Neutral Citation: 1994 ONICDRG 146
File Nos. A-002167 & A-002092
ONTARIO INSURANCE COMMISSION
BETWEEN:
ROBERT OSHANA
Applicant
and
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Insurer
and
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Insurer
DECISION
Issues:
The Applicant, Robert Oshana, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on May 4, 1991. He applied for accident benefits, payable under Ontario Regulation 6721.
The issues in this hearing are:
Which insurance company, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive) or State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (State Farm), is liable to pay Mr. Oshana's accident benefits?
Is Mr. Oshana's claim for benefits properly considered under section 12 or section 13 of the Schedule? Is Mr. Oshana entitled to weekly income benefits under section 12(1) of the Schedule, based on an offer of employment?
Mr. Oshana also claims interest on any outstanding amounts owing, and his expenses incurred in the hearing.
Result:
Progressive is liable to pay any accident benefits.
Mr. Oshana is entitled to weekly income benefits of $240 a week under section 12(1) of the Schedule for the period from one week after the accident until June 15, 1991, and to interest on this amount under section 24(2) of the Schedule.
Mr. Oshana is entitled to his reasonable expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration proceeding under section 282(11) of the Insurance Act.
Hearing:
The hearing was held in London, Ontario on January 31, 1994 and February 1, 1994, before me, Susan Naylor, Senior Arbitrator.
Present at the Hearing:
Applicant: Robert Oshana
Applicant's Representative: Stuart Kiar Barrister and Solicitor
Progressive's Representative: Robert Gray Barrister and Solicitor
State Farm's Representative: Nigel Gilby Barrister and Solicitor
Witnesses:
Robert Oshana
Sarkis A. Oshana, Applicant's brother
Abdou (Eddie) Ismail
Dr. A. Barry Deathe
For ease of reference, I have referred to Robert and Sarkis Oshana by their first names.
Documents Before the Arbitrator
A complete list of exhibits is listed in Appendix A. Counsel for each insurance company filed a brief of authorities. The authorities referred to are listed in Appendix B. The Applicant took no position on which insurer was liable to pay benefits.
1. "Who is the insurer:
The priority rules governing liability to pay accident benefits between insurers are set out in section 268(2) of the Insurance Act. The relevant subsections state:
(2) The following rules apply for determining who is liable to pay no-fault benefits:
- In respect of an occupant of an automobile,
i. the occupant has recourse against the insurer of an automobile in respect of which the occupant is an insured,
ii. if recovery is unavailable under subparagraph i, the occupant has recourse against the insurer of the automobile in which he or she was an occupant
(5) Despite subsection (4), if a person is a named insured under a contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy or the person is the spouse or a dependant, as defined in the No-Fault Benefits Schedule, of a named insured, the person shall claim no fault benefits against the insurer under that policy and, if there is more than one such policy, the person, in his or her discretion, may decide the insurer from which he or she will claim the benefits.
Section 2(c) of the Schedule defines an "insured person" as:
(c) the named insured, his or her spouse and any dependant of either of them while the occupant of any other automobile,
Section 3(2) of the Schedule defines a "dependant" as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this Schedule, a person is a dependant of another person if the person is principally dependent for financial support on the other person or the other person's spouse. O. Reg. 273/90, s. 3.
Sarkis Oshana, Robert's older brother, was insured with Progressive. If Robert is found to be a dependant of his brother, Progressive is the responsible insurer. To be a dependant of Sarkis, Robert must be principally dependent on him for financial support at the time of the accident. The words "principally dependent ..for financial support" have been considered in a number of judicial and arbitration decisions, listed in Appendix B. In the arbitration decision of Bruce and Eleanor McDonald and State Farm Insurance Companies, March 11, 1993, OIC file No. A-001347, (appeal pending), Arbitrator David Draper summarised the cases in the following words:
The term, "principally dependent for financial support" requires more than some dependence. It means that the person claiming benefits must establish that he or she is more financially dependent on the .. person than on any other source.
I also accept that the cases cited ... conclude that a person can only be "principally dependent for financial support" on one source...
The decisions also make it clear that each case turns on its own facts.
If Robert is not a dependant of Sarkis, he has recourse against State Farm, because at the time of the accident he was a passenger in a car insured with State Farm.
There is no doubt that before the accident Robert relied on members of his family for financial support. He had no earnings or independent source of income.
