Neutral Citation: 1997 ONICDRG 47

OIC A-014646

ONTARIO INSURANCE COMMISSION

BETWEEN:

ANN SEGAL

Applicant

and

ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

DECISION

Issues:

The Applicant, Ann Segal, is the spouse of Albert Segal, who died as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 22, 1994. Mrs. Segal applied for and received death benefits from Zurich Insurance Company ("Zurich"), payable under the Schedule¹ The parties were unable to agree on the amount of death benefits to which Mrs. Segal is entitled. The dispute was not resolved through mediation and Mrs. Segal applied for arbitration under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, (the "Act") as amended.

The sole issue in this hearing is:

What is the correct amount of Ann Segal's death benefits?

Mrs. Segal also claims interest on any amounts owing, and her expenses incurred in the hearing.

Result:

1. The correct amount of Ann Segal's death benefits is $50,000.

2. Ann Segal is entitled to expenses she incurred in this arbitration, less her expenses for one half day of hearing.

Hearing:

The hearing was held over five days at the offices of the Ontario Insurance Commission in North York, Ontario, on February 12, 13, and 14, 1996 and April 23 and 24, 1996, before me, Asfaw Seife, Arbitrator. The proceedings were recorded by court reporters from Rosenberger & Weir.

Present at the Hearing:

Mrs. Segal's

Stanley Pasternak

Representative:

Barrister and Solicitor

Zurich's

William J. McCorriston

Representative:

Barrister and Solicitor

Witnesses: Listed in Appendix A to this decision.

Exhibits: Listed in Appendix A to this decision.

Evidence and Findings:

Background:

Albert Segal died in a motor vehicle accident on June 22, 1994; he was 81 years old, separated, and living alone in a condominium in Toronto. By all accounts, Albert Segal had had a long and successful career as a self-employed businessman, dating back to the 1940s. Although he had engaged in various business enterprises over the years, his main occupation was the operation of a men's retail clothing store he owned in Toronto. In 1970, he sold his clothing store, and for the following 15 years, he occupied himself doing the following: buying goods at major auctions, bankruptcy and liquidation sales and selling them for profit; managing rental buildings he owned; and investing his money in securities. By 1985, when Mr. Segal was 70 years old, he had phased out his involvement in the buying and selling of goods, and the managing of rental property; however, he continued buying and selling securities until the time of the accident. At the time of his death, Mr. Segal's portfolio was valued at approximately $1,300,000.

Apart from his investment activities, Albert Segal had an interest in consumer issues. He was often depicted in newspapers as an avid consumer advocate who devoted considerable time in his retirement years to challenging the business practices of big corporations and defending consumers' rights.

The Position of the Parties:

Zurich has paid Ann Segal a death benefit of $50,000. Ann Segal claims she is entitled to the maximum $200,000 under section 51(1)(a) of the Schedule. She claims that, at the time of the accident, Albert Segal was self-employed at trading in securities, adding value to his investment and earning his living from the proceeds of his investment. She argues that interest, dividends and gains from the disposition of securities, are "remuneration or profit" Albert Segal received from working. She states that during the 52 and 156 weeks preceding the accident, Albert Segal earned income from his self-employment in excess of the amount necessary to entitle her to the maximum death benefit of $200,000.

Zurich disagrees. It contends that Albert Segal was not employed or self-employed at the time of the accident, nor at any point during the 156 weeks preceding the accident. Zurich submits that at the time of the accident, Albert Segal was an elderly, retired person living from his investments. Zurich argues that investment income² cannot be considered income from employment, for the purposes of the Schedule, and the amount of Ann Segal's death benefit is the mandatory minimum of $50,000.

Zurich further argues that if it is found that Albert Segal was self-employed, his profits from the sale of stocks were not sufficient to generate a death benefit greater than the minimum under the Schedule.

The Law:

Section 51.-(1) of the Schedule as it existed on June 22, 1994, states:

If an insured person dies as a result of an accident, the insured person is survived by a spouse who was his or her spouse at the time of the accident and,

(a) the insured person met any of the qualifications set out in subsection 7(1), the insurer shall pay the spouse an amount equal to the insured person's net weekly income from employment determined in accordance with section 81 or 82 multiplied by 187.2;

(b) the insured person did not meet any of the qualifications set out in subsection 7(1), the insurer shall pay the spouse $50,000.

Section 51(8) provides that the payment under subsection (1) or (2) shall not be less than $50,000 and not be more than $200,000.

