FIRE SAFETY COMMISSION
Tribunals Ontario
COMMISSION DE LA SÉCURITÉ-INCENDIE
Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario
Appeal under section 26 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 4.
Between:
Peter Lakovnik Applicant
and
Toronto Fire Services Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair (A)
For the Applicant: Peter Lakovnik, Self-represented For the Respondent: Emma Luca, Counsel
Held in writing: November 12, 2025
INTRODUCTION
1Peter Lakovnik (Applicant) has brought a motion pursuant to s. 26(3) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 4 (FPPA) seeking an extension of time to file an appeal of a Fire Marshal order with the Fire Safety Commission.
2The Applicant submits that he could not file the appeal on time because he received the documents late. He also cites family obligations as another factor that impacted his ability to file on time.
3Toronto Fire Services (Respondent) opposes the motion and submits that the Applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay or explained why there are apparent grounds for granting the appeal.
ISSUE
4Should the Commission grant the Applicant an extension of time to appeal?
RESULT
5The Applicant's motion for an extension of time to appeal is granted.
BACKGROUND
6Peter Lakovnik and Lea Andersen are the owners of a property located at 180 Winona Drive, Toronto. The property is described as a residential occupancy consisting of a residential structure and a detached garage situated on an irregular lot parcel directly south of St. Clair Ave. West.
7Toronto Fire Services (Respondent) inspected the property on August 22, 2024, and issued an Inspection Order to the owners on September 26, 2024.
8The Inspection Order was issued pursuant to s. 21(1)(g) of the FPPA, which requires an owner to take measures necessary to ensure fire safety by remedying contraventions of the Fire Code, O. Reg. 213/07 (OFC).
9The Inspection Order identified a contravention of OFC Division B, Sentence 2.7.1.7.(1), which requires means of egress to be maintained in good repair and free of obstructions. More specifically, the Inspection Order required the Applicant to create a minimum opening of 1100mm in a section of metal fencing that obstructed an easement/right-of-way and impeded the means of egress from adjacent properties to an open public thoroughfare. The compliance date was October 31, 2024.
10On November 26, 2024, the Applicant requested a Fire Marshal review of the Inspection Order pursuant to s. 25 of the FPPA.
11On September 25, 2025, the Fire Marshal issued Fire Marshal Review No. FM-24465 (Review Order), in which it confirmed the action required by the Inspection Order and amended the compliance date to October 25, 2025.
12On October 15, 2025, the Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Review Order with the Commission.
13After the Commission notified the Applicant that his appeal was incomplete and appeared to have been filed outside of the appeal timeline, the Applicant filed additional documents and a Notice of Motion requesting an extension of time to appeal on October 22, 2025.
14On October 24, 2025, the Commission issued a Notice of Written Motion Hearing setting submissions deadlines and ordering that the motion be held in writing on November 12, 2025.
SHOULD THE COMMISSION GRANT AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL?
15For the reasons set out below, the Commission grants the Applicant an extension of time to appeal.
16Subsection 26(1) of the FPPA permits any person who considers themselves aggrieved by an order made by the Fire Marshal under s. 25 to appeal that order to the Commission.
17Subsection 26(2) of the FPPA sets out the timeline for filing those appeals. It requires a notice of appeal to be filed with the Commission within 15 days after the order is served.
18Subsection 26(3) of the FPPA provides that the Commission may extend the time for appealing an order if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for granting the appeal and that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension. It may then give directions related to the extension.
Apparent Grounds for Granting the Appeal
19The first prong of the two-part test in s. 26(3) of the FPPA asks whether there are apparent grounds for granting the appeal.
20Motions for an extension of time to appeal are not intended to be a hearing on the merits of the Applicant's appeal of the Review Order. However, to satisfy the burden on this motion, the Applicant must provide some evidence of apparent grounds for granting the appeal (Batinic v Waterloo Fire Rescue, 2021 ONFSC 7 at para 40). I find that the Applicant has done so.
21The Applicant's Notice of Appeal indicates that he is appealing the Review Order because the residents of 873, 875 and 877 St. Clair Ave. West do not have the legal right of way over the Applicant's private land, and that allowing this decision to go forward would grandfather right of way and increase the use of the private lane if and when future redevelopment happens. The Applicant filed several other documents with his Notice of Appeal, including a 1986 Committee of Adjustment Notice of Public Hearing related to the property at 875-877 St. Clair Ave. West. He also filed correspondence from the owners of 873 St. Clair Ave. West asking the Applicant and Ms. Andersen to grant them right of way along the north edge of their property, which the Applicant denied.
