Neutral Citation: 2015 ONFSCDRS 42

FSCO A12-003908

BETWEEN:

ARIF SAHINBAY Applicant

and

UNICA INSURANCE INC. Insurer

REASONS FOR DECISION

Before: James Robinson

Heard: October 14, 16, 21, 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2014, at the offices of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario in Toronto.

Appearances: Mr. Sahinbay, self-represented Leilah Edroos for Unica Insurance Inc.

Issues:

The applicant, Arif Sahinbay, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on April 9, 2010. He applied for and received statutory accident benefits from Unica Insurance Inc. (“Unica”), payable under the Schedule.¹ Unica terminated weekly income replacement benefits. The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and Mr. Sahinbay applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended.

The issues in this hearing are:

Is Mr. Sahinbay entitled to receive a non-earner benefit in the amount of $185.00 per week from October 11, 2010 to April 9, 2012 and in the amount of $320.00 per week from April 10, 2012 to date and ongoing, less amounts paid, if any?
Is Mr. Sahinbay entitled to attendant care benefits in the following amounts: a) $1,223.80 per month from April 9, 2010 to July 8, 2010; b) $6,000.00 per month from July 9, 2010 to January 31, 2011; and c) $4,525.30 per month from February 1, 2011 to date and ongoing?
Is Mr. Sahinbay entitled to payments for housekeeping and home maintenance services in the amount of $100.00 per week from April 9, 2010 to date and ongoing?
Is Mr. Sahinbay entitled to receive medical benefits for various treatments recommended by various treatment providers, as particularized in Schedule “A” to these Reasons?
Is Mr. Sahinbay entitled to receive payment for the cost of various examinations recommended by various assessors, as particularized in Schedule “A” to these Reasons?
Did Mr. Sahinbay suffer a catastrophic impairment as a result of the accident which occurred on April 9, 2010?
Is Unica liable to pay a special award because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to Mr. Sahinbay?
Is Unica liable to pay Mr. Sahinbay’s expenses in respect of the arbitration?
Is Mr. Sahinbay liable to pay Unica’s expenses in respect of the arbitration?
Is Mr. Sahinbay entitled to interest for the overdue payment of benefits?

Result:

The applicant shall not receive a non-earner benefit in the amount of $185.00 per week from October 11, 2010 to April 9, 2012 and in the amount of $320.00 per week from April 10, 2012 to date and ongoing, less amounts paid, if any.
The applicant shall receive attendant care benefits as follows: a) $1,223.80 per month from April 9, 2010 to July 8, 2010; b) $3,000.00 per month from July 9, 2010 to January 31, 2011; and c) $3,000.00 per month from February 1, 2011 to April 8, 2011.
The applicant is entitled to payments for housekeeping and home maintenance services in the amount of $100.00 per week from April 9, 2010 to April 8, 2011.
The applicant is entitled to receive payments for medical benefits for the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 1, 2, and 3 under the rubric “Medical Benefits claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons in the total amount of $9,348.03.
The applicant is entitled to receive payments for costs of examination for the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11 under the rubric “Costs of Examination claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons in the total amount of $24,188.75.
The applicant did not suffer a catastrophic impairment as a result of the accident which occurred on April 9, 2010.
The insurer is not liable to pay a special award to the applicant.
The insurer is liable to pay the applicant’s expenses in respect of the arbitration.
The applicant is entitled to interest for the overdue payment of benefits.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

Preliminary issue No. 1

At the commencement of the hearing, I advised the applicant and counsel for the insurer that the Commission had received a letter from applicant’s counsel of record indicating that he would not be appearing. I offered the applicant the opportunity to request an adjournment in order that he could seek legal advice or obtain alternative counsel.

In due course the applicant indicated that he wished to proceed with the hearing. I offered the applicant the opportunity to seek a brief adjournment in order that I could take steps to compel his counsel to attend with his file in order that the applicant could satisfy himself that he had all the documents and information he required in order to proceed. Again, the applicant declined that offer and indicated that he was satisfied that he was in a position to proceed.

I took steps to satisfy myself that the applicant had the necessary capacity to represent himself. I canvassed with him the issue of whether anyone held a power of attorney with respect to his person or property and whether the Public Trustee had at any time had involvement in his personal affairs. I reviewed his educational background and his knowledge of the matters in issue in the case.

