Neutral Citation: 1999 ONFSCDRS 204 FSCO A98-001322

BETWEEN:

BALDEV KAUR Applicant

and

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY Insurer

REASONS FOR DECISION

Before: Shari L. Novick

Heard: May 11 and 12, 1999, at the Offices of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario in Toronto.

Appearances: Margaret Gorska for Ms. Kaur Stephen B. Macaulay for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

Issues:

Baldev Kaur's two children were killed in a tragic motor vehicle accident in India on July 15, 1994. Ms. Kaur applied for death benefits and for the repayment of funeral expenses from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"), payable under the Schedule.¹ Liberty Mutual denied the benefits claimed.

The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and Ms. Kaur applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended.

The issues in this hearing are:

Is Ms. Kaur eligible to claim statutory accident benefits as a result of the motor vehicle accident that occurred in India on July 15, 1994?
If so, did Ms. Kaur have a "reasonable excuse" within the meaning of subsection 59(4) of the Schedule for failing to notify Liberty Mutual of her intention to claim benefits within thirty days?
If the answer to both questions posed above is yes, is Ms. Kaur entitled to a death benefit as a result of her daughter Shelley's death under subsection 51(2) of the Schedule?
If the answer to questions 1 and 2 is yes, is Ms. Kaur entitled to a death benefit as a result of her son Tajinder's death under subsection 51(5) of the Schedule?
If the answer to questions 1 and 2 is yes, is Ms. Kaur entitled to recover funeral expenses incurred under section 52 of the Schedule?
Is Ms. Kaur entitled to her expenses of this arbitration?

Result:

Ms. Kaur is eligible to claim statutory accident benefits notwithstanding the fact that the accident occurred in India.
Ms. Kaur has a "reasonable excuse" for failing to notify Liberty Mutual of her intention to claim benefits within thirty days.
Ms. Kaur is entitled to receive a death benefit under subsection 51(2) of the Schedule as a result of Shelley's death.
Ms. Kaur is entitled to receive a death benefit under subsection 51(5) of the Schedule as a result of Tajinder's death.
Ms. Kaur is entitled to recover funeral expenses incurred in the amount of $7, 200.
Ms. Kaur is entitled to her expenses of this arbitration.

Ms. Kaur's testimony was provided with the assistance of a Punjabi translator.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

Background:

Baldev Kaur arrived in Canada from India in 1972 with her husband and infant daughter, Shelley. She subsequently had a son, Tajinder, in 1978. She worked for several years as a machine operator in a plastics factory, but became disabled as a result of a workplace accident in 1991 and has not worked since then. Ms. Kaur qualified for and began receiving a CPP disability pension in 1993.

The Applicant and her two children lived in a basement apartment in her brother-in-law's home in Brampton at the time of the accident. Ms. Kaur is relatively uneducated and her ability to communicate in English is limited.

Tragically, both Shelley and Tajinder died in a motor vehicle accident in India on July 15, 1994, shortly after the family had gathered there for Shelley's wedding. Shelley's new husband was also killed in the accident.

Is Ms. Kaur prevented from claiming benefits because the accident took place in India?

As set out above, the accident giving rise to this application occurred in India. The Insurer contends that the territorial limits contained in section 243 of the Insurance Act and in the standard form automobile insurance policy (set out in section 1.2 of the OAP 1) restrict insured persons to claiming benefits under the Schedule for accidents occurring within Canada, the United States or on vessels travelling between these two countries. Section 243 states as follows:

Insurance under sections 239 and 241 applies to the ownership, use or operation of the insured automobile within Canada and the United States of America and upon a vessel, plying between ports of those countries.

Section 1.2 of the OAP 1 form contains similar language, indicating that coverage is provided under the policy to insured persons for incidents occurring in either Canada or the United States, or on a vessel travelling between ports in these countries.

Counsel for the Insurer relies on the decision of the Director of Arbitrations in Luu and Zurich Insurance (OIC P-96-00045A, July 4, 1996), upheld on judicial review by the Divisional Court (reasons reported at 1997 CanLII 16222 (ON CTGD), 32 O.R. (3d) 807). The applicant in that case was denied benefits on the basis that the territorial limitations set out above precluded her from claiming benefits arising out of an accident that occurred in Vietnam.

