Neutral Citation: 2004 ONFSCDRS 193

FSCO A02-000307

FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF ONTARIO

BETWEEN:

SAVITHIRI SIVANANTHAN

Applicant

and

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

DECISION ON ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST AND EXPENSES

Before:

Anne Sone

Heard:

By telephone conference call on June 24, 2004.

Written submissions were received on July 5, 2004.

Appearances:

Moira Gracey for Mrs. Sivananthan

Christopher J. Schnarr for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Issues:

The Applicant, Savithiri Sivananthan, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on October 21, 1999. She applied for and received statutory accident benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), payable under the Schedule.¹ State Farm terminated weekly income replacement benefits on June 15, 2000. The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and Mrs. Sivananthan applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended. After an arbitration hearing, I made the following order dated February 16, 2003:

1. Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to receive a weekly income replacement benefit of $293 per week from June 16, 2000 to date, and ongoing, pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of the Schedule.

2. If the parties cannot agree on the entitlement to, or the amount of the expenses of this proceeding, they may request a date for a hearing on this issue by writing to the Commission within 30 days of the date of this order, in accordance with Rule 79.1 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code (Fourth Edition, May 31, 2001).

3. If the parties cannot agree on the issue of entitlement to interest for overdue payment of benefits, pursuant to section 46(2) of the Schedule, they may request a date for a hearing on this issue by writing to the Commission within 30 days of the date of this order.

The parties did not agree on the entitlement to, or the amount of expenses of the proceeding; nor did they agree on the issue of entitlement to interest for overdue payment of benefits. At the request of the parties a hearing was held on these issues, followed by written submissions.

Result:

1. Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to interest on the overdue payment of her benefits.

2. Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to legal fees in the amount of $9,249.05, plus $647.43 GST; and disbursements in the amount of $7,474.30 plus $523.20 GST.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

Entitlement to Interest for Overdue Payment of Benefits

Background:

After paying Mrs. Sivananthan weekly income replacement benefits from October 28, 1999, State Farm forwarded to Mrs. Sivananthan, an insurer's examination report of Dr. Joseph Kwok, orthopaedic surgeon, dated January 7, 2000. On January 19, 2000, it delivered a notice of stoppage of weekly benefits and a request for assessment, in form OCF-17/59. State Farm advised Mrs. Sivananthan that her weekly income replacement benefit would be stopped effective February 1, 2000, unless she attended a disability assessment at a designated assessment centre ("DAC"). On January 28, 2000, Mrs. Sivananthan disputed the stoppage of weekly benefits and requested an assessment. The requested disability assessment took place in May 2000 and on June 15, 2000, State Farm received the results of the report prepared by the DAC.

The DAC report concluded that "there is no support to Mrs. Sivananthan's claim that she continues to suffer from a disability in respect to income replacement benefits as a result of the motor vehicle accident of October 21, 1999." As a consequence of the DAC report, State Farm stopped payment of income replacement benefits, effective June 15, 2000.

Mrs. Sivananthan disputed State Farm's stopping payment of the income replacement benefit and, on February 16, 2004, as noted above, I decided that she was entitled to receive a weekly income replacement benefit in the amount of $293 per week from June 16, 2000 to date and ongoing.

Applicant's Submissions regarding the Payment of Interest:

Mrs. Sivananthan submits that she is entitled to interest on the income replacement benefits she was awarded. In Attavar v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that, where an insurer follows the recommendations of a DAC, and the DAC is later found to be incorrect, interest accrues from the date the insured was entitled to the weekly benefit, not the date of the decision.²

In a series of related appeals (the "Related Appeals"), the Director's Delegate deals with the issue of interest in the context of medical or rehabilitation benefits that had been refused or were subject to the DAC process.³ He held that interest is not payable, and the medical or rehabilitation benefit is not overdue until such time as the arbitrator orders the benefit to be paid.

Since the rulings in the Related Appeals, Mrs. Sivananthan pointed out that arbitrators and director's delegates have not applied them with respect to weekly benefits. They have ordered interest to be paid on past weekly benefits, not merely from the date of the decision.⁴

Analysis of the Rationale in the Related Cases

Mrs. Sivananthan submits that the decisions in the Related Appeals do not apply where the contested benefit is a weekly benefit rather than a medical or rehabilitation benefit. She states that the Director's Delegate in the Related Appeals acknowledged that the Ontario Court of Appeal's ruling on this point in Attavar is law with respect to weekly benefits.

