:

Cynthia Levy:

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student ("actual") $14,900.41

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student - Legal Aid Rate $6,026.28

Disbursements $5,179.42

Jose Lopez:

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student ("actual") $13,802.05

Fees for Lawyers. Law Clerk and Student - Legal Aid Rate $5,545.48

Disbursements $4,710.92

Victoria Odzenma:

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student ("actual") $12,560.74

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student - Legal Aid Rate: $5,774.79

Disbursements $5,239.42

Elisse Price:

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student ("actual") $13,767.92

Fees for Lawyers, Law Clerk and Student - Legal Aid Rate $5,517.23

Disbursements $5,179.42

I have reached the conclusion that the appropriate expense award in this matter is $8,800.00 inclusive of taxes, to be divided equally among the Applicants.

Therefore it is ordered that the Applicants shall each forthwith pay to Wawanesa the sum of $2,200.00 for costs/expenses.

July 18, 2016

H. Michael Kelly, Q.C. Arbitrator

Date

Financial Services Commission of Ontario / Commission des services financiers de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2016 ONFSCDRS 193

FSCO A13-013340, A13-013342, A13-013936 & A13-015098

BETWEEN:

CYNTHIA LEVY, ELISSE PRICE, JOSE LOPEZ & VICTORIA ODZENMA

Applicants

and

WAWANESA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

ARBITRATION ORDER

Under section 282 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as it read immediately before being amended by Schedule 3 to the Fighting Fraud and Reducing Automobile Insurance Rates Act, 2014, and Ontario Regulation 664, as amended, it is ordered that:

1. Kanevsky is removed as representative of Ms. Cynthia Levy and Ms. Victoria Odzenma, effective as of the commencement of the Hearing on May 19, 2016.

2. The Applicants were not, on June 27, 2011, injured in a motor vehicle accident, as defined in the Schedule, and their claims advanced in this Arbitration are hereby dismissed.

3. Wawanesa is entitled to repayment of benefits paid by Wawanesa, as follows:

a. Mr. Jose Lopez: $2,200.00 for Medical Benefits;

b. Ms. Elisse Price: $3,485.56 for Medical Benefits;

c. Ms. Victoria Odzenma: $8,521.16 for Medical Benefits and $7,734.74 for Income Replacement Benefits.

4. Ms. Cynthia Levy, Mr. Jose Lopez, Ms. Victoria Odzenma and Ms. Elisse Price shall forthwith pay to Wawanesa, costs of this Arbitration proceeding, inclusive of taxes, as follows:

a. Cynthia Levy: $2,200.00

b. Jose Lopez: $2,200.00

c. Elisse Price: $2,200.00

d. Victoria Odzenma: $2,200.00.

July 18, 2016

H. Michael Kelly, Q.C. Arbitrator

Date

Footnotes

1. 1The representative for Elisse Price and Jose Lopez were removed by Arbitrator's Order dated December 23, 2015.
2. 2The Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010, Ontario Regulation 34/10, as amended.
3. 3Exhibit 5(b), Tab H.
4. 4Shakur v. Pilot Insurance Company, (1990) 1990 CanLII 6671 (ON CA), 74 O.R. (2d) 673; TTC Insurance Company Limited and Deborah Wootton, Appeal P04-00004, Decision Date: 2004-11-02, Appeal FSCO 3747; Agyemang et al. and Pafco Insurance Company, FSCO A11-001755, A11-001757, A11-001867 - Preliminary Issue Decision, May 26, 2015; Economical Mutual Insurance Company and J. E. (OIC) P96-00033, June 25, 1996, Appeal.
5. 5Exhibit 5(a), Tab D.
6. 6Exhibit 5(b), Tab E.
7. 7There was no evidence called to specifically identify the author who provided the details to the reporting officer. The Police Report does not correspond to the version of the accident later given by Ms. Levy, Ms. Ali, or Ms. Price.
8. 8Exhibits 1 to 4, Tab 5 - Letters, dated October 23, 2014, from Wawanesa to each Claimant, enclosing OCF-9.
9. 9Exhibits 5(a) and 5(b).
10. 10Regulation 664, R.R.O. 1990, as amended.
11. 11Exhibit 5(b) Tab G.