The Court of Appeal has recently heard Mrs. Luu's appeal and has set aside the Divisional Court's decision, restoring the original decision of the arbitrator. In its endorsement (reported at 1999 CanLII 18732 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 484), the court stated that its decision in Prasad v. Gan Canada (1997) 1997 CanLII 1995 (ON CA), 33 O.R. (3d) 481 was determinative of this issue. In Prasad, the plaintiff was injured when she was thrown from a motor scooter while vacationing in Mexico. The court found that the territorial limitation in section 243 of the Act does not apply to accident benefits provided under the Schedule, as these benefits are not "insurance under sections 239 or 241." Those sections of the Act relate to third party liability coverage for owners (section 239) and non-owners (section 241) of a vehicle. The court determined that the definition of "insured person" in the Schedule, which provides for coverage for accidents occurring both in and outside of Ontario, is a complete answer to the territorial limitations argument.

The state of the law on this issue was clear at the time of the hearing, and is even clearer now. On the basis of the Court of Appeal's decisions in Luu and Prasad, I find that Ms. Kaur is entitled to claim accident benefits arising out of the accident in India.

Does Ms. Kaur have a "reasonable excuse" for failing to comply with the notice requirements in section 59?

Subsection 59(1) of the Schedule provides that a person applying for benefits must notify the insurer of their intention to do so "within thirty days after the circumstances arose that gave rise to their entitlement to benefits, or as soon as practicable thereafter." This time limit is subject, however, to subsection 59(4), which provides that failing to comply with the thirty-day time limit does not disentitle a person from receiving benefits if they have a reasonable excuse. Many arbitrators have considered the question of what constitutes a reasonable excuse in this context, and I will attempt to set out some of the general principles that have emerged from these decisions below.

The accident in question occurred in July 1994. Liberty Mutual did not receive Ms. Kaur's Application for Accident Benefits until some time in 1998. It was not clear from the evidence whether the application was forwarded to the Insurer in February 1998 by a lawyer representing Ms. Kaur at that time, or whether it was only delivered to the Insurer in August of 1998 by her current agents, after mediation between the parties had failed. In any event, I find that the earliest point at which the Insurer received an application for benefits from Ms. Kaur was some three and one-half years after the accident.

The Applicant argues that I should apply subsection 59(4) to excuse her late delivery of the application for benefits to the Insurer. She testified that she suffered from shock and experienced overwhelming grief in the aftermath of the accident that caused the loss of her two children and her son-in-law. As mentioned above, the accident occurred shortly after Ms. Kaur's family had gathered in India to celebrate Shelley's wedding. The Applicant explained that Shelley had met her husband in India the previous summer when the family had travelled there, and they had decided to get married the following year. She stated that Shelley had planned to return to Canada with her new husband a few weeks after the wedding.

Ms. Kaur testified that she did not remember returning to Canada after the accident. Her brother-in-law, Surinder Singh, testified that the Applicant was "not in a good state" after the accident and that he had accompanied her back to Canada approximately one month after the accident, once her doctor confirmed that it would be safe for her to travel. The Applicant stated that she was very depressed and grief-stricken upon returning home, and was overwhelmed with feelings of loss. She recalled feeling that "the whole world was coming to an end." She testified that she withdrew completely and refused to accept calls from people offering condolences, speaking only with her sister and brother-in-law.

Ms. Kaur stated that she rarely interacted with anyone else, other than her doctors, for a long period after the accident. She recalled being prescribed medication for her depression, and being referred to a psychologist by her family doctor, but refusing to go. She testified that she was barely able to function for many months, and that her sister and brother-in-law looked after her, cooked her meals and made sure that she did not sleep alone. She stated that the loss of her daughter Shelley was particularly difficult to bear, as she had relied on her for many things and that her death left her feeling as if her life had come "to a standstill."

Ms. Kaur explained that she had not been aware that she was entitled to claim death benefits from the Insurer. She recalled that a friend of her brother-in-law's had suggested that she pursue payment of death benefits as a result of the accident some time in 1997. She testified that she contacted a lawyer after that, and after waiting awhile with no action being taken, she contacted her current representatives. She stated that she was only able to start speaking about the accident earlier this year.

