Neutral Citation: 1995 ONICDRG 53
File No. A-006595
ONTARIO INSURANCE COMMISSION
BETWEEN:
RONALD L. MORLEY
Applicant
and
NATIONAL FRONTIER INSURANCE COMPANY
Insurer
DECISION
Issues:
The Applicant, Ronald L. Morley, is the widowed spouse of the late Marilyn Morley. Mrs. Morley was critically injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 20, 1993, and died from her injuries on March 25, 1993. At the time of the accident Mr. and Mrs. Morley were residing together, with their three children, the eldest of whom was 14. Mr. Morley received statutory accident benefits from the Insurer, payable under Ontario Regulation 6721. Optional Benefit 1 had been purchased. Benefits paid by the Insurer included:
Funeral expenses pursuant to section 10 of the Schedule,
$50,000 to Ronald Morley, as sole surviving spouse, under section 11(2)(a) of the Schedule,
$20,000 to each of the three children, as surviving dependants, under section 11(2)(c) of the Schedule,
Mr. Morley also claimed a death benefit of $20,000 under section 11(2)(c) of the Schedule, as a surviving dependant of Marilyn Morley, at the time of the accident. The Insurer denied payment of this benefit on the basis that dependant death benefits are not payable to spouses. The parties were unable to resolve this dispute through mediation and the Applicant applied for arbitration under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended.
The issues in this hearing are:
Does payment of a death benefit to a surviving spouse under subsection 11(2)(a) of the Schedule preclude a further payment of death benefits to that spouse under subsection 11 (2) (c) as a dependant of the deceased?
Was Ronald Morley principally dependent for financial support on Marilyn Morley, within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Schedule, at the time of the accident, thereby qualifying for a death benefit of $20,000 under section 11 (2) (c) of the Schedule?
Mr. Morley also claims interest on any amounts owing, and his expenses incurred in the hearing.
Result:
Payment of a death benefit to a surviving spouse under subsection 11(2)(a) of the Schedule does not preclude a further payment of death benefits to that spouse under subsection 11 (2) (c) as a dependant of the deceased.
Ronald Morley was not principally dependent for financial support upon Marilyn Morley, within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Schedule, at the time of the accident. Mr. Morley does not qualify for a death benefit of $20,000 under section 11 (2) (c) of the Schedule.
Mr. Morley is entitled to payment of his expenses of the arbitration.
Hearing:
The hearing was held in London, Ontario, on June 16, 1994, before me, Janice Mackintosh, arbitrator.
Present at the Hearing:
Applicant:
Ronald L. Morley
Applicant's Representative:
Paul Brooks Barrister and Solicitor
Insurer's Representative:
Andre I. G. Michael Barrister and Solicitor
Witness:
Ronald Morley
A list of exhibits and other documents referred to at the hearing is attached as Schedule A.
Evidence and Findings:
Section 11 (2) of the Schedule provides that the Insurer will pay in respect of the deceased:
(a) $50,000 to his or her spouse, if the deceased is survived by a spouse who was his or her spouse at the time of the accident;
(b) $50,000 to his or her dependants, if the deceased is survived by any dependant who was a dependant at the time of the accident and is not survived by a spouse who is entitled to a benefit under this section;
(c) $20,000 to each of his or her surviving dependants who was a dependant at the time of the accident;
(d) if, at the time of the accident, the deceased was a dependant, $20,000
(i) to the person upon whom the deceased was dependant or, if that person is dead, to the surviving spouse of that person if the surviving spouse was the deceased's primary caregiver, or
(ii) to the other surviving dependants of the person upon whom the deceased was dependant if that person and his or her spouse are dead.
Section 3(2) of the Schedule provides:
(2) For the purposes of this Regulation, a person is a dependant of another person if the person is principally dependent for financial support on the other person or the other person's spouse.
Are the spousal and dependant provisions of section 11 mutually exclusive?
Counsel for the Applicant maintains that the plain language meaning of the words "dependant" and "spouse" used in subsections 11(2) (a), (c), and (d) of the Schedule, suggest that these provisions are overlapping rather than mutually exclusive. Counsel submitted that where an applicant meets the definition of "spouse" under section 224(1) of the Insurance Act, he or she is entitled to receive the spousal benefit under section 11(2)(a) of the Schedule, regardless of the financial arrangements between the spouses at the time of the accident. Further, where an applicant can also establish principal financial dependency upon his or her spouse at the time of the accident, he or she should be entitled to receive an additional benefit under section 11(2)(c).
