Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

The applicant sought costs of $90,180 plus disbursements on a substantial indemnity basis against both the Ministry of Natural Resources and Mr. Duncan following a successful application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs against the Ministry, finding the real dispute was between the applicant and Mr. Duncan.

The court also rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, noting Mr. Duncan's conduct was not harsh or vexatious.

After reducing the claimed amount for excessive fees, including those of a retired lawyer acting as a witness, the court fixed costs at $30,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements payable by Mr. Duncan.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court decision that stayed their action for unpaid health and welfare benefits to allow the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) to determine if it had jurisdiction.

The dispute arose following a union raid.

The Divisional Court confirmed it had jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the Small Claims Court but dismissed the application, agreeing that the OLRB, which has exclusive jurisdiction over labour relations issues, should first determine its jurisdiction over the matter.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them jointly liable with a co-defendant for unpaid invoices owed to the respondent contractor.

The respondent had performed mechanical and electrical work on a property being developed by the appellants and the co-defendant.

The deputy judge found that a partnership or joint venture existed between the appellants and the co-defendant, and that the co-defendant had contracted with the respondent as an agent for the venture.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the deputy judge's findings of fact regarding the existence of a joint venture or partnership.

The court held that the appellants were jointly liable for the debts incurred on behalf of the venture, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant banquet hall appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for breach of contract and ordering the return of the respondents' $10,000 deposit.

The respondents had booked a wedding reception but sought to postpone it due to illness, which the appellant treated as a cancellation under the contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply proper principles of contractual interpretation.

The contract clearly stipulated that a failure to proceed on the specific function date constituted a cancellation, entitling the appellant to retain the deposit and claim liquidated damages.

The plaintiff farmer raised wild boars and was told by the defendant City to remove them or face charges under an exotic animal by-law.

The plaintiff removed the boars, suffering financial loss, and was subsequently charged, though the charges were later withdrawn.

The plaintiff sued the City in negligence, arguing it failed to consider whether his operation was a 'normal farm practice' exempt from municipal by-laws under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act.

The City appealed the dismissal of its motion to strike the negligence claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the City did not owe a statutory or common law duty of care to the plaintiff.

The appellant tour operator appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding damages to the respondents for a ruined vacation at a Cuban resort.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge erred in law by imposing a duty on the tour operator to supervise its third-party suppliers.

The court held that a tour operator's duty is limited to exercising due care in selecting competent suppliers.

Furthermore, the Deputy Judge erred in applying contra proferentem to invalidate an unambiguous exclusionary clause limiting the tour operator's liability for the acts of third parties.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding on behalf of York University students whose classes were disrupted by a 2008 strike, alleging breach of contract, breach of the Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion, finding the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because the claims improperly interfered with the university's academic discretion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's conclusion that the claims were barred by academic discretion and that the pleadings were insufficient to establish a contractual or statutory cause of action.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their claim for damages arising from their detention and search by police officers.

The officers had detained, handcuffed, and searched the appellants while investigating a break and enter, despite the appellants not matching the suspect descriptions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in concluding there were reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

The court also found the appellants were de facto arrested, not merely detained.

The court awarded each appellant $500 in damages for false arrest and imprisonment.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a trial judge's order denying him costs after he was awarded $12,000 in a wrongful dismissal action.

The trial judge denied costs under Rule 57.05(1) because the award fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, which had increased to $25,000 during the litigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting the plaintiff's continuing obligation to assess the appropriate forum and the undue length of the trial caused by the plaintiff's unsuccessful pursuit of punitive damages.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Case Management Master's decision dismissing a motion for her recusal based on a reasonable apprehension of bias in a construction lien proceeding.

The Divisional Court first determined it had inherent jurisdiction to hear the application despite the statutory prohibition on appeals from interlocutory orders under the Construction Lien Act, as the allegation went to fundamental fairness.

On the merits, the court applied the correctness standard and found that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Master's procedural orders and expressions of frustration did not demonstrate bias to a reasonably informed bystander.

The application was dismissed.

The court determined the costs of two pre-hearing motions in an appeal.

The respondent was awarded $2,500 in costs on a partial indemnity basis for successfully moving to strike the self-represented appellant's improperly cast motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were awarded for the appellant's successful motion to extend the time for appeal, as the appellant required an indulgence from the court and the respondent took an unreasonable position in resisting the motion.

The plaintiffs were successful in their motion for leave to appeal, with the ultimate issue concerning the limitation period reserved to the trial judge.

The court awarded costs of the motion to the plaintiffs in the amount of $3,500, exclusive of disbursements and HST, considering the factors in Rule 57.01 and the uniqueness of the law.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent leave to amend her statement of claim to add a derivative claim against an insurer on behalf of a corporation.

The respondent sought to recover her investment losses under a fidelity bond issued to the corporation, alleging the corporation's principal committed fraudulent acts.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the principal was the controlling mind of the corporation and could not defraud his own corporation.

As the proposed derivative claim was bound to fail, the respondent was not a proper complainant under the Business Corporations Act.

The moving party (respondent on appeal) brought a cross-motion to quash the appellants' appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board order and to lift the statutory stay under s. 25(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The underlying dispute involved possession of a residential property where the moving party claimed an illegal lockout and the appellants were prospective purchasers who subsequently became tenants.

The court found the appeal was not manifestly devoid of merit and was brought in time, as it appealed the Board's review decision rather than the original interim order.

The court also declined to lift the statutory stay, finding the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo until the appeal could be heard.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to appoint a monitor over the plaintiff charity's financial affairs, as well as the associated costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decisions under Rule 62.02(4)(a) and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The court also found no error in principle in the motion judge's discretionary costs award.

The successful respondent on an appeal from the Small Claims Court sought partial indemnity costs of $15,961.25.

The appellant argued the costs were disproportionate to the $9,129.02 at issue in the appeal.

The court considered the Rule 57 factors, noting that while the monetary amount was small, the legal issues regarding priority between a perfected security interest under the PPSA and an unregistered non-possessory lien under the RSLA were complex and important to the appellant.

The court fixed costs at $9,500 plus HST.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought to appeal a decision of an Appeal Panel of the Law Society that dismissed his appeal from an Appeals Management Tribunal's refusal to extend the time to appeal a professional misconduct finding.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Appeal Panel's decision was reasonable.

The court agreed that the appellant failed to meet the criteria for an extension of time, noting a lack of bona fide intention to appeal, no reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the Law Society, and no merit to the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment in a commercial lease dispute.

The underlying action involved a dispute over a $210,000 payment, which the tenants claimed was a security deposit and the landlord claimed was a commission.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that a trial was necessary to resolve conflicting evidence, and concluding that the matter did not involve issues of public importance.

The Crown appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering it to reimburse a former public servant for pool maintenance expenses incurred during a foreign posting in Dubai.

The Crown argued the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, the claim was statute-barred, and the employee was bound by an Occupancy Agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Crown was estopped from relying on the statutory grievance ouster because it failed to provide the employee with the necessary grievance information.

The court also held the action was commenced within the limitation period and the Crown had implicitly accepted the employee's caveat regarding pool expenses.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution and Charter damages against a police officer and the Crown.

The appellant had been charged with assault causing bodily harm following a prison fight, but the charge was later withdrawn.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge and did not act with malice.

The court also confirmed that mala fides is required to establish a breach of section 7 of the Charter in this context, and that the appellant sued the wrong level of government for his transfer to a maximum-security facility.

The appeal was dismissed.