Kumuthakumary Kulaveerasingam v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2016 ONFSCDRS 177

Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Commission des services financiers de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2016 ONFSCDRS 177

Appeal P15-00013

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF ARBITRATIONS

KUMUTHAKUMARY KULAVEERASINGAM Appellant

and

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY Respondent

BEFORE: Delegate Lawrence Blackman

REPRESENTATIVES: Mr. David S. Wilson for the Appellant, Mrs. Kumuthakumary Kulaveerasingam Mr. Cary N. Schneider for the Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

HEARING DATE: March 3, 2016

APPEAL ORDER

Under section 283 of Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as it read immediately before being amended by Schedule 3 to the Fighting Fraud and Reducing Automobile Insurance Rates Act, 2014, and Ontario Regulation 664, as amended by Ontario Regulation 43/16, it is ordered that:

1. The appeal is allowed. Paragraph 2 of the Arbitrator’s February 6, 2015 decision is rescinded and replaced by the following:

Mrs. Kulaveerasingam is entitled to interest on overdue benefits for each day the amount is overdue from the date the amount became overdue at the rate of 2 per cent per month, compounded monthly.

2. The Respondent shall pay the Appellant her legal expenses of this appeal fixed in the amount of $2,938.57, inclusive of all fees, disbursements and taxes.

June 21, 2016

Lawrence Blackman Director’s Delegate

Date

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE APPEAL

This decision pertains to the transition provisions under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Accidents on or after November 1, 1996, Ontario Regulation 403/96, as amended (the “Old Regulation”), and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule — Effective September 1, 2010, Ontario Regulation 34/10 as amended (the “New Regulation”).

Subsection 2(1) of the New Regulation states that, except as otherwise provided in section 68, the benefits set out in the New Regulation shall be provided under every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy in respect of accidents occurring on or after September 1, 2010. However, paragraph 2(2)2 of the New Regulation further provides:

2. An amount that would, but for subsection 3(1.3) of the Old Regulation, be paid under the Old Regulation after August 31, 2010 shall be paid under this Regulation in the amount determined,

i. under the Old Regulation, other than under section 24 of that Regulation, or

ii. under subsections 25 (1), (3), (4) and (5).

Section 3 of the Old Regulation states:

(1.1) Subject to subsection (1.3), the benefits set out in this Regulation shall be provided under every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy in respect of accidents that occur on or after November 1, 1996 and before September 1, 2010.

(1.2) Section 24 and Parts X, XI, XII, XIII and XV do not apply after August 31, 2010.

(1.3) No amount referred to in this Regulation shall be paid after August 31, 2010.

(1.4) An amount that would, but for subsection (1.3), be paid under this Regulation after August 31, 2010 shall be paid under the New Regulation, but in the amount determined,

(a) under this Regulation, other than section 24; or

(b) under subsections 25 (1), (3), (4) and (5) of the New Regulation.

[Emphasis added]

The Appellant, Mrs. Kulaveerasingam, was injured in an October 29, 2010 motor vehicle accident. As a result, she applied to her first-party automobile insurer, the Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for statutory automobile accident benefits.

The parties disputed the Appellant’s entitlement to ongoing income replacement benefits (“IRBs”) and interest. In her February 6, 2015 decision, Arbitrator Pressman (the “Arbitrator”) held that the Appellant was entitled to ongoing weekly IRBs of $400, and interest on overdue IRBs at the rate 1% per month, compounded monthly, under subsection 51(2) the New Regulation. Subsection 46(2) of the Old Regulation requires that an insurer pay interest on overdue payment of benefits at the rate of 2% per month, compounded monthly.

The Appellant appeals the Arbitrator’s Order, arguing that she is entitled to interest at a monthly rate of 2%, not 1%. She submits that the Arbitrator erred in not following State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Federico, (FSCO P12-00022, March 25, 2013), application for judicial review dismissed in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federico, Financial Services Commission of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 109.

The Arbitrator found that the new, reduced rate of interest applied effective September 1, 2010 to existing policies and not simply to accidents on or after September 1, 2010. The Arbitrator cited subsection 2(1) of the New Regulation, entitled “Application and Transition Rules:”

Except as otherwise provided in section 68, the benefits set out in this Regulation shall be provided under every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy in respect of accidents occurring on or after September 1, 2010.

