Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

The plaintiffs appealed an interlocutory order removing their solicitor of record for allegedly improper conduct.

The solicitor had contacted corporate counsel for a non-party (Cineplex) to clarify ownership issues regarding the premises where the plaintiff's slip and fall occurred.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and reinstated the solicitor, finding that the motions judge mischaracterized the legal test and misconstrued the facts.

The court held that the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibiting contact with represented parties did not apply, as the non-party was not represented by the defendant's counsel and no confidential information was discussed.

The appellant appealed a Deputy Judge's decision granting default judgment to the plaintiff.

The Divisional Court found that the Deputy Judge misapplied the law by refusing to hear the defendant, who was present and ready to proceed despite lacking an interpreter, and by harshly denying a brief adjournment requested by counsel to allow witnesses to arrive.

The appeal was allowed, the default judgment was set aside, and the appellant was granted leave to file a Defence and Counterclaim.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a discretionary, administrative decision made by a motion judge in Triage Court.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and no matters of public importance involved.

The court noted the decision did not affect the plaintiffs' substantive rights or infringe any constitutional rights.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding her liable under a conditional sales contract for a motor vehicle.

She argued the trial judge erred by admitting business records and hearsay evidence without compliance with the notice requirements of section 35 of the Evidence Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 27(1) of the Courts of Justice Act permits the admission of relevant hearsay in Small Claims Court proceedings, and that section 35 of the Evidence Act is an enabling provision that does not restrict other statutory avenues for admitting business records.

The evidence was found sufficient to establish liability.

The respondents requested an adjournment of an appeal of a costs order due to the death of one of the co-respondents.

The majority of the Divisional Court denied the adjournment, noting that the deceased's estate had no interest in the litigation, the request was for an indefinite period, and the case had been pending for a considerable time.

Molloy J. dissented, stating she would have granted the adjournment to ensure the rights of the deceased's estate were protected.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle the appeal.

The court held that Rule 49 does not apply to offers to settle appeals and awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed the costs at $12,000 for fees plus disbursements and GST, finding the appellant's claimed hours slightly excessive for a case dismissed at the pleadings stage.

The applicant, a vice principal, sought judicial review of a decision by the Investigations Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers not to refer his complaint against a principal to the Discipline Committee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked standing.

As a mere complainant under the Ontario College of Teachers Act, he had no special or private interest in the decision beyond that of any member of the public.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party defendants sought leave to appeal a motions judge's refusal to strike out the plaintiff's claims for 'knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty' and 'assisting or facilitating breach of contract' in a proposed class action arising from investments in a hedge fund.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there were conflicting decisions regarding the existence of the tort of assisting breach of contract, and good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision regarding knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty given the plaintiff was not a client of the defendants.

The issues were deemed to be of general importance to the investment industry.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Municipal Board regarding the revocation of a licence, arguing the Board erred in law by failing to understand that the revocation was tainted by prior allegedly unlawful actions by the Ministry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's decision and noting that the Board's conclusion that the appellant was not in compliance with licence conditions was a finding of fact that could not be disturbed.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order dismissing a motion for judgment on executed Minutes of Settlement.

The motions judge had found genuine issues for trial but then added inconsistent reasons stating he would have found in favour of the applicant if he was in error.

The Divisional Court held that the primary finding of genuine issues for trial was supported by the evidence and dismissed the appeal, noting the subsequent comments were unnecessary and beyond the judge's jurisdiction on a Rule 49.09 motion.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction granted by Lederman J., which included the re-instatement of the plaintiff's employment based on a finding of a serious issue of oppression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and noting that the re-instatement of employment, while rare, was within the judge's discretion under the oppression remedy.

The court also held that the failure to provide an undertaking did not automatically preclude the injunction and that no principle of broad importance was involved to justify granting leave.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision granting summary judgment dismissing her counterclaim against the respondent school board.

The counterclaim originally sought educational supports for her daughter or damages to fund private education.

After the school board agreed to provide the supports, the Master found the counterclaim moot.

The appellant sought to pursue damages on unpleaded grounds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master was correct as the pleaded claim was moot and the appellant had not moved to amend her pleadings.

The plaintiff and defendants both sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that transferred the proceeding from Toronto to Windsor on the condition that the defendants pay the plaintiff's travel and accommodation expenses in any event of the cause.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal to both parties, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of imposing such a financial condition on a change of venue order.

Leave was also granted on the issue of costs, as the motion judge had not afforded the parties an opportunity to make submissions on costs.

The appellants appealed a Deputy Judge's decision finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a mobile home.

The vendors had stated there was a 'new roof in 2002,' but only part of the roof had been replaced.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of palpable and overriding error to the Deputy Judge's findings of mixed fact and law.

The court upheld the finding that a special relationship existed, the statement was inaccurate, and the purchaser relied on it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant bailiff appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for selling the respondent's tools and materials without notice under the Repair and Storage Liens Act after locking the respondent out of commercial premises for rent arrears.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking damages based on full replacement cost rather than actual value.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings on liability, the measure of damages, or the determination that the claim was not statute-barred.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over a claim involving a Band Council and declaratory relief.

During the appeal, the parties agreed to reconcile most of their difficulties and issue a new Statement of Claim focusing on unjust dismissal.

The Divisional Court declined to decide the remaining issue of whether a Band Council member can sue the Band Council, leaving it to be raised against the new pleading if necessary.

No costs were awarded.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action for wrongful dismissal and overtime pay, as well as the subsequent costs award.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was a probationary employee who could be terminated without notice under the employment contract.

The court also considered whether leave was required to appeal the costs award under the Courts of Justice Act.

Although leave was required, the court granted it but ultimately dismissed the costs appeal, finding the trial judge's award was within the statutory limit and properly exercised.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal of a summary judgment order, the respondents sought costs of the appeal on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Divisional Court found no evidence of bad faith to justify substantial indemnity costs.

Taking into account the quantum of the claim, the costs previously awarded, and the factors set out in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $5,000 to the respondent Gaydon and $3,500 to the respondent Burger King.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay the respondent contractor for the installation of a pool enclosure fence.

The appellant argued the contractor was negligent and breached the Sale of Goods Act because the fence did not comply with municipal by-laws requiring a cedar hedge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the contractor did not owe a duty of care regarding by-law compliance, as the appellant chose the fence type and assumed responsibility for permits.

The court also upheld the finding that the Sale of Goods Act was not breached, as there was no defect in title and the fence fulfilled its purpose of enclosing the yard.

The defendant in a civil action for damages arising from a double homicide appealed a Master's decision finding insufficient evidence that he was a person under a disability.

The defendant's former counsel had withheld psychiatric reports from the Master due to concerns about solicitor-client privilege.

On appeal, the court admitted the psychiatric reports as fresh evidence, holding that the traditional due diligence criterion for fresh evidence should yield where compelling psychiatric evidence exists and the interests of justice require its admission to protect a vulnerable person.

The appeal was allowed and the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as litigation guardian.