Mrs. Sivananthan submits that the reasoning in the Related Appeals focuses on the language of the Schedule. The interest provision in section 46 of the 1996 Schedule states that interest applies from the date that benefits are overdue. The Related Appeals note that the Schedule does not impose any deadline for payment of medical or rehabilitation benefits, short of a decision, unless there is a DAC report. The DAC provisions relieve the insurer from the requirement to pay if the DAC report is negative. Thus, according to these decisions, the benefits do not become "overdue" until there is an arbitration decision.

The Related Appeals, after considering Attavar, state "the provisions governing the payment of medical and rehabilitation benefits are far more important to our deliberations because these sections contain direct links between the DAC rules and the definition of overdue."

By contrast, weekly benefits have deadlines for payment. Subsection 35(2) requires payment of an income replacement benefit within 14 days of an application, and subsection 35(4) requires payment every two weeks thereafter.

Subsection 37(4) provides that the insurer may stop paying the benefit if there is a negative DAC report. Mrs. Sivananthan notes that this language is permissive, not mandatory. The insurer is entitled to look at the entirety of the evidence, and if the DAC report is not persuasive or if the insurer determines that the claimant is in fact entitled to benefits, it may continue paying the weekly benefit.

Mrs. Sivananthan submits that the insurer has an ongoing duty to adjust the claims file in light of new information, even where an arbitration or litigation has been commenced. When the benefits at issue are income replacement benefits, an arbitrator would have to determine at what point in the process the weekly benefits became payable after the insured challenged the DAC report. This is not tenable for every arbitration.⁵

Mrs. Sivananthan states that the permissive wording of the section implies that if the claimant is entitled to income replacement benefits, then the insurer is not relieved of its obligation to pay under the Schedule, whatever the outcome of the DAC process may be. In her view, this interpretation is consistent with the rights and obligations of the insurer to continue adjusting and evaluating entitlement to weekly benefits during the dispute proceedings.

The Related Appeals note that it is clear that the insurer's ultimate obligation to pay for treatment is determined by the adjudicator, not the DAC assessment.

Subsection 37(6) of the Schedule states: "Nothing in this section prevents a person from disputing a stoppage in the payment of a benefit in accordance with sections 279 to 283 of the Insurance Act and section 50 of this Regulation and, if it is finally determined that payment of the benefit should not have been stopped, the insurer shall, (a) resume payment of the benefit; and (b) pay any amounts under the benefit that were not paid." [My underlining].

Mrs. Sivananthan submits that "any amounts under the benefit" includes any interest that has accrued on the benefits.

The interest rate under the Schedule is not a penalty.

In Mrs. Sivananthan's view, the interest rate under the Schedule is not a penalty. The Related Appeals denied interest from the date of denial partly as a result of a determination that the interest rate under the Schedule represented a penalty against the insurer.

Mrs. Sivananthan points out that a number of cases, both at the Commission and in the courts, including the Court of Appeal, have found that the 2% monthly compounded interest rate prescribed by the Schedule is not punitive in nature.⁶

According to Mrs. Sivananthan, there is no difference between the meaning of a "punitive" measure and a "penalty". In fact, in those cases, the words "punitive" and "penalty" were essentially synonymous.⁷

According to Mrs. Sivananthan, it is semantically untenable to find that the interest rate under the Schedule, while not punitive, represents a penalty.

Parity between the parties does not exist in the dispute of weekly benefits.

In the Related Cases, another reason cited for not applying interest from the date of denial was because it would impair the parity between the parties that exists in the Schedule.

Medical and rehabilitation benefits are a fixed sum paid to a third party. Mrs. Sivananthan argues that there is parity in the dispute resolution system described by Related Cases, in that if the DAC assessment is positive, the insurer must pay pending dispute and obtains no interest if successful; whereas, if the DAC assessment is negative, the insured person must pay pending dispute and, according to the Related Cases, obtains no interest on the sum if successful.

However, Mrs. Sivananthan states that in the case of income replacement benefits, this parity does not occur if interest is not payable from the date of a negative DAC assessment, where entitlement is determined at arbitration. If the DAC assessment is negative, the applicant has no alternative but the lengthy dispute resolution process; whereas, if the DAC assessment is positive, the insurer has the alternative of paying income replacement benefits for a reasonable time, and then obtaining an insurer's examination if it thinks things may have changed. It can then terminate benefits if the insurer's examination does not favour the applicant.

