Neutral Citation: 1994 ONICDRG 85

File No. A-004476

ONTARIO INSURANCE COMMISSION

BETWEEN:

DIANNE RAFFOUL

Applicant

and

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

DECISION

Issues:

Dianne Raffoul is the daughter of the deceased, Mary Raffoul. Mary Raffoul died in a tragic motor vehicle accident on October 3, 1992. The issue in this arbitration is whether Dianne Raffoul is a dependant of her mother and entitled to death benefits under s. 11(2)(b) and 11(2)(c) of Ontario Regulation 672¹.

Any accident benefits payable as a result of the death of Mary Raffoul are payable by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm).

Result:

State Farm must pay $50,000 to Dianne Raffoul under s. 11(2)(b) of the Schedule;
State Farm must pay $20,000 to Dianne Raffoul under s. 11(2)(c) of the Schedule.
Interest is payable on these benefits under s. 24(1) of the Schedule.
The Applicant is entitled to her expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration proceeding under s. 282(11) of the Insurance Act.

Hearing:

A hearing was held in Leamington, Ontario on December 20, 1993, before me, Susan Naylor, Senior Arbitrator. The Applicant, Dianne Raffoul, was represented by Frank C. Ricci, Barrister and Solicitor. State Farm was represented by Lawrence R. McRae, Barrister & Solicitor. Dianne Raffoul and her brother, Louie Raffoul testified at the hearing.

The Applicant and the Insurer each filed an exhibit brief, marked Exhibit 1 and 2 respectively. The Insurer filed a letter from Statistics Canada, dated December 14, 1993, which was marked Exhibit 3. Counsel for the Insurer also filed a handwritten review of Dianne Raffoul's financial position. The cases referred to by each counsel are listed in Appendix A.

Evidence and Findings:

The facts in this case are not really in dispute.

At the time of her mother's death, Dianne Raffoul was a young, single woman of twenty-two. She lived at home with her widowed mother, her father having passed away some ten years earlier.

Dianne was the youngest of seven brothers and sisters. She had lived at home in the Leamington area all her life. By 1992, Dianne was the only child living at home. All her brothers and sisters had married and had moved out of the home; they were financially independent of their mother. The last brother, Louie, moved out about two years before the accident. It is clear that the family was very close-knit and spent a great deal of time together - Dianne's sister lived a few doors away, while Louie lived about five miles away.

In late 1992, Dianne and her boyfriend were planning their future together. Their engagement announcement was imminent but did not take place until after Mrs. Raffoul's death. The wedding date was later arranged for May, 1994. It can be assumed that, like her brothers and sisters before her, Dianne would have moved out of her mother's home after she married; however, these events were some time down the road.

Dianne's mother, Mrs. Mary Raffoul, was 61 years old when she died. According to her son Louie's testimony, his mother led a traditional life; she was a homemaker and did not work outside the home. However, she was comfortable financially and had accumulated substantial resources over her lifetime.

Because Mrs. Raffoul could not read or write English well, all her paperwork was done by Louie. He paid the bills for her and prepared her income tax returns. He did the same for his sister, Dianne. He was named his mother's executor and took care of the household expenses after her death. For this reason, Louie Raffoul is in a particularly good position to testify as to his mother's and his sister's financial affairs.

At the time of her death, Mrs. Raffoul had three sources of income:

Canada Pension Plan Survivor Benefits;
pension from her deceased husband's employer, Chrysler Canada; and
income from investments

Mrs. Raffoul's income tax returns for 1989 to 1992 were filed. In the year of her death, her income was approximately $26,000. Investment income represented the majority of her income sources - about 75 per cent.

Documents filed for estate purposes (Exhibit 1, Tab 15 and 16) showed substantial assets on Mrs. Raffoul's death. An application for probate listed assets of $393,316 (Tab 15); her personal property, consisting of money in bank accounts and Canada Savings Bonds, was $273,315.26. Mrs. Raffoul also owned her own home, free and clear of any mortgages. By her will, her assets were left to her children, equally. After Mrs. Raffoul's death, the family agreed that Dianne should continue to live in the family home for as long as she needed a place to live, and that the household expenses would be paid out of the estate.

According to the evidence, Mrs. Raffoul was very generous to her children, and gave or lent them money during her lifetime. These transfers were also helpful from the perspective of income-splitting for tax purposes. Louie testified that his mother helped him and three other children buy homes, and, in all likelihood, would have done the same for his youngest sister, Dianne. Mrs. Raffoul also transferred bonds and investments to her children during her lifetime, and opened savings accounts for them.