Having satisfied myself that the applicant had the capacity to represent himself, I confirmed to him that I would accept a written authorization from him pursuant to Rule 5 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code (the Code) removing his solicitor from the record, if he were disposed to give it. I recessed in order to give the applicant time to deliberate. Upon my return to the hearing room, the applicant filed such an authorization with me. I accordingly ruled that the applicant’s former solicitor be removed from the record and proceeded to hear this application.

Preliminary issue No. 2

In his pre-hearing letter dated August 7, 2013, Arbitrator Bujold confirmed that the applicant had undertaken at the pre-hearing to provide written particulars of the basis for his claim for a Special Award herein within sixty days of the date of receipt of the adjustor’s log notes in this matter. The said adjustor’s log notes were subsequently delivered. Thereafter, repeated written demands were made by insurer’s counsel to the applicant and his various representatives for such written particulars, without success.

On September 19, 2014 Arbitrator Bujold resumed the pre-hearing. By his letter of that same date, he confirmed that the applicant had not yet delivered written particulars with respect to his claim for a Special Award in this matter.

By a letter dated September 23, 2014 addressed to the applicant’s counsel, insurer’s counsel again confirmed that the insurer had not received such written particulars.

There was no evidence before me at the hearing that such written particulars were ever delivered. I ruled that the insurer had been prejudiced in its conduct of this case by such non-delivery.

Pursuant to subsection 282(10) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8), I retain an independent discretion to make a special award if I am satisfied that an insurer “has unreasonably delayed or withheld payment.” In the circumstances of this case there is no evidence that the insurer did so. On the contrary, I am satisfied on the basis of the available evidence that the applicant’s claims were adjusted in good faith and that the claims advanced by him were properly the subject of adjudication.

I accordingly find that the applicant’s claim for a Special Award in this matter must be dismissed.

Background

Prior to his accident on July 11, 2012, the applicant suffered from a major depressive disorder. He had been receiving benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act because of this condition. He had been under the continuing care of a psychiatrist from 2007 onward and was being treated for this condition with a number of medications.

The applicant had immigrated to Canada in 2000. In his native Turkey he had completed secondary school and had received a college-level education in hotel management. Prior to the onset of his depression he had been employed in Canada as a forklift operator, a construction worker and, most recently, as a long-haul truck driver. He is married with two children, one of whom was born subsequent to the accident. His wife does not work. Although he testified through an interpreter, the applicant can speak and write English with confidence.

I will deal with the applicant’s catastrophic impairment claim first before proceeding to a consideration of the other issues.

Is the applicant catastrophically impaired within the meaning of subsection 3(2) of the Schedule?

Subsection 3(1.2) of the Schedule provides, in part, as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this Regulation, a catastrophic impairment caused by an accident that occurs after September 30, 20001 is…

(f) subject to subsections (1.4), (2.1) and (3), an impairment or combination of impairments that, in accordance with the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th edition, 1993, results in 55 per cent or more impairment of the whole person…

The applicant argued his claim on the basis of whole body impairment. He relied upon the catastrophic impairment report of Dr. L.G. dated November 26, 2012 and upon his own testimony. In my opinion the applicant failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to catastrophic impairment.

First, there is evidence throughout the reports which were filed in evidence in this matter that the applicant, when requested to perform upon diagnostic psychological tests, put forward a sub-maximal effort.

For instance, in his defence psychological report dated September 22, 2010, Dr. M. noted as follows:

“…The Rey Memory Test is a 15-item test designed to determine the level of effort and the extent to which there is exaggeration of cognitive problems. Mr. Sahinbay provided significantly low scores on both the recall and the recognition components of this relatively simple test. These results indicated that there was a high probability that Mr. Sahinbay was exaggerating or intentionally embellishing his cognitive difficulties.”

In her defence neuropsychological report dated February 27, 2012, Dr. L-B noted as follows:

On a test that is sensitive to motivation variables, 8/15 items were recalled, and a 2 X 4 array containing the letter D was produced. On another test of motivation, the scores across three trials were 25/50, 34/50 and 31/50, suggesting a suboptimal effort. Similarly, another test of motivation (Dot Counting) suggested suspect effort.