Unlike the insurer, the applicant has no power to change the status of payments between a DAC report and the arbitration hearing. Control over the payments rests entirely with the insurer until the arbitration hearing.

According to Mrs. Sivananthan, parity was not the legislative intent with respect to weekly benefits. The intent was to level the dispute resolution playing field by increasing the costs of dispute resolution for the party with more power and resources, thus discouraging denials of legitimate claims. She contends that this balancing is reflected throughout the Schedule. For example, it is reflected in the differing fees in the dispute resolution process.

In her view, another indicator that parity is not a goal of the Schedule is the fact that insurers are not able to apply for arbitration. Only the insured person can bring a dispute to arbitration. This recognizes the power of insurers to control the claim through payment or denial, while the insured has recourse only to the dispute resolution process.

Mrs. Sivananthan argues that the insurer's power to control the claim exists even where the Schedule indicates it must pay. For example, there are instances in which insurers have terminated an income replacement benefit after a positive DAC assessment, despite the provisions of the Schedule requiring payment. As a result, the insured has been forced to arbitration to resolve the dispute.⁸

Mrs. Sivananthan submits that any excess in the interest rate from the real costs of borrowing faced by the insured is part of the framework of recognition in the Schedule of the imbalance of power and resources between insurance companies, by definition large, well-resourced institutions, and insured individuals.

The Related Appeals state that the incentive to pay legitimate claims resulting from the interest rate in the Schedule is negated if the interest is payable in any event. Mrs. Sivananthan submits that this is true, but it is not the case that interest is payable in any event. If the insured is found at arbitration not to be entitled to the benefits, neither the benefits nor the interest is payable. Thus, the incentive, and the consequent levelling of the playing field, only apply when the insured is denied benefits to which he or she is entitled.

Purposive analysis of the interest rate on weekly benefits in the Schedule:

As stated above, the Related Appeals all relate to medical and rehabilitation benefits. Medical and rehabilitation benefits are a fixed sum due to a third party. Usually, they have interest accruing for which the applicant is responsible at commercial rates. Mrs. Sivananthan agrees with the observation that the 2% interest rate is more than compensatory in medical and rehabilitation cases, as it would likely represent a windfall to the applicant and thus, a sort of penalty to the insurer.

Mrs. Sivananthan reasons that income replacement benefits represent a stream of income upon which applicants depend for their living expenses, rather than a fixed sum for fixed services. When an insured's income replacement benefits are terminated, that person usually has no source of income on which to live. At the same time, the insured continues to have costs for rent, mortgage, food, insurance, childcare, utilities, and so forth, commensurate with his or her standard of living, while working at full wage. As such, the opportunity cost of the benefits, which interest is intended to cover, is not the possible interest rate the insured person could earn on the benefits if invested, but rather the interest rate or credit cost of money to cover the costs of living.

In Mrs. Sivananthan's view, the legislature intended to compensate an insured person for not having use of her money.⁹ Without an income stream, insured persons are rarely able to obtain new credit in the form of credit lines or personal loans. If they are able to obtain credit, it is likely to be at a higher rate than average, given the risk inherent in being a debtor without a source of income. Thus, in order to meet their obligations, insured persons are often forced to turn to high-cost credit, often through credit cards which carry interest rates as high as 18% or more. They face late payment fees on bills that amount to more than 2% interest monthly. They may be unable to meet payments and face legal costs on collection actions.¹⁰ Thus, according to Mrs. Sivananthan, the 2% monthly interest rate on weekly benefits in the Schedule does not represent a windfall to the insured person in the same way it might when applied to medical and rehabilitation benefits. In contrast, if interest is not payable between a negative DAC assessment and a successful arbitration, the insurer stands to benefit from the use of the insured's money for the duration of the process, while the insured will not obtain any interest to compensate for the value of the money withheld for that period.

Purposive analysis - Discouraging use of the DAC system:

According to Mrs. Sivananthan, another way in which weekly benefits are different from medical and rehabilitation benefits is that a DAC assessment is mandatory if an insured person wishes to dispute a denial of a medical or rehabilitation benefit. However, a disability DAC assessment is not mandatory in the case of weekly benefits. Imposing the same interest rules on income replacement benefits, as have recently been decided for medical and rehabilitation benefits, would defeat the objectives of the legislature in providing the option of DAC assessments to insured people.