In Dianne's case, her mother had transferred two Canada Savings Bonds totalling $15,000 to Dianne's name. Mrs. Raffoul also placed $2,500 in Canada Savings Bonds jointly in her and Dianne's names and placed other investment money in Dianne's name.

It appears, from both Louie's and Dianne's testimony, that Dianne did not know that her mother had transferred these investments to her or that she had any of these assets. Although income from them was declared as Dianne's income on her tax returns, Dianne had nothing to do with the completion of her tax return - her brother took care of all the paperwork. I accept that Dianne had no knowledge of the investments, or of the income they generated.

Mrs. Raffoul and her daughter lived in a comfortable home with a garden, and all the modern conveniences. Mary Raffoul paid for the upkeep of the house and all the household expenses. Dianne did not pay for room or board, and did not contribute financially to the household expenses. Her mother paid for all the furniture, appliances and the day-to-day living expenses. She provided a car for Dianne's use, and paid for most of the cost of running it.

Mrs. Raffoul also did most of the domestic chores, including the laundry, the cooking, and the vast majority of the housework. Louie estimated that his mother did 98% of the work around the house.

According to Louie, his mother treated Dianne as if she was still in high school. Dianne did not take care of her own finances, pay any bills, complete her own income tax returns or do financial planning. This was all done for her. She was not, however, listed as a dependant of her mother on her mother's tax return.

Dianne has never held a full-time job. She completed her education in 1990, obtaining a diploma in early childhood education, and worked part-time after that. At the time of her mother's death, Dianne was working at two jobs, both part-time.

Dianne first started working as a salesperson in a gift store, called the Final Touch. She worked about 14 hours a week, at minimum wage. She then obtained another part-time job as a pre-school supervisor with the South Essex Community Council. The pre-school program ran for 2.5 hours a day, five days a week during the school year. It did not run during the summer months between the end of May to the end of September, or during the Christmas and March breaks. Dianne earned $13.50 an hour for the time she worked. She was able to negotiate longer hours - 20 hours a week - starting in October, 1992.

In 1992, Dianne earned a total of $9,257.50 from her two jobs. The income tax returns show that her earnings from employment had steadily increased, doubling between 1990 and 1992, and with her increased hours working for the South Essex Community Council, her earnings could be expected to continue to rise.

After her mother's death, Dianne gave up her job with the Final Touch. She continued to work 20 hours a week as a pre-school supervisor, and shortly before the hearing, got a second part-time job as a salesperson in a clothing store, at minimum wage.

Dianne's income tax returns were filed, showing her income for the years 1989 to 1992. This consisted principally of her employment earnings and the interest from the investments her mother had transferred to her. In the 1992 tax year, the bonds generated income of $1,312.50. She was also credited with income of around $900 from other investments. Dianne's 1992 income tax return showed a gross income, including employment earnings and investment income, of $11,985.88. Her disposable income after taxes was around $10,000.

Dianne used her earnings as pocket money for going out with her friends, for clothes and other such items. She did not use any of the money for household items and did not give her mother any money. She put what she did not spend into a savings account, and had saved about $4,300. She also had an RRSP, and had contributed $791 the year before, although it was not clear whether she or her mother made the contribution.

I received evidence analysing Mrs. Raffoul's and Dianne's expenses, and attributing a value to the benefits provided to Dianne by her mother. The evidence was introduced to allow a comparison between the financial support provided by Mrs. Raffoul and that available from Dianne's other income sources, such as her employment earnings and investments.

Louie Raffoul prepared a list of Mrs. Raffoul's and Diane's expenses in 1992, together with a further list summarizing the value of the services provided to Dianne by her mother, (Exhibit 1, Tab 17, 18, and 24). I have combined the lists for ease of reference, and have reproduced them in Appendix B.

Louie Raffoul testified that he prepared the lists from bills and estimates, and tried to come up with an average monthly amount, based on monthly expenditures for the period from the month before Mrs. Raffoul's death to the present day. He felt that the figures "low-balled" the actual amounts.

The figures showed that Mrs. Raffoul had expenses in 1992 of $26,818.38. These included all the costs of running the household, utilities, groceries and most of the costs of running an automobile. Dianne's expenses, which amounted to $10,177.00, generally, did not cover day to day necessities, but items such as entertainment, clothes, and cigarettes. Dianne testified that her mother paid for "big-ticket" clothing items, although she, Dianne was expected to pay for her day-to-day wardrobe.