I find that while Ms. Kaur did not comply with the time limits in the Schedule for notifying the Insurer of her intention to claim benefits, the circumstances she was facing after the accident constitute a "reasonable excuse" for not doing so. I accept that after losing her two children and son-in-law in a tragic accident shortly after her daughter's wedding, Ms. Kaur suffered inconsolable grief and was unable to function for a period of time. Her evidence and that of Mr. Singh bear that out. As difficult as that grief would be for anyone in her position to bear, I find that the Applicant was affected even more profoundly by the loss she suffered, due to her physical disability and her limited ability to communicate in English. While the details of her dependence on her daughter Shelley will be discussed more fully below, it is clear that she relied extensively on Shelley as a result of her health problems and lack of education and that she depended on her to manage the family's affairs.

When assessing whether the circumstances surrounding a delay in notifying an insurer of a claim for benefits constitute a "reasonable excuse" within the meaning of subsection 59(4), each case must be determined on its own facts. Earlier decisions on this issue have balanced the interests of the parties by weighing the prejudice to the insurer resulting from the lost opportunity to assess an applicant's situation shortly after the event that triggers their entitlement to benefits, against the hardship to the applicant in not being able to access benefits that would otherwise be available. The majority of arbitral opinion requires that a reasonable excuse be provided by the applicant and that the mere lack of prejudice to an insurer is not sufficient to extend the time limits set out.

In most cases in which this issue is raised, applicants are seeking weekly benefits or medical/rehabilitation benefits, and an assessment of their medical or functional status at the time of or shortly after the accident is crucial to their entitlement to benefits. No such assessment is required in this case, however. The Applicant claims death benefits and the repayment of funeral expenses; claims that are entirely unrelated to her medical or functional status at any time. The only real dispute between these parties revolves around the extent of Ms. Kaur's dependence on her daughter, and her son's dependence on her. The facts surrounding these issues are the same, whether they are analysed a few months after the accident or a few years later. While insurers are entitled to early notice of a claim so that they can take steps to investigate the matter and respond appropriately, I see no prejudice to the Insurer in these circumstances in allowing this case to proceed.

The Schedule is akin to remedial legislation and should be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner. A balancing of the parties' interests in this case clearly favours the extension of the time limits set out in section 59. Bearing these factors in mind, I find that the combination of grief and shock suffered by the Applicant as a result of the deaths of her two children, her physical disabilities, her lack of awareness or understanding of procedures such as those for filing a claim for accident benefits with her insurer and her past reliance on her daughter Shelley to look after issues of this sort, constitute a "reasonable excuse" in this case for failing to comply with the time limit prescribed.

I am aware that the delay in question is substantially longer than those excused in other cases. I am also mindful of the argument that the notion of a "reasonable excuse" taken to its extreme could lead to the notice requirements in the Schedule being entirely ignored. My finding that a delay of three and one-half years can be excused under subsection 59(4) is restricted to the unique circumstances of this case for the reasons expressed above, and should not be interpreted as a general sanction for delays of this length.

In Kuronen and Allstate Insurance Company of Canada (OIC A951897, December 29, 1995) the arbitrator excused an eighteen-month delay between the accident and the provision of notice to the insurer, and allowed the applicant to pursue his claim for weekly and med/rehab benefits. The evidence disclosed that Mr. Kuronen abused drugs and alcohol and did not obey repeated instructions from his doctors not to bear weight on his fractured leg and to stop smoking so that his fractures would heal more quickly. He consulted two family doctors in order to double the amount of prescription drugs he could obtain, and discharged himself early from the hospital against his doctor's advice. The Insurer claimed that if his application for benefits had been received in a timely fashion, a rehabilitation caseworker would have been appointed to supervise Mr. Kuronen's rehabilitation.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's argument and found that as the applicant had a history of disregarding the advice of those interested in his recovery, he would not likely have acted any differently if a caseworker had become involved at an earlier stage. He found that the breakup of the applicant's marriage, the fact that he had spent time in jail and on the street after the accident as well as his addiction to drugs and alcohol affected his ability to pursue his legal rights in a timely fashion and constituted a reasonable excuse for the delay. I find the circumstances underlying Ms. Kaur's delay in notifying the Insurer of her claim for death benefits to be significantly more compelling than those in Kuronen, justifying an excuse of the more lengthy delay.

