Mantle v. Cornwall Fire Service, 2025 ONFSC 42
Appeal under s. 26(1) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c.4
Between:
Michael Mantle
Appellant
and
Cornwall Fire Services
Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
Panel: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair Paul Stopciati, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Did not attend
For the Respondent: Laura Robinson, Counsel
Heard by videoconference: April 16, 2025
OVERVIEW & BACKGROUND
1Michael Mantle (the “Appellant”) appeals Items 2 and 6 of an Inspection Order issued by Cornwall Fire Services (the “Respondent), as they relate to the residential unit he occupied (Unit #4) in 205 First Street East (the Building) in Cornwall, Ontario.
2On December 10, 2024, Inspector Matthew Testa of Cornwall Fire Services (the “Respondent”) inspected the Building pursuant to s. 19(1) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 (FPPA). He issued an Inspection Order (the “Order”) on Shabbir Ahmad Dareshani and Sitara Shabbir Dareshani, the building owners, pursuant to s. 21(1)(g) of the FPPA, which provides for remedying any violation of the [Ontario Fire Code O.Reg. 213/07 (OFC)].
3On December 26, 2024, the Appellant requested a Fire Marshal Review of Items 2 and 6 of the Order, pursuant to s. 25 of the FPPA as he considered himself aggrieved by the Order.
4The Fire Marshal issued Fire Marshal Review FM-24494 on January 6, 2025, exercising its power under s. 25(4)(a) of the FPPA to refuse to consider the substance of the request and refer the matter to the Fire Safety Commission (the “Commission”) for a hearing under s. 26.
ISSUE
5The issue in dispute is:
- Should the Commission confirm, rescind, or amend Items 2 and 6 of the Order as they relate to Unit #4 of the Building, or make such other order as the Commission deems appropriate?
RESULT
6The Commission dismisses the appeal.
PRELIMINARY AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The Appellant did not attend the scheduled hearing
7The hearing was scheduled to start at 9:30 a.m. on April 16, 2025, however the Appellant was not in attendance.
8The Commission’s Case Management Officer (CMO) tried contacting the Appellant, leaving both voicemails and emails. The Appellant did not respond to either.
9The Appellant consented to the hearing date during a case conference on January 28, 2025. On February 6, 2025, the Commission issued a Notice of Hearing to the parties by email, confirming the hearing date and providing details for accessing the hearing.
10A Notice of Motion Hearing (see below) was subsequently issued on March 5, 2025, and emailed to the parties by the Commission, scheduling it on the same date as the merits hearing.
11While the Appellant did not exchange disclosure with the Respondent, or file submissions with the Commission by the deadlines, he also did not submit an adjournment request to the Commission.
12As the Appellant did not respond to the CMO’s attempts to reach him, we ordered the motion hearing to proceed at 10:00 a.m. pursuant to s. 7 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (SPPA).
The Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
13On March 4, 2025, the Respondent filed a Notice of Motion seeking an order of the Commission to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the statutory requirements for bringing the proceeding have not been met, the proceeding relates to matters that are outside of its jurisdiction, and/or the appeal is moot.
14The Commission scheduled the Respondent’s motion to be heard at the start of the hearing on April 16, 2025, and invited the Appellant to make written submissions by April 2, 2025. The Appellant did not file written submissions.
The Respondent’s Position
15The Respondent asserted the following facts:
The Appellant is a former tenant of Unit #4 in the Building;
On December 13, 2024, the Respondent issued an Order to the owners of the property, Shabbir Ahmad Dareshani and Sitari Shabbir Dareshani, identifying 13 compliance actions required to be completed by the owners by April 15, 2025;
The Order did not require compliance actions to be undertaken by any persons other than the owners;
On February 19, 2025, the owners and their contractor attended the property and completed certain repairs to the Building. This included installing a working smoke alarm in Unit #4, and repairing the entrance door, remedying the fire separation breach. The Respondent confirmed that Items 2 and 6 of the Order as related to Unit #4 had been remedied.
The Appellant is no longer a tenant
16The Respondent submits that the Appellant is no longer a tenant of the Building:
On December 13, 2024, the Fire Marshal authorized the Respondent to close the Building pursuant to s. 21(2)(b) of the FPPA. The Respondent closed the Building, and all persons were removed. The Building has remained closed to entry by unauthorized persons since that date.
On January 28, 2025, the Landlord Tenant Board issued an Order on consent that terminated the Appellant’s tenancy in the Building effective February 15, 2025.
The Commission Does not Have the Jurisdiction to Proceed with the appeal
17The Respondent submits that the Commission should dismiss the appeal on the basis that it relates to matters that are outside of its jurisdiction due to the doctrine of mootness, quoting Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 (Borowski).
18The Respondent referenced Draven v. Toronto Fire Services (2022 ONFSC 6) (Draven), where the Commission found that there was no live issue in dispute because the Order was remedied prior to the hearing. In this case, the Commission dismissed the appeal on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction to proceed (para 26).
19The Respondent submitted that the rationale for finding no jurisdiction in the current appeal is the same as in Draven, in that the Commission’s limited resources should not be expended on a proceeding that will not resolve a live fire safety dispute. The controversy ended when Items 2 and 6 of the Order for Unit #4 were remedied by the owners on February 19, 2025.
20The Respondent also submitted that, there was no ongoing relationship between the parties: the Appellant’s tenancy ended on December 13, 2025, and his legal tenancy in the Building was terminated effective February 15, 2025.
21The Respondent concludes that the appeal is moot because there is no live controversy at this time, and there is no ongoing relationship of the parties.
