Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Commission des services financiers de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2015 ONFSCDRS 262

FSCO A12-001531

BETWEEN:

FERNANDO VEGA

Applicant

and

CERTAS DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

REASONS FOR DECISION

Before: Anne Sone

Heard: December 9, 10, and 11, 2013, February 21 and June 6, September 5, and November 21, 2014, at the offices of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario in Toronto

Appearances: Margaret Gratsias and Kwaku Bona for Mr. Vega David Murray for Certas Direct Insurance Company

Overview:

The Applicant, Fernando Vega, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on August 12, 2010. He applied for and received some statutory accident benefits from Certas Direct Insurance Company (“Certas”), payable under the Schedule.¹ The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and Mr. Vega applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended.

Issues:

The issues in this hearing are:

1. Is Mr. Vega entitled to an income replacement benefit at the rate of $400 per week from August 19, 2010 to August 12, 2012?

2. Is Certas liable to pay a special award because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to Mr. Vega?

3. Is Certas liable to pay Mr. Vega’s expenses in respect of the arbitration?

4. Is Mr. Vega liable to pay Certas’ expenses in respect of the arbitration?

5. Is Mr. Vega entitled to interest for the overdue payment of benefits?

At the pre-hearing, Mr. Vega claimed entitlement to benefits for attendant care and housekeeping. These claims were withdrawn at the start of the hearing.

Result:

1. Mr. Vega’s claims for an income replacement benefit and a special award are dismissed.

Motion regarding Mr. Vega’s Documents

At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Vega attempted to file a brief of documents. Certas objected on the basis of Rule 39.1 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code (Fourth Edition — Updated January 2014). Rule 39.1 states that all documents, reports (including experts’ reports) and assessments to be introduced at a hearing by either party must be served on the other party at least 30 days before the first day of the hearing.

Rule 39.1 also refers to Rule 39.2, which provides that in extraordinary circumstances, a party may seek an arbitrator’s permission to serve a document, report or assessment on the other party for use at a hearing less than 30 days before the first day of hearing.

Mr. Vega did not provide any evidence (oral, documentary or otherwise) that extraordinary circumstances existed in this case. Certas submitted that it would be prejudiced by Mr. Vega’s failure to provide this brief at least 30 days prior to the hearing.

Since Mr. Vega did not prove that extraordinary circumstances existed in this case, I did not permit this brief to be introduced as evidence at this hearing.

On August 12, 2010, Mr. Vega was riding his bike (on his way home from a job interview) when he was struck by a car making a turn at an intersection.

He was knocked onto the hood of the vehicle and slid off it to the ground. He testified that he may have lost consciousness for under a minute.

He was taken by ambulance to hospital. At the hospital, he was examined and released to the care of his family doctor. Mr. Vega stated that he was diagnosed with a mild concussion. No tests or x-rays were performed. No medication was prescribed.

He testified that he sustained injuries to his head, neck, left shoulder, back and left leg and attended physiotherapy sessions at Austin Albion Rehab Centre for a few months post-accident until the funding was cut off. He later received psychological counselling for a few months, which he found helpful.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Vega had worked 12.5 weeks of the last 52 at Longo's Supermarket (Longo’s). He also testified that he did some odd jobs for cash, including landscaping for his friend’s father and helping out with a friend’s demolition and renovation business. His recollection regarding the dates of these odd jobs was extremely vague. He did not produce any documents to verify this cash business. Nor were there any income tax returns or notices of assessment to show that he had declared it. When the accident occurred, Mr. Vega was looking for work.

Prior to the accident, Mr. Vega had received approximately 25 weeks of Employment Insurance (EI) benefits. However, he was not receiving EI benefits at the time of the accident.

His OCF-10 Election form dated August 16, 2010² claimed a Non-Earner benefit (NEB).

Mr. Vega submitted that he sent a letter to the insurer in January 2012 re-electing an income replacement benefit (IRB).

Certas states the letter was not addressed to it, and that it did not receive this letter.

For reasons elaborated below, I find that Mr. Vega did not prove that he made a re-election to IRB or that he provided a “reasonable explanation” regarding his delay in re-electing.

Mr. Vega submits that he qualified for an IRB based on including his EI payments in the calculation of working 26 weeks in the last 52.