The relevant portions of section 7(1) of the Schedule state:

7.-(1) An insured person who sustains an impairment as a result of an accident is entitled to a weekly income replacement benefit if the insured person meets any of the following qualifications:

1. The insured person was employed at the time of the accident and, as a result of and within two years of the accident, suffers a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of that employment.

2. The insured person,

(i) was not employed at the time of the accident,

(ii) was employed at some point during the 156 weeks before the accident,

Section 5 of the Schedule states:

For the purpose of this Regulation, a person is employed if, for salary, wages, other remuneration or profit, the person is engaged in employment, including self-employment, or is the holder of an office, and "employment" has a corresponding meaning. (emphasis added)

Was Albert Segal Employed at the time of the Accident?

Four witnesses testified on behalf of the Applicant. Gary Segal (barrister and solicitor), Ann and Albert Segal's 49-year-old son and the Executor of Albert Segal's estate, testified at length about his father's business activities going back to the 1920s. Albert Tobias, a retired accountant, who prepared Albert Segal's income tax returns for over 35 years testified about Albert Segal's business affairs prior to 1990. Kevin Barnes, the stockbroker who liquidated Albert Segal's capital assets upon his death, gave opinion evidence regarding securities trading and Albert Segal's portfolio. Danny Baratz, Chartered Accountant, who had prepared Albert Segal's tax returns since 1991, testified about Albert Segal's business activities during the three-year period before the accident.

Zurich called Lawrence Rosen, Chartered Accountant, who, at Zurich's request, had prepared a report about the calculation of Ann Segal's death benefits. Mr. Rosen gave opinion evidence in accounting and the calculation of death benefits under the Schedule. Zurich also called Stanley Haswell, a retired stockbroker, who gave opinion evidence on securities trading, and the nature of Albert Segal's portfolio.

The parties also filed considerable documentary evidence, as listed in Appendix A. This list includes the report by the accounting firm of Rosen & Vittese, dated February 2, 1996 (exhibit 8), and a chart prepared by Zurich representing Albert Segal's "stock transactions" from June 22, 1991 until June 22, 1994, including information regarding the gain or loss as a result of the disposition of shares in 1991, 1992 and 1993 (exhibit 9). The parties agree that financial information contained in these two exhibits is substantially correct.

Albert Segal's sources of income for the 156 weeks years prior to the accident consisted of income from investment: interest, dividends, and gains he realized from the sale of stocks. (He also received pension income and rental income; however, these were not claimed as income from employment, and are not relevant to the issues in arbitration.).

In the 52 weeks prior to the accident, Albert Segal's gross, pre-tax income from interest and dividends was $121,114 ($88,770 from interest plus $32,344 from dividends). For the 156 weeks before the accident the amount was $359,107 ($269,766 from interest plus $89,341 from dividends).

In the 52 weeks prior to the accident, Albert Segal gained $3,699.84 from the sale of stocks. However, in the 156 week period before the accident, his stock transactions showed a net loss of $22,380.

Thus, in the 52 weeks prior to the accident, the combined total pre-tax gross income from all three sources was $124,813, while for the 156 weeks before the accident, the figure is approximately $359,107.

Was Albert Segal's income from investment income earned from self-employment? Having reviewed the entire evidence and the provisions of the Schedule, I have concluded that Albert Segal was not "employed" at the time of the accident, or at any point during the 156 weeks before the accident, for the purposes of the Schedule. I find that the income claimed for calculating Ann Segal's death benefits is not income from "employment." Accordingly, I find that the requirements of section 7(1) have not been met, and that Ann Segal is entitled to a death benefit of $50,000.

My reasons are as follows:

The word "employment" itself is not defined in the Schedule. Essentially, section 5 of the Schedule says that a person is employed, if the person is employed for salary, wages, other remuneration or profit.

It is not disputed that, during the 25 years prior to his death, Albert Segal bought and sold stocks, realizing gains and losses. He invested a considerable amount of money in bonds, treasury bills, debentures and other instruments of debt obligation which bore income in the form of interest. He also received dividend income from stocks he held in companies. I therefore conclude that Albert Segal invested his money in securities for profit, or a reasonable expectation of profit. However, it is more difficult to answer the question of whether by virtue of engaging in such activities Albert Segal was "self-employed" for the purposes of the Schedule.