If choosing a DAC assessment carries with it the significant negative consequence of no interest accruing during the dispute resolution period, and if the DAC report is erroneously negative, then Mrs. Sivananthan submits that insured people will be discouraged from using the DAC system for weekly benefits, when no such penalty exists if a DAC assessment is not undertaken at all.

Assuming that DAC results are not always contested by either party, the result of discouraging use of DAC assessments will be more arbitration proceedings and fewer speedily resolved disputes. Such an outcome would be contrary to the intention of the no-fault system, which is to provide the most just, quickest and least expensive resolution of the dispute.

State Farm's Submissions regarding the issue of interest:

State Farm's position is that interest is due and owing only as of the date of the decision on February 16, 2004. It submits that February 16, 2004 was the day on which the income replacement benefit became payable and thus "overdue" as that term is used in the Schedule.

Framework for analysis regarding "overdue"payments

State Farm is of the view that the statutory language in the 1994 Schedule being considered in Attavar differs from and therefore does not apply to the 1996 Schedule. It states that the Court of Appeal in Attavar reached its conclusions because there was no direct link between the payment provisions contained in the 1994 Schedule, and the rights of an insurer to stop payment during the DAC process. The payment provisions did not contain specific authorizations for the insurer to stop payment following a DAC result that held that no benefit was owing.

In addition, under the 1994 Schedule, the definition of "overdue" was made expressly conditional on a failure to pay benefits within 14 days after receiving the application. In State Farm's submission, the definition of "overdue" under the 1996 Schedule is different and cannot be interpreted in the same manner as in Attavar.

Furthermore, in State Farm's view, the legislative change must be considered purposeful. By creating a direct link between the payment provisions and the DAC process and thereby creating a right for the insurer to stop payment in certain circumstances, the Legislature must also be presumed to have affected a change in how interest is to be calculated.

Section 46 of the 1996 Schedule governs the payment of interest on "overdue benefits." It states:

46(1) An amount payable in respect of a benefit is overdue if the insurer fails to pay the benefit within the time required under this Part.

(2) If payment of a benefit under this Regulation is overdue, the insurer shall pay interest on the overdue amount for each day the amount is overdue from the date the amount became overdue at the rate of 2 per cent per month compounded monthly.

State Farm submits that the payment provisions of section 38 (medical benefits) do not differ in substance from the payment provisions set out in section 37 (weekly benefits). Accordingly, in its view, the principles set forth by the Director's Delegate in the Related Cases are applicable to the facts of this case.

For example, according to State Farm, after following the DAC report of June 15, 2000, it was under no obligation whatsoever to pay income replacement benefits to the Applicant.

The insurer's obligation to pay the disputed benefits did not arise until such time as there was a positive decision from a judge or arbitrator that such benefits were owing, in this case, as of February 16, 2004.

In State Farm's view, by not awarding interest for weekly benefits, insureds would have an incentive to pursue the dispute resolution process more quickly.

Conclusion regarding Interest:

In my view, a finding that an applicant is entitled to weekly benefits is what is relevant to determining whether interest is payable.

Section 4 of the 1996 Schedule provides that the "insurer shall pay an insured person ... an income replacement benefit, if the insured person meets any of the following qualifications." Therefore, the insurer's requirement to pay arises from the insured meeting the test of entitlement.

Section 46 states that "an amount payable in respect of a benefit is overdue if the insurer fails to pay the benefit within the time required" under Part X. In Part X, under subsection 35(4), an insurer is required to pay an income replacement benefit at least once every second week. In other words, the insurer must pay if the person meets the test of entitlement.

Subsection 37(1) makes it clear that the premise for the insurer stopping weekly benefits is if it determines that the person is not entitled to these benefits. Under subsection 37(4), the insurer may stop paying the benefit if the DAC is negative. Therefore, the premise is again a lack of entitlement. This section is essentially providing that a negative DAC is prima facie proof of lack of entitlement.

Under subsection 37(6), if it is finally determined that payment of the weekly "benefit should not have been stopped, the insurer shall (a) resume payment of the benefit; and (b) pay any amounts under the benefit that were not paid." In effect, an arbitrator's decision means that the insurer should not have stopped payment under subsection 37(4), despite the permissive language there. Accordingly, since it should not have stopped payment, the insurer was obligated to pay under subsection 35(4) and, therefore, interest is owed on the overdue benefit under section 46.