In the 1980s, most of Robert's family - first, Sarkis, and subsequently, his mother, father and several brothers and sisters - came to Canada from Syria. Robert was able to join them in late 1989. He was 26 years old at the time and had been student in England; his only employment had been during college holidays. He had graduated with a diploma in building studies, with a view to becoming an engineering draftsperson.
Robert's older brother, Sarkis, had come to Canada in 1983, and obtained work. He sponsored his mother and father's application for immigration. As a condition of sponsorship, he had to undertake to support his parents financially for up to ten years.
Sarkis was not named as Robert's sponsor on the immigration papers; instead, their father sponsored Robert and undertook to support him. Sarkis testified that this was done as a matter of formality to help Robert's immigration; however, he, Sarkis ultimately felt responsible to provide for Robert, because he was their father's sponsor.
For the first few months after Robert arrived in Canada, the family lived together in the same apartment. The family was close knit, and everyone tried to help out financially when they could. Robert quickly found work in his chosen profession and was able to contribute to the family's expenses. At some point in 1990, Robert and Sarkis moved to a separate apartment, which they shared.
Unfortunately, Robert had worked for only about three months before he was laid off in April 1990, due to the economic conditions. He made extensive efforts to find work after this, but was unsuccessful and remained unemployed between April 1990 and May 1991, when the accident happened. With the job situation still bleak, in the spring of 1991, Robert decided to return to university full-time for a four-year engineering degree, starting in September. He applied for financial assistance under the Ontario Student Assistance Program, citing negligible funds. (Exhibit 1, Tab 6).
During this time, Sarkis paid the rent, which was about $300 a month, and bought most of the food. He did not charge Robert for room and board. Robert used Sarkis' car, but he did not contribute to its operating costs, except for gas. Sarkis occasionally gave Robert money whenever his brother needed it. However, Sarkis had limited earnings, and was trying to save for his wedding.
Robert received additional money from other family members, particularly from his brother Edward in England. Robert gave Sarkis some of this money for household expenses when he could, although his contributions were irregular. He also helped with his family's expenses.
Robert testified that Edward sent him $1,000 or $2,000 a number of times a year. He said that the money was intended to pay for family expenses, as well as his own. Robert's testimony about how much money he received, from whom, and for what purpose, was vague and confused. He could not remember many details, although I believe he tried to do his best.
A bank book statement for the joint account of Robert and his younger brother Joseph was filed (Exhibit 1, Tab 9). The statement showed transactions for the period from January to July 1990 and from April 1991 to December 1991. Deposits for the periods averaged out at $1,100 a month, with equivalent withdrawals. Immediately before the accident of May 4, 1991, the balance in the account was under $10, although a deposit of $1,200 was made on May 9, 1991.
The records were incomplete and inconclusive. It is not clear how much of the money flowing in and out of the account was Robert's. Robert was unable to identify the source of the deposits or their purpose - it could have been money for Robert from Edward, or from another family member, it could have been earmarked for the family rather than for Robert, or it may have been deposited by Joseph for his own purposes. According to Robert's testimony, any of these were possible. It is hard to draw any conclusions from the banking information.
In order for Robert to be a dependant of Sarkis under the Schedule, he must be principally or chiefly dependent on Sarkis for financial support, rather than on the other members of his family. Robert was not listed as a dependant of Sarkis on the tax returns. There is no question that he was receiving money from Edward, at least. However, it is not clear how much he received or for what purpose.
On the other hand, Sarkis' contribution to his brother's support is certain. He paid the rent and utilities, bought the food and provided his brother with the use of a car. This support must be seen in context. Robert and Sarkis testified that they believed that Sarkis was responsible for Robert's support in Canada. I find this to be significant, regardless of the actual immigration arrangements. Sarkis lived with his brother and fulfilled these responsibilities in concrete terms by providing for his brother's support on a day-to-day basis.
In the particular circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that Robert was principally or chiefly dependent on Sarkis for financial support at the time of the accident. Therefore, Progressive is liable to pay any accident benefits to which he is found entitled.
2. Weekly Income Benefits:
(a) Offer of employment
Robert had not worked for a year before the accident. However, he claimed that he had a job to go to, which qualified him for benefits under section 12(2) 1. iii. of the Schedule, on the basis that he was, at the time of the accident,
entitled to start work within one year under a legitimate offer of employment made before the accident and evidenced in writing.
Benefits payable under this subsection are based on the gross weekly income payable under the contract of employment, and do not start until the job would have started (section 12 (7) 2. ii and section 12 (6) of the Schedule).