Alternatively, the Appellant does not have Standing to bring his appeal
22The Respondent submits that the Commission should dismiss the appeal on the basis that the Appellant does not have standing to initiate the proceeding.
23The Respondent referenced s. 25 and s. 26 of the FPPA, which limits requests for Fire Marshal Review, or appeals to the Commission, respectively, to “any person who considers himself or herself aggrieved by the order”.
24The Respondent submitted that, on an objective standard, the Appellant is not aggrieved by the Order, given the following:
The Order only imposes compliance on the owners. The Order does not impose any actions, obligations or requirements on the tenants or occupants of the Building;
The Appellant has not occupied the Building since the Order was issued on December 13, 2024;
On December 26, 2024, when the Appellant requested a Fire Marshal Review of the Order, pursuant to s. 25 of the FPPA, he was not an occupant of the Building;
The Appellant will not return to occupy Unit #4 of the Building, as his tenancy was legally terminated on February 15, 2025.
25The Respondent submits that the Commission is authorized by statute and its own procedural rules to dismiss an appeal where some aspect of the statutory requirements for bringing an appeal have not been met (SPPA, s. 4.6(1)(c) and Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, Version I (October 2, 2017) as amended, Rule 3.4(c)).
ANALYSIS
26The Commission dismisses the appeal for the reasons that follow.
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear the appeal
27The Commission finds that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, pursuant to s. 26 of the FPPA, for the reasons that follow.
28The Commission does not agree with the Respondent’s submission that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the matter is moot. In paragraph [26] of Draven the Commission found that there was no basis to proceed with the appeal because it was moot. In paragraph [27], the Commission found that it had no jurisdiction to hear complaints about the Respondent’s processes and procedures. These are two separate findings.
29Section 25 of the FPPA states the following:
A person who considers himself or herself aggrieved by an order made by an inspector, other than the Fire Marshal, under s. 21(1) or (2) may, within 15 days after the order is served, submit a written request to the Fire Marshal for a review of the order.
30In this case, the Commission became involved, not because the appellant appealed an order made by the Fire Marshal under s. 25, but because the Fire Marshal referred the request for its review to the Commission.
31Section 26(6) of the FPPA describes the powers of the Commission:
The Fire Safety Commission may confirm, amend or rescind the order of the Fire Marshal or make such other order as the Commission deems appropriate.
32The Commission finds that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The Appeal is Moot
33The Commission dismisses the appeal as moot for the reasons that follow.
34The leading case on mootness is Borowski. In its reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) described the doctrine of mootness as follows (p.353 Borowski):
The doctrine of mootness is part of a general policy that a court may decline to decide a case which raises merely a hypothetical or abstract question. An appeal is moot when a decision will not have the effect of resolving some controversy affecting or potentially affecting the rights of the parties. Such a live controversy must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commenced but also when the court is called upon to reach a decision. The general policy is enforced in moot cases unless the court exercises its discretion to depart from it.
35In Borowski, the SCC outlined a two-step analysis used to consider mootness:
Is the dispute between the parties’ moot?
If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the appeal?
36The SCC went on to outline three factors to be considered in determining whether to exercise discretion to hear a moot case:
The requirement of an adversarial context;
The concern for judicial economy; and
The need for courts and tribunals to demonstrate a measure of awareness for their proper law-making function.
Step 1 – Is the appeal moot?
37The Commission finds that there is no live controversy remaining, accepting the Respondent’s evidence that Items 2 and 6 of the Order, as pertains to Unit #4, have been complied with.
Step 2 – Should the Commission exercise discretion to hear the appeal, even though it is moot?
38The Commission has considered the three factors outlined in Borowski and find that there is no basis on which to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal. The Commission’s reasons follow.
Adversarial context
39As determined above, in regard to the appeal, a live controversy no longer exists.
40An adversarial context for the purpose of this analysis means that the parties continue to have an adversarial relationship even after there is no longer a live controversy between them.
41We find that there is no adversarial context remaining, as the owners complied with the Order, and the Appellant is no longer a legal tenant of Unit #4. There are no further issues to be decided.
The Board’s Resources
42With respect to the concern for judicial economy, we find that there is no uncertainty in the law that would justify the Commission using its resources to hear the appeal.
The Board’s awareness of its limited role, as an adjudicative body
43With respect to the need for the Commission to be sensitive to its role as the “adjudicative branch”, the Respondent made no submissions.
44The Commission’s proper function is to adjudicate disputes; in this case there is no live dispute, as items 2 and 6 of the Order have already been complied with and the appeal is moot.
45Based on consideration of the factors set out above, the Commission dismisses the appeal because it is moot.
The Statutory Requirements for bringing a proceeding have not been met
46The Commission also dismisses the appeal because the statutory requirements for bringing a proceeding have not been met, for the reasons that follow.
47Paragraph [29] above describes that, pursuant to the FPPA, a person who is aggrieved by an order may appeal it.
48The Commission agrees with the Respondent’s submissions that the Appellant is not aggrieved by the Order, given that compliance was the responsibility only of the building owners and that no actions, obligations, or requirements were imposed on the tenants or occupants of the building.
49The Commission also agrees with the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant is not aggrieved by the Order as he is no longer a tenant of Unit #4.
50The Commission dismisses the appeal because the statutory requirements for bringing an appeal have not been met, as the Appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved. The Commission agrees with the Respondent that the SPPA and its Rules authorize it to dismiss an appeal where some aspect of the statutory requirements for bringing an appeal have not been met.
ORDER
51The Respondent’s motion is granted, and the appeal of the Order is dismissed.
Released: May 15, 2025
______________________________
Susan Clarke, Vice Chair
______________________________
Paul Stopciati, Member