I also note that in the 1996 Schedule, the wording about the effect of a negative DAC assessment for a medical or rehabilitation benefit differs significantly from the wording concerning the effect of a negative DAC assessment for a weekly benefit.

Accordingly, I find that the reasoning in the Related Cases concerning interest awards for medical and rehabilitation benefits does not apply to this case which concerns an interest award for an income replacement benefit.

I agree that Attavar and Mercier were 1994 Schedule cases, whose wording is somewhat different, so they do not directly apply. However, I am of the view that the broader reasoning does apply.

State Farm has suggested that interest should only be ordered in cases when there is non-compliance. For example, if an insurer has not followed procedure, or if it has not paid benefits in the time it was supposed to pay the benefits. This is essentially a submission that interest is punitive, which has been dealt with and rejected on numerous occasions. If an insurer unreasonably withholds paying benefits, then it may also be liable to pay a special award.

In State Farm's view, by not awarding interest for weekly benefits, an insured would have an incentive to pursue the dispute resolution process more quickly. However, this can end up penalizing an insured for trying to work, after a DAC assessment which says he or she can work. I do not believe that this is the result that the Schedule is trying to achieve. Furthermore, a denial of benefits, by itself, provides an insured with incentive to pursue his or her rights in a timely way. Accordingly, I conclude that Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to interest on the overdue payment of her benefits.

EXPENSES:

Entitlement:

The criteria for awarding expenses are found in section 12 of Ontario Regulation 664, as recently amended by Regulation 275/03, effective October 1, 2003. These criteria are also found in Rules 75 and 76 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.¹¹ In an award of expenses, an arbitrator is to consider the following factors:

(a) each party's degree of success in the outcome of the proceeding;

(b) any written offers to settle made in accordance with Rule 76;

(c) whether novel issues are raised in the proceeding;

(d) the conduct of a party or a party's representative that tended to prolong, obstruct, or hinder the proceeding, including a failure to comply with undertakings and orders;

(e) whether any aspect of the proceeding was improper, vexatious or unnecessary.

I will discuss the factors which I believe apply in this case.

Degree of success

Mrs. Sivananthan succeeded in proving her claim for the benefits in dispute. She was successful on the procedural motion regarding the qualification of an expert witness raised during the hearing. Mrs. Sivananthan's impairment was unusual, and thus the issues were difficult and fairly complex. She was also successful on the issue of interest.

Written offers to settle

On January 8, 2003, after the conclusion of mediation and prior to the conclusion of the arbitration, State Farm made a written offer to settle of $7,500.00 for the issues in dispute, which at that time included medical and rehabilitation benefits as well as income replacement benefits. Mrs. Sivananthan was awarded more than the offer made by State Farm.

On January 13, 2003, Mrs. Sivananthan made a written offer to settle of $34,000 plus reinstatement of her benefits. Mrs. Sivananthan was awarded more than her own offer to settle.

Novel issues in the proceeding

State Farm raised a novel issue in the proceeding in challenging whether a vocational assessor can be qualified as an expert to provide opinion evidence as to whether Mrs. Sivananthan meets the post-104 week test for income replacement benefits. That issue had not specifically been dealt with before at the Commission. Mrs. Sivananthan was successful on this issue at the arbitration.

The conduct of a party prolonging or obstructing the hearing

I thank both counsel for their extensive and helpful submissions, and particularly commend counsel for the Applicant for consistently meeting her time estimates for her examinations and submissions during the hearing.

Conclusion regarding entitlement:

Given the factors that I have cited above, I find that Mrs. Sivananthan was entitled to her expenses in connection with this arbitration.

Quantum of Fees and Disbursements:

Mrs. Sivananthan submitted that in view of the above factors, expenses should be awarded at the maximum rate of $150 per hour, pursuant to Rule 78 of the Code. Although this was her first arbitration, Mrs. Sivananthan's counsel, Ms. Gracey, conducted herself in a very competent manner. State Farm suggested adding a 15% premium to the minimum rate resulting in an hourly fee of $80.90 per hour. Under all the circumstances of the case, I find that $100 would be a fair amount for her hourly rate.