According to this subsection, the offer must be a legitimate offer of employment, it must be made before the accident, and the offer must be evidenced in writing.
Robert alleged that, shortly before the accident, he had arranged to start work as the night shift manager of a coffee shop, "Uncle Dave's Donut & Deli". Robert and his friends regularly "hung out" at the cafe, socialising. The cafe was managed by a distant relative of Robert's, Eddie Ismail, who offered him the job. Robert did not want to start work until after Sarkis' wedding on May 4, 1991. They therefore arranged for Robert to begin several days afterwards. As things happened, the accident intervened and Robert never took on the job.
I heard oral testimony from Robert, Mr. Ismail and from Sarkis. The picture was muddied by the length of time that had elapsed between the accident and Robert's claim for benefits and by the involvement of the two insurers.
The offer was not reduced to writing. Robert and Mr. Ismail both testified that Robert had completed a job application at the time the offer was made. However, a copy of the application was not filed. According to the evidence, Robert did not approach either insurance company about a possible claim until around March, 1992. Mr. Ismail testified that, by that time, he had thrown away Robert's original application in the normal course of business.
At Robert's request, Mr. Ismail wrote a letter dated March 24, 1992, marked Exhibit 1, Tab 7, confirming the offer for the purposes of Robert's insurance claim. The letter indicated that Robert applied for work on May 1, 1991, and on review of the application, was hired to begin work on May 8, 1991. It provided some details of the job.
Although Mr. Ismail's letter was written after the accident, it appears to meet the requirement that the offer be evidenced in writing. I did not receive submissions that would lead me to find otherwise. However, the letter carries little evidentiary weight. It is not a corroborative document made contemporaneously with the offer or in the ordinary course of business. It adds little if anything to the testimony of Robert and Mr. Ismail. Ultimately, my assessment of the legitimacy of the offer and its terms rests on my findings as to the credibility of these witnesses.
While there were some discrepancies in the evidence, Mr. Ismail gave his testimony in a firm, forthright and credible manner. In my opinion, he was not partisan, and I generally accept his version of events. Robert had less specific recollection of the details.
Mr. Ismail testified that he managed the coffee shop throughout the day and night shifts. He wanted some relief from these long hours. Robert expressed an interest in a job. About a week before the accident, the two men discussed the possibility of Robert taking over the night shift. Several days before the accident on May 4, 1991, Robert arranged to stay until closing so that he could watch what Mr. Ismail did. He was shown the office and kitchen. He then filled in an application and was offered the job. He did not want to start right away, because his brother was getting married that weekend. They therefore decided on a start date of Wednesday May 8, 1991, four days after the accident.
The terms of the agreement were not completely pinned down, as is commonplace with small businesses. Mr. Ismail testified that the specific hours to be worked and the rate of pay were not finalized, although they had a general understanding of the range of pay and the hours contemplated. However, despite the lack of details, I am satisfied that there was enough certainty in the arrangements between the parties to constitute an offer of employment within the meaning of section 12(2) 1. iii of the Schedule.
Mr. Ismail testified that the job paid between $7.50 and $8.00 an hour. He intended to hire Robert full-time for the summer (40 hours a week), and then on a part-time basis when the university term started.
I find that Robert was scheduled to start work on May 8, 1991, and was going to be paid at a minimum of $7.50. I base Robert's income on the minimum figure agreed to, and find that he was hired for a forty hour week for the duration of the summer, with reduced hours after the commencement of the university year. Accordingly, his earnings for the summer would have been $300 a week, for a weekly income benefit of $240.
Robert had a vague understanding of what the job entailed. According to Mr. Ismail, the job involved overseeing the employees working at the cafe, serving customers when needed, organising the supplies and ensuring that the shelves were stocked with cases of drink, coffee cups and other supplies, doing the paperwork, organising the day's "take", and closing up the shop at the end of the day. The night manager was also responsible for sweeping and mopping the cafe floor and taking out the garbage at closing time.
In my view, the job duties generally involved light physical work. The garbage bags generally weighed around 10 lbs each, but there was a separate garbage bag containing coffee grounds which weighed between 20 to 30 lbs. Bringing in supplies and restocking the shelves involved bending and lifting from time to time. However, this could be accomplished without carrying a large or heavy quantity of supplies at any one time. Moreover, according to Mr. Ismail's testimony, the job duties were loosely defined. If necessary, some of this work could be done by the day shift manager or by another employee.
