Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ODC

The moving party brought an urgent motion for a stay pending appeal, which was adjourned and ultimately became moot when her motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The responding estate trustees and the Children's Lawyer sought their costs of the stay motion on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that the responding parties were required to oppose the stay motion due to the broad relief initially sought and the urgency claimed by the moving party.

Applying the principles from Sawdon Estate, the court made a blended costs order, fixing the responding parties' full indemnity costs and directing the moving party to pay a partial indemnity portion, with the balance to be paid from the estate.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Healey J. dated August 9, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all-inclusive to the responding party within 30 days.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Steele J. The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether it is legally possible for some limited partners to bring a common law derivative action on behalf of a limited partnership against a general partner.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000, payable in the discretion of the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties, Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Auto Canada Corp., sought leave to appeal the order of Barnes J. dated June 10, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded against each moving party, payable to the respondent within 30 days.

The applicant, LifeLabs LP, brought a motion seeking additional disclosure from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to complete the record for its application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia privacy commissioners rejecting LifeLabs' claims of privilege over documents related to a cyber-attack.

LifeLabs sought internal policies, correspondence between the commissioners, and documents generated during the decision-making process, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the requested documents were protected by deliberative secrecy (adjudicative privilege) and that LifeLabs had not established a sufficient foundation of procedural unfairness to displace the privilege.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, brought a motion for a stay pending the outcome of her application for judicial review of the Justices of the Peace Review Council's recommendation that she be removed from office.

The respondent took no position on the motion.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the applicant raised serious issues to be tried, would suffer irreparable harm if removed from office pending review, and the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the orders of Daley J. dated October 21, 2021, and December 21, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the orders of Daley J. dated October 12, 2021, and December 21, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $5,000, payable by the moving parties David Atsushi Ohashi and Pamela Gloria Ohashi.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated July 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed in the amount of $5,000.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review regarding a public service member's refusal to provide a certificate for a court recording furnished for transcript preparation.

The court issued a Rule 2.1 notice and subsequently dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court held that providing a recording is an administrative task, not a statutory power of decision, and that the applicant should pursue his concerns in the Ontario Court of Justice or the appropriate appellate court, which control their own processes.

The self-represented applicant commenced a third proceeding in the Divisional Court seeking judicial review regarding the Ministry of the Attorney General's process for providing court recordings for transcription.

The court had previously dismissed two similar proceedings and provided directions on how to properly obtain authoritative transcripts.

The court found the current application to be an attempt to re-litigate previously decided issues and a waste of judicial resources.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, and the applicant was prohibited from commencing further proceedings in the Divisional Court without prior permission.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action on behalf of purchasers of Volkswagen and Audi diesel vehicles who sold their vehicles prior to the disclosure of the emissions defeat device.

The motion judge had found no plausible methodology to calculate damages on a class-wide basis.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by requiring a tangible demonstration of the proposed methodology rather than merely assessing whether it met the low 'some basis in fact' threshold of plausibility.

The matter was remitted to a new judge to rehear the balance of the certification issues.

The appellant sought leave to bring an application for judicial review of an adjudicator's interim determination under the Construction Act, which ordered him to pay the respondent contractor $119,314.

The appellant argued the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction because the contract had been abandoned and thus 'ceased to exist', and because a lien had already been registered and bonded off.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that jurisdictional challenges must be raised before the adjudicator first, an abandoned contract does not cease to exist, and the Act expressly permits concurrent adjudication and lien proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award made by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).

The appellant argued that the respondent had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court by commencing an action there before pursuing arbitration, and that he had not received proper notice of the arbitration proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the respondent unequivocally abandoned the right to arbitrate, and confirming that the record supported the application judge's finding that proper notice was given.

The proposed intervener, Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO), brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning an alleged illegal eviction.

The landlords opposed the motion, arguing it was a private dispute.

The court granted the motion, finding that ACTO had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest in the subject matter and could provide a useful and distinct perspective on the interpretation of the Residential Tenancies Act, particularly regarding the remedies available for illegal evictions.

The respondent doctor brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order granting Canadian Women in Medicine (CWIM) leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application for judicial review.

The underlying judicial review concerned a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons to take no further action on a complaint alleging discriminatory hiring practices.

The Divisional Court majority granted the motion and set aside the intervention order, finding that the motion judge failed to consider whether CWIM's legal position was distinct from the applicant's and failed to recognize that the underlying matter was primarily a private administrative dispute.

A dissenting judge would have dismissed the motion, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP sought leave to intervene as a party in an appeal brought by Capital Sports Management Inc. The underlying appeal challenged an order requiring the production of certain solicitor-client documents based on a finding of an implied joint retainer among Capital Sports, Trinity Development Group Inc., and Gowlings.

Gowlings argued it had a direct interest in the appeal because its conduct and advice were directly impugned.

The court granted Gowlings leave to intervene as a party with limited participation rights, finding that its focused submissions would likely be useful to the court in addressing significant issues about solicitor-client privilege after the breakdown of a relationship involving an implied joint retainer.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Belobaba J. dated May 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the agreed-upon amount of $3,500.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Corthorn J. dated May 10, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding physicians and hospital.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate, which overturned an Arbitrator's finding that he suffered a catastrophic impairment as a result of a 2013 motor vehicle accident.

The applicant had previously been involved in two accidents in 2002.

The Director's Delegate found that the applicant was already catastrophically impaired before the 2013 accident and that the Arbitrator erred by applying the material contribution test instead of the 'but for' test.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding the Director's Delegate's decision unreasonable because it relied on an unestablished fact that the applicant was already catastrophically impaired.

The Court also held that the Arbitrator's use of the material contribution test was appropriate in circumstances involving multiple accidents where it is impossible to determine which accident caused the impairment.