Real Estate Law - ODC

The appellant appealed an application judge's order requiring it to vacate a gas bar premises.

The application judge had found a month-to-month commercial tenancy existed and ordered vacant possession.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the application judge erred by resolving disputed material facts regarding whether the appellant had an ownership interest in the property rather than a tenancy.

The appeal was allowed and the application was converted to an action to proceed to trial.

The appellant mortgagee appealed a motion judge's decision finding that a mortgage commitment's interest rate provision breached section 8 of the Interest Act.

The provision increased the interest rate from 8.25% to 18% in the final month of the term unless the mortgage was renewed or discharged.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the interest rate increase was triggered by the passage of time rather than default, and therefore did not violate the Interest Act.

The appellant was awarded judgment reflecting the 18% interest rate for the final month and thereafter, along with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the calculation of interest on a mortgage.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, ordering judgment in an amount that accounts for interest at 8.25% for the first six months of the mortgage term and 18.00% for the seventh month and thereafter.

Written reasons were to follow.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding $20,350.60 to the respondent real estate brokerage for an unpaid commission.

The appellant argued the Deputy Judge erred in applying the discoverability test under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the reasons were insufficient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge made no errors in applying the modified objective test for discoverability, especially given the appellant's own misrepresentations about not looking for a property.

The reasons were also found sufficient for appellate review.

The appellants, four individuals who purchased a property, appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering them to pay $24,478.63 in real estate commissions to the respondent real estate agent and brokerage.

The appellants argued the Deputy Judge erred in finding an enforceable oral agreement and in applying the principles of unjust enrichment, as no Buyer Representation Agreement was signed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's factual inferences that the appellants deliberately cut the respondents out of the transaction to save on commission, thereby unjustly enriching themselves.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal concerning the designation of certain properties under the Ontario Heritage Act and the interpretation of provincial and municipal heritage planning provisions.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on two specific questions of law relating to the Tribunal's consideration of the Ontario Heritage Act, the Provincial Policy Statement, the Growth Plan, and the municipal Official Plan.

Costs of the motion were fixed and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The self-represented appellants, claiming to be tenants, sought to appeal an order made between a second mortgagee and the property owners.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1, noting the appellants were not parties to the underlying proceeding and had no standing to appeal.

The court held that any recourse the appellants might have should be pursued via a motion in the Superior Court of Justice at first instance.

The appeal was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process pursuant to Rule 2.1.01.

The moving parties failed to close on a pre-construction home and sued for the return of their deposit.

The action was stayed by a Master due to an arbitration clause in the agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving parties sought to appeal the stay but missed the deadline, and a single judge of the Divisional Court dismissed their motion to extend the time to appeal, finding the appeal was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The moving parties brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to review the single judge's order.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact, and agreeing that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 is a complete bar to the appeal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) regarding the applicable legislative and policy framework for a subdivision development proposal.

The LPAT had determined that the current policy regime applied, relying on the retroactive application of s. 22.1 of the Planning Act to establish the request date.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the LPAT's determination involved questions of mixed fact and law, and that the issues raised were not of sufficient general or public importance to warrant the court's attention.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the question of whether the Tribunal erred by requiring a condition in its grant of a Public Safety Maintenance Easement that permitted physical encumbrances or encroachments authorized by an approval authority.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them liable for $25,000 in damages plus costs for breaching a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA) with the respondent real estate brokerage.

The appellants argued the trial judge made several factual and legal errors, including finding the BRA enforceable despite their claim that it was not adequately explained.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants understood the BRA, deliberately bypassed the respondent to avoid paying commission, and engaged in unreasonable conduct warranting elevated costs.

The appellants appealed an order directing the sale of a jointly owned property rather than its partition.

Following the commencement of the appeal, the appellants sold their interest in the property to the respondent for $3,900,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the issues raised were not elusive of review and did not warrant the expenditure of judicial resources.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision of the Condominium Authority Tribunal ordering it to produce redacted legal invoices to a unit owner.

The corporation had sent a letter to all owners blaming a small group of owners for increased legal costs, which the Tribunal found constituted a waiver of solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the invoices.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's application of the common law principles of waiver or its interpretation of the disclosure exceptions under the Condominium Act.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) decision that ordered the application of a discounted industrial rate for development charges on a new building constructed by the respondent developer.

The municipality argued the LPAT erred by applying a balance of probabilities standard rather than requiring certainty of future industrial use, and sought to introduce fresh evidence of non-industrial tenants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the LPAT's application of the civil standard of proof to predict future use, rejecting the fresh evidence as irrelevant to the time of building permit issuance, and concluding the issues were not of sufficient general or public importance.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal that upheld a zoning by-law amendment permitting a Supervised Consumption Facility.

The applicants argued the Tribunal erred in law by finding the amendment conformed to the 1989 Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave, finding the proposed appeal raised a question of mixed fact and law, there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the Tribunal's decision, and the issue was not of sufficient general or public importance.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles determining the easterly and westerly boundary lines of his property and dismissing his request for costs.

The appellant argued the Deputy Director erred by rejecting surveyor evidence that a cedar hedge and a frame structure established the boundaries through possession.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Deputy Director reasonably concluded there was insufficient evidence to relate the physical occupation back to the original survey.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to one of the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order requiring the demolition or removal of a shed built without a permit and other property cleanup orders.

The Divisional Court upheld the demolition order under the Building Code Act, noting the appellant admitted to building without a permit.

The court declined to transfer the appeal of the remaining orders under the Municipal Act to the Court of Appeal, finding the issues were largely moot as the municipality had already demolished the shed and removed derelict items.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought two motions: one to set aside a costs order made by a single judge on an abandoned motion for leave to appeal, and another for leave to appeal a reconsideration decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions.

The court found no error in the costs order, noting the appellant could have simply requested reasons under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act instead of bringing a motion.

The court also denied leave to appeal the tribunal's decision, agreeing that the appellant lacked standing under s. 34(19) of the Planning Act because he did not make oral or written submissions at the statutory public meeting.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision regarding interest and costs awarded following the expropriation of its lands by the respondent City.

The Board had calculated statutory interest based on the appellant's net interest in the lands after deducting an outstanding mortgage, and awarded costs against the appellant from the date of a Rule 49 settlement offer that exceeded the final compensation award.

The Divisional Court found the Board's interpretation of the Expropriations Act regarding both the interest calculation and the costs award to be reasonable, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles regarding a boundary dispute between neighbouring lakefront properties.

The issue was whether the metes and bounds description in the registered deed and plan of subdivision, which contained a mathematical error, or an original wooden surveyor's stake should govern the boundary line.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a registered description generally governs, where it demonstrably fails to express the grantor's true intention, original surveyors' monuments take precedence.

The court affirmed the application of the hierarchy of boundary evidence and section 9 of the Surveys Act.