Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The appellant mother wrongfully removed the parties' three children from their habitual residence in Nigeria to Ontario.

The trial judge declined jurisdiction under s. 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act and ordered the children returned to Nigeria under s. 40, finding no serious harm would result.

On appeal, the mother argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the serious harm test, Nigerian law, and the requirements of s. 40.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors and correctly applied the law regarding jurisdiction and return orders.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated April 22, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring her to pay table amount child support, arguing the judge erred by failing to apply the undue hardship test under section 10(1) of the Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified the legal test but was unable to apply it due to the appellant's failure to provide sufficient evidence of her income and means.

The court found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish undue hardship.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting the respondent sole decision-making authority over their child.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence and finding a material change in circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that hearsay evidence is admissible on a motion to change under the Family Law Rules, and that compelling evidence, including the child's escalating behavioural crisis and the parents' inability to communicate, supported the finding of a material change.

The appellant husband appealed an order granting the respondent wife's motion for partition and sale of their jointly owned matrimonial home and dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The husband argued the parties had reached a binding agreement for him to buy out the wife's interest.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no meeting of the minds, as the husband's acceptance did not include the wife's requirement for a spousal support release.

The Court also found no error in the order for partition and sale under the Partition Act, noting no malicious or oppressive conduct by the wife.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal several orders of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring him to pay $1,200 per month in spousal support following his retirement.

He argued the motion judge erred by providing insufficient reasons, miscalculating incomes, allowing 'double dipping' from his previously equalized pension, and ordering support indefinitely.

The Divisional Court dismissed most grounds of appeal, finding the motion judge properly applied the exceptions to the rule against double dipping.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to add a provision allowing either party to apply to vary the order when the respondent begins drawing her pension.

The father moved for a stay pending appeal of an order requiring him to provide a notarized copy of his severely autistic child's passport and OHIP card to the mother.

The mother, a Ghanaian diplomat, required the documents to obtain a travel visa to return to Canada and resume equal parenting time.

The court admitted fresh evidence from an immigration lawyer but ultimately dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no irreparable harm to the father and that the balance of convenience and the child's best interests favoured the mother returning to Canada.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of Dow J. dated March 10, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 for the stay motion and $5,000 for the motion for leave to appeal to the responding party.

The appellant appealed an order dealing with a motion to change child support, challenging the motion judge's findings on imputed income, retroactive child support, special expenses, and costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law in the motion judge's detailed reasons.

The court also declined to address additional issues raised by the respondent because no cross-appeal was filed.

The respondent was awarded $1,000 in costs for reasonable disbursements as a self-represented litigant.

The requester sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) to records held by the Children's Lawyer relating to a custody and access dispute involving his children.

The Children's Lawyer refused, arguing the records were not in the custody or control of the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) when acting as counsel for a child.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordered MAG to issue an access decision, finding the records were under MAG's control.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, not correctness, as interpreting s. 10(1) of FIPPA is not a true question of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable and noting that solicitor-client privilege concerns could be addressed through FIPPA exemptions.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding that a $1 million life insurance policy was part of the deceased's estate and available for dependant support claims under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The deceased had been ordered on consent to maintain his former spouse as the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased still 'owned' the policy under s. 72(1)(f) of the SLRA despite the irrevocable designation.

The Court further held that the former spouse did not have 'creditor rights' under s. 72(7) because the designation did not create a security interest, and she was not entitled to damages for breach of contract.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining the sale price, distribution of proceeds, and interest following an application for partition and sale of a jointly owned property.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings regarding the initial purchase contribution and the respondent's entitlement to occupation rent due to ouster.

However, the court found palpable and overriding errors in the calculation of carrying costs, the allocation of real estate commission, and the award of pre-judgment interest on funds already paid into court or held in trust.

The appeal was allowed in part to correct these financial calculations.

The appellant grandmother appealed a summary judgment order finding her grandson to be a child in need of protection and making him a Crown ward with no access.

The grandmother argued the motions judge erred in applying the summary judgment test and assessing credibility.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the test and did not improperly weigh evidence or assess credibility, as the material issue was the undisputed lack of a relationship between the grandmother and the child.

The maternal grandmother appealed a motions judge's decision confirming the jurisdiction of the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa to apprehend two children residing temporarily with her in Quebec.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the children's habitual residence remained in Ontario and that the collaborative cross-border apprehension with Quebec authorities was a practical and legal solution.

The court confirmed the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over the child protection proceedings.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had rescinded the Society's decision to refuse an adoption application by the respondent foster parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's mandate under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act allows it to make substantive determinations regarding the best interests of the child, rather than being limited to procedural fairness.

The Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Board's decision to place the children for adoption with the respondents was reasonable.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order of $45,000 made against him in a family law proceeding.

The motions judge had awarded costs on a full indemnity basis after finding the applicant acted in bad faith and unreasonably.

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to bring the motion but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the costs award and noting the case did not raise issues of general importance.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order requiring him to pay table child support and a percentage of section 7 expenses for his adult child attending university.

The father argued that the child attending university constituted a material change in circumstances under their Amending Agreement, and alternatively claimed undue hardship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the agreement or her conclusion that the father failed to prove undue hardship.

The court also declined to remit the matter for a full hearing, emphasizing the principle of proportionality in child support variations.

The appellant brought a motion to adjourn the appeal in order to obtain a transcript of a trial management conference.

The Divisional Court denied the motion, noting that a court reporter is only present at such conferences when a litigant is unrepresented, and a transcript cannot be ordered without the conference judge's permission.

The court held that granting an adjournment based on the mere hope of obtaining permission made no sense.

Furthermore, the relevant rule only contemplates transcripts of oral evidence, which was not given at the conference.