As stated in several arbitration decisions, words in legislation must be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the legislation.³

Commenting on the legislative intent of section 51(1) of the Schedule, Arbitrator William Renehan stated in Mark Weiler and Personal Insurance Company of Canada: ⁴

The benefit under section 51(1) addresses two losses which arise on the death of a spouse; a financial loss, where the insured spouse had income from employment, and a non-financial loss. The benefit for the non-financial loss is fixed at $50,000 without any inquiry as to the relationship between the spouses. The benefit for the financial loss is based on the insured spouse's income from employment at the time of death. The total benefit under section 51(1) cannot exceed $200,000.

The only inquiry required in order to determine entitlement to the $50,000 benefit is whether the claimant was the spouse of the insured. In my view, the $50,000 benefit payable with respect to non-financial loss generally addresses the loss of intangibles, such as the loss of care, which arise on the death of a spouse.

I agree with Arbitrator Renahan's view and conclude that section 51(1)(a) was intended to provide a fair and adequate financial compensation to a person who, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, lost a spouse who earned income from employment before the accident.

The incorporation of sections 7(1), 82 and 83 into section 51(1)(a), indicates the legislature's intention that compensation for the surviving spouse's financial loss is based on the deceased's income from employment or occupation. The criteria for calculating net weekly income are therefore the same under both weekly income replacement benefits and death benefits.

Accordingly, in my view, it is not sufficient for the party claiming that the insured person meets the requirements of section 5 to establish that the insured person engaged in an activity for financial remuneration. The party must prove that this activity constituted "employment," and that the income in question is attributable to that employment and was earned during the requisite period.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary (8th Edition) defines "employ(ed)" as :

1. use the services of (a person) in return for payment; keep in one's service; and

"employment" as :

1. The act of employing or the state of being employed; 2. a person's regular trade or profession;

"self-employed" is defined as:

working for one's self, as a freelance or owner of a business, etc.; not employed by an employer

The Commissioner's Guideline for Identifying Self-employed Individuals,⁵ issued pursuant to Section 268.3 of the Insurance Act, is to be used when it has already been established that the individual is employed, but it is unclear whether the individual is self-employed or what the relationship is between the individual and an employer. In this case, the Guideline is not directly applicable since it has not been established that Albert Segal was employed. However, I find the indicators for self-employment listed in the Guideline helpful in my consideration of the issues in this case.

The Guideline defines "business" as follows:

An activity that is carried on for profit or with a reasonable expectation of profit, including a profession, a calling, a trade, a manufacture or undertaking of any kind, an adventure or concern in the nature of a trade, or a service.

Some of the indicators listed in the Guideline for identifying traditional self-employment situations (as opposed to contract of service situations) are as follows:

The individual

• is an owner of an unincorporated sole proprietorship or a partner in a partnership (other than a limited partner).

• has an established location where business transactions take place.

• participates in the everyday operations of the business (not just an investor or receiving remuneration for purposes of income splitting).

• determines own method and schedule for accomplishing tasks.

• determines own hours and may not necessarily work a set number of hours per period i.e. (40 hours).

• determines the annual income as his or her profit from the business according to the Income Tax Act (Canada) and Income Tax Act (Ontario).

It is clear from the evidence, and the Applicant concedes, that Albert Segal was not self-employed in the traditional sense. He was not an owner of an unincorporated business enterprise engaged in the sale of goods or services. He was not engaged in the practice of a trade, a calling, or a profession where he was paid by others for work done or services provided. The Applicant, however, argues that Albert Segal was involved in an activity that was carried on for profit or reasonable expectation of profit, by trading in securities, adding value to his investment and earning his living from the profits of his investment. The Applicant submits this would constitute self-employment.

The issue of whether investment income should be considered as income from employment or occupation for the purposes of calculating weekly income benefits has been considered in a number of arbitration decisions under similar provisions of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule—Accidents before December 31, 1994.

In Bonitatibus and Wellington Insurance Company,⁶ Arbitrator Julaine Palmer declined to consider the Applicant's dividend income from shares he owned in a construction company as income from employment. She stated:

Without evidence that the Applicant's occupation involved investing , I cannot consider this income as being "income from ....occupation or employment" to determine the Applicant's gross weekly income.... "(emphasis added)

In Rajbir Singh and Wellington Insurance Company,⁷ the Applicant was part-owner of a farm which he had bought as an investment opportunity only. Apart from his income as a cab-driver, Mr. Singh had received, prior to the accident, his share of the profits when the farm was sold. He did not live on the farm. He neither managed nor did any farming himself. He did no work relative to the farm. The Arbitrator decided not to include his profits from his investment in his income from employment or occupation.