By combining section 4 of the Schedule, (which relates to IRB eligibility criteria) and section 8 of the Schedule (which relates to gross income calculation), Mr. Vega also submits that he is eligible for an IRB benefit.

For the reasons elaborated below, I do not agree with these submissions.

In case I have erred in my decision that Mr. Vega failed to prove that he was eligible to receive an IRB, I also provide an analysis and my findings as to why I found that he was not entitled to an IRB due to a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of his employment.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

After Electing Non-Earner Benefits, can Mr. Vega Re-Elect Income Replacement Benefits in this case?

Following the accident, Mr. Vega submitted an Application for Accident Benefits (OCF-1)³ dated August 16, 2010 to Certas.

That Application indicates at Part 5 that Mr. Vega’s status at the time of the accident was “unemployed”, which he admitted in his testimony. The Application also indicates, in Part 8, that Mr. Vega’s injuries prevented him from working from August 12, 2010 and that an Employer’s Confirmation of Income (OCF-2) was to follow.

After receiving Mr. Vega’s Application for Accident Benefits, Certas replied with a letter dated November 1, 2010.⁴ That letter notes that due to conflicting information, Certas was unable to address Mr. Vega’s claim for either an IRB or a NEB. Certas also sought additional information with respect to Mr. Vega’s employment status. An Explanation of Benefits (OCF-9) confirming this request was included.

In cross-examination, Mr. Vega admitted that in correspondence dated November 9, 2010, his lawyers forwarded an Election of Income Replacement, Non-Earner or Caregiver Benefit (OCF‑10) to the insurer in which Mr. Vega elected a NEB.

If a person’s application for accident benefits indicates that he or she may qualify for more than one of an IRB, NEB or caregiver benefit, subsection 36(2) of the Schedule requires an insurer to notify that person that he or she must elect within 30 days after receiving the notice which benefit he or she wishes to receive. Under subsection 36(3), the insurer shall deliver this notice to the insured within 10 business days after receiving the person’s application.

Certas submits that if Mr. Vega failed to re-elect within the 30 day time limit set out above, then the insurer may be prejudiced by the delay. As such, Certas contends that the insured must have a reasonable explanation if he or she fails to comply with the 30 day time limit.

Mr. Vega submits that based on Gadacz and ING Insurance Company of Canada,⁵ he is entitled to re-elect the sort of weekly benefits he receives.

According to Director’s Delegate Makepeace in RBC General Insurance Company and Antony,⁶ assessing whether an insured has “a reasonable explanation” for failing to comply with a time limit in connection with re-election requires consideration of a number of factors including:

• how much time passed between the initial election and the purported re-election;

• the reasons for the delay;

• the insured person’s reason for seeking to re-elect;

• the effect of the re-election on the amount and duration of the benefits; and

• whether re-election would prejudice the insurer’s ability to investigate and assess the claim.

Mr. Vega testified that he executed a further OCF-10 to elect an IRB on January 27, 2012; however, Certas denied ever receiving this alleged OCF-10, and Mr. Vega was unable to produce a copy of it. Accordingly, I give little weight to this testimony.

Further, there was no credible evidence as to the reasons for the delay or why the re-election was being made. I also note that at the time that Certas conducted its section 42 assessments, it was on the basis that Mr. Vega was claiming a NEB. Accordingly, Certas’ medical examinations addressed that benefit, not an IRB. Therefore, in this case, re-election would prejudice Certas’ ability to investigate and assess the claim.

As a result, I find that Mr. Vega has not proven on a balance of probabilities that he has “a reasonable explanation” for failing to comply with a time limit in connection with his purported re-election.

In the event that I have erred in this finding, and it is found that Mr. Vega had a right to re-elect and did re-elect an IRB, I will now look at Mr. Vega’s claim for this benefit.

Does Mr. Vega’s claim for an Income Replacement Benefit comply with the requirements of the Schedule?

Under section 4 of the Schedule, in certain circumstances, the insurer shall pay an IRB to an insured person who sustains an impairment as a result of an accident. If the insured person was not employed at the time of the accident that insured person must meet a number of qualifications.

Since Mr. Vega was not employed at the time of the accident, he must comply with the requirements of subparagraph 4(1)2 of the Schedule.