(b) Disability
Robert's entitlement to weekly income benefits rests on whether he has been substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of the job that he was offered. Although his injuries may have affected him in other ways, this inquiry is limited to the effect of the accident on his ability to work as the night shift manager at the coffee shop.
Robert suffered soft tissue injuries to his shoulder and lower back in the automobile accident on May 4, 1991. At the time, he was travelling to his brother Sarkis' wedding. Robert testified that immediately after the accident he felt pain in his low back and right hip and leg. However, he did not require medical attention at that time, and was able to continue on to the wedding. He subsequently developed pain in his shoulders, and went to see his family doctor about these complaints some days later.
Dr. Paterson examined Robert and found normal range of motion, with some tenderness in Robert's lower back. He prescribed analgesics and administered physical therapy. According to Dr. Paterson's records, Robert received therapy once a week for about four weeks.
Robert stopped seeing the doctor after the end of May, 1991. His injuries seemed to have substantially resolved. He did not have any ongoing shoulder pain. However, he testified that he continued to feel discomfort in his lower back. He started the university course in September, as planned. It was not until the end of March 1992, that Robert returned to Dr. Paterson, with further complaints of neck, back and knee pain.
Robert never started work at the coffee shop. Before he was due to do so, he told Mr. Ismail that he had been injured in a car accident, and could not work. He testified that he did not want to strain his back. Mr. Ismail testified that he would have modified the job duties to Robert's physical limitations, but he was not asked to do so. Robert testified that he never discussed the job, or his ability to do it, with his family doctor.
Dr. A. Barry Deathe, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, examined Robert on behalf of State Farm much later, in 1993. He thought it likely that Robert had suffered a mild cervical and lumbar sprain in the accident, which accounted for his initial symptoms of pain. He testified that resolution of Robert's injuries within six weeks of the accident was consistent with normal healing times for a mild soft tissue injury of the type Robert had suffered, and that, at the outside, Robert should have been able to return to work by the beginning of July 1991.
I find that, by mid-June, Robert's symptoms had largely resolved. He no longer needed to see a doctor or receive therapy. His back may have caused him some intermittent discomfort after this; however, I do not consider that it prevented him from doing the night manager's job. The job duties were flexible. Robert would have had the opportunity to sit down, or move about, as needed. It was predominantly light work, and only occasionally involved a weight of more than 10 lbs.
On his own testimony, Robert was ready to start work by this time. He testified that he asked Mr. Ismail about the job in June, but was told that it was no longer available as Mr. Ismail had decided to continue to do both shifts himself. I conclude from all the evidence that Robert was substantially able to do the essential tasks of the night manager's job by June 15, 1991,
Robert testified that he began to get headaches and neck pain and his back pain worsened several weeks after he commenced university. He testified that his problems, particularly the neck pain and headaches, did not improve, and he was unable to write his exams because of this. He testified that he quit the university course in January 1992, out of frustration.
It is not clear when Robert started to experience these problems. According to Dr. Paterson's clinical notes, he did not seek medical attention for his symptoms until the end of March, 1992, nearly a year after the accident, and several months after leaving school. Robert disputed this, but I find the clinical notes to be the most reliable record of what happened.
Robert first went back to Dr. Paterson with renewed complaints of neck pain, headaches, and low back pain on March 28, 1992. He subsequently also complained of pain in both knees. He received medication and additional physiotherapy and was referred to a specialist. According to the medical evidence and Robert's testimony, Robert's neck pain was the main problem.
Dr. Paterson ascribed Robert's symptoms to "ongoing post-resolution of his soft tissue injuries over the past year", (Report, July 17, 1992, Exhibit 1, Tab 1).
Robert testified that he has continued to suffer from disabling neck, back and knee pain. He testified that the pain affects his ability to walk long distances, to sit down or stand up for long periods and to bend down or lift heavy objects.
Dr. Mackenzie, a specialist in internal medicine, saw Robert for his neck and knee pain on June 26, 1992. Although his physical findings on examination were unremarkable, he arranged for a bone scan and MR scan of the cervical spine, to look for a cause of Mr. Oshana's symptoms.
These tests disclosed a rare lesion in the left frontal region of Robert's skull, which Dr. Mackenzie suspected to be an eosinophilic granuloma. He felt this could account for Mr. Oshana's headaches, although it did not explain his neck or back pain. (Reports, Exhibit 1, Tab 3).