Louie testified that, with some exceptions, he generally attributed 50 per cent of Mrs. Raffoul's expenses for Dianne's benefit to come up with the amount of support and value of benefits to Dianne, which he put at a total of $20,268.00.

Louie estimated the value of the housing provided to Dianne at $500 a month, which he felt was a reasonable estimate of the cost of renting an apartment. He felt that $1,200.00 represented the cost of furnishing an apartment modestly, with second hand furniture. A 1992 Rental Market Study conducted by Canada Mortgage & Housing Corporation (Exhibit 2, Tab 4) showed the average weighted monthly rental for a one bedroom apartment in the Leamington area to be $488. State Farm suggested that the amount should be based on the cost of shared accommodation, which counsel felt more closely approximated Dianne Raffoul's living arrangements.

Dianne's mother had provided her with a car to go to and from work, and to get around. Mrs. Raffoul did not have a driver's license and had bought the car in 1987 for the use of the children living at home. Dianne testified that she used the car, mostly to go the three or four miles to and from work. She drove to Windsor approximately once a week with her mother, to visit her sister and go shopping.

Mrs. Raffoul paid for most of the automobile expenses, including the license, insurance, taxes, repairs, and some of the gas bills. Dianne did not contribute to the cost of the vehicle's operation, except for gas.

Louie allocated all the automobile expenses to Dianne, plus $1,200.00 for the use of the car. He explained that this figure roughly represented the cost of renting the car for a year, at a monthly cost of $100.00. I agree with the State Farm's submissions that Mrs. Raffoul derived some benefit from this arrangement, but it is clear to me that the car was kept predominantly for Dianne's benefit.

Counsel for the Applicant compared the total estimated value of Mrs. Raffoul's support - $20,268.00 - with Dianne's disposable income in 1992 - $10,000. He submitted that the value of the support provided to Dianne vastly exceeded her means, and that therefore she was principally dependent for financial support on her mother.

Counsel for State Farm presented alternative values for the support provided by Mrs. Raffoul. He compared household expenses against figures on family expenditure for 1990 prepared by Statistics Canada, marked Exhibit 2, Tab 3, and either excluded or reduced the value of items which he felt reflected a higher than average standard of living. He calculated the total value of Mrs. Raffoul's support to be taken into account to be $7,380, significantly less than Dianne's 1992 earnings.

The Regulations

Part III of the Schedule provides for the payment of benefits in the event that an insured person dies within the benefit period set out in s. 11(3), if the deceased person had a spouse or dependants at the time of the accident.

The relevant provisions in this case are sections 11 (2)(b) and 11(2)(c), which provide as follows:

11.--(2) If, as a result of an accident, an insured person dies within the benefit period set out in subsection (3), the insurer will pay with respect to the insured person, if Optional Benefit 1 has been purchased,

(b) $50,000 to his or her dependants, if the deceased is survived by any dependant who was a dependant at the time of the accident and is not survived by a spouse who is entitled to a benefit under this section;

The policy-holder had purchased Optional Benefit No. 1, providing for a higher level of benefits. Since Mary Raffoul was a widow, State Farm must pay the benefits contained in s. 11 (2)(b) and (c) if her daughter, Dianne, was her dependant at the time of the accident. It is conceded that, if so, the amounts set out in s. 11(2)(b) and s. 11(2)(c) are both payable.

The definition of dependant is contained in section 3(2) of the Schedule. Its states:

3.--(2) For the purposes of this Schedule, a person is a dependant of another person if the person is principally dependent for financial support on the other person or the other person's spouse.

The core issue in this case is whether Dianne was principally dependent for financial support upon her mother, under s. 3(2) of the Schedule.

Counsel for the Applicant focused on the fact of Dianne's reliance on her mother's financial support, in the overall context. The Insurer focused on her need for financial support, given the Applicant's earning capacity.

Both counsel brought a number of judicial cases and arbitration decisions to my attention. I am indebted to counsel for their careful and considered submissions in this case. I have carefully considered these cases, which are listed in Appendix A.

In the present case, previous jurisprudence should be applied with some caution. Firstly, the statutory test set out in s. 2(3) of the Schedule - that the applicant must be "principally dependent for financial support" - is different from the much broader test for dependency considered in some of the earlier cases. Secondly, determination of the nature and degree of dependency is essentially one of fact, and turns on the particular circumstances of each case.