The Arbitrator found the language in subsection 2(1) clear and unambiguous. If a motor vehicle accident occurred on or after September 1, 2010, then the statutory accident benefits provided are subject to the New Regulation, the only exception being section 68. The section 68 exception refers to optional benefits. The Arbitrator found that section 68 did not mention interest. Therefore, interest did not form part of the subsection 2(1) exception.

The Arbitrator noted “FSCO’s non-binding” Bulletin No. A-04/10, Transition to the New Statutory Accidents Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (the “Superintendent’s Bulletin”) dated April 26, 2010. The Bulletin states that the New Regulation will apply to all accidents on or after September 1, 2010.

Citing the Bulletin, the Arbitrator held that “holders of transitional policies will find the amounts of their benefits unchanged (from the Old Regulation).” The parties agree the Appellant’s automobile insurance policy is a transitional policy. The Arbitrator found that the Bulletin supported her view of how sections 2 and 68 of the New Regulation are to be read and applied.

The Arbitrator held that if the Legislature’s intention was that an insurer would not be subject to the new, reduced interest provision in the New Regulation, that could have been specified, but it was not. Although agreeing with the presumption against retroactive application,¹ the Arbitrator found that this did not decide the issue.

Rather, the Arbitrator stated that the real question was when does an accident benefits claim become sufficiently concrete for a substantive right to materialize? She cited the appeal decision in Federico for the proposition that an accident benefits claim becomes sufficiently concrete for a right to materialize on the date of the accident. The Arbitrator found this to be a reasonable conclusion as accident benefits are not provided or claimed until an accident occurs.

In Federico, I stated:

In the present case, the contract of insurance between the Appellant insurer and the Respondent insured created rights and obligations as soon as the contract was formed, including interest under subsection 46(2) of the Old Regulation, at 2% per month, compounded monthly. In any event, the situation would have materialized or become sufficiently concrete as of the December 20, 2006 accident date, some four years before the legislative changes in question.

The Arbitrator rejected the Appellant’s submission that she focus on the first sentence in the above paragraph, that spoke to the contract of insurance creating rights and obligations as soon as the contract was formed. She rejected the Appellant’s argument that the second sentence of that paragraph (regarding when the situation would have materialized or become sufficiently concrete) was not relevant. The Arbitrator, at Footnote 12, stated that this was “not a sensible approach to interpreting case law.”

The Arbitrator agreed that the Appellant’s contract of insurance created rights and obligations as soon as it was formed. However, the policy terms were not fixed for its entire duration, being subject to amendment by the legislature “through clear and unambiguous statutory provisions.”

The Arbitrator held that the Appellant had no vested right to the higher interest rate under the Old Regulation as her right to claim accident benefits only materialized and became sufficiently concrete on the day of her accident, October 29, 2010, a month after the New Regulation came into effect. Therefore, the Appellant’s claim for interest on overdue benefit payments was subject to the New Regulation, including the section 51, monthly 1% interest rate.

II. THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS

The Appellant submits the Arbitrator erred in law in her February 6, 2015 decision as follows:

1. The Arbitrator presumed, without citing any authority, that interest is a statutory accident benefit. The case law² supports interest as not being a benefit. Subsection 2(1) of the New Regulation refers to “the benefits set out in this regulation.” Interest, however, is not a statutory accident benefit. Therefore, subsection 2(1) of the New Regulation does not apply. Nor does subsection 3(1.1) of the Old Regulation (that limits payments for accidents between November 1, 1996 and August 31, 2010) apply as it also refers to benefits.

2. Subsection 3(1.2) of the Old Regulation provides that Part X (that includes the section 46 interest provision) does not apply after August 31, 2010. However, subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation states that an amount that would, but for subsection 3(1.3) be paid under the Old Regulation after August 31, 2010, shall be paid under the New Regulation, but in the amount determined under the Old Regulation. Significantly, subsections 3(1.3) and (1.4) of the Old Regulation refer to payment of an “amount,” not “benefits.”