In addition to complying with the provisions of subparagraph 4(1)2 iv, one of the two elements of subparagraph 4(1)2 ii must be satisfied. Accordingly, Mr. Vega must prove that either:

• he was employed for at least 26 weeks during the 52 weeks before the accident, or

• he was receiving benefits under the Employment Insurance Act (Canada) at the time of the accident.

Mr. Vega’s only confirmed employment in the 52 weeks prior to the accident was at Longo’s as a stocker. His employment file at Longo’s indicates that he worked there from February 2 to April 27, 2010 for a total of 12.5 weeks.⁷

Mr. Vega’s employment insurance file shows that his EI benefits ceased on January 24, 2010. Therefore, he was not receiving benefits under the Employment Insurance Act (Canada) at the time of the accident on August 12, 2010.

Mr. Vega submits that the time that he was receiving benefits under the Employment Insurance Act (Canada)⁸ should count towards the 26 weeks (during the 52 weeks prior to the accident) he needs to satisfy this condition under the Schedule. I do not agree. If the Legislature intended Mr. Vega’s interpretation, it could have specifically set this out in the Schedule. Instead, it very specifically uses the word “or” when describing the two elements set out above.

Mr. Vega submits that (although he was not employed at the time of the accident), he should receive an IRB because he qualifies under subparagraph 4(1) 2 iv of the Schedule. This section states as follows:

[A]s a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident, [the insured person] suffers a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of the employment in which the insured person spent the most time during the 52 weeks before the accident.

However, Mr. Vega omits to say that this section is conjunctive and requires that he has qualified under subparagraph 4(1) 2 ii of the Schedule. As discussed above, I have found that he does not.

Although the term “employment” may not be limited to those specific periods where work is being done and wages are being received, the case law indicates that a continuing employment relationship is a requisite condition to maintaining an “employed” status in those circumstances.⁹

Receiving employment insurance benefits is generally evidence of a cessation of the employment relationship, such that an insured should no longer be considered employed.¹⁰ Looking at the intentions and expectations of the parties concerned as well as the facts in this case, I find that Mr. Vega was not in a continuing employment relationship such that he could be said to be “employed.”¹¹

Mr. Vega also referred to subsection 8(4) of the Schedule, which states that for the purpose of determining the amount of an insured person’s IRB, the gross annual income from employment for a person who qualifies for a benefit under paragraph 2 of section 4 shall be deemed to be the person’s gross income from employment for the 52 weeks before the accident.

In addition, he referred to subsection 8(6) of the Schedule. This provision states that a determination of gross income shall include any EI benefits received.

It is unclear to me how subsections 8(4) and (6), which pertain to the calculation of an IRB (rather than entitlement to an IRB) have any relevance to this case.

In connection with statutory interpretation, Mr. Vega referred me to the case of Blue Mountain Resorts Ltd. v. Bok.¹² In Blue Mountain, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the provisions of a public welfare statute are to be interpreted generously. On the other hand, it also stated that this does not justify a limitless interpretation of their provisions.

Accordingly, I find that Mr. Vega’s claim for an IRB does not comply with the provisions of the Schedule.

In case I have erred in interpreting the provisions of the Schedule discussed above, I will now consider the next issue set out in section 4 of the Schedule. That is the question of whether Mr. Vega, as a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident, suffered a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of the employment in which he spent the most time during the 52 weeks before the accident.

Does Mr. Vega’s claim for an Income Replacement Benefit meet the substantial inability test in Section 4 of the Schedule?

Mr. Vega’s Credibility

Mr. Vega was a generally straight forward witness with respect to his physical issues. He did not show any marked tendency to exaggerate his physical and psychological symptoms post-accident. For the most part, his psychological test results confirm this observation.

However, when describing visiting a counsellor for psychological counselling in high school, he testified that it was for “Just a few visits.” On the contrary, he admitted on cross-examination that this therapy took place for eight to ten months.

In addition, Mr. Vega was a mediocre historian with respect to his work history. His testimony regarding past events was terse, vague, (especially with respect to dates) and at times misleading. Some examples of this include when he testified that he was laid off due to shortage of work,¹³ where the testimony or documents showed otherwise at:

• Breakaway Staffing Edge

• Longo’s, where he quit, and began receiving EI, and

• Big Al's Aquarium, where he was let go “because he did not have a good reason for missing work.”