The overarching principle governing interpretation of the language of the dependency provisions remains that set out in Miller v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, (1984) 1984 CanLII 2019 (ON HCJ), 48 O.R. (2d) 451; affirmed (1985) 1985 CanLII 2022 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (2d) 797, namely that the benefits scheme is remedial legislation and should be accorded a broad and liberal interpretation that best meets its objectives.

Prior court decisions have held that an individual must chiefly or for the most part derive his or her financial support from another person in order to be principally dependent for financial support on that person i.e. an applicant must be more financially dependent on the deceased person than on any other source. Counsel referred to this as the "50% + 1%" rule of thumb - the applicant must derive at least 51% of his or her financial support from the person.

In Miller, Mr. Justice O'Brien suggested a number of criteria to apply in determining whether an applicant was a "dependant relative" under a policy, including the amount and duration of the financial dependency, the financial or other needs of the claimant, the ability of the claimant to be self-supporting, and the general standard of living within the family unit. These standards were approved on appeal, with the exception of the general standard of living within the family, which was not approved. The case considered a different test - the dependency was not limited to financial support, nor did it need to be the principal means of support; however, the criteria, with some modifications, have been applied in cases dealing with language similar to that under the Schedule, and are helpful in considering the definition of a dependant under s. 3(2) of the Schedule.

In Miller, the applicant, who was 23 years old, was employed full-time at the time of the accident, and had earned $2,566.62 in the prior three months. Because of sporadic employment he had earned only another $880 in the year before. He lived with his parents, but did not contribute to the household expenses. His parents provided him with use of a car. He spent his earnings on work clothes and entertainment, and had saved about $700. Counsel introduced figures from the National Council of Welfare, setting out requirements for a subsistence level standard of living, and from the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, showing adequate budgetary requirements for a more generous standard of living for specific categories of household expenditures. Based on the evidence before him, the judge found that the applicant was a "dependant relative" under the test at that time. The judge made no express reference to the statistics in his findings, and it is unclear what, if any, use was made of them.

In Pagliarella et al v. DiBiase Brothers Inc. et al, (1989) 1989 CanLII 4388 (ON HCJ), 71 O.R. (2d) 193, - also a decision of Mr. Justice O'Brien and dealing with similar statutory language - the applicant lived at home in a traditional Italian household. She made no financial contribution to household expenses. She was employed full-time, and had managed to save a substantial amount - over $45,000 - which she was saving until she was married. The judge took into account the fact that the applicant was able to save the substantial sum because of financial concessions made by her father, and held that she was a "dependent relative" under the S.E.F. 42 endorsement.

A number of arbitration decisions, dealing with the definition of dependant under the Schedule, were put before me. In my view, none of these are especially helpful as they all turn on their own facts.

In Crnkovic v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co, O.I.C. File No. 2228, issued on April 8, 1993, the applicant's parents provided her with financial support which "enhanced the lifestyle which their daughter would otherwise have been able to afford". However, she was no longer residing in the family home, and was, for the most part, self-supporting, with a gross income in the year before the accident of $20,000. She was held not to be a dependent. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable.

Similarly, in Maninder Singh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, O.I.C. File No. A-001525 and 001526, issued on June 4, 1993, although the applicant lived at home, he pooled his earnings with those of the rest of the family, and contributed substantially to the household expenses.

The facts in Cattrysse v. Westminister Mutual Insurance Co., O.I.C. File Nos. A-001789 and A-001618 issued on June 21, 1993, are somewhat more analogous to those in the present case. The applicant lived at home and worked on the family farm. His parents provided him with a car and paid for food and the necessities of life. He had agreed to defer his earnings until after the tobacco crop was sold, but had a small amount in a savings account. He was held to be a dependant of his parents.

Najem v. Axa Insurance Co., O.I.C. File No. A-003115 and A-003116, issued on July 27, 1993, concerned which of two insurers was responsible for benefits. The applicant was in his second year of a co-op engineering program. Each year consisted of two semesters of full-time academic work and one semester of work in a co-op placement. During the first year, he lived in residence, but moved home during the summer co-op placement. In his second year, he chose to live at home, preferring his mother's cooking and housekeeping to conditions in residence. He was into his second year co-op placement when the accident occurred. He was employed for the four month placement at gross wages of around $600 a week. His total income for the school year, including earnings and student grants but excluding his student loan, was around $9,500. He paid no room or board, and his mother did his laundry. However, he helped with maintenance work around the house and garden, did major household chores, and managed the household finances for his mother. Arbitrator Mackintosh evaluated the value of the support and benefits that the applicant and his mother provided to each other, and concluded that the applicant's total income sources outweighed his mother's financial support. Therefore, she held that he was not principally dependent for financial support on his mother.