Accordingly, it is clear that interest continues to be payable under the New Regulation in an amount determined under the Old Regulation, namely 2% per month compounded monthly. Nothing is to be drawn from the omission of any reference to interest in section 68 of the New Regulation, referenced in subsection 2(1) therein.

3. The Appellant agrees that the Superintendent’s Bulletin is not binding. Nonetheless, the Arbitrator failed to state how the Bulletin supported her view, notwithstanding that it states that the “coverages and coverage limits that are available in accordance with the old SABS under any automobile insurance policy already in effect as of September 1, 2010 will remain unchanged until the policy expires or is terminated.” The term “coverages” must be properly interpreted as including interest.

4. Both parties agree that the Appellant’s automobile insurance policy was in effect prior to September 1, 2010. The Appellant had paid for a package of compensation that included interest at 2% a month. It is clear the Legislature has the right to change that package of coverage mid-stream, ignoring that an insured had purchased certain coverage, but only if done in a clear and unambiguous manner through words only capable of that meaning.

Section 2 of the New Regulation is ambiguous. It does not clearly state that an insured’s substantive right to interest under subsection 46(2) of the Old Regulation would be altered in any way. Subsection 2(1) does not refer to coverage, but only to benefits. While section 1.3 of the Old Regulation states that Part X (that includes interest) does not apply after August 31, 2010, it does not clearly authorize an interference with a vested right to interest under subsection 46(2).

Paragraph 3(1.4)(a) of the Old Regulation also does not state that a vested right under subsection 46(2) is altered in any way. Rather, it is consistent with an interpretation that an insured’s vested right under the earlier interest provision remains.

Accordingly, such an amendment will not apply retroactively to substantive rights. Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1975 CanLII 4 (SCC), held that the presumption that vested rights are not affected unless the intention of the legislature is clear applies whether the legislation is retrospective or prospective in operation.

5. The Arbitrator gave no reason why the sensible approach was to focus on an accident claim becoming sufficiently concrete for a substantive right to materialize. Rather, Federico held that the contract between the insured and the insurer created rights and obligations as soon as the contract was formed, including interest at 2% a month, compounded monthly, under subsection 46.2 of the Old Regulation.

If the right to interest at a certain rate is to be taken away, that can only be done by unambiguous and unequivocal language. Insurance is purchased to provide coverage should a potential risk materialize. An insured person purchases a concrete right as of the date of purchase.

Arguing that the Arbitrator did not err in law and that she was correct in finding that the interest rate of 1% per month, compounded monthly, applied, the Respondent submits:

1. At the time of the October 29, 2010 motor vehicle accident the Appellant had not yet renewed her policy. Therefore, she had a “transitional policy.” Accordingly, sections 2 and 68 of the New Regulation apply to her claim.

2. At arbitration, the Appellant did not argue that interest was not a benefit. Rather, she cited Sorokin v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company ³ in support of her position that interest is a statutory accident benefit. The Respondent submits, but without any supporting case law, that it is well established that a party cannot take a new position on appeal.

3. The Superintendent’s Bulletin clearly states that “new accidents” are those automobile accidents that occur on or after September 1, 2010 and that the New Regulation applies to all new accidents for all purposes. The rest of the Bulletin applies to accidents that occur before September 1, 2010. There is “no ambiguity in the non-binding Bulletin ... Any section of that Bulletin that discusses continuation of coverage and limits is intended to apply to old accidents” (that is, accidents before September 1, 2010).

4. Both Zaya and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, (FSCO A12-005753, November 28, 2014), and Rajbhai and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, (FSCO A13-003578, October 27, 2014), held that claims for housekeeping and caregiving benefits made under transitional policies were required to comply with the new incurred expense requirements of the New Regulation. These decisions, the Respondent submits, “are on all fours” with this case.

5. Federico, as well as Subramaniam and Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, (FSCO A09-002594, July 13, 2012), are distinguishable as they pertain to accidents that occurred before September 1, 2010.

In Federico, Arbitrator Murray held that the rate of interest is a substantive right and vested on the date of the collision. In Subramaniam, Arbitrator Rogers agreed that interest is a matter of substantive law, but held that interest vests when payment of the benefit becomes overdue. Arbitrator Pressman, in Zaya, followed Federico.