As a result, I find that Mr. Vega was a somewhat, although not totally credible witness.

Mr. Vega’s pre-accident medical and employment history

Mr. Vega testified that prior to the accident, he did not have any physical or psychological issues that interfered with his employment or ability to perform activities of daily living. He admitted that in 2004, he was in a bar fight. That fight resulted in a fractured, shattered cheek, which required surgery to put in plates. He stated that “No psychological issues arose from this fight that I needed counselling for.” On cross-examination, Mr. Vega confirmed he went to a walk-in clinic in 2006 and complained enough about low back pain enough to warrant an x-ray.

Starting about 2005, Mr. Vega worked at a staffing agency called Breakaway Staffing Edge for approximately two to three years. He was sent to predominantly fork lift operator jobs.

Mr. Vega also admitted on cross-examination that he was receiving EI from August 2008 to 2009. He applied for those benefits in either June or July 2008.

Mr. Vega’s employment at Longo’s entailed unloading trailers that came in and stocking product on shelves. He performed this job from February 2 to April 27, 2010 (or for 12.5 weeks).

Mr. Vega’s EI records indicate that he applied for EI benefits on August 12, 2009. On his EI application form, his answer to the question: “Will you be returning to work with this employer?” was “Unknown.”

Mr. Vega’s post-accident employment history

A few weeks after the accident, Mr. Vega started working at Canpet as an order picker, but that only lasted for one day.

Mr. Vega started working in the receiving department at Big Al’s Aquarium on September 17, 2010, which was approximately six weeks after his accident on August 12, 2010. His employment file shows that he worked there to March 3, 2011 and again from March 23, 2011 until September 4, 2011. He then returned a third time from September 3, 2012 to November 8, 2012.

In order to obtain the job at Big Al’s Aquarium, his physiotherapist wrote a letter dated September 20, 2010 stating the following:

Mr. Vega is able to lift and bend as tolerated. He does not have recommended activity/work restrictions at this time.

When he found this work too heavy, he was transferred to the order picking department.

Mr. Vega testified that he was let go due to shortage of work for his abilities — not due to his inability to perform the work. On the other hand, his employment file at Big Al’s Aquarium indicates something different. In an e-mail, written in October 2012, his supervisor states that “Fernando Vega called in, and I fired him because he did not have a good reason for missing work.”

Insurer’s Examinations

Mr. Vega submitted a claim dated August 16, 2010 to Certas for a NEB. He also claimed a housekeeping and home maintenance benefit. As a result, Certas sent Mr. Vega for insurer’s examinations regarding these benefits. I have found earlier that there is no credible evidence Mr. Vega ever notified Certas that he was changing his election from a NEB to an IRB.¹⁴

When Certas’ assessors examined Mr. Vega, they were investigating the benefits that he was claiming at the time. Indeed their reports indicate that he told these assessors that he was currently working. Mr. Vega is claiming that the weight of these reports is undermined because the assessors were dealing with benefits other than income replacement.

However, Dr. Marc Mandel, a psychologist who examined Mr. Vega on behalf of Certas, indicated that he would not have conducted his tests or examination any differently, had he been asked to answer the question of whether Mr. Vega suffered from a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of his employment, so as to be entitled to an IRB.

In his report dated February 3, 2011, Dr. Mandel diagnosed Mr. Vega with an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood. However, he testified that this was minor and that Mr. Vega was able to work, and was, in fact, working at that time. In an addendum report dated March 8, 2012, he states that after reviewing additional documentation, his “original opinion and results obtained in the Psychological Assessment that took place on January 24, 2011 remain accurate …”

I found Dr. Mandel’s reports to be thorough, balanced and reasonable. Under these circumstances, I give full weight to his reports, and to his opinion that from a psychological perspective, Mr. Vega did not suffer from a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of the employment in which he spent the most time during the 52 weeks before the accident.