Dr. L-B gave evidence for the insurer at the hearing. It was evident from her testimony and demeanour that she was a conscientious and truthful witness. She testified quite clearly that the applicant’s results in certain diagnostic tests which she administered to him would have been consistent with those she might expect from a severely mentally challenged person. The applicant seemed embarrassed by that testimony. He presented throughout the hearing as a person of high-average intelligence who well understood both the issues and the process in which he was participating.

The conclusion drawn by Dr. M. was that the applicant was “malingering.” Dr. L-B was more circumspect but was very clear in her evidence that the applicant’s test results disclosed that he was putting forth a “poor effort at neuropsychological testing.”

Indeed, it is not necessary for me to find that the applicant was malingering. The evidence is equally consistent with a very high level of suspicion on the part of the applicant with respect to the diagnostic process. Whatever the reason, I am satisfied that the applicant failed to be forthright with respect to various tests employed by various assessors.

In his catastrophic impairment assessment filed on behalf of the applicant, Dr. L.G. failed to deal in a straightforward manner with this serious credibility problem. He recited the findings of other specialists with respect to this issue of sub-maximal effort and then essentially issued a flat denial. In my opinion he failed to rebut the allegations of sub-maximal effort and malingering on the part of the applicant.

It is impossible, confronted with the applicant’s lack of candour, to accept Dr. L.G.’s opinion that the applicant has sustained a 45% psychological impairment. His sub-maximal effort has tainted the very evidence that the applicant required in order to prove his own case. I would place the degree of impairment at something substantially less than 45%.

Second, Dr. L.G. suggests, and the applicant himself argued, that he had sustained a 10% permanent physical impairment as a result of the accident. The nature of the physical impairments was thoroughly canvassed in the applicant’s testimony. These included continuing neck and back discomfort and pain and weakness in his left shoulder (and additional more minor complaints relating to hearing and taste.) In addition the applicant gave evidence that he had difficulties with balance.

Unfortunately, this testimony is directly contradicted by the surveillance evidence adduced by the insurer. Notwithstanding the applicant’s testimony at the hearing about the nature of his physical pains and his balance problems, in the surveillance we see him walking and carrying groceries over significant distances with ease and confidence and with no sign of discomfort. Sometimes he lifts items in a fluid motion to above the level of his shoulder, using his left arm. On one occasion he lifts a filled grocery basket and swings it about without apparent discomfort. While walking he ascends curbs in a natural motion without looking and without evidencing any of the symptoms of wobbliness or imbalance to which he testified at trial.

I am not satisfied on the basis of the available evidence that the applicant’s degree of physical impairment attains the level of 10% as submitted by him. This is inconsistent with and contradicted by the observable facts.

Third, the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that he has suffered brain damage as a result of the accident. He relies for this submission upon the results of an MRI test discussed in a report by Dr. G. dated February 1, 2011. The report states, in part, as follows: “This gentleman’s MRI shows tiny three to four non-specific foci of increased signal in the frontal periventricular white matter right greater than left.”

These spots were explained by the insurer’s witness Dr. P in his testimony at the hearing as imaging flaws related to the MRI scan itself rather than to any physical injury.

On April 9, 2010 – the date of the accident – Dr. N. conducted a CT head scan of the applicant and reported as follows: “The brain parenchyma, ventricles and sulci appear normal. No infarction, hemorrhage or abnormal intracranial mass effect is seen. Bone windows show no evidence for skull fracture.”

The applicant testified that Dr. G. advised him that he had experienced permanent brain injury as a result of the accident. This testimony is unsupported by any report, note, opinion or document produced in evidence. Dr. G. was not called to testify at the hearing. Notwithstanding the applicant’s apparently earnest belief to the contrary, I am not satisfied on the basis of the available evidence that the applicant suffered any permanent brain injury as a result of the accident.

The burden of proof in this proceeding lies upon the applicant. I find that he has failed to prove that he has suffered a 55% whole body impairment as required by subsection 2(1.2) of the Schedule. The applicant’s claim of catastrophic impairment must accordingly fail.

