Environmental Law - ODC

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry's alleged decision to exempt a wind farm project from compliance with the Endangered Species Act regarding the Redside Dace.

The Ministry had communicated via email that there were no Redside Dace issues in the project area, and thus the proponent did not need to apply for a permit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's emails did not constitute an exercise of a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review, applying the precedent from Sierra Club.

Following the dismissal of their appeals from decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal regarding wind farm approvals, the appellant landowners argued they should not pay costs because the litigation was in the public interest.

The Divisional Court held that while the appeals were not public interest litigation that would merit no costs, they did contain a strong public interest component regarding the constitutionality of the legislative regime.

Taking this into account, along with the lack of particularity in the respondents' bills of costs and the lower scale of costs typically awarded on appeals to the Divisional Court, the court awarded reduced partial indemnity costs to the successful respondents totaling $67,000.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board approving the respondent's application to construct electricity transmission lines for a wind energy project and approving the forms of land agreements offered to affected landowners.

The appellant argued the independent legal advice clauses in the agreements were misleading and the Board failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the approval of the form of agreement was a discretionary decision that did not raise a question of law or jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Board's decision was reasonable and its reasons were adequate.

The applicants brought a motion seeking leave to file seven reply affidavits in an application for judicial review concerning a decision to allow increased sulphur production at a Suncor refinery.

The respondents objected to the vast majority of the proposed reply evidence on grounds including improper case-splitting, irrelevance, and that the evidence was available earlier.

The court held that a less strict standard for reply evidence applies on an application prior to cross-examinations than at trial.

Applying this standard, the court permitted most of the reply evidence, striking only portions that were purely confirmatory, raised new issues that should have been in the main case, or repeated earlier evidence verbatim.

The Municipality of North Middlesex appealed two decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval under the Environmental Protection Act.

The Tribunal had struck the Municipality's Notice of Constitutional Question and refused to grant it public interest standing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal correctly applied the law, did not err in principle, and provided compelling reasons.

The developer brought a motion for security for costs against a non-profit corporation seeking judicial review of a Conservation Authority decision approving a residential subdivision.

The corporation argued it was a public interest litigant and that an order for security would terminate the litigation.

The court found the corporation had insufficient assets to pay costs and rejected the public interest litigant argument, noting the litigation primarily concerned a localized neighbourhood dispute rather than a broader public interest.

The court ordered the corporation to post $20,000 as security for costs.

The Township of Muskoka Lakes brought an application for judicial review to stop the Ministry of Natural Resources from leasing Crown lands to Swift River Energy Limited for the construction of a hydro-electric facility.

The Township argued that the Ministry's decision to issue a Notice under s. 28 of the Public Lands Act prohibiting public access to the lands was unreasonable and an attempt to thwart portage and public access rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's decision was reasonable given the public safety concerns associated with the site, where two drownings had previously occurred.

The court also noted that a lease of Crown lands does not constitute a disposition under s. 65(4) of the Act.

The appellant construction company appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent residents $14,700 in damages for nuisance, trespass, and negligence arising from noise and odour emitted by a temporary asphalt plant.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of liability in nuisance, concluding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing the severity of the interference or the character of the neighbourhood.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to qualify the respondents' expert witness despite her employment with an environmental advocacy group.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding trespass and negligence, finding that noise and odour are indirect intrusions that do not constitute trespass, and that the respondents suffered no compensable personal injury or property damage to ground a negligence claim.

The damages award remained unchanged.

The Niagara Escarpment Commission applied for judicial review of a Joint Board decision granting conditional approval to Walker Aggregates Inc. to develop a quarry in the Niagara Escarpment Plan area.

The applicant argued the Board failed to properly apply the Niagara Escarpment Plan, improperly delegated approval of an Adaptive Management Plan to the Minister of Natural Resources, and erred in assessing noise impacts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as it correctly applied the relevant planning documents, did not improperly delegate its authority, and reasonably assessed environmental and noise impacts.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision awarding the respondents compensation under the Expropriations Act.

The appellant challenged the award of disturbance damages for pre-expropriation business losses and the Board's refusal to reduce the property's market value due to environmental contaminants.

The respondents cross-appealed the Board's refusal to award interest on the disturbance damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the law regarding disturbance damages and reasonably concluded that the environmental contaminants did not reduce the property's market value.