Mrs. Sivananthan claimed expenses for 90.34 hours of Ms. Gracey's time. Ms. Gracey noted that her phone dockets between March and October, 2002 were lost due to computer problems, and therefore not claimed. State Farm objected to one hour of the time after the hearing that Ms. Gracey docketed, on the basis that it was unnecessary. Overall, I find that Mrs. Sivanathan's claim for 90.34 hours of Ms. Gracey's time for this arbitration is reasonable. At an hourly rate of $100, this comes to $9,034.00.

Mrs. Sivananthan also claimed for 18.7 hours of Elizabeth Frade's time at the rate of $23 per hour. State Farm objected on the basis that one-half of Ms. Frade's time was spent performing secretarial duties, as opposed to law clerk duties. Rule 78.2 of the Code does not provide for expense awards for secretaries. Under these circumstances, I find that Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to an award of 9.35 hours of Ms. Frade's time at the rate of $23 per hour, which comes to $215.05.

Mrs. Sivananthan is claiming $7,563.09 for disbursements. Of this amount, $1,588.79 was paid for an expert's report produced by JVS of Greater Toronto for an Assessment - Vocational Evaluation and Report. She acknowledges that $88.79 should be deducted off this amount, since $1,500.00 is the maximum she can claim for an expert's report. State Farm did not object to any of the other disbursements. Accordingly, I find that Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to $7,474.30 for her disbursements.

Conclusion regarding fees and disbursements:

Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I find that Mrs. Sivananthan is entitled to legal fees in the amount of $9,249.05, plus $647.43 GST; and disbursements in the amount of $7,474.30, plus $523.20 GST.

December 31, 2004

Anne Sone Arbitrator

Date

Neutral Citation: 2004 ONFSCDRS 193

FSCO A02-000307

FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF ONTARIO

BETWEEN:

SAVITHIRI SIVANANTHAN

Applicant

and

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

ARBITRATION ORDER

Under section 282 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended, it is ordered that:

1. State Farm shall pay Mrs. Sivananthan interest on the overdue payment of her benefits.

2. State Farm shall pay Mrs. Sivananthan's legal fees in the amount of $9,249.05, plus $647.43 GST; and disbursements in the amount of $7,474.30 plus $523.20 GST.

December 31, 2004

Anne Sone Arbitrator

Date

Footnotes

1. 1The Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule — Accidents on or after November 1, 1996, Ontario Regulation 403/96, as amended.
2. 2Attavar v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, (2003), 2003 CanLII 7430 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 199 (C.A.), Mercier v. Royal & SunAlliance 2003 CanLII 21638 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 1233 (Ont. C.A.).
3. 3Pa fco Insurance Company Limited and Langdon (FSCO P02-00017, July 17, 2003); Glinka and Dufferin Mutual Insurance Company (FSCO P01-00002, July 17, 2003); Allstate Insurance Company of Canada and Khaledi (FSCO P01-00046, July 17, 2003); and Allstate Insurance Company of Canada and Amoa-Williams (FSCO P01-00052, July 17, 2003).
4. 4Trottier and Royal & SunAlliance Insurance Company of Canada (FSCO P03-00019, December 15, 2003) and Rumak and Personal Insurance (FSCO A01-000065, November 5, 2003).
5. 5Khazzaka v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Canada] 2002 CanLII 45018 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3110 (Ont. C.A.).
6. 6Singh v. Gore Mutual Insurance Co. (FSCO P98-00036, October 18, 2002); Coles v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. (FSCO A97-000647, June 12, 2002); Persofsky v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (P00-00041, January 31, 2003) and Attavar v. Allstate Insurance Co. of Canada, see footnote 2.
7. 7Singh v. Gore Mutual Insurance Co. (FSCO P98-00036, October 18, 2002).
8. 8Alobic v. Maplex (FSCO A97-001365, February 9, 2000); Singh v. Commercial Union (FSCO A99-001160, September 11, 2001); Sivaloganathan v. Liberty Mutual (FSCO A03-000317, July 4, 2003) and Sellathamby v. Allstate (FSCO P02-00009, December 17, 2002).
9. 9Singh and Gore Mutual Insurance Co. (FSCO P98-00036, October 18, 2002).
10. 10Singh v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (FSCO A99-001160, September 11, 2001).
11. 11Updated Fourth Edition, October 2003.