Further investigation of the lesion has taken place, although the results of these investigations were not placed in evidence. It was not suggested that the lesion was in any way related to the accident. The medical evidence before me suggested that Mr. Oshana's condition is unusual, and not much is known about it. Understandably, it has been a source of great concern to Robert. The evidence of Dr. Mackenzie and Dr. Deathe indicates that it may have contributed to Robert's problems at university, at least insofar as the headaches are concerned.
The tests performed at the request of Dr. Mackenzie also showed minor disc bulging of the cervical spine, but no evidence of impingement on the cord or nerve root compression, and also mild disc bulging at the L4-5 level. Dr. Mackenzie concluded that "the absent (sic) of significant disease in the bone scan or MR scan of the cervical spine suggests that his (Robert's) symptoms may be due to chronic ligamentous strain related to the M.V.A. in May 1991. (report, September 26, 1992, Exhibit 1, Tab 3).
Dr. Deathe examined Robert in March, 1993, at State Farm's request. He felt that the neck pain that emerged when Robert started university was likely related to a repetitive strain injury from studying activities, superimposed on multiple level early degenerative disc disease which pre-dated the accident. He did not feel that Robert's neck problem was attributable to the mild cervical sprain that Robert sustained in the automobile accident, and that had resolved.
Dr. Deathe's report of March 29, 1993 recommended further therapy, to help with lumbar flexibility and conditioning, but did not suggest that Mr. Oshana's continuing symptoms of back pain would disable him from work.
Dr. Goldenberg, an orthopaedic surgeon who examined Robert in May 1992 at Progressive's request, also concluded that Robert's neck pain was not related to the accident, and that Robert's back pain did not prevent him from working.
Dr. Deathe's testimony at the hearing impressed me as fair, impartial, and professional. His impressive curriculum vitae is marked Exhibit 5. I accept his opinion that, given the mildness of the initial symptoms, their early resolution and the time that elapsed, the accident did not cause Robert's neck pain. I accept Dr. Deathe's view that the more likely cause was a repetitive strain injury, superimposed on early underlying degenerative disc disease.
I note that Dr. MacKenzie did not consider the x-ray findings to be significant, and concluded that Robert's complaints were not orthopaedic in nature. I did not have the benefit of Dr. Mackenzie's comments on Dr. Deathe's opinion, which I found convincing.
Robert's counsel suggested that the accident may have aggravated his degenerative disc disease, triggering his ongoing symptoms. Dr. Deathe acknowledged that a trauma could accelerate previously unsymptomatic pathology, and render symptoms more prolonged. However, he discounted that possibility in this case, based on the minor nature of the symptoms and the time frame within which they resolved. There was no medical evidence before me to the contrary.
There is also no medical evidence to suggest that Robert's complaints of pain in both knees is related to the accident.
I accept that Robert continues to suffer from ongoing back pain. However, the weight of the evidence does not suggest that this back pain has prevented him from doing the night manager's job, had it been available, save for a brief period of time immediately after the accident. As I have found, the duties of the job that Robert was going to do were flexible. He was not required to remain in one position, but could sit down or move about, as needed. The job involved predominantly light physical work and I do not find that Robert has been unable to do the occasional lifting or bending involved.
Accordingly, I find that Mr. Oshana is entitled to weekly income benefits at the rate of $240, from one week after the accident to June 15, 1991. He is not entitled to weekly income benefits after that time.
Expenses
S. 282(11) confers a discretion on the arbitrator to award an applicant his or her expenses incurred in respect to the arbitration. The prescribed expenses and maximum amounts are set out in Ontario Regulation 664, R.R.O. 1990.
The arbitration decision in Ralph McCormick and Economical Mutual Insurance Company, October 2, 1991, OIC File No. 000139, discussed criteria that should guide the exercise of the discretion to award expenses. These principles were approved by the Director of Arbitrations in the appeal decision in Vito Luigi Calogero and The Co-Operators General Insurance Company, February 13, 1992, OIC File No. P-000251.
In this case, I found on the evidence that Mr. Oshana was entitled to weekly income benefits but for only a short period of time. The arbitration was complicated because it involved two insurers. It is regrettable that the claim could not have been resolved consensually between the parties, without the need for and expense of a hearing.