Is the Applicant entitled to receive non-earner benefits within the meaning of section 12 of the Schedule?

Subsection 12(1) of the Schedule provides, in part, as follows:

The insurer shall pay an insured person who sustains an impairment as a result of an accident a non-earner benefit if the insured person meets any of the following qualifications:

The insured person suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident and does not qualify for an income replacement benefit…

At the time of the accident the applicant was in receipt of benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Plan ("ODSP") and had been for two or more years. He had been awarded benefits on the basis of of major depression from which he then suffered and continues to suffer. He was prescribed and continues to take various psychotropic medications as part of his treatment regimen.

The position of the insurer is that the applicant’s case fails the test of causation. The applicant was under the care of a psychiatrist before the accident and was under the care of the same psychiatrist afterwards. The condition for which he was treated before the accident was major depression. The condition for which he was treated after the accident was major depression. The applicant took psychotropic medications before and after. The applicant does not appear to have visited his psychiatrist any more frequently after the accident than he did before. If then the applicant has suffered a “complete inability to carry on a normal life” the insurer would submit that it was not “as a result of…the accident.” There is every reason to agree.

Prior to the accident the applicant was under the regular and continuing care of a psychiatrist whose clinical diagnosis was and remains “major depression.” This opinion has been corroborated by the applicant’s psychologist. The treatment plan includes anti-depressant medication. The applicant was unable to work in his ordinary occupation of driver or in any other capacity.

I am therefore satisfied on the balance of probabilities and on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence that the applicant had suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life prior to the accident.

The testimony of the applicant was that since 2007 he had been concentrating on recovering from his depressive condition. He was seeing his psychiatrist and taking his medication. His evidence was that in the months leading up to the accident his expectation had been that he would return to work and he testified that he was feeling some optimism about that possibility. Whatever his past or present feelings on that point, I am not satisfied on the basis of the available evidence that there had been any material change in the applicant’s mental condition post-accident.

Insofar as I am satisfied that prior to the accident the applicant had already suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life, I am unable to agree with his submission that the accident caused his condition or made any material contribution to it. The applicant’s claim for a non-earner benefit fails the test of causation.

I therefore find that the applicant shall not be paid a non-earner benefit in accordance with the terms of the Schedule.

Is the applicant entitled to receive attendant care benefits within the meaning of section 16 of the Schedule?

Section 16 of the Schedule provides, in part, as follows:

(1) The attendant care benefit shall pay for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the insured person as a result of the accident for ,

(a) services provided by an aide or attendant…”

The evidence of the applicant, which was not successfully challenged on cross-examination, was that he had no independent recollection of the events of the initial nine months after his accident and that he had only partial recollection of events for the three months thereafter. This testimony is generally consistent with the statements made by him and reported by various professionals with whom he subsequently consulted.

The evidence of the applicant, supported by the report of Ms. Lisa Duffus and others, was that the applicant’s wife found intolerable the burden of caring for the applicant during the months after the accident. The applicant was incontinent and was soiling the apartment with human waste. This evidence is not inconsistent with a concussive type of injury. The applicant testified that his wife was concerned about the psychological consequences to their child of this behaviour. She moved out of the apartment with the child for an eight-month period. Mr. E.O. moved into the applicant’s apartment and cared for him throughout that period.

There is some considerable inconsistency in the evidence about where the applicant’s wife lived during this period. Be that as it may, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities and on the basis of the available evidence that the applicant was attended by Mr. E.O. for a period of twelve full months after the accident and that he required such care due to his physical and psychological condition and due to the absence of his wife during much of that period.

The applicant’s further testimony was that, subsequent to the twelve-month period immediately following the accident, he continued to require attendant care. His testimony was that because of balance problems and problems with forgetfulness it was necessary for him to rely upon Mr. E.O. as a full-time minder.

There is no credible evidence in the report of any medical practitioner produced at this hearing to support the applicant’s claim that he required continuing help and support because of balance problems or confusion.

That in itself would not necessarily be fatal to his claim for attendant care. However, the insurer produced videotape surveillance evidence of the applicant as he functioned on several different days in public settings. While Mr. E.O. was present in these surveillance tapes, there was nothing in the behaviour of either the applicant or Mr. E.O. at any time to suggest that he was there for any other reason than simple companionship, notwithstanding the applicant’s attempts to explain the evidence away.

