Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ODC

The applicant career college brought a motion for a stay of the Superintendent's decision to revoke approval of its diagnostic medical sonography program pending a judicial review application.

The revocation followed the loss of the program's accreditation status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of irreparable harm, such as financial inability to pay required student refunds.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay to allow students to receive refunds and pursue education elsewhere, rather than remaining trapped in an unaccredited program.

The appellant, a board member of a not-for-profit anti-hate organization, sued the respondents for defamation over two tweets that criticized the organization but did not name him.

The Small Claims Court dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to prove the tweets would lead a reasonable person to believe they referred to him.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, concluding the trial judge applied the correct legal test.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, confirming that the impugned words were not reasonably understood to refer to the appellant.

The appellant was struck by a car while riding his bicycle and applied for a determination of catastrophic impairment based on a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 8.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal denied the application.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by refusing to admit a video of the accident, permitting the respondent's expert to testify beyond the scope of his report, and refusing to allow the appellant to call reply evidence.

The appeal was granted and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The plaintiff appealed a trial judge's decision finding she did not meet the threshold requirements under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff argued the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors by failing to explain his preference for conflicting medical evidence and by omitting reference to the evidence of her chiropractor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review is palpable and overriding error, and finding no such error in the trial judge's careful review of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licensing Appeal Tribunal.

Prior to the hearing, the parties reached a settlement.

The Divisional Court endorsed the settlement, explicitly noting that its endorsement should not be taken as approval of the Tribunal's reasoning in the case.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, which upheld an arbitrator's decision dismissing his claim for accident benefits.

The applicant had settled his claim in 2003 after eight years of litigation but purported to rescind the settlement in 2014, arguing the settlement disclosure notice did not comply with the Settlement Regulation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's Delegate reasonably and correctly applied binding Court of Appeal precedent establishing that the regulation's strict disclosure requirements do not apply to settlements reached after a court action has commenced.

The appellant appealed a decision confirming a Master's Report which found that a contract for the supply of light fixtures was between the respondent distributor and the respondent electrical contractor, rather than the appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the Master's factual findings regarding the identity of the contracting parties.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also denied.

The appellant bank appealed an interlocutory order adjourning its summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had adjourned the motion to hear oral evidence regarding whether the bank knew or should have known that the respondent's brother was using a line of credit, secured by the respondent's condominium, for his own benefit contrary to a trust agreement.

The appellant argued that under Hryniak v. Mauldin, the motion judge was required to determine if there was a genuine issue for trial based solely on the paper record before ordering oral evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Hryniak does not restrict a motion judge's inherent equitable jurisdiction to adjourn a motion and hear oral evidence to determine if a genuine issue for trial exists.

The appellant, an IT contractor, appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for unpaid fees and expenses against the respondent placement agency.

The parties' contract contained a 'pay when paid' clause.

The third-party client terminated the appellant's services and refused to pay outstanding invoices after discovering the appellant's principal had undisclosed U.S. and Ontario securities convictions for insider trading.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the respondent had made good faith efforts to collect the unpaid amounts before reasonably abandoning the collection efforts due to the appellant's material non-disclosure of penal offences.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action was a subrogated claim brought by an insurer in the names of the respondents for damages arising from a fuel oil spill.

The appellants argued the action was a nullity because the respondents were undischarged bankrupts when the claim was issued, meaning their causes of action had vested in their Trustees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer's subrogation rights crystallized before the husband's assignment in bankruptcy, and the Trustee had disclaimed interest in the insurance claims.

Thus, the insurer was entitled to commence the action in the husband's name.

The appellants sued the respondent consulting firms for failing to deliver an approved environmental Risk Assessment on time.

After discovery, the appellants moved to add an individual employee of the respondents as a necessary defendant, which the Master refused.

The appellants appealed the Master's decision and brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence and would not be conclusive.

The court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the Master made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the individual was not a necessary party, as the corporate respondents were fully insured and capable of responding to the claims.

The appellants appealed a trial decision awarding the plaintiffs $20,000 for a purchaser's lien and dismissing their counterclaim and crossclaims, as well as the subsequent costs awards.

The appellants argued the $20,000 award constituted double recovery because the plaintiffs had previously settled with other defendants for $400,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no double recovery because the purchaser's lien claim was only advanced against the appellants.

The court also found no error in principle in the trial judge's discretionary costs awards.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement reached by his former counsel with the respondent police board.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider her discretion to continue the proceeding under Rule 49.09(b) and erred in fact by ignoring his evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised her discretion to enforce the settlement, as the former counsel had ostensible authority to settle and the appellant's remedy for any allegedly negligent legal advice lay against his former counsel, not the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order of a Master dismissing her wrongful dismissal action for delay.

The appellant argued the Master erred by measuring the delay from September 2006 and ignoring intervening factors, such as a previous order excusing delay and an amended statement of claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master properly considered the entire history of the litigation, correctly applied the law regarding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and properly found the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for a lost diamond.

At trial, the judge ordered both parties to take polygraph tests and relied on the results, which favoured the respondent, to assess credibility and dismiss the claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the results of polygraph tests are inadmissible to determine the truth of facts in dispute, as they usurp the function of the trier of fact, and a court cannot delegate its jurisdiction even on consent.

The plaintiff filed a very late factum in a leave application, necessitating an adjournment.

The defendant requested that the leave application be dismissed due to the unreasonable delay.

The court declined to dismiss the application, noting the severe consequence of losing the right to litigate on the merits, but awarded $2,000 in costs to the defendant payable forthwith for the wasted court time.

The defendant bank moved to quash the plaintiffs' appeal from a Master's order requiring the plaintiffs to pay $100,000 into court as security for costs.

The plaintiffs had appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the order was effectively final because they were impecunious.

The court held that orders for security for costs are interlocutory, not final, and therefore the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 on a quantum meruit basis for unpaid boiler repair work.

The appellant argued the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable relief under section 96(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that quantum meruit is a common law remedy, not an equitable one.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if it were an equitable remedy, section 23(1) of the Act grants the Small Claims Court jurisdiction to award equitable relief in the form of monetary payments up to its jurisdictional limit.

This is a supplementary reasons for judgment regarding costs following an appeal and a Rule 59 motion concerning a pension plan death benefit.

The successful appellant sought substantial indemnity costs payable out of the pension plan fund.

The court found that the litigation clarified a problematic part of the Pension Benefits Act, benefiting members and administrators of plans throughout Ontario.

Applying the principle that costs of litigation necessary for the administration of a trust should be paid from the trust, the court awarded the appellant substantial indemnity costs of $40,000 plus disbursements, payable by the Board from the funds of the Plan.

The plaintiffs appealed an order dismissing their motion to amend their statement of claim to add a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The motion was brought 13 years after the action was commenced and long after the relevant limitation period had expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where a limitation period has passed, a plaintiff must show special circumstances to amend a pleading, rather than merely showing an absence of non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court found no special circumstances and noted that the defendant would likely suffer real prejudice given the passage of time.