Entitlement to death benefits - was the Applicant a "dependent" of her daughter Shelley?

Section 51 of the Schedule sets out the circumstances under which death benefits are payable if an insured person dies as a result of an accident. Subsection 51(2) states:

(2) If an insured person dies as a result of an accident, the insured person is survived by one or more dependents who were dependents at the time of the accident and no benefit is payable to a spouse under subsection (1), the insurer shall pay the dependents an amount equal to the amount that would be payable to the spouse under subsection (1) if the insured person had a spouse who was entitled to payment under that subsection.

The term "dependant" is defined in section 4 of the Schedule. That section provides that a person is a dependant of another person if the person "is principally dependant for financial support or care on the other person or the other person's spouse."

Shelley was listed as a driver on Baldev Kaur's insurance policy with Liberty and therefore meets the definition of "insured person" under the Schedule. As she leaves no surviving spouse, subsection 51(2) may apply. The issue to then be decided is whether Ms. Kaur was principally dependant for financial support or care on her daughter, Shelley. Earlier arbitration decisions have established that in order for an individual to be considered to be dependant on another person, she must "chiefly or for the most part" derive either financial support or care from that person, and must be more dependant on that person than on any other source, including herself.

There are two branches to the inquiry under this provision — whether Ms. Kaur was financially dependant on Shelley, and whether she was dependant upon her for care. The Applicant need only prove one type of dependence in order to be entitled to benefits. While most of the evidence focused on whether Ms. Kaur was financially dependant on her daughter, the question of whether she was dependant on her for care to the requisite degree is the more difficult question to answer.

The evidence provided on the issue of financial dependence consisted of income tax returns from both the Applicant and Shelley Singh for the years leading up to the accident, as well as the Ms. Kaur's viva voce evidence. The Applicant testified that she had worked as a machine operator at ABC Plastics from 1981 to 1991 and earned between $1,000 and $1,100 per month. She stated that she had been self-sufficient during that period and had been able to support her family on the salary that she earned. In March of 1991 she sustained a head injury while at work, and was not able to return to work afterwards. She recalled receiving workers' compensation benefits equivalent to her full salary for a while, and testified that when these benefits were subsequently reduced by 50 percent she began receiving social assistance, such that her combined income roughly equalled the salary that she had been earning while working at ABC.

In 1993 Ms. Kaur qualified for a disability pension from CPP. After receiving a lump sum payment early that year she subsequently received regular monthly benefits and a top-up from social assistance, amounting to a monthly total of between $1,000 and $1,100. Ms. Kaur explained that at the time of the accident in 1994 she was paying $500 rent to her brother-in-law monthly, for the use of the basement apartment in which she lived with her children.

Shelley had been attending university on a full-time basis during the period leading up to the accident. The evidence indicated that she had also worked as a cashier at Valdi Foods, averaging 30 hours per week at an hourly wage of between $10 and $11. Ms. Kaur stated that while she generally paid the rent for their apartment out of her CPP benefits, Shelley paid for most of the household expenses, as well as groceries and gas from her earnings. Shelley was also responsible for covering her tuition fees, books and any school supplies she needed. Ms. Kaur testified that she had purchased the car that Shelley drove, and had also paid the insurance premiums on the car. While the Applicant's testimony regarding who paid what expense was at times unclear and inconsistent, the picture that emerges from the evidence is that Ms. Kaur and her daughter pooled their earnings and that the household expenses were paid on an "as needed" basis.

I am not persuaded that the Applicant was principally dependant on her daughter for financial support, as that phrase has come to be defined under the Schedule. An analysis of the income tax returns filed reveals that in each of 1991, 1992 and 1993 the benefits that the Applicant received amounted to at least twice as much as Shelley's earnings. Ms. Kaur testified that the benefits she received after her workplace accident in 1991 were roughly equivalent to the salary that she had earned while she was working. In light of her testimony that she had been able to support her family while she was working with the salary that she earned, I can only conclude that receiving the same amount of income in the form of workers' compensation and social assistance benefits (and later, CPP benefits) led to the same result.

Ms. Kaur testified that Shelley became ill and did not work at all from March of 1994 until the accident in July. I think it is fair to presume from the evidence that she was supported or at least assisted financially by her mother during that period.