In the result, I am persuaded on the basis of the available evidence that the applicant has proven, on the balance of probabilities, a claim for attendant care for the twelve-month period from April 9, 2010 through April 8, 2011. Having reviewed the Form 1 filed in this matter, I am of the view that the amounts calculated by Ms. Duffus are fair and reasonable. I was not persuaded to the contrary by the testimony of the insurer’s witness Ms. Judy Phillips which I found contradictory not least because she was willing to recommend the provision of assistive devices while maintaining that the claim for attendant care was not reasonable or necessary.

Pursuant to subsection 16(5) of the Schedule, no payment for attendant care can exceed $3,000.00 per month in those cases where, as here, there is no catastrophic impairment.

Accordingly the applicant shall be paid his expenses of attendant care for the period from April 9, 2010 to April 8, 2011 as follows: $1,223.80 per month from April 9, 2010 to July 8, 2010; $3,000.00 per month from July 9, 2010 to January 31, 2011; and $3,000.00 per month from February 1, 2011 through April 8, 2011.

Is the applicant entitled to receive a benefit for housekeeping and home maintenance within the meaning of section 22 of the Schedule?

Section 22 of the Schedule provides, in part, as follows:

(1) The insurer shall pay for reasonable and necessary additional expenses incurred by or on behalf of an insured person as a result of an accident for housekeeping and home maintenance services if, as a result of the accident, the insured person sustains an impairment that results in a substantial inability to perform the housekeeping and home maintenance services that he or she normally performed before the accident.

(2) The amount payable under this section shall not exceed $100 per week.

(3) No payment is required under this section for expenses incurred more than 104 weeks after the onset of the disability…

It is a condition precedent for receipt of a benefit under this section that the insured person have a substantial inability to perform the housekeeping and home maintenance services that he or she normally performed before the accident.

Prior to the accident the applicant was at home and in receipt of ODSP benefits. He credibly testified at trial with respect to his contributions to housekeeping and home maintenance. That testimony was not shaken in cross-examination, nor was it materially contradicted. The applicant’s evidence was corroborated by the report of L.D. dated September 7, 2012, tendered in evidence, which was prepared upon the basis of interviews with the applicant and with his wife. L.D.’s report indicates that the applicant expended 5.25 hours per week in contributions to housekeeping and home maintenance prior to the accident. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities and on the basis of the available evidence that this was the case and I so find.

That said, for the reasons outlined in the earlier discussion with respect to the applicant’s claim for attendant care, I am persuaded that the applicant required housekeeping and home maintenance services for the period from April 9, 2010 through April 8, 2011. I am satisfied that, as of the latter date, he would have been capable of the movement and self-direction to undertake the relatively minor housekeeping and home maintenance tasks which he had undertaken prior to the accident.

The applicant shall accordingly be paid housekeeping and home maintenance benefits at the rate of $100.00 per week from April 9, 2010 to April 8, 2011.

Is the Applicant entitled to receive medical benefits within the meaning of section 14 of the Schedule?

Section 14 of the Schedule provides, in part, as follows:

(1) The insurer shall pay an insured person who sustains an impairment as a result of an accident a medical benefit.

(2) The medical benefit shall pay for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the insured person as a result of the accident…

The applicant claims medical benefits as set forth in Schedule “A” to these Reasons. The insurer’s position is that the medical benefits claimed by the applicant are not reasonable and necessary.

The applicant’s hospital records and initial medical visits consistently reported injury to his left arm, shoulder, neck and lower back. The applicant reported headache and hearing loss and these symptoms were noted upon his attendance at various medical appointments in 2010 and 2011.

On the evidence of the surveillance tapes produced by the insurer, it is apparent that the applicant’s physical symptoms had substantially resolved by October 21, 2011. In view of the physical complaints consistently expressed by the applicant as recorded in the clinical notes and records, reports and documentation filed in evidence, I am satisfied that the medical benefits claimed by the applicant and outstanding for the calendar year 2010 are reasonable and necessary. I therefore allow the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 1, 2, and 3 under the rubric “Medical Benefits claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons in the total amount of $9,348.03.