Counsel for the Applicant maintains that there is no inconsistency in allowing spouses to be eligible for both types of benefits because the criteria under which each is made available is different.
Furthermore, where a spouse establishes financial dependency, it is appropriate for an additional amount to be paid to address that loss.
Counsel for the Applicant submitted that nothing in the wording of section 11 or section 3(2) supports the Insurer's view that a spouse is limited to a single benefit under section 11 and that the receipt of a spousal benefit precludes the receipt of a dependant's benefit.
In contrast, counsel for the Insurer submitted that the plain language meaning of the term "dependant" must be considered in light of the interpretation provided under section 3(2) of the Schedule. Section 3(2) provides that a person is a "dependant of another person" if they can establish that they are principally dependent for financial support on the other person or the other person's spouse. Counsel suggested that the phrase "the other person" is not intended to refer to an applicant's own spouse. If the phrase "the other person" did include an applicant's own spouse, it could lead to the absurd result of an applicant proving that he or she was principally dependent for financial support upon "the other person's spouse" ie. themselves. Counsel suggested that if the plain reading of section 3(2) leads to an absurdity, the section must be interpreted in a manner which avoids an absurd result.
I am not persuaded by the Insurer's argument. Section 3(2) does not purport to define who is, or who is not, a dependant - this remains a question of fact to be determined in each case. Rather, section 3(2) identifies criteria which must be present in order to establish the fact of dependency. It is inherent in the plain wording of section 3(2) that in order to qualify as a dependant, a claimant must be dependent upon a person other than themselves. That dependency, by definition, cannot be established through one's own self, but requires a connection or relationship with another.
Counsel for the Insurer maintains that the Schedule as a whole, distinguishes between spouses and dependants. For example, the definition of "insured person" under section 2 of the Schedule, refers to "the named insured, his or her spouse and any dependant of either of them". Section 11(2)(a) provides a separate higher benefit for spouses which, counsel maintains, implies that a claimant may be eligible for a spousal or dependant benefit, but not both. Similarly, section 11(6) refers to spouses and dependants disjunctively as follows:
11(6) No amount is payable under subsection (1) or (2) to a spouse or dependant unless the spouse or dependant, as the case may be, survives the deceased by thirty days.
Counsel for the Insurer states that these provisions support its interpretation that a claim for spousal benefits under section 11(2)(a) is distinct from, and precludes, a claim for dependant benefits under section 11(2)(c) or (d).
I accept the Insurer's view that the Schedule creates distinct benefits for spouses and dependants with different criteria for each. However I am not persuaded that a claim under the former precludes a claim under the latter.
In my view the provisions referred to by the Insurer are not specific enough to deprive a claimant, who establishes financial dependency upon the deceased, from receiving an additional benefit under section 11(2)(c).
Counsel for the Insurer suggested that had the legislators wanted to convey the meaning proposed by the Applicant, section 3(2) of the Schedule would have provided:
3(2) For the purpose of this Schedule, a person is a dependant of another person, including his or her spouse, if the person is principally dependant for financial support on the other person or the other person's spouse.
[emphasis added]
In contrast, counsel for the Applicant suggested that had the legislators wanted to make the benefits under section 11(2)(a) and (c) mutually exclusive, they could have employed similar wording to that used under section 11(2)(a) and (b), to make these benefits mutually exclusive.
In the case of Fathia Ahmed and Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, May 18, 1994, OIC File No. A-003995, I observed that the combination of sections 3(2) and section 11 of the Schedule, appear to do more than compensate individuals who have lost financial support because of the death of their principal source of support, in a motor vehicle accident. Section 11 (2) (a) makes no reference to financial dependency, whereas sections 11(2)(b), (c), and (d) introduce the concept of dependency and incorporate the reference to financial dependency contained in section 3(2) of the Schedule. I conclude that in its totality, section 11 recognises the complexity of family units and the connection, both financial and otherwise, as between spouses as well as among their respective children and dependants. I conclude that section 11 is intended to address a variety of family circumstances and to provide compensation to those claimants who meet the specific criteria set out within each subsection.
