Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a non-profit organization suspending him from its executive committee.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After receiving written submissions from the applicant, the court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent was a private charitable organization, not a state decision-maker, and therefore its decisions were not subject to judicial review or the Charter.

The self-represented applicant objected to the form and content of a draft order reflecting a previous panel decision, arguing that the costs were unreasonable, seeking a grace period for payment, and disputing the interest rate.

The court dismissed the objections, noting that the quantum of costs had already been decided, the panel did not grant a deferral, and the 2.0% post-judgment interest rate was correct under the Courts of Justice Act.

The draft order was approved as to form and content.

The appellant appealed a Master's judgment granted on a motion to enforce a settlement or for summary judgment in a construction lien reference.

The Divisional Court found that while the Master had jurisdiction to hear the motion, the Master erred by granting a Judgment rather than issuing a Report.

This distinction is critical as it determines the proper routes for review and appeal.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Master to issue a Report.

The appellants appealed an order directing the sale of a jointly owned property rather than its partition.

Following the commencement of the appeal, the appellants sold their interest in the property to the respondent for $3,900,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the issues raised were not elusive of review and did not warrant the expenditure of judicial resources.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent damages for a roofing contract dispute.

The appellant argued the trial was procedurally unfair due to the deputy judge's frequent interventions and comments, which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the deputy judge's well-intended activism became a reversible error by taking over the trial and improperly limiting the self-represented appellant's cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered before a different deputy judge.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her motion to amend her statement of claim to add a utility company as a defendant after the expiry of the presumptive two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff alleged she walked into a light pole and initially sued the municipality, only later discovering the utility company owned the pole.

The Divisional Court found the Master erred in law by failing to make specific findings on when the plaintiff actually knew or reasonably ought to have known of her claim against the utility company.

The Court set aside the Master's order and granted leave to add the utility company as a defendant, noting that a trial was required to determine the limitations issue.

The appellant contractor appealed a decision declaring its construction lien expired.

The motions judge had found that the owner's notice of termination constituted 'abandonment' of the contract under s. 31(2) of the Construction Lien Act, triggering the 45-day period to register a lien.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that abandonment requires the contractor to abandon the contract, either subjectively or objectively.

A unilateral termination notice by the owner does not force abandonment by the contractor, especially where the contractor remains ready, willing, and able to complete the work and settlement discussions are ongoing.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's proceeding, the respondent sought costs.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the hours and billable rates claimed to be reasonable.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $7,788.37.

The appellant challenged his late brother's will but later abandoned the claim.

The respondents (estate trustees) obtained summary judgment on a counterclaim for damages representing CRA interest and penalties incurred by the estate due to the litigation delay, or alternatively, as an award of costs.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the judgment, holding that commencing litigation is not an actionable wrong unless it meets the strict test for the tort of abuse of civil process, which was neither pleaded nor proved.

The court also held that estate administration expenses, such as CRA penalties, cannot be awarded as legal costs.

The plaintiff sued several police officers and the London Police Services Board for negligent investigation following his arrest for break and enter and breach of recognizance in the context of a domestic dispute.

The trial judge found two officers and the Board liable and awarded damages.

The defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge relied on a legal test that was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal.

Applying the correct standard, the court held that the police acted reasonably based on the information available to them and had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrests.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting judgment to the respondent bank for a defaulted vehicle loan and dismissing his defendant's claim.

The appellant argued he thought he was only co-signing for a friend and challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction over a contract signed in Saskatchewan.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that Ontario had jurisdiction over the appellant, that there was valid consideration, and that no misrepresentations were made by the bank or dealership.

However, the court remitted the matter back to the trial judge solely to provide reasons for dismissing the defendant's claim against the bank.

The appellants appealed an order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add the TTC Insurance Company Limited as a defendant.

The appellants argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the limitation period for an indemnification claim does not begin to run until a demand is made and the insurer fails to satisfy it, following the Markel line of authorities.

The appellant property manager appealed an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike a third party claim brought by the respondent developers.

The respondents sought contribution and indemnity from the appellant for alleged construction deficiencies and maintenance failures at a condominium.

The appellant argued the third party claim should be struck because the respondents did not assert an independent cause of action against it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant does not need an independent cause of action against a third party to bring a claim under the Negligence Act, provided the defendant is exposed to joint and several liability for damages caused to the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order setting aside a default judgment and awarding partial indemnity costs to the respondents.

The underlying action involved a nuisance claim regarding property interference.

The Divisional Court reviewed the motion judge's application of the five-part test for setting aside default judgments and found no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in her discretionary decision.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

The moving party, a class member in a train derailment class action, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing his appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal order, noting the moving party had an intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to obtaining issued and entered orders, and demonstrated an arguable case on the merits.

The court found that truncating the appeal based on a procedural irregularity would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order was set aside, and an extension of time was granted.

The respondent Registrar successfully resisted an application for judicial review regarding the cannabis retail lottery and sought costs.

The applicants argued that costs should not be awarded to a decision-maker that successfully resists judicial review, relying on an alleged overriding principle.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting that in Ontario, costs are awarded to administrative tribunals acting in an adversarial role to defend their decisions.

The court awarded the Registrar costs of the stay motion and the application, fixing the quantum at $40,000.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to review an order refusing to extend the time to review a registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal related to an arbitrator's denial of attendant care and housekeeping benefits.

The court found the motion had no chance of success, as previous judges had already determined the appeal lacked legal merit.

The court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also ordered that the appellant may not bring any further motions in the appeal proceeding without prior leave.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision which found that no settlement agreement existed between the parties.

The appellant argued the motion judge provided insufficient reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal test, adequately summarized the viva voce evidence, and reasonably concluded there was no meeting of the minds.

The appellant purchased a pharmacy business from the respondents and later sued for breach of warranty after a fertility clinic located in the same building closed.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the withheld information about the clinic's closure would not reasonably have deterred the appellant from completing the transaction given its limited financial impact.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in his interpretation of the commercial contract or his assessment of the evidence.

The appellants appealed a decision granting an oppression application and ordering the production of financial documents to the minority shareholder.

The application judge found that the majority shareholder's refusal to provide financial disclosure and call a shareholders meeting constituted oppressive conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the application judge's interchangeable reference to the minority shareholder company and its principal.

The Court upheld the finding that the minority shareholder had a reasonable expectation of ongoing access to financial disclosure, which was violated by the appellants' conduct.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also denied.