22The Respondent submits that the Applicant has failed to comply with Rule 15.1 of this Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure and has failed to explain how any of the documents he filed with the Notice of Appeal provide reliable evidence for this Commission to reasonably find that either the existing easement reflected on title is extinguished, or that the Applicant is not required to comply with the requirement to remove the obstruction to the means of egress. While I agree with the Respondent that the relevance of the Committee of Adjustment records to this appeal is unclear, there is some evidence in the Applicant's correspondence with the owner of one of the neighbouring properties that suggests the issue of who is entitled to the right way needs to be explored further as part of assessing whether the Applicant is required to comply with the Review Order and the underlying Inspection Order. For that reason, I find that the Applicant has shown there are apparent grounds for granting the appeal.
Reasonable Grounds for Applying for the Extension
23The second prong of the test in s. 26(3) relates to whether there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension. For the reasons set out below, I find the Applicant has demonstrated reasonable grounds for applying for the extension.
24In affidavit evidence filed by the Respondent on the motion, Kevin Hooke, Acting Division Chief at Toronto Fire Services indicates that he inquired with the Office of the Fire Marshal to find out how the Applicant was notified of the Review Order. He received the following information:
- The Review Order was served on the Applicant via email on September 25, 2025; and
- A copy of the Review Order was sent to the co-owner, Lea Andersen, via courier on September 25, 2025. The courier's tracking showed that it was delivered on September 26, 2025.
25The Applicant submits that he did not receive the Review Order until October 1, 2025. He states that he was not at the Toronto property when the Review Order was delivered, and that it was his grandson, a minor, who accepted the letter. The Applicant indicates that around that time he was away in Tweed for 12 days. He says it was his daughter who brought the registered letter to his mother's home upon their return from Tweed, and that his caregiving responsibilities for his 98-year-old mother further limited the time he had to prepare his appeal. The Applicant also states he did not receive the Review Order by email. In reply submissions filed on November 6, 2025, he states that he is 76 years old and finds email frustrating.
26The Respondent submits that the Applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in this matter, and that it is not reasonable for the Applicant to fail to acknowledge that the Review Order was delivered to him via email on September 25, 2025. The Respondent also relies on Inspector Clifford Zarudny's chronology notes, which indicate that the inspector spoke to the Applicant by phone on October 3, 2025 and discussed the Review Order and appeal options with him.
27I agree with the Respondent and find that, pursuant to s. 77(3) of the FPPA, service by email is deemed received the day after it is sent and that, in this case, the Review Order emailed on September 25, 2025 was deemed received on September 26, 2025. Nevertheless, I find that the Applicant has provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.
28I am not persuaded by the Respondent's argument that it is not reasonable for the Applicant to assert that he lacked sufficient time to gather supporting documentation when a) he became aware of the substantive issues raised in the Review Order when he was first served the Inspection Order in September 2024; and b) had more than a year to gather documentation to substantiate his claim. Instead, I accept the Applicant's submission that he was away from home during much of the 15-day period he had to appeal the Review Order, that extenuating personal circumstances impacted his ability to file on time, and that he had to navigate a new legal process at the tribunal level.
29I am also not persuaded by the Respondent's submission that it is not reasonable for the Applicant to fail to acknowledge the phone conversation he had with the inspector on October 3, 2025. Although the phone conversation is not mentioned in the Applicant's materials, I do not find it to be an intentional omission or a factor that renders the Applicant's request unreasonable because in reply submissions, the Applicant himself acknowledged receiving notice of the Review Order on October 1, 2025, earlier than the date of the phone conversation.
30Based on my earlier finding that email service was effected on September 26, 2025, and based on the Applicant's admission that he received notice as early as October 1, 2025, I agree with the Respondent that the Applicant was in possession of the Review Order within the 15-day appeal period. Nevertheless, I find there was no significant delay in filing the appeal. The Applicant should have filed the Notice of Appeal by October 13, 2025, but instead filed it on October 15, 2025. This is only a brief delay that calls for a modest extension and signals that the Applicant was not attempting to unduly delay the process.
31Based on the information provided, and for reasons set out above, I am persuaded that there are circumstances present to warrant extending the time to file an appeal.
ORDER
32The motion for an extension of time to appeal is granted.
33The Commission will schedule a case conference in the matter as soon as possible.
Released: December 24, 2025
Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice Chair (A)