In Morin and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Insurance Company,⁸ Arbitrator David Draper, as he then was, stated;

According to section 12(7)(1), only income from an applicant's "occupation or employment" is to be considered in calculating his or her weekly income benefits. I accept, therefore, that investment income is not included. However, I find that Mr. Morin's involvement in Mr. C's [Donuts] went well beyond that of a mere investor.

Arbitrator Draper found that Mr. Morin, together with his partner, operated the business and shared the duties of the business, and accordingly, the profits and losses from the business were attributed to Mr. Morin's self-employment in the business.

In this case, if the Applicant can prove, on the balance of probabilities, that Albert Segal's activities were more than those of a mere investor; that, at the time of the accident, Albert Segal's activities in securities trading constituted a business, or an occupation, then, in my view, Albert Segal would qualify as an "employed" person, for the purposes of the Schedule. There is no substantial dispute between the parties regarding the following facts:

Albert Segal was not a licensed stockbroker nor did he have any formal training or designations as a dealer in securities. He did not buy or sell securities for others, nor did he offer investment advice or provide financial services for money. He bought and sold stocks through stockbrokers, and only invested his own money. He did not borrow money for investment purposes.

Mr. Segal conducted his investment activities from his condominium, where he had an office equipped with a telephone, a television set, and a copy machine. He had no computer, nor any special device for monitoring the stock exchange market. He gathered financial information by listening to news, reading newspapers, watching television, and reviewing financial and annual reports of companies. He reviewed his portfolio with his stockbrokers, who provided him with daily quotes on bonds. He performed all stock transactions through his stockbroker.

Mr. Segal kept meticulous handwritten records of all of his investment transactions in a stock ledger he had maintained since 1969. The ledger contains, among other things, details of the securities he traded in, including the amounts and dates of purchase and sale of securities, and the profit or loss realized at their disposition.

Even though Albert Segal maintained detailed records of his financial affairs, he has not kept any coherent records of his own day to day activities. His "Daily Journals" for 1991, 1992 and 1993 (the 1994 Journal was not produced) contain various types of notations, including names and telephone numbers of individuals and businesses, appointments, mathematical calculations, and other notations. While these notes suggest that Albert Segal was a relatively busy person during the years in question, they do not assist in determining what he did on a daily basis, or the amount of time he spent in his investment activities.

Almost all of evidence regarding Mr. Segal's investment activities, including how much time he spent conducting such activities and the nature of the activities, came from Gary Segal. I heard no evidence from anyone claiming to be Albert Segal's stockbroker or anyone who had any business dealings with him, or knew of his research or investigations into the securities market or potential purchases.

Gary Segal testified that during the three years prior to the accident, his father spent 90 per cent of his time engaged in investment activities. While it is reasonable to assume that Albert Segal would have spent some time looking after his investment interests, I do not find Gary Segal's claim of 90 per cent is supported by any evidence.

Gary Segal testified that he left the family home in 1967 when he was 21 years of age, and had not lived with his father since Ann and Albert Segal separated in 1988. Gary Segal's testimony was based on his observations of his father's activities during his occasional weekend visits with him and on what he said his father told him. I do not place a great deal of weight on Gary Segal's evidence because of its hearsay nature and because Mr. Segal gave his evidence in a manner more consistent with the role of an advocate than that of an independent witness. He participated in the hearing as more than a witness for the Applicant; he assisted counsel for the Applicant in presenting the evidence and making submissions.

Albert Segal's personal income tax returns, filed in evidence, show that Albert Segal reported his income from the disposition of securities as capital gains or capital losses and not as business income or income from self-employment. Zurich contends that this is evidence that Albert Segal did not consider his investment activities as self-employment. Albert Segal's accountants testified that his income tax returns were prepared in this manner because Mr. Segal had made an election under section 39(4) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) to report such income as capital gain/loss rather than as an income from business for reasons of tax planning. Counsel for the Applicant suggested that Albert Segal had the option to report this income as income from self-employment. No documentary evidence was produced to support the contention that Albert Segal in fact made the election.

Revenue Canada Interpretation Bulletin 479R,,⁹ (the Bulletin), which discusses the tax treatment of the gain or loss from the disposition of shares or a debt obligation was filed in evidence. The Bulletin indicates that a gain or loss from the disposition of sales or a debt obligation such as a bond, debenture, bill, note or hypothec will be taxed either as a business income gain or loss (income account) or as a capital gain or loss (capital account).

