Human Rights - ODC

The Applicants sought judicial review of Ontario's Mathematics Proficiency Test (MPT), a standardized test required for teacher certification.

They argued the MPT violated s. 15 of the Charter by having a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates.

The Divisional Court found that the MPT infringed s. 15, as statistical evidence showed significant disparities in success rates for Black and Indigenous candidates.

The Court further held that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1, as the Respondent failed to show the MPT minimally impaired the rights of racialized candidates, given the availability of less impairing alternatives like requiring math courses in Bachelor of Education programs.

The legislative provisions creating the MPT were declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The respondent moved to dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The underlying dispute regarding a discriminatory driver's licensing policy had been resolved in the applicant's favour by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, and the policy was subsequently amended.

However, the court dismissed the motion to dismiss, finding that the underlying legal issue—whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a standalone Charter claim—is an important issue that may be evasive of appellate review.

The mootness issue was left to be decided by the full panel hearing the application on the merits.

The self-represented applicant moved under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's orders adding the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal as a party to his judicial review application and dismissing the application for extreme delay.

The applicant argued that s. 9(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act and the Divisional Court's test for delay violated the Charter and the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no constitutional violations, no error in adding the Tribunal as a party, and no error in dismissing the application due to an extraordinary and unexplained 12-year delay.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision which found that the respondent employers were not statutorily obligated to negotiate the maintenance of pay equity plans following a health services integration.

The union argued that the Pay Equity Act required mandatory bargaining for pay equity maintenance and that the Tribunal's interpretation violated the freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal reasonably interpreted the Act as placing the responsibility for maintaining pay equity solely on the employer, with the union's role limited to monitoring and filing complaints.

The Court also found that the Tribunal's decision did not disproportionately limit Charter protections.

The applicant union sought judicial review of two decisions by the Agricultural, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal.

The Tribunal had dismissed an unfair labour practice complaint against the employer and rejected a constitutional challenge alleging that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 violates the freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by failing to provide a right to strike.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision on the unfair labour practice was reasonable and its conclusion on the constitutional issue was correct, as it was bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Fraser.

The applicant, a francophone physician, sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had denied his request for a disciplinary hearing before a bilingual panel, concluding that the use of interpreters was sufficient and constituted a reasonable limit under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Divisional Court granted the application, holding that the standard of correctness applied to the interpretation of language rights.

The Court found that the applicant has a presumptive right to a bilingual panel under section 86(1) of the Code.

The Court further held that the Committee's conclusion that interpreters were a reasonable limit under section 86(4) was unreasonable because it failed to consider the specific circumstances of the case.

The matter of reasonable limits was remitted to the Committee.

The plaintiff, acting as litigation guardian for his developmentally disabled daughter, brought a proposed class action against Ontario alleging negligence and section 7 Charter violations regarding the administration of waitlists for adult developmental services.

The motion judge certified the negligence and Charter claims.

Ontario appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court unanimously allowed the appeal regarding the Charter claims, finding no positive obligation on the state to provide social assistance.

A majority of the court also allowed the appeal regarding the negligence claims, holding that the administration of the benefits program is a core policy decision protected by Crown immunity.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her request for reconsideration.

Her original human rights application was dismissed as abandoned after she failed to respond to a Notice of Intent to Dismiss regarding a jurisdictional issue.

The Divisional Court applied the Vavilov framework and found the adjudicator's reconsideration decision was reasonable, internally coherent, and entitled to a high degree of deference.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of three decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing her application against her former employer for alleged discrimination in denying her tenure and terminating her employment.

The Tribunal had directed the matter to a preliminary and summary hearing, ultimately dismissing the claims for delay and for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's procedures were fair and its decisions were reasonable.

The court declined to consider new Charter and negligence claims raised for the first time on judicial review.

The applicant sought leave to proceed with an application for judicial review of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's failure to order interim relief in his human rights complaint against a health centre.

