ADR/Mediation Services - ODC

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review in the Divisional Court to remove a parenting coordinator/arbitrator appointed under a consent order.

The respondent challenged the court's jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Arbitration Act, an application to remove an arbitrator must be brought in the Superior Court of Justice or Family Court, not the Divisional Court.

The court also noted it would decline to exercise its discretion even if it had jurisdiction, as the proper route is under the Family Law Rules and the Arbitration Act.

The applicant purchaser sought judicial review of an arbitrator's costs award that ordered him to pay the respondent vendor's legal fees on a substantial indemnity basis following a dismissed arbitration over a cancelled condominium project.

The Divisional Court found it had jurisdiction because the arbitration was mandatory under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The Court held the arbitrator's costs decision was unreasonable and internally inconsistent, as it failed to properly apply the specific costs regime in the Tarion Addendum which presumes the vendor pays the purchaser's reasonable legal expenses absent just cause.

The costs award was quashed and remitted to the arbitrator for reconsideration.

The appellant builder appealed an arbitrator's final award on damages and costs following a failed real estate transaction.

Previously, a Superior Court judge had set aside the arbitrator's initial liability award, finding the respondent buyers liable for anticipatory breach, and remitted the matter for damages assessment.

On remand, the arbitrator ignored the court's binding findings, created a legal fiction of 'contributory breach of contract,' and limited the builder's damages to the forfeited deposits without hearing evidence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that arbitrators are bound by the law and appellate court directions.

The award was set aside and remitted to a new arbitrator to properly assess damages based on the difference between the contract and resale prices.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an arbitration award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $3,300.

The appellant sought to appeal a Superior Court decision denying him leave to appeal a family law arbitration award.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing there is no right to appeal a denial of leave.

The Divisional Court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence and followed the general rule that an order refusing leave to appeal is not appealable, except in narrow circumstances where a judge mistakenly declines jurisdiction.

As the appellant did not allege the judge declined jurisdiction, the notice of appeal was quashed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order regarding whether a court can issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation in the face of an arbitration agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs submissions were made, no costs were ordered.

The moving parties failed to close on a pre-construction home and sued for the return of their deposit.

The action was stayed by a Master due to an arbitration clause in the agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving parties sought to appeal the stay but missed the deadline, and a single judge of the Divisional Court dismissed their motion to extend the time to appeal, finding the appeal was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The moving parties brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to review the single judge's order.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact, and agreeing that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 is a complete bar to the appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal a Master's decision that stayed their action in favour of arbitration.

The underlying dispute involved an agreement of purchase and sale for a pre-construction home containing a mandatory arbitration clause.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the proposed appeal had no merit because section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act precludes appeals from decisions granting a stay.

The court also found no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the Master's decision.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to stay the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs had sued for fraudulent misappropriation of funds under a joint venture agreement, and the defendants argued the dispute fell within the agreement's arbitration clause.

The motion judge found the claim was essentially in fraud and not covered by the arbitration clause.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The applicants sought to appeal and judicially review an arbitrator's decision finding them personally liable for the tort of deceit in a real estate venture.

They argued the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over them personally as they had not signed the arbitration agreement in their personal capacities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the applicants had agreed to arbitration by their conduct, including obtaining a prior court order referring the claims to arbitration, and had waived any jurisdictional objections by participating without complaint.

The court also held that judicial review is unavailable for private commercial arbitrations and that the arbitration agreement's 'final and binding' clause precluded any