The Schedule is remedial legislation which is intended for the protection of the insured person and those claiming through the insured person. As between the narrow interpretation suggested by the Insurer and the more liberal construction proposed on behalf of the Applicant, I am satisfied that the more liberal construction more accurately reflects the true intent, meaning and spirit of the legislated insurance scheme. In reaching this conclusion, I rely upon section 10 of the Interpretations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 219, which provides:
- Every Act shall be deemed to be remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of any thing that the Legislature deems to be for the public good or to prevent or punish the doing of any thing that it deems to be contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.
Was Mr. Morley principally dependent for financial support upon his wife at the time of the accident?
At the time of the accident, Mr. and Mrs. Morley were joint owners of a family farm. They lived there with their three children. Mr. and Mrs. Morley had purchased the 160 acre property and farmhouse from Mr. Morley's father when Mr. Morley's father decided to retire from farming. Mr. Morley testified that over the years, family-operated farms in Ontario have experienced financial difficulties. Mr. and Mrs. Morley had been farming at a loss for several years. During that time it was necessary for Mr. Morley to take additional work outside the farm just to meet farm expenses. Mrs. Morley also worked outside the farm as a full-time nurse and office manager in a doctor's office, earning approximately $54,000 yearly.
Mr. and Mrs. Morley purchased the farm from Mr. Morley, Senior, at the market value of approximately $200,000 by arranging a first mortgage of $130,000 with the bank, and a second mortgage of $70,000 with Mr. Morley's father. The Morleys paid $840.00 a month ($10,080 yearly) to the bank in respect of the first mortgage, and paid no monthly principal or interest in respect of the $70,000 second mortgage to Mr. Morley's father.
The Insurer maintained that the $70,000 second mortgage from Mr. Morley's father amounted to an interest free loan. The Insurer argued that the benefit of this interest free loan from the father was intended only for Mr. Morley, out of natural love and affection for his son. The Insurer proposed that the value of this interest free loan ought to be added to the financial contribution made by Mr. Morley to his own expenses and those of his family. The Insurer provided no specific value to be attributed to the interest free loan.
I am not persuaded that the benefit of the interest free loan was intended for Mr. Morley alone. Mr. Morley's father may have been anxious to retire from farming and eager to sell his unprofitable farm to finance his retirement. There may not have been a ready market for such a farm and the Morleys may have been the only willing buyers. Mrs. Morley's external source of income was likely instrumental in obtaining mortgage financing through the bank. Mr. Morley, Senior, likely conferred the benefit of the interest free loan on both Mr. and Mrs. Morley, while also facilitating the means of financing his own retirement. For these reasons, I have attributed no specific value to the interest free loan from Mr. Morley's father and have excluded it from the calculation.
As the farm continued to lose money, Mr. and Mrs. Morley ultimately entered into a share - cropping arrangement with another farmer who pays approximately $10,400 a year for the use of their land. The Morleys and the share-cropper split the expenses related to seed and fertilizer. The Morleys remained responsible for the $10,080 mortgage payments, $1,200 yearly taxes, and additional expenses related to the maintenance of the farmhouse, barns drainage and insurance. These expenses exceeded the rental income received from the share-cropper. Total farm losses in 1991 were $14,753.04. Total farm losses in 1992 were $4,450.42. The Morleys each declared one half of the total farm income and deducted one half of the total farm losses against income, on their personal income tax returns.
Mr. Morley testified about the high unemployment in his area. He stated that the only way he could remain in the area and obtain full-time employment, was to start his own business. In February 1991, Mr. Morley started a long distance trucking company, called Ron Morley & Sons Trucking Company. The company's fiscal year ran from February 1 to January 31. Mr. Morley was the sole shareholder of the company.
In February 1991, the company purchased a three year old tractor-trailer rig for $94,398 (Exhibit 1, Tab 2, 1993 balance sheet, under fixed assets). In order to finance the purchase of the used tractor-trailer, the company borrowed $75,000 from the bank on a short-term loan to be repaid within four years (ie. by February 1, 1995). For the remainder, the company borrowed $20,000 from Mr. Morley. Mr. Morley obtained the $20,000 by mortgaging the family farm, co-owned by his wife. The used tractor was expected to run for three more years (ie. until 1994), while the used trailer was expected to run for four more years (ie. until 1995). Mr. Morley hoped that with careful maintenance and repair and a little luck, the tractor-trailer rig might last longer than the debt on the bank loan. He also hoped that profit margins in the trucking business would improve when the general economy improved.