Self-employment for the purposes of the tax legislation is not determinative of the issue under the Schedule, however, given the circumstances of this case, I find the criteria listed in the Bulletin helpful in determining whether Albert Segal's investment activities can be considered self-employment.

The Bulletin indicates that the course of conduct and intention of the taxpayer determine whether a securities transaction is on income or capital account. The Bulletin sets out some of the factors applied by the Courts in ascertaining whether the taxpayer's course of conduct or intention suggests the carrying on of a business. It indicates that a combination of the following factors may be sufficient to characterize the activities of a taxpayer as a business in securities trading:

(a) frequency of transactions, a history of extensive buying and selling of securities or a quick turnover of properties;

(b) period of ownership- securities are usually owned only for a short period of time,

(c) knowledge of securities markets - the taxpayer has some knowledge of or experience in securities markets;

(d) security transactions form a part of a taxpayer's ordinary business,

(e) time spent- a substantial part of the taxpayer's time is spent studying the securities markets and investigating potential purchases,

(f) financing -security purchases are financed primarily on margin or other form of debt,

(g) advertising- the taxpayer has advertised or otherwise made it known that he is willing to purchase securities, and

(h) in the case of shares, their nature- normally speculative in nature or of a non-dividend type.

The Bulletin indicates that a taxpayer's intention to sell at a gain, is not sufficient by itself to establish that the taxpayer was involved in an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. In addition, it must be demonstrated that one or more of the above factors are present, and that the taxpayer's intention was to sell the property at the first suitable opportunity.

I heard divergent opinion from experts on both sides as to whether Albert Segal met any of the criteria listed in the Bulletin. Stanley Haswell, a stockbroker with more that 35 years experience in the field of securities trading, and who, while in business, had a significant number of clients (50 per cent of his clientele) over age 65, testified that the nature of Albert Segal's portfolio does not fit the profile of an aggressive trader who spent considerable time in studying and investigating the stock market and invested in speculative, high-risk ventures for short-term gain. Mr. Haswell considered Albert Segal's investment patterns to be more consistent with those of a retired person investing his savings carefully in low-risk, stable companies.

The opposing view came from Kevin Barnes, who only had one year's experience as a stockbroker prior to becoming involved in the liquidation of Albert Segal's capital assets. He had five or six elderly clients, none of whom had a mix of the type of equities that Albert Segal had. He testified that just by looking at Albert Segal's portfolio as it existed at the time of his death, he would consider Mr. Segal to be an aggressive trader, who took great risks by investing in highly speculative stocks. However, on cross-examination, Mr. Barnes admitted that only approximately 20 per cent of Albert Segal's total value of net worth at the time of his death was invested in what he would call speculative stock. He conceded that the rest was invested in secure grade stocks, bonds, GICs, treasury bills, and debentures, which are all fixed income securities that are passive in nature. He also admitted that he did not analyse Albert Segal's portfolio prior to his death.

Having carefully considered the evidence of both Mr. Haswell and Mr. Barnes, I prefer to rely on Mr. Haswell's opinion. Mr. Haswell is the more experienced of the two, and testified about the patterns of Albert Segal's investment based on his analysis of past transactions.

Both experts agreed that the number of security transactions a person does is indicative of the amount of time he/she spends in the business. They considered 100 transactions a year to be fairly heavy trading for a person who is not a stockbroker or a licensed dealer. 1000 transactions per year is considered very heavy. The evidence shows that during the 156-week period before the accident, Albert Segal performed an average of 29 transactions per year, and traded in the stocks of 18 different companies. During the six months prior to his death, he had only sold one stock and purchased 17. His portfolio, which consists of Canadian companies, reveals that at his date of death, he owned securities which he purchased as early as 1983, and as late as 1994. In the three years prior to the accident, he was receiving interest and dividend income, and income from the disposition of securities he purchased as far back as 1986. During the period from 1991 to 1993, with the exception of one stock, no stock appears to have been sold in the same year of its purchase. Eighty per cent of Mr. Segal's portfolio was invested in secure grades, fixed income securities generating passive income.

Having carefully considered all of the evidence, I am not convinced that Albert Segal's investment activities can be characterized as those of a person who engaged in securities trading as a business, who spent a substantial part of his time in investment-related activities, or who bought and sold securities with the objective of short-term profit.