No matter which vesting date is accepted, the Appellant’s substantive right was to interest with interest payable at 1% per month.

6. Paragraph 3(1)(1.4) of the Old Regulation has little or no bearing on interest. Section 51 of the New Regulation has a new rate of interest. The New Regulation applies to all accidents after August 31, 2010. If however, it is found that interest is not a benefit, paragraph 3(1)(1.4) may apply as it talks about an amount, not a benefit, being paid.

The Appellant submits, in reply, that there is no principle, “well established” or otherwise, that a party cannot take a new legal position on appeal. In any event, she submits that her position has not changed. She also argues that Zaya and Rajbai can be distinguished in that they clearly pertain to a claimed statutory benefit. Further, those decisions may be incorrect.

The Appellant further argues that the Respondent, at oral submissions, never answered my question as to what it thought subsection 3(1)(1.4) of the Old Regulation meant, because there is no answer that assists it. The Appellant argues that the legislation is “so badly mangled” that it is not possible to say what the Legislature intended to do. Simply put, there is ambiguity between subsection 2(1) of the New Regulation and subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation.

III. ANALYSIS

The Arbitrator found section 2(1) of the New Regulation to be clear and unambiguous; for accidents occurring on or after September 1, 2010, the benefits payable (other than optional benefits) were under the New Regulation, including interest payable at 1 percent per month. She stated that if the Legislature’s intention was that an insurer would not be subject to the new, reduced interest provision in the New Regulation, that could have been specified, but it was not.

Respectfully, I find that the Arbitrator erred in law in looking at section 2(1) of the New Regulation in isolation. She further erred in finding that the only language of the legislation was that an insured would be subject to the new, reduced interest rate.

Subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation (part of the change of the policy that the Appellant purchased) states that an amount that would, but for subsection 3(1.3) be paid under the Old Regulation after August 31, 2010, shall be paid under the New Regulation, but in the amount determined under the Old Regulation. The Arbitrator ignored this, and similar language in paragraph 2(2)2 of the New Regulation.

Regarding these provisions, the Divisional Court in Federico stated:

… we find that the Tribunal reasonably interpreted sections 3(1)(1.4) of the Old Regulation and s. 2(2)2 of the New Regulation as providing that an amount that would have been paid under the Old Regulation after August 31, 2010, shall be paid under the New Regulation, but in an amount determined under the Old Regulation.

Subsection 3(1.2) of the Old Regulation states, in part, that Part X therein does not apply after August 31, 2010. Part X includes the section 46 interest provision. Noting the apparent conflict between subsection 3(1.2) and subsections 3(1.3) and (1.4), my appeal decision in Federico cited Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th Edition, (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002), at page 273, regarding implied exceptions (generalia specialibus non derogant):

When two provisions are in conflict and one of them deals specifically with the matter in question while the other is of more general application, the conflict may be avoided by applying the specific provision to the exclusion of the more general one.

Subsections 3.1(1.3) and (1.4) of the Old Regulation specifically address the matter in question, the amount of interest payable, in a detailed and comprehensive way. I found them to be the specific provisions that provide the exception to the subsection 3(1.2) general provision.

I agreed with Arbitrator Renahan, in Qin and Perth Insurance Company, (FSCO A10-000812, January 26, 2012), that subsection 3(1.2) pertained to procedural provisions while subsections 3(1.3) and (1.4) specifically addressed the substantive right of the amounts of payments. I held:

In the present case, the contract of insurance between the Appellant insurer and the Respondent insured created rights and obligations as soon as the contract was formed, including interest under subsection 46(2) of the Old Regulation, at 2% per month, compounded monthly.

Federico pertained to an accident that happened prior to the September 1, 2010 transition date.

As noted at page nine of that decision, the insured in that case argued, in the alternative, “that his rights crystallized on December 20, 2006 when he sustained his injuries or, at the latest, before September 1, 2010 as he had, prior to that date, disputed the Appellant’s denial of IRBs and overdue interest.”