Dr. Osama Gharsaa, an orthopaedic surgeon who examined Mr. Vega on behalf of Certas, prepared a report dated February 3, 2011, which concluded that Mr. Vega was not disabled from carrying on a normal life. Regarding treatment to improve function, he encouraged home-based exercises to help with his conditioning, as well as a strong core strengthening program to help with his back pain. He testified that Mr. Vega did not have an orthopaedic impairment at the time he was examined. His report notes that Mr. Vega self-reported pain in his back, left shoulder and knee, as well as occasional neck pain. While Dr. Ghaarsa also noted that Mr. Vega had a limp (slight antalgic gait on the left side) and that he had mild thinning of the cartilage in his left knee,¹⁵ he did not find an impairment that would prevent Mr. Vega from performing his activities of daily living (ADLs).

With respect to treatment, he stated that Mr. Vega had uncomplicated soft tissue injuries that would resolve in 6 to 12 weeks, and that no further treatment was required.

As he was not asked to do so, Dr. Gharsaa did not address the issue in his report of whether Mr. Vega suffered from a substantial inability to perform essential work duties; however, he testified that he found that from a musculoskeletal point of view, Mr. Vega did not have any impairment when he examined him.

Dr. Gharsaa also testified that he was only concerned with Mr. Vega’s abilities from an orthopaedic standpoint of “bone, muscle, ligaments and tendons.” Dr. Gharsaa addressed the effects of pain on Mr. Vega’s functioning by stating that as long as he could find no underlying orthopaedic issue, it would not harm Mr. Vega to perform ADLs and work duties, even with pain. Indeed, Dr. Gharsaa testified that in the longer term, from an orthopaedic point of view, not doing your job was bad for your outcome in terms of de-conditioning.

Dr. Gharsaa admitted that he was not a pain specialist. Accordingly, I give less weight to his report and testimony because of his limited expertise in this area. In addition, although he listed Mr. Vega’s work duties in his report, he did not opine on Mr. Vega’s ability to perform them.

Conclusion regarding the substantial inability to perform essential tasks of employment test:

I have some comments regarding Mr. Vega’s claim for an IRB. They are as follows:

• There is no evidence that Certas received a form electing an IRB, which would have allowed it to adjust his claim for this benefit.

• Within six weeks of the accident, Mr. Vega started working (for the first time in several months) at a job that had similar physical requirements as the work he did the most over the past year.

• At the time he started working at this job, his physiotherapist wrote a letter, which stated the following: “Although in some pain, he was able to perform this job and a somewhat lighter one for approximately one year”.

• It appears Mr. Vega was let go because of a failure to show up without explanation although at the hearing, he testified that he was let go due to shortage of work for his abilities.

• Although Dr. Mandel’s report and testimony confirmed that he had diagnosed Mr. Vega with an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood, he opined at the hearing that this was minor and that he was able to work.

• I place little weight on incidents in Mr. Vega's pre-accident physical and psychological history as he had shown himself able to work after these occurrences, and the psychological counselling he received, while more prolonged than he stated in his testimony, had happened approximately nine years prior to the accident.

• Mr. Vega did not produce any expert evidence of a substantial inability to perform his pre-accident employment tasks. The only expert evidence produced demonstrated that he did not suffer from a psychological or physical impairment that would prevent him from completing the tasks of his pre-accident employment.

• Mr. Vega has not declared his income under the Income Tax Act.¹⁶ Accordingly, there is no reported income to use to calculate the amount of a potential IRB pursuant to section 64.1 of the Schedule.¹⁷

I also have the following comments about Certas’ defence of this claim:

• I place little weight on the report or testimony of Dr. Gharsaa, as he was not providing an opinion about an IRB. However, I also note that at the time of the report, Mr. Vega was not claiming an IRB.

• Dr. Gharsaa is also not a specialist in pain which is the crux of Mr. Vega's physical difficulties. I rely on Dr. Mandel's report regarding Mr. Vega’s psychological state because he testified that although Mr. Vega had an impairment, it was minor. In addition, Dr. Mandel testified that he would not have done anything differently had he been asked to opine on the substantial inability test.

It is well established that in these sorts of cases, the onus of proof is on the Applicant.¹⁸

The most telling evidence in this case regarding the substantial inability test, is that shortly after the accident, Mr. Vega obtained a job at Big Al’s Aquarium with similar physical requirements to his job at Longo’s. Although he did suffer from some pain related to his work duties, he performed them and managed to get a transfer to a position that was more suited to his abilities. Mr. Vega testified about the limitations caused by his pain; however, he managed to work at Big Al’s the majority of the 104 week post-accident period, and I was therefore not persuaded that he suffered from a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of his employment.