The court reviewed the application on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the application appeared frivolous or vexatious as it sought remedies not available at law, the court stayed the proceeding and directed the registrar to issue a notice requiring the applicant to file written submissions explaining why the application should not be dismissed.

The tenant, who suffers from mental illness, appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court found that the Board failed to accommodate the tenant's disability by refusing to grant a second adjournment, which prevented her from fully and fairly participating in the process.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The tenant brought a motion appealing the decision of Keenan J., which upheld a Tribunal order evicting her for disruptive conduct.

The tenant argued the Tribunal erred in finding her conduct continued after receiving an N5 notice, misapplied section 84(1) of the Tenant Protection Act, and failed to properly assess the landlord's duty to accommodate her disability under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding overwhelming evidence that the landlord accommodated the tenant's disability to the point of undue hardship and that the Tribunal made no errors of law.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss or adjourn a motion brought by the respondent Ontario Human Rights Commission, which was scheduled to be heard by a panel of the Divisional Court.

The applicant argued that the respondent failed to comply with a production order and a previous costs order.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the outstanding costs order but dismissed the motion to dismiss or adjourn, finding that the applicant's arguments regarding the timing of the respondent's motion should be made to the panel hearing that motion.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration board decision that upheld the constitutionality of s. 58(5)(c) of the Employment Standards Act.

The provision denied severance pay to employees whose contracts were frustrated due to illness or injury.

The Divisional Court found that the provision discriminated against severely disabled employees, violating s. 15(1) of the Charter, and was not saved by s. 1.

The offending words were struck down, and the disabled employee was awarded severance pay.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to strike an affidavit from the appeal book in an appeal from a human rights tribunal decision.

The affidavit contained notes and subjective observations regarding the tribunal's conduct during the hearing, which the Commission argued went beyond permissible gap-filling evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the affidavit was not fresh evidence but was relevant to the issues of bias and partiality raised on appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award upholding the discharge of an employee for sleeping on the job.

The employee was subject to a Last Chance Agreement that permitted immediate discharge for sleeping at work.

The union argued the arbitrator unreasonably disregarded medical evidence suggesting the employee suffered from sleep apnea and circadian rhythm disorder.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator carefully considered the evidence and reasonably concluded the sleep apnea only became significant after termination.

The arbitrator's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission refusing to deal with his age discrimination complaint on the basis that it was filed outside the six-month limitation period.

The applicant argued that the Commission breached the rules of natural justice by providing insufficient reasons and that its decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's screening function attracts a standard of patent unreasonableness, the reasons provided were adequate for an administrative screening decision, and the decision to dismiss the complaint for untimeliness was supported by the evidence.

EGALE Canada Inc. moved for intervenor status as an added party in an application brought by same-sex couples seeking marriage licences.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the motion.

The court granted EGALE intervenor status under Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that EGALE had a direct interest in the subject matter and could make a useful contribution by providing a different perspective from the applicants, specifically regarding relationship options and national context.

To prevent undue delay and prejudice, the court imposed strict conditions on EGALE's participation, limiting its evidence and cross-examination to its unique perspectives.

The applicant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, attempted to file nomination papers for the office of Mayor of Toronto.

The City Clerk rejected the nomination before nomination day on the basis that provincial legislation rendered members of the House of Commons ineligible to hold municipal office.

The applicant sought mandamus and an order quashing the relevant statutory provisions, arguing they violated his democratic rights under section 3 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the clerk had the discretion to reject the nomination early and that the restriction on holding municipal office did not infringe the applicant's Charter right to be qualified for membership in the House of Commons.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of Inquiry and sought to introduce fresh evidence and claim Charter damages against the Board and the Human Rights Commission for delay.

The Divisional Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to award damages, that the Board is not a suable entity, and that delay does not found a claim under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court also denied the appellant's request for an adjournment to file a companion application for judicial review, ordering the appeal to proceed on its merits.