The Court also upheld the refusal to award interest on disturbance damages, as it is not provided for in the Act.

The appeal was allowed only to correct an arithmetical error in the business loss calculation.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's alleged failure to intervene and enforce an approved waste management plan under s. 27 of the Waste Diversion Act, 2002.

The applicant argued that changes to tendering criteria constituted a 'material change' requiring the Minister's approval.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, finding that the Minister has no statutory duty to intervene or supervise operational decisions, and that the decision of what constitutes a 'material change' is a policy-laden function beyond the court's jurisdiction.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that dismissed his appeal concerning a proposed development.

The OMB had dismissed the appeal on the basis that the moving party failed to present apparent land use planning grounds.

The moving party argued the OMB erred in law by equating 'land use planning grounds' with 'evidence from a land use planner' and by finding he had not tendered a land use planning opinion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's assessment of the evidence was a question of mixed fact and law, not a pure question of law.

The Court also found no reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB's decision, as the evidence provided by the moving party was insufficient to demonstrate legitimate land use planning concerns.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent transit authority's decision to enter into a contract for diesel multiple units for an air-rail link.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct an electrification feasibility study and improperly accepting ministerial direction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to enter a commercial contract did not constitute a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act as it did not determine any legal rights.

Furthermore, the court held that the respondent acted within its statutory authority under its governing legislation.

The applicant sought costs of $90,180 plus disbursements on a substantial indemnity basis against both the Ministry of Natural Resources and Mr. Duncan following a successful application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs against the Ministry, finding the real dispute was between the applicant and Mr. Duncan.

The court also rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, noting Mr. Duncan's conduct was not harsh or vexatious.

After reducing the claimed amount for excessive fees, including those of a retired lawyer acting as a witness, the court fixed costs at $30,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements payable by Mr. Duncan.

The applicants, comprising 118 limited partnerships, sought judicial review of the Minister of Energy's directions to the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) to change the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) Program rules.

The applicants had submitted numerous applications under the original FIT Rules 1.0 and argued that the new FIT Rules 2.0 were applied retroactively, breached their legitimate expectations, and interfered with vested rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's policy directions were subject to a reasonableness standard of review.

The court held that the applicants had no vested rights or legitimate expectations that the program rules would remain unchanged, as the FIT Program was a discretionary government policy initiative subject to modification.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's approval of Terms of Reference for an environmental assessment regarding a transportation corridor.

The applicant argued that the Terms of Reference conflicted with the Growth Plan under the Places To Grow Act, 2005, because they did not restrict the study to the existing highway route.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Growth Plan did not preclude considering alternative routes and that the Minister's decision was reasonable.

The appellant farmer appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission that upheld an inspection order imposing conditions on open air burning of brush on his property.

The appellant argued the Commission erred in its interpretation of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act by not requiring proof that a fire 'would seriously endanger' health and safety before imposing conditions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Commission's interpretation of the Act was correct and its factual findings regarding the necessity of the conditions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that approved a zoning by-law amendment permitting a 12-storey condominium development on a dynamic beach.

The moving party argued the development site fell within the Dynamic Beach Hazard, where development is prohibited.

The OMB accepted expert engineering evidence from the respondents that proposed shoreline protection works would adequately protect the site and mark the landward limit of the hazard.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's preference for one expert's opinion over others was a finding of fact, not an error of law, and therefore did not meet the test for leave to appeal.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review challenging the promulgation of a regulation prescribing minimum setback requirements for wind energy facilities.

The applicant argued the Minister of the Environment failed to consider the precautionary principle in the ministry's statement of environmental values, as required by section 11 of the Environmental Bill of Rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was protected by privative clauses and that the Minister had complied with the mandated process by considering all principles, including the precautionary principle, alongside other policy factors.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision dismissing its appeal against the City of Ottawa's Official Plan Amendment (OPA 77) without a hearing.

The applicant argued the OMB erred by reviewing evidence on the motion to dismiss, akin to a summary judgment motion, rather than assuming the facts in the notice of appeal were true.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding the OMB's procedure was reasonable and necessary to screen out appeals with no chance of success.

The court also found no error in the OMB's conclusion that the applicant's environmental and storm water management concerns could not form a land use planning basis to refuse OPA 77 at this stage.