In summary, I am not persuaded that at the time of the accident, Albert Segal was self-employed in buying and selling securities. Accordingly, I cannot consider that income from his investments was earned from his self-employment or occupation.

Having concluded that Albert Segal was not employed at the time of the accident within the meaning of section 7 of the Schedule, I find that Ann Segal's death benefit is the minimum $50,000 stipulated under the legislation.

Expenses:

As an Arbitrator, I have the discretion to deny or reduce the award for an applicant's claim for expenses incurred in arbitration, if I find that the claim is totally without merit, or that the applicant has contributed to a delay in the proceedings. In this case, I find that the Applicant's claim is not entirely without merit. However, I also find that Gary Segal's conduct in the hearing caused undue delay in the proceedings. I found Mr. Segal very difficult to control, both as a witness and while he was assisting counsel for the Applicant. He was admonished several times during the hearing to refrain from interrupting the proceedings, and to give his evidence without arguing the case. Despite these repeated instructions, he continued to engage counsel in arguments, rather than giving his testimony in a straightforward fashion. Mr. Segal's testimony which could have been concluded in less than half a day, ended up consuming one and half days, due largely to his non-compliance with instructions from his counsel and the arbitrator. As a result, I have decided to deny the Applicant her expenses for one-half day of the hearing.

Order:

1. The correct amount of Mrs. Segal's death benefits is $50,000.

2. Mrs. Segal is entitled to her expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration, less her expenses for one-half day of hearing.

March 13, 1997

Asfaw Seife

Arbitrator

Date

Appendix A

Witnesses:

Gary Segal

Applicant's son

Albert Tobias

Retired Chartered Accountant

Kevin Barnes

Licensed Stockbroker

Danny Baratz

Chartered Accountant

L. Rosen

Chartered Accountant

Stanley Haswell

Retired Stockbroker

List of Exhibits:

Exhibit 1

Seven volumes - financial documents of Albert Segal

Exhibit 2

Chart prepared by Gary Segal - Income Taxes/Net income, 1990-1994

Exhibit 3

Albert Segal's diaries for 1991, 1992, 1993

Exhibit 4

Chart prepared by Gary Segal - Sales/Purchases of Stock, 1991-1994

Exhibit 5

Handwritten notations made on one page of Camdev Corp. Reports

Exhibit 6

Letter dated September 28, 1992 to A. Segal from Scotia McLeod Inc. and a handwritten note.

Exhibit 7

Newspaper clippings, a letter by A. Segal (undated) and attachments

Exhibit 8

Report by Rosen & Vettese Ltd. - February 2, 1996

Exhibit 9

Chart prepared by Zurich re: Sales/Purchases and Tax Excerpts for 1991-94

Exhibit 10

1991 Notice of Assessment

Exhibit 11

1992 Notice of Assessment

Exhibit 12

1993 Notice of Assessment

Exhibit 13

Calculations by Danny Baratz, Chartered Accountant

Exhibit 14

Three letters from Danny Baratz to Albert Segal

Exhibit 15

Three invoices from Danny Baratz to Albert Segal

Exhibit 16

Revenue Canada Interpretation Bulletin - 479R

Exhibit 17

Memorandum from Gloria Morris, Zurich's representative, dated January 18, 1995

Footnotes

1. 1The Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule — Accidents after December 31, 1993, and before November 1, 1996, called "the Schedule" in this decision. The Schedule is Ontario Regulation 776/93, as amended by Ontario Regulation 781/94 and 463/96.
2. 2Investment is the employment of money for the purpose of earning income or capital gain or both. Income is the revenue derived from investment which is usually received in the form of interest on bonds, and dividends from shares. Dividends are payments made to shareholders from profits of a company. Dividends are not paid automatically, but only when declared or authorized by the board of directors, a committee chosen by and from the shareholders and empowered to act on behalf of all shareholders in the management of the company's affairs.
3. 3The various approaches to statutory interpretation are discussed in Salmon and Toronto Transit Commission (June 29, 1992), P-000235.
4. 4(April 1, 1996), OIC A95- 000259
5. 5Commissioner's Guideline No. 6, Ontario Insurance Commission, April 25, 1995.
6. 6(April 8, 1993), OIC A-000082(2)
7. 7(June 24, 1994), OIC A-004139
8. 8(June 16, 1993), OIC A-001311
9. 9Interpretation Bulletin dated February 29, 1984 issued by the Department of National Revenue, Taxation.