Mr. Morley testified that in the year preceding his wife's death, he had a regular truck route from London, Ontario, to Vancouver. Each trip lasted approximately 8 to 14 days, driving approximately 60 to 70 hours a week. He made approximately 25 trips a year, and estimated that he was on the road approximately 250 days out of the year. While on the road, his expenses for food and lodging were paid through the company.
When he was at home, Mr. Morley rested, socialized with his family and friends, completed the invoicing and paperwork associated with his trucking business, and performed regular maintenance and repairs to his rig. He stated that he had little time or energy for maintenance of the house and farm.
While he was away, his wife oversaw the house and farm and arranged for any necessary repairs or maintenance to be done by hired help. She acted as an unpaid secretary for the trucking company, doing banking, taking calls, and lining up delivery loads. She cleaned the house, shopped, prepared meals, did the family laundry, cared for their three children, and worked full-time as a nurse and office manager in a doctor's office.
Mrs. Morley died in March 1993. Counsel for the Insurer submits that at the time of the accident, Mr. Morley was not principally dependent for financial support upon his wife. The Insurer maintains that company revenues were increasing and company loans were diminishing. In the two years immediately preceding his wife's death, a $32,300 dividend had been issued to Mr. Morley in 1991, and a $32,200 T-4 slip had been issued to Mr. Morley in 1992. The Insurer submitted that at January 1993, the company was essentially solvent but for a $2,884 loss, a $43,877 bank loan, not due to the bank until February 1995, and a $45,151 loan payable to the sole shareholder, Mr. Morley. In any event, the Insurer maintained that the bulk of Mr. Morley's food and lodging expenses were paid through the company while he was on the road 250 days of the year.
Mr. Morley submitted that the company could not have maintained its near solvent position without the assistance of his wife. He could not have left the bulk of his salary and dividend in the company in the form of a $45,151 shareholder loan, if his wife had not subsidized his living expenses and those of his children with her greater income from nursing. He could not have financed the initial purchase of the tractor-trailer without her consent to the $20,000 mortgage against the family home. The company could not have paid a secretary to take calls and arrange delivery loads. He could not have travelled 250 days a year without the round-the-clock child care and other domestic responsibilities willingly undertaken by his wife.
Mr. Morley testified that after his wife's death, he was unable to carry on the trucking company and the company was forced to wind up its affairs. Mr. Morley testified that the company could not afford to pay the salary of a full-time driver, while he stayed at home to care for his children and farm.
Section 3(2) of the Schedule has been considered in several previous decisions of the Commission. The interpretation of "dependant" provided in the Schedule specifies that the support must be financial and the dependence principal. In Maninder Singh and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Pilot Insurance Company, June 4, 1993, OIC File No. A-001525 and A-001526, Senior Arbitrator Naylor concluded that "an individual must chiefly or for the most part derive his or her financial support from another person in order to be principally dependant for financial support on that person". Arbitrator Naylor excluded other forms of dependence such as social dependence, except to the extent that social factors pertain to financial dependence. I adopt this interpretation of section 3(2) of the Schedule.
The company's financial statements for the fiscal year ending January 31, 1992, reflect a net after-tax income in the amount of $29,753. The company carried no salary expense that year. The company declared a dividend to Mr. Morley in the amount of $32,300 in anticipation of profits (Exhibit 1, Tab 3, T-5 1991, statement of investment income). However, the company did not possess sufficient cash to actually pay the declared amount. Unpaid amounts were carried forward on the company books as part of the shareholder loan to Mr. Morley. Mr. Morley testified that out of the $29,753 after-tax income of the company, he discharged the $20,000 mortgage against the family home, paid interest and expenses related to that mortgage, and paid his personal income taxes of $137. Therefore, less than $9,616 was available to Mr. Morley to defray his remaining expenses during the period February 1, 1991 to January 31, 1992. In 1991, Mr. Morley's expenses included $7,376.50 (representing his half of the $14,753 farming losses), as well as additional shelter expenses for telephone, electricity, heating fuel, and water for the family home.
In the fiscal year ending January 1993, the company posted total salaries of $33,211 as an expense, and issued a 1992 T-4 slip in the amount of $32,200 to Mr. Morley (Exhibit 1, Tab 5, 1992 T-4 slip). The net after-tax position of the company, including Mr. Morley's salary expense, resulted in a net loss of $2,884 (Exhibit 1, Tab 2, statement of operations).