From a psychological perspective, he was diagnosed with an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood. As stated earlier, in Dr. Mandel’s opinion this would not substantially disable him from the essential tasks of his employment. As Dr. Mandel conducted a very full and thorough examination, I accept his opinion.

Mr. Vega may have been substantially disabled for a short period of time between the one week after the accident and when he began to work; however, there was no cogent evidence to substantiate this differentiation, and clearly he was actively seeking work during most, if not all of this time period.

Accordingly, I find that Mr. Vega, as a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident, did not suffer from a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of the employment in which he spent the most time during the 52 weeks before the accident.

In any event, since Mr. Vega has not declared his income under the Income Tax Act, there is no reported income to use to calculate the amount of a potential IRB pursuant to section 64.1 of the Schedule.

Special Award

Under subsection 282(10) of the Insurance Act, an arbitrator may award a lump sum if he or she finds that an insurer has unreasonably withheld or delayed payments. After the accident, Mr. Vega made a claim for a NEB. Certas had a psychologist and an orthopaedic surgeon conduct examinations of Mr. Vega. Their reports concluded that he was not entitled to a NEB.

There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Vega ever even notified Certas that he was even claiming an IRB until it received his Application for Mediation. So there was no reason for Certas’ medical examiners to address this issue in their reports.

Further, I have found that he did not qualify for an IRB under the initial requirements of section 4 of the Schedule. In addition, I have found that he lacked a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of the employment in which he spent the most time during the 52 weeks before the accident.

Since I have dismissed Mr. Vega’s claim for an IRB, he is not entitled to a special award. Accordingly, I dismiss this claim.

EXPENSES:

If the parties are unable to resolve the issue of expenses, a hearing in accordance with Rule 79 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code (Fourth Edition — Updated January 2014) may be requested within 30 days.

December 1, 2015

Anne Sone Arbitrator

Date

Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Commission des services financiers de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2015 ONFSCDRS 262

FSCO A12-001531

BETWEEN:

FERNANDO VEGA

Applicant

and

CERTAS DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

ARBITRATION ORDER

Under section 282 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended, it is ordered that:

1. Mr. Vegas claims for an income replacement benefit and a special award are dismissed.

December 1, 2015

Anne Sone Arbitrator

Date

Footnotes

1. 1The Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule — Accidents on or after November 1, 1996, Ontario Regulation 403/96, as amended.
2. 2Enclosed with a letter from his legal representatives dated November 9, 2010.
3. 3Exhibit 11.
4. 4Exhibit 12.
5. 5(FSCO A07-000276, September 21, 2007).
6. 6(FSCO P03-00023, July 22, 2004).
7. 7Prior to his position at Longo’s, Mr. Vega was employed by The Staffing Edge as a forklift operator from February 12, 2006 to October 29, 2008.
8. 8Mr. Vega received benefits under Employment Insurance Act (Canada) from August 16, 2009 to January 24, 2010 for a total of 22 weeks.
9. 9Longworth and Economical Mutual Insurance Company (FSCO A05-001539, May 18, 2006); Madore and Co‑Operators General Insurance Company (OIC A-004305, August 24, 1994).
10. 10Madore above, and Longworth and Economical Mutual Insurance Company (FSCO A05-001539, May 18, 2006).
11. 11Gallaghar and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (FSCO P03-00016, August 11, 2004); Moussali and Allstate Insurance Company of Canada (OIC A96-001077, July 23, 1997.)
12. 12(2013) 2013 ONCA 75, 114 O.R. (3d) 321 ONCA.
13. 13Concerning his employment at Big Al’s Aquarium, Mr. Vega testified that he was let go due to shortage of work for his abilities.
14. 14Mr. Vega testified that he sent a letter to the insurer in January 2012 re-electing an IRB, but Certas denies ever receiving such a letter.
15. 15Patella femoral syndrome which Dr. Garsaa opined was not caused by the accident, since it would have taken much longer to develop.
16. 16R.S.O. 1990, c.I.2
17. 17Uribe and Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company (FSCO A08-000880, April 29, 2009).
18. 18TTC Insurance Company Limited and Wootton (FSCO P04-00004, November 2, 2004).