It is clear from the arbitral jurisprudence that mutual financial dependence or codependence between two people is not enough, and that an applicant has to prove that she was chiefly dependant on someone else for financial support in order to be entitled to a death benefit. On the evidence before me, I find that Ms. Kaur does not meet the test for financial dependence set out in the Schedule.

The second branch of the inquiry calls for a consideration of whether the Applicant was principally dependant on her daughter for care. This is a more difficult question to answer, as the extent of care provided by one person to another does not lend itself to being quantified in the same manner as an assessment of a person's financial dependence on another. As well, the word "care" is not defined in the Schedule and can bear different meanings, depending on the context. In the case of Weiler and Personal Insurance Company of Canada (OIC A95-000259, April 1, 1996), Arbitrator Renahan referred to decisions in which the meaning of the word "care" appearing in other provisions had been considered. He concluded that in addition to bearing the legislative intent of subsections 51(1) and (4) in mind, factors such as the nature of the emotional and physical care provided, the amount and duration of the dependancy for care as well as the needs of an applicant and his or her ability to be self-supporting must be considered.

In Mersinidis and Jevco Insurance Company (OIC A-950704, May 24, 1996), Arbitrator Kirsch considered this question as it related to an elderly couple who lost their 32 year-old son in an accident. She agreed with the factors identified in Weiler as indicia of whether someone is principally dependant on another for care, and concluded that each of the applicants in the case before her were able to care for themselves and for each other when required. She found that while the applicants' son had performed various household duties for his parents, he had done so out of love, obligation and in return for their financial assistance and not because they were principally dependant upon him for care.

The situation in the present case differs significantly from the cases cited above. While no medical evidence regarding the Applicant's medical condition was filed, Ms. Kaur testified that after sustaining a head injury at work in 1991 her condition gradually worsened and she began to experience various pains all over her body. She stated that she was unable to concentrate and spent her days lying down or sitting around the apartment. The evidence suggested that she took various medications, although it was not clear which symptoms they addressed. She claimed that she could not cook meals for herself, but could prepare a simple sandwich and make tea. She stated that while she could generally manage her own personal care, she required assistance with washing her hair. She could not take baths, but could shower with the use of aides.

Ms. Kaur testified that prior to the accident, Shelley had looked after her and had cooked all of her meals. She stated that Shelley had also done the grocery shopping and the household chores. Her brother-in-law Surinder Singh confirmed that Shelley had been primarily responsible for looking after the home, washing and drying the family's clothes and cooking for her mother. He stated that Shelley had the "full burden of the house", explaining that her responsibilities at home far eclipsed those of his own daughters.

The evidence also indicates, however, that Ms. Kaur felt well enough to travel to India with her children for three months during the summer of 1993. The Applicant was able to return to India the following summer for Shelley's wedding, and returned once more in May of 1996, two years after the accident, at her doctor's suggestion.

Ms. Kaur conceded under cross-examination that Shelley was out of the house for a large part of the day during the week, as well as on weekends, as she had a full course load at school, worked part-time and went out with her friends.

Notwithstanding Shelley's absence from the home on most days and Ms. Kaur's ability to travel to India on two occasions prior to the accident, I am satisfied that the Applicant was principally dependant for care on her daughter Shelley. While the extent or exact nature of Ms. Kaur's disability was not defined at the hearing, I think it is fair to say that she suffers from various significant health problems. She qualified for a permanent CPP disability pension in 1993 and has been taking several types of medication, on a regular basis for many years. Other than her trips to India, during which she was always accompanied by someone, she did not venture out on her own and relied on Shelley and to a lesser extent her son Tajinder to take care of the household chores and to look after her. While she may not be a complete invalid, I am satisfied on the evidence before me that she is significantly disabled by her medical condition and that as a result she was more dependant on Shelley for care than on anyone else, including herself.

Accordingly, I find that Ms. Kaur qualifies for benefits under subsection 51(2) of the Schedule. The parties made no submissions on the exact amount of the death benefit that she was entitled to receive under this provision. The manner of calculating the appropriate amount payable is set out in subsection 51(1), and I will leave it to the parties to determine the proper quantum of the benefit in accordance with this provision.

Entitlement to death benefits under subsection 51(5) — was Tajinder a dependant of the Applicant?