Mr. Morley testified that the $32,200 salary set out in the 1992 T-4 slip was never actually paid out to him by the company because the actual expenses incurred by the company were greater than the conceptual expenses reflected on the balance sheet and statement of operations of the company for the fiscal year ending January 1993. For example, the value of the tractor-trailer had been depreciated to $63,864 on the 1993 balance sheet, yet Mr. Morley received only $41,000 when he was finally able to sell the rig in May 1993. The company paid down the outstanding principal and expenses on the bank loan in respect of the tractor-trailer, in preference to paying out salary to Mr. Morley.
Mr. Morley calculated that he received approximately $12,077 of the $32,200 income set out on his 1992 T-4 slip from the company. From this amount he paid $6,171 in personal income taxes, which left approximately $5,906 after-tax income available to him to defray living expenses during the period February 1, 1992 to January 31, 1993.
Mr. Morley testified that in the year preceding his wife's accident, he, his wife, and their three children, lived on Mr. Morley's after-tax income of $5,906 from the trucking company, along with Mrs. Morley's after-tax income of approximately $34,000 from her skilled occupation as a nurse and office manager. The family had no additional income or savings.
I was provided with little information concerning the family's expenses for food, clothing, transportation, entertainment, prescriptions, dental, and miscellaneous expenses. Mr. Morley explained that 10 per cent of their shelter costs were declared as expenses against farming income in their income tax returns. From my review of the statement of farming income and expenses filed with the Morley's 1992 income tax returns, I calculate their shelter costs for telephone, electricity, heating fuel, and water (exclusive of the 10 percent portion attributed to farming expenses) to be approximately $7,300.
On the basis of these facts, I find the 1992 after tax income and expenses of the Morleys to be as follows:
MRS. MORLEY
MR. MORLEY
After Tax Income
$ 34,000.00
$ 5,906.00
EXPENSES:
Farm Losses
$ 2,225.21
$ 2,225.21
Shelter
$ 3,650.00
$ 3,650.00
REMAINDER
$ 28,124.79 ÷ 5 = $ 5,624.96
$ 30.79
I find that in 1992, Mr. Morley had less than $30.79 to contribute to his personal expenses such as food, clothing, personal transportation, insurance, entertainment, medical, dental and miscellaneous expenses. It is clear that Mrs. Morley made a direct financial contribution to Mr. Morley's personal expenses as well as absorbing all the miscellaneous expenses of their three children. However, it is difficult to determine whether Mrs. Morley's financial contribution to Mr. Morley's expenses outweighed his own contribution.
I accept Mr. Morley's evidence that the miscellaneous expenses of the family consumed the remaining $28,124.79 of his wife's income and that they had no savings. Mr. Morley testified that he and his wife co-mingled their funds in several joint accounts and, like many families, they kept no accounting of specific expenditures made on behalf of each family member. If miscellaneous expenses were divided equally among the five members of the family, Mrs. Morley would have contributed approximately $5,624.95 towards each family member's miscellaneous expenses. However in view of Mr. Morley's extended absences from home and Mrs. Morley's monthly new car payments, it is likely that Mrs. Morley consumed part of Mr. Morley's portion of the $5,624.95. Mr. Morley testified that when he was home, he drove a leased pick-up truck. The expenses related to the pick-up truck were approximately $7,000 a year and one half of these expenses ($3,500) was claimed against farm income. At the very least, Mrs. Morley would have had to contribute $3,500 towards Mr. Morley's pick-up truck expenses.
I find it likely that Mrs. Morley made a direct financial contribution of approximately $4,000 to Mr. Morley's support in 1992. This contribution is somewhat less than Mr. Morley's own contribution of $5,906 after-tax income.
The Insurer accepted that Mrs. Morley made a greater contribution to the expenses of their three children than did Mr. Morley. The Insurer paid benefits to each of the children under section 11(2)(c) on the basis that the children were principally dependent for financial support upon their mother. The interdependency, mutual support, and non-monetary contributions made by one spouse to the other, and each spouse to their children, are difficult to isolate and impossible to quantify. In my view, the exchange of such intangibles is addressed under section 11(2)(a) of the Schedule which compensates for the loss of a spouse, without reference to an accounting as between spouses. However, I conclude that section 11(2)(c) addresses the more tangible, financial arrangements between spouses.
In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the financial contribution made by Mrs. Morley was not greater than Mr. Morley's own contribution to his living expenses. Accordingly, I conclude that Mr. Morley was not principally dependent for financial support upon his wife, at the time of her accident, within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Schedule.
