Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

L'appelante a interjeté appel du rejet de son action en diffamation à la Cour des petites créances.

Elle alléguait que l'intimée avait tenu des propos diffamatoires à son égard lors d'une évaluation de rendement et à deux de ses connaissances qui enquêtaient sous un faux prétexte.

La Cour divisionnaire a confirmé que le juge de première instance n'a pas erré en concluant que les deux connaissances agissaient comme agents de l'appelante, ce qui annulait la publication à des tierces parties.

De plus, le refus d'accorder un ajournement pour faire entendre un technicien audio constituait un exercice raisonnable de la discrétion judiciaire.

L'appel a été rejeté.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to pay $310,500 into court pursuant to Rule 45.02.

The defendant argued there was good reason to doubt the motion judge's finding that a specific fund existed and had not been commingled.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding the motion judge reasonably concluded that $310,500 remained directly traceable to the original fund and had not been commingled.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The plaintiffs appealed a master's decision refusing to add a party (Trailcon) and refusing to allow amendments to the pleadings after the expiry of the limitation period.

The defendants cross-appealed the master's decision to add another party (684).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that Trailcon's insurer had constructive notice of the claim, constituting special circumstances to overcome the limitation period.

The court also allowed the amendments, finding they were alternative theories of liability rather than new causes of action.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim against the respondent bank and granting the bank's counterclaim for $10,000 on an outstanding student loan.

The appellant argued he was not in default and was eligible for interest relief and capitalization.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had admitted to being in default during the trial and had already exhausted his two permitted interest capitalizations under the applicable regulations.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a municipality's decision awarding a construction contract to a third party, alleging breaches of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the requested remedy of certiorari or mandamus was discretionary and inappropriate because the third party had already commenced work.

The court concluded that damages would be an adequate and preferable remedy for the applicant.

The defendants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding the plaintiffs' failure to comply with discovery undertakings.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge's order was vague and lacked reasons, and noted that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow a party to delay providing particulars until 90 days before trial.

As the plaintiffs had satisfied most undertakings after the appeal was perfected, the Court set aside the motion judge's order and directed the plaintiffs to particularize their future healthcare costs within 14 days, failing which the action could be struck from the trial list.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory order made by a Small Claims Court judge setting aside a default judgment.

The Divisional Court noted that while it has jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedures Act to review such decisions, it will generally decline to do so where the application is essentially an appeal of an interlocutory order, as the Courts of Justice Act does not permit appeals from interlocutory orders of the Small Claims Court.

The court found no reason to interfere, holding that the Small Claims Court judge acted within his jurisdiction.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant brought an appeal under the Construction Lien Act from a Master's reasons before the report was confirmed.

The court previously found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the proper procedure was a motion to oppose confirmation under Rule 54.09.

In this endorsement on costs, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents for the jurisdictional issue, noting the appeal was unnecessary as the Master had advised the parties of the proper forum.

The court fixed costs at $2,500 for the first respondent and $1,500 for the second respondent.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that struck out affidavit evidence filed in support of a motion for full indemnity costs.

The excluded evidence detailed prior business dealings between the parties, which the applicant alleged proved the respondent's appeal was brought in bad faith.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the Board's conclusion that pre-proceeding conduct was irrelevant to costs.

The Court held that denying the opportunity to review conduct that occurred prior to launching the appeal could amount to a denial of natural justice.

The appellant hospital appealed a partial summary judgment awarding the respondent architectural firm over $1 million in a construction lien action.

The motion judge had relied on an 'admission' letter sent by the hospital following a pre-trial conference.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge erred by relying on the pre-trial communication contrary to Rule 50.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court also found that affidavit evidence from a peer-review architect raised a genuine issue for trial regarding the completion of the contract and the validity of the invoices.

The applicant appealed a decision dismissing his claim against the respondent bank for seizing a GIC and funds from his savings account to satisfy overdue credit card charges.

The applicant argued his signature on the security pledge agreements was forged.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual finding that the applicant signed the agreements.

Furthermore, the court upheld the finding that the bank was entitled to exercise its common law right of set off.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his solicitor negligence claim against the respondent law firm.

The appellant alleged his former solicitor negligently handled his breach of fiduciary duty claim against a real estate agent, pressuring him into a settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the standard of care for solicitors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion for an interim preservation order regarding a $3.5 million cash collateral drawn from a standby letter of credit.

The motions judge had found that the appellant had no proprietary interest in the funds and that the law of guarantee did not apply.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and noting that the application of guarantee law to a standby letter of credit in the context of an underlying agreement is an issue of broader significance.

A stay of the order directing payment of the funds was also granted pending the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to exclude the medical report and evidence of a defence expert, Dr. Bednar, prior to trial.

The motions judge had declined to rule on the admissibility, holding that such a determination should be reserved for the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, with the majority finding that it would be extremely rare for a motions judge to be in an equal or better position than the trial judge to rule on the exclusion of expert evidence.

Matlow J. dissented, arguing the motions judge had jurisdiction under Rule 37.02(1) and should have considered the merits.

The appellant appealed a Master's decisions interpreting Minutes of Settlement in a construction lien action regarding roof repairs.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 71(1) of the Construction Lien Act because the Master's report had not yet been confirmed.

In the alternative, reviewing the merits, the court found the Master correctly interpreted the settlement agreement's definition of 'Work' and made no palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant ex-husband appealed a Master's order denying his request to amend his defamation claim against his ex-wife.

The proposed amendments related to statements the ex-wife made to a psychologist conducting a court-appointed custody assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made during a custody assessment are protected by absolute privilege to ensure full and free disclosure in family law proceedings.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal from a decision refusing certification of a class action, and the dismissal of the defendant's cross-appeal regarding costs, the Divisional Court determined the costs of the appeal.

The court found that the action involved a matter of public interest, particularly given the promulgation of the Cigarette Ignition Propensity Regulations.

Applying section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act and Rule 57, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Small Claims Court dismissing their statement of claim on a motion by the respondent.

The motions judge provided no written or oral reasons for the dismissal, simply endorsing the record with 'dismissed'.

The Divisional Court held that litigants are entitled to know the reasons for a decision, and the complete absence of reasons made appellate review impossible.

The appeal was allowed, the decision set aside, and the matter remitted to the Small Claims Court for a new hearing before a different judge.

Following the respondents' complete success on an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, cross-appeal, and the underlying application.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs for three related motions, noting the applicants had made unfounded and speculative allegations of wrongdoing, unnecessarily complicating the proceedings.

The court fixed the total costs payable by the applicants to the respondents at $125,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellants, real estate agents, appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent for their failure to include a financing condition in a second offer to purchase a residential property.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding that the respondent suffered no damage as a result of the appellants' omission.

Even if the condition had been included, the conditional period would have expired before the bank withdrew its financing approval, leaving the respondent in the same position.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to the appellants' conduct.