Although Federico did not turn on this point, I held that in that case there was an even stronger case as the motor vehicle accident took place on December 20, 2006, some four years before the legislative change. I concluded that as of August 31, 2010, for both reasons, the insured in Federico had tangible, concrete, vested and materialized rights to interest at 2% per month, compounded monthly.

Unlike Federico, the contractual date and the accident date fall on different sides of the September 1, 2010 transition date. Does that make a difference under this specific legislation as written? I find that it does not as the language of this specific legislation is neither clear nor unambiguous that the Legislature clearly intended to retrospectively take away an insured person’s right in a purchased contract of insurance to a specific 2% per month rate of interest that were “tangible, concrete and distinctive” as soon as that contract was entered into, which was prior to the September 1, 2010 transition date.

In Federico I noted that Driedger states, at page 557, that Gustavson Drilling provides that a provision should be given immediate effect unless to do so would change the past (a retroactive application) or interfere with vested rights. To rebut the presumption against retroactive legislation all that is required is some sufficient indication that the legislation is meant to apply not only to ongoing and future facts but also to facts that are past (see page 562 of Driedger).

I continued:

In Dikranian, the Supreme Court held, at paragraph 39, that a court cannot find that a vested right exists if the juridical situation under consideration is not tangible, concrete and distinctive. The mere possibility of availing oneself of a specific statute is not a basis for arguing that a vested right exists. In the present case, the Respondent did not have simply the possibility as of August 31, 2010 of entering into a contract of insurance that included specific amounts. Rather, it is not disputed that there was a binding contract of insurance prior to August 31, 2010.

The Supreme Court continued, at paragraph 40, that there is more. “The situation must also have materialized.” When a right becomes sufficiently concrete will vary depending on the juridical situation in question. The Court gave as examples that “a tort or delict instantaneously gives rise to the right to compensation” and that “rights and obligations resulting from a contract are usually created at the same time as the contract itself.”

Dikranian held that in the case before it, “a contract was signed and entered into before new provisions came into force. The contract continued to produce its effects notwithstanding those provisions. The rights and obligations resulting from the contract were fixed and crystallized as soon as the contract was entered into.” The Court held that although the right (regarding repayment of student loans) was provided for in legislation, it was incorporated into a private contract (between the student and the financial institution) in which the parties, freely, and on an informed basis, defined their rights and obligations. The Court concluded:

It was the contract (not the legislation) that created rights and obligations for the parties as soon as it was formed … The right not to pay more interest than the contract specified was also acquired at that time. [Emphasis added]

The Appellant, in her written submissions, put it this way:

… insurance is purchased only to provide coverage if a potential risk materializes. From the date of purchase of the insurance, any insured has purchased the security to guard against the consequence of that risk … any insured has purchased a concrete right as of the date of purchase and that the said right vests long before the occurrence of an accident. The rights which an insured has purchased are vested in the event of the occurrence of that risk, and cannot, it is respectfully submitted be easily taken away.

In his dissent in Gustavson, Pigeon J. stated that “if the legislative change is read as applicable to that contract, the result is an outright forfeiture or confiscation of this valuable right” (regarding entitlement to deductions). In oral submissions, I asked the Respondent whether, in this present case, there was a forfeiture or confiscation of a valuable right. The Respondent conceded that no one got any money back when the insurance coverage changed. The Respondent further conceded that, for “reasons beyond our comprehension,” this may not have been fair. However, the Respondent submitted that the Legislature had acted in an appropriate manner within their powers under section 268 of the Insurance Act.

I find that the “rights and obligations resulting from the contract were fixed and crystallized as soon as the contract was entered into.” The parties agree that the Appellant’s contract of automobile insurance was entered into prior to the September 1, 2010 transition date. Subsection 2(1) of the New Regulation speaks broadly of the benefits in that Regulation applying in respect of accidents occurring on or after September 1, 2010. Subsection 3(1.2) of the Old Regulation speaks broadly of Part X no longer applying after August 31, 2010.

However, the present issue is the amount of interest payable to this insured person.

Both subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation and paragraph 2(2)2 of the New Regulation specifically state that an amount that would, but for subsection (1.3) of the Old Regulation (that no amount in the Old Regulation shall be paid after August 31, 2010) be paid after August 31, 2010, shall be paid under the New Regulation, but in the amount determined under the Old Regulation other than section 24 (that pertains to the cost of examinations).