Expenses
The Applicant seeks an award of the expenses he has incurred in this arbitration. An award for expenses may be made under section 282(11) of the Insurance Act, which provides as follows:
The arbitrator may award to the insured person such expenses incurred in respect of an arbitration proceeding as may be prescribed in the regulations to the maximum set out in the regulations.
The prescribed expenses and amounts are set out in Schedule 1 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code and in Ontario Regulation 664, R.R.O. 1990, Dispute Resolution Expenses.
In Ralph McCormick and Economical Mutual Insurance Company, October 2, 1991, OIC File No. A-000139, Arbitrator Susan Naylor made the following comments about expenses, with which I agree:
The discretion to award expenses should be exercised, having regard to the intent and purpose of the legislative scheme. The arbitration process has been established under the Insurance Act, as amended, in order to facilitate applicants' access to relatively inexpensive, speedy and informal adjudication of disputes regarding no-fault benefits. The discretion to award expenses should be exercised in accordance with this objective, having regard to the individual circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to award an applicant his or her expenses, unless, in the circumstances of the particular case, it is determined that the application for appointment of an arbitrator was manifestly frivolous or vexatious, or that the applicant's conduct unreasonably prolonged the proceedings.
The Director of Arbitrations approved this statement of the principles guiding an award of expenses in the appeal decision in Vito Luigi Calogero and The Co-Operators General Insurance Company, February 13, 1992, OIC File No. P-000251. In view of the difficult factual and legal issues raised by this case, I conclude that it is appropriate to award Mr. Morley his expenses of the arbitration.
Order:
Payment of a death benefit to a surviving spouse under subsection 11(2)(a) of the Schedule does not preclude a further payment of death benefits to that spouse under subsection 11(2)(c) as a dependant of the deceased.
Mr. Ronald Morley was not principally dependent for financial support upon Marilyn Morley, within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Schedule, at the time of the accident. Mr. Morley does not qualify for a death benefit of $20,000 under section 11 (2) (c) of the Schedule.
Mr. Morley is entitled to payment of his expenses of the arbitration.
May 15, 1995
Janice Mackintosh Arbitrator
Date
SCHEDULE A
Exhibit 1:
Financial Information:
Tab 1
Summary prepared by R. McLeod
Tab 2
Financial Statement of Ron Morley & Sons Trucking Inc. for year ending January 31, 1993
Tab 3
1991 Income Tax Return - Ronald Morley
Tab 4
1991 Income Tax Return - Marilyn Morley
Tab 5
1992 Income Tax Return - Ronald Morley
Tab 6
1992 Income Tax Return - Marilyn Morley
Other documents before the arbitrator:
Report of Mediator, dated December 3, 1993
Application for Appointment of an Arbitrator, dated January 14, 1994
Response by Insurer, dated February 16, 1994
Pre-hearing letter, dated April 12, 1994
Authorities relied on by the Applicant:
Grimbly et al v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, [1988] I.L.R. 1-2389 921 (Dist.Ct.)
Martins v. Gibraltar General Insurance Company, [1984] I.L.R. 1-1779 6852 (Co.Ct.)
Interpretations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.219
Authorities relied on by the Insurer:
No-Fault Benefits Schedule, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 672, s.3(2), s.11
Ontario Automobile Policy Form 1 (O.P.F. 1), s.2.2.2, s.2.17
Barnard et al. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America (1986), 1986 CanLII 2522 (ON HCJ), 57 O.R. (2d) 558 (H.C.J.)
Chevrier v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1985), 1985 CanLII 6521 (ON HCJ), 14 C.C.L.I. 130 (Ont. S.C. C.A.)
Ireland v. Royal Insurance Canada (1991), 1992 CanLII 15582 (ON CTPD), 8 C.C.L.I. (2d) 64 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)
Madill v. Chu (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 296 (S.C.C.)
Miller v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America (1984), 1984 CanLII 2019 (ON HCJ), 48 O.R. (2d) 451 (H.C.J.)
Amnon Ajzensztadt and CAA Insurance Company, July 13, 1992, OIC File No. P-000185
Magdy Amin and Security National Insurance Company, June 29, 1993, OIC File No. A-001553
Adolf and Maria Crnkovic and Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Company, April 8, 1993, OIC File No. A-002228
Peter Najem and Axa Insurance Company and Economical Mutual Insurance Company, July 27, 1993, OIC File Nos. A-003115 and A-003116