I did not hear much in the way of submissions on Ms. Kaur's behalf regarding her entitlement to a death benefit as a result of the death of her son, Tajinder. The Insurer argued that no benefits were payable under this heading as Tajinder would only fall within the definition of an "insured person" set out in section 1 if he was found to be a dependant of the named insured, Baldev Kaur. Counsel argued that as the Applicant rested her claim for death benefits on the basis of her dependence on her daughter Shelley, it would be inconsistent to claim that her son Tajinder was in turn dependant on her. Put another way, the Insurer contends that Ms. Kaur's entitlement under subsection 51(5) flows from Tajinder's dependancy on her and that if he is not her dependant, he does not fall within the definition of an "insured person" and consequently, no benefit can then flow from his death.

While I agree with the Insurer's analysis, I find that the logic applied ignores a crucial aspect of the notion of dependency as it is defined in the Schedule. Section 4 makes it clear that there are two ways in which a person can be dependant on another - financially, and for care. If I had accepted Ms. Kaur's argument that she was financially dependant on Shelley, I agree that it would have been inconsistent to have then found Tajinder to be financially dependant on her. However, I rejected that argument and based my finding of dependence on the Applicant's reliance upon Shelley for care. I do not see how this finding would preclude a determination that Tajinder, who had just finished tenth grade at the time of the accident, was financially dependant on his mother. On the evidence presented, I am satisfied that he was financially dependant on her, as his only income was derived from selling newspapers over a ten-week period.

Consequently, Ms. Kaur is entitled to a death benefit of $10,250.46 under subsection 51(5), in addition to the amount she is entitled to receive under subsection 51(2) as a result of Shelley's death.

Funeral Expenses:

Surinder Singh, the Applicant's brother-in-law, testified that he paid all of the expenses related to both Shelley and Tajinder's funerals, which took place in India shortly after the accident. He was not able to produce any bills or receipts confirming the payments allegedly made, stating that he had not had the presence of mind to ask for them at the time and explaining that receipts "are generally not given in India." Mr. Singh estimated that he had paid approximately 100,000 rupees for Shelley's funeral and approximately 80 to 90,000 rupees for Tajinder's funeral, which took place in a small village. He estimated that 100,000 rupees currently equal approximately $4,000 (Canadian).

The Insurer submitted that funeral benefits should not be payable as they were not incurred by an "insured person" under the policy and no documentation exists to substantiate the claim.

I accept Mr. Singh's evidence that he paid the expenses related to Shelley and Tajinder's funerals and find his explanation for not having receipts confirming the payments made to be reasonable. Subsection 52(1) simply states that an insurer shall pay the funeral expenses incurred in respect of an insured person who dies as a result of an accident, and does not specify that only insured persons under the policy can recover these expenses. On the basis of the evidence before me, I find that the Insurer is liable to pay $4,000 in respect of Shelley's funeral and $3,200 in respect of Tajinder's funeral.

Interest:

Section 67 of the Schedule mandates the payment of interest on death benefits and funeral expenses that are overdue. Subsection 67(2) provides that a benefit is overdue if it is not received within thirty days of an application for benefits having been submitted. In light of the evidence in this case regarding the timing of the filing of Ms. Kaur's application for benefits, I find that interest should run from September 30, 1998, at the rate of 2 percent per month.

EXPENSES:

I find that the Applicant is entitled to her expenses of the hearing. I encourage the parties to resolve the issue of the appropriate quantum of expenses payable among themselves, failing which I may be revisited on the issue.

October 20, 1999

Shari L. Novick Arbitrator

ARBITRATION ORDER

Under section 282 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended, it is ordered that:

Ms. Kaur is entitled to a death benefit under subsection 51(2) of the Schedule as a result of Shelley's death. The exact amount of the benefit is to be calculated by the parties in accordance with subsection 51(1).
Ms. Kaur is entitled to a death benefit under subsection 51(5) of the Schedule as a result of Tajinder's death in the amount of $10,250.46
Ms. Kaur is entitled to funeral expenses under section 52 of the Schedule in the total amount of $7,200.
Interest is payable on all of the amounts set out above from September 30, 1998, at the prescribed rate.
Ms. Kaur is entitled to her expenses of the arbitration.