However, Mr. Oshana's case was not without merit, and, in accordance with the usual principles governing an award of expenses in this forum, he should receive his expenses. Accordingly, I award Mr. Oshana the expenses he has incurred in respect to the arbitration. I remain seized of the issue in the event that the parties cannot agree on the amount.
Order
Progressive is liable to pay any accident benefits.
Mr. Oshana is entitled to weekly income benefits of $240 a week under section 12(1) of the Schedule for the period from one week after the accident until June 15, 1991, and to interest on this amount under section 24(2) of the Schedule.
Mr. Oshana is entitled to his reasonable expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration proceeding under section 282(11) of the Insurance Act.
Susan Naylor Senior Arbitrator
Date
APPENDIX A
Exhibits
Exhibit 1 Production brief filed by Applicant's Counsel
Exhibit 2 Letter from Mark Bossy, personnel manager, Cuddy Farms dated December 9, 1988
Exhibit 3 Letter from Doris Jarrett, Office Manager, Modern Building Cleaning Inc., dated December 9, 1988
Exhibit 4 Clinical notes of Dr. Ian Paterson (1 page)
Exhibit 5 Curriculum Vitae of Dr. A. Barry Deathe
Exhibit 6 Videotape, recorded on April 23, 1993
Exhibit 7 Videotape recorded on May 23, 1993
Exhibit 8 Undertaking and Assistance form, Employment and Immigration Canada, dated December 22, 1988
Exhibit 9 Record of Landing form, Employment and Immigration Canada, dated December 6, 1989
Exhibit 10 Application for Accident Benefits, dated April 29, 1992
Exhibit 11 Application for Accident Benefits, dated August 5, 1992.
Exhibit 12 Application form for Ontario Special Bursary Plan dated November 7, 1991
Exhibit 13 Application form for the Ontario Special Bursary Enhancement Program, dated November 22, 1991, and attachments
APPENDIX B
Authorities cited
Cattrysse v. The Westminster Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Cattrysse v. Anglo Canada General Insurance Company, June 21, 1993, OIC File Nos. A-001618 and A-001789
Chevier et al v. Zurich Insurance Company, [1985] I.L.R. 1-1919 (Ont.Dist.Ct.)
Cowie v. The Non-Marine Underwriters, Members of Lloyds', March 9, 1993, OIC File No. A-001159
Crnkovic v. Simcoe and Erie General Insurance Company April 8, 1993, OIC File No. A-002228
Downs v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, July 18, 1991, OIC File No. A-0000064 at p. 23
Flemming v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance, April 28, 1992, OIC File No. A-000406 at p. 15
Gaba v. Allstate Insurance Company, August 21, 1992, OIC File No. A-000624 at p. 13
Hunt v. Royal Insurance Company of Canada, October 15, 1992, OIC File No. A-000370 at p. 15
Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, Section 268
Johnson v. Federal Mutual Insurance Company [1988] I.L.R. 1-2334 (Alta. Q.B.)
Martins v. Gibraltar General Insurance Company (1984), 1984 CanLII 5962 (ON HCJ), 6 C.C.L.I. 226 (Ont.Co.Ct.)
McCormick v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, October 2, 1991, OIC File No. A-000139
McDonald v. State Farm Insurance Co., March 11, 1993, OIC File No. A-001327
Miller v. Safeco (1984), 1984 CanLII 2019 (ON HCJ), 9 C.C.L.I. 1 (H.C.) Affirmed (1985) 1985 CanLII 2022 (ON CA), 13 C.C.L.I. 31 (C.A.)
Miller v. Safeco Insurance Co. (1985), 1985 CanLII 2022 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (2d) 797 (CA);
Najem v. AXA Insurance Co., July 27, 1993, OIC File Nos. A-003115 and A-003116
Ontario Automobile Police Form 1, ss. 1.1 - 2.3
Pagliarella v. Di Biase Brothers Inc. (1989), 1989 CanLII 4388 (ON HCJ), 71 O.R. (2d) 193 (H.C.);
Simeonoff v. Pafco Insurance Company, unreported decision of the Ontario Court (General Division), 1992
Singh v. State Farm Insurance Co. and Pilot Insurance Company, June 4, 1993, OIC File Nos. A-001525 and A-001526
Taylor v. Ontario (Motor Vehicle Accident Fund) et al (1989), 1989 CanLII 10431 (ON HCJ), 44 C.C.L.I. 116 (Ont.Dt.Ct.) Tritto v. Wellington Insurance Company, August 10, 1992, OIC File No. A-001178 at p. 22