I am not persuaded that the Legislature clearly intended, contrary to subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation and paragraph 2(2)2 of the New Regulation, to retroactively interfere with a vested right to interest on overdue payments at the rate of 2 per cent per month compounded monthly under subsection 46(2) of the Old Regulation. I am not persuaded, as set out in the majority decision in Gustavson, that the language of the Regulations expressly or by necessary implication requires, contrary to subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation and paragraph 2(2)2 of the New Regulation, the retrospective operation of subsection 51(2) of the New Regulation of interest payable at the rate of 1 per cent per month, compounded monthly.

Respectfully, I find that the Arbitrator erred in law in applying the amount of interest under the New Regulation, contrary to subsection 3(1.4) of the Old Regulation and paragraph 2(2)2 of the New Regulation.

Regarding the Superintendent’s Bulletin, I note that the beginning of the Bulletin states that the New Regulation applies for all purposes. One queries, however, how can that be correct when the Respondent concedes that there is a statutory exception for section 68 optional benefits?

However, the Bulletin has a heading, at page three, entitled “Coverages and Limits on Policies Already in Effect as of September 1, 2010.” Underneath that heading, it states that (with the exception of the named insured insurer and insured otherwise agreeing in writing):

The coverages and coverage limits that are available in accordance with the Old SABS under any automobile insurance policy already in effect as of September 1, 2010 will remain unchanged until the policy expires or is terminated.

The Respondent asks that the words “for accidents that have already occurred prior to September 1, 2010” be read into the heading. If one has to read in wording, I fail to see how that wording can be said to be unambiguous.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court in Federico stated:

With respect to the submission about the Superintendent’s Bulletin, the position of the parties before the Tribunal was both that the Bulletin was not binding on the Tribunal and that it was incorrect. However, the applicant submits that the Tribunal went too far at para. 42 of its decision when it found that the Bulletin “did not assist”. We disagree with the applicant’s interpretation of para. 42. All that the Tribunal found was that the Bulletin did not assist in explaining how the Superintendent arrived at the conclusion he did, which is true.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Paragraph 2 of the Arbitrator’s February 6, 2015 decision is rescinded. It is replaced by an order that the Appellant is entitled to interest on overdue benefits for each day the amount is overdue from the date the amount became overdue at the rate of 2 per cent per month, compounded monthly.

IV. APPEAL LEGAL EXPENSES

Both parties seek their legal expenses of this appeal.

The Appellant seeks $2,938.57 in legal expenses, including 14.85 hours up to and including three hours of oral submissions. The Respondent seeks $3,050.05, including 23.9 hours in total.

Pursuant to subsection 12(2) of R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 664 (the “Expense Regulation”), on the basis of her success in this appeal, I find the Appellant entitled to her reasonable appeal expenses.

I am persuaded that the Appellant’s claimed hours, significantly less than that claimed by the Respondent, to be reasonable. I find the claimed hourly rate of $150 more than justified by the experience of counsel. I am persuaded that the Appellant’s claimed disbursements of $421.49, including $250 for the filing fee, are also reasonable.

Accordingly, I award the Appellant her claimed legal expenses of $2,938.57.

June 21, 2016

Lawrence Blackman Director’s Delegate

Date

Footnotes

1. 1The Arbitrator stated, at Footnote 10 of her decision, that “an ambiguous and unclear legislative amendment will not apply retroactively to substantive rights,” citing Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1975 CanLII 4 (SCC), R. Sullivan: Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 5th Ed. (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2009), Dikranian v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 SCC 73, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 530.
2. 2Lionti et al. and Security Insurance Company c/o Monnex Insurance Management Inc., (FSCO A99-000823, December 27, 2000), Bourcier and Primmum Insurance Co. (Formerly Canada Life Casualty Insurance Company), (FSCO A01-000915, May 16, 2002), and Singh and Gore Mutual Insurance Company, (FSCO P98-00036, October 18, 2002)
3. 32008 CanLII 26265 (ON SC), upheld on appeal in Sorokin v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 ONCA 152.