In view of the strong and compelling evidence of the surveillance tapes produced by the insurer, I am not satisfied that the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 4, 5 & 6 under the rubric “Medical Benefits claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons are reasonable and necessary within the meaning of the Schedule and I accordingly disallow them.

Is the Applicant entitled to receive costs of examination within the meaning of section 24 of the Schedule?

The applicant claims costs of examination as set forth in Schedule “A” to these Reasons. The insurer’s position is that the medical benefits claimed by the applicant are not reasonable and necessary.

As I have explained elsewhere in these Reasons, I am satisfied that the applicant suffered psychological injury as a result of the accident. I am also satisfied that he suffered physical injury but that those injuries had substantially resolved by October 21, 2011 or earlier.

With respect to the costs of examination claimed by the applicant, I am not satisfied that he has proven his case as to the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 1, 9 and 10 under the rubric “Costs of Examination claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons, insofar as no copy of any of these three treatment plans was filed in evidence, nor did the applicant give evidence with respect to them. I accordingly disallow them as unproven.

With respect to the treatment plan enumerated as number 12 under the rubric “Costs of Examination claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons, I am not satisfied in view of the surveillance evidence of the insurer that the Occupational Therapy Assessment dated Sepember 21, 2012 by Tru-Path OT is reasonable and necessary. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant’s physical symptoms had resolved by October 21, 2011 and that this treatment plan does not appear justified on the basis of the available evidence.

I am, however, satisfied that the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11 under the rubric “Costs of Examination claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons are reasonable and necessary within the meaning of the Schedule. These various treatment plans relate to consultations undertaken during the twelve-month period after the accident. They relate to symptoms consistently reported by the applicant to physicians and specialists during that period. Moreover, the fact that some of the symptoms and concerns reported by the applicant to his physicians and specialists may possibly have been delusional does not render the consultations something other than reasonable and necessary.

I therefore allow the treatment plans enumerated as numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11 under the rubric “Costs of Examination claimed” in Schedule “A” to these Reasons in the total amount of $24,188.75.

EXPENSES:

If the parties are unable to reach an agreement on expenses, they may request an appointment before me in accordance with Rule 79 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

March 9, 2015

James Robinson Date Arbitrator

Schedule “A” to the Reasons of Arbitrator Robinson in FSCO file no. A11-0028991

Medical Benefits claimed

$2,464.37 OCF 18 dated June 7, 2010 by Dr. Sugar.
$1,520.72, OCF 18 dated July 28, 2010 by Dr. Sugar.
$5,362.94 for OCF 18 dated August 27, 2010 by Dr. Steiner.
$11,491.51 for OCF 18 dated October 2, 2012 by Tru-Path Occupational Therapy.
$5,126.15 for OCF 18 dated October 2, 2012 by Tru-Path Occupational Therapy.
$3,290.00 for OCF 18 dated October 2, 2012 by Tru-Path Occupational Therapy.

Costs of Examination claimed

$1,234.23 for Functional Abilities Evaluation by Dr. Sole on April 28, 2010.
$1,154.42 for In-Home Assessment by Dr. Heisel on April 28, 2010.
$2,961.87 for OT Assessment by Dr. Brown on May 26, 2010.
$3,225.63 for Orthopaedic Assessment by Dr. Langer on June 3, 2010.
$3,121.26 for Headache Assessment by Dr. Laibovitz on June 7, 2010.
$1,678.68 for Functional Abilities Evaluation by Andrew Haluskay on June 10, 2010.
$3,225.63 for Neurological Assessment by Dr. Jensen on August 16, 2010.
$4,621.26 for Chronic Pain Assessment by Dr. D'Onofrio on August 27, 2010.
$1,989.58 for Driver Anxiety Evaluation by Dr. Steiner on December 10, 2010.
$1,923.76 for Speech and OT Assessment by Leanne Shapiro on January 19, 2011.
$4,200.00 for Neurophysiological Assessment by Dr. J.D. Salmon on September 20, 2012.
$5,000.00 for Occupational Therapy Assessment by Tru-Path OT on September 21, 2012.

Financial Services Commission of Ontario