In my view, the facts in Najem are different from those in this case. The applicant had previously moved out of the home, and had chosen to move back in for convenience. He was able to support himself on his income, and had done so the year before. He contributed to the operation of the household, and this was taken into account in evaluating the value of the support he received.

The decisions above make it clear that each case must be decided on its own facts. While the test requires that the support be financial and primary, the entirety of the applicant's circumstances must be looked at to determine if these conditions are met. The statutory test set out in s. 3(2) is a financial test, but it is not limited to a purely numerical calculation.

In a case where goods and services are provided by a family member otherwise than for payment, and the facts are relatively straightforward, a detailed evaluation of such goods and services is a largely academic exercise, and is not necessary.

Dianne was a young, single woman who lived at home with her widowed mother. She relied on her mother completely for virtually all the basic necessities of life, including shelter, food, utilities, and the means of getting to and from work. She made no contribution to the household costs.

Dianne relied on her mother to take care of her - to do the cooking, the housework, the shopping, to pay the bills - in her words: "Mum took care of everything". Essentially, the only thing Dianne paid for herself were some entertainment expenses, clothing, cigarettes and gas.

In short, at the time of the accident, Dianne's mother met virtually all of Dianne's financial needs. Dianne had never left home and had never been independent of her mother. I note that the fact that an applicant had lived at home from the time he was a young boy was found to be very relevant in Martins v. Gibralter General Insurance Company [1984] I.L.R. 1-1779.

No doubt, as is to be expected, some mutual benefit accrued from these arrangements. However, from a financial perspective, the support overwhelmingly flowed in one direction - from mother to daughter.

As far as Dianne's means were concerned, she had never worked on a full-time basis and had gross income of $11,985.88 in the year before the accident, leaving around $10,000 in disposable income. She agreed in her testimony that she could have contributed to room and board out of her earnings. However, her means were obviously limited and were not used to live on.

Figures from the Household Surveys Division of Statistic Canada, marked Exhibit 2, Tab 1 and 2, and Exhibit 3, which delineated low income family units, were introduced in evidence. According to an explanatory letter from Statistics Canada marked Exhibit 3, the 1992 low-income cut-off was determined from the 1992 data on family expenditures, and is defined as a family who on average spend 54.7% or more of their income on food, shelter and clothing.

According to Exhibit 3, the low income cut-off line for a single person was fixed at $11,186 in rural areas and $12,829 for someone living in an urban area of under 30,000 people (Leamington has a population of 14,000). Based on her 1992 tax return, Dianne Raffoul's income put her under the low-income cut-off line. In any event, however, while the ability to be self supporting is a relevant criterion of dependency, nothing in the Schedule suggests that this must be measured by reference to a subsistence-level standard of living.

Much of the evidence and counsel's submissions were directed at the question of Dianne's ability to support herself. State Farm's counsel took the position that Dianne's ability to support herself should be measured by her earning capacity, rather than her actual earnings for 1992. He noted that her earnings showed an upward trend. She had started to work longer hours; she need not have given up her job at the Final Touch, and nothing was stopping her from seeking full-time employment, had she wished to do so.

State Farm's counsel measured Dianne's earnings and earning capacity against a number of benchmarks, to show that Dianne's full-time equivalent earnings were sufficient to sustain financial independence.

In my view, section 3(2) requires a realistic assessment of an applicant's actual financial circumstances to determine whether they are in fact relying on another for support. The actual circumstances of the applicant must be looked at, and not an imputed earning capacity. Where, as here, an applicant works part-time, her financial circumstances should be measured based on her part-time earnings, and not on the income she might have earned had she worked full-time.

Section 11 requires an assessment of the applicant's circumstances "at the time of the accident". However, I agree with Arbitrator David Draper in Frank Donohue v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, O.I.C. File No. 6756, issued on August 31, 1994, that a person's position cannot be determined solely by a single "snapshot" of his or her circumstances at that date.

In this case, Dianne Raffoul had a disposable income of around $10,000 in the year of the accident. She had negotiated an increase in hours, which would have led to a corresponding increase in her annual earnings. However, for all intents and purposes, she had not seen the benefit of that increase in hours. Moreover, her overall income did not actually increase because she did not continue to work at her second job. In these circumstances, it would not be fair or realistic to regard her earnings at the time of the accident as greater than those reflected in her 1992 tax return.

In addition to her employment income, State Farm's counsel submitted that Dianne had substantial financial resources from investments, amounting to capital of around $25,000, which were at her disposal. He suggested that a person with such substantial assets cannot be regarded as principally dependent for financial support on another. He drew the analogy of someone with 1 million dollars in lottery winnings, who chooses not to spend the money. In my view, this case is entirely different from the analogy suggested. While Dianne Raffoul may have been entitled to draw upon them, I accept that she had no knowledge of the assets in her name. She cannot be regarded as having funds at her disposal in respect of assets that she was entirely unaware of.

Moreover, as in Pagliarella, the bulk of the investments were provided by Dianne's mother, a factor that, if anything, underscores her dependency on her mother.

The case of Martins, which dealt with similar language to that of the Schedule - is also on point. In that case, the applicant was unemployed in the year before the accident, and lived with his parents. He owned a half interest in the home, and his own car. The judge rejected the view that the applicant was required to sell his interest in the house or his car, or mortgage the house, before he could be considered to meet the statutory test.

This reasoning is equally applicable to assets set aside for retirement purposes. Furthermore, I do not find Dianne's savings of $4,300 to be sufficiently significant to change her financial status.

In the summer of 1992, Dianne stayed with her sister while her mother visited relatives abroad for three to four months. Assuming this fact is relevant given that the stay occurred several months before the accident, in my view, this purely temporary arrangement did not affect her situation as a dependant of her mother. On the contrary, it suggests that other family members looked after Dianne when her mother was not around to do it.

Mrs. Raffoul did not list Dianne as a dependant on her tax returns. While this is a relevant consideration, the tax status of the parties is but one factor to be considered. In all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that it is significant in this case.

Having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular, Dianne's limited means, the fact that she had always lived with her mother and relied on her almost completely to provide her with the necessities of life, I find that she was principally dependent for financial support on her mother at the time of the accident.

Order:

State Farm must pay $50,000 to Dianne Raffoul under s. 11(2)(b) of the Schedule;
State Farm must pay $20,000 to Dianne Raffoul under s. 11(2)(c) of the Schedule.
Interest is payable on these benefits under s. 24(1) of the Schedule.
The Applicant is entitled to her expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration proceeding under s. 282(11) of the Insurance Act.

September 21, 1994

Susan Naylor

Senior Arbitrator

Date

APPENDIX A

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cattrysse v. Westminster Mutual Fire Insurance Co., [1991] O.I.C. File Nos. A-001789 and A-001618

Crnkovic v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993] O.I.C. File No. A-002228

Ireland v. Royal Insurance Canada et al, [1992] I.L.R. 1-2837

Martins v. Gibraltar General Insurance Company, [1984] I.L.R. 1-1779

Miller v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, (1984) 1984 CanLII 2019 (ON HCJ), 48 O.R. (2d), 451

Miller v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, affirmed (1985) 50 O.R. (2d) (797)

Najem v. AXA Insurance Co., [1993] O.I.C. File Nos. A-003115 and A-003116

Pagliarella et al v. DiBiase Brothers Inc. et al, (1989) 1989 CanLII 4388 (ON HCJ), 71 O.R. (2d) 193

Revega v. Western Union Insurance Company, [1975] I.L.R. 1-665

Simeonoff v. Pafco Insurance Co. Ltd., [1993] I.L.R. 1-2920

Singh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., [1993] O.I.C. File Nos. A-001789 and A-001618

APPENDIX B

LIST OF EXPENSES OF MARY RAFFOUL IN 1992($)

EXPENSES OF DIANNE RAFFOUL IN 1992($)

AMOUNT OF SUPPORT AND VALUE OF BENEFITS GIVEN BY MARY RAFFOUL TO DIANNE RAFFOUL IN 1992 ($)

Footnotes

Prior to January 1, 1994, Ontario Regulation 672 was called the No-Fault Benefits Schedule. After that date it became the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Accidents Before January 1, 1994. In this decision, the term "Schedule" will be used to refer to Regulation 672.
Includes Income Tax, Canada Pension and Unemployment Insurance

Dianne Raffoul v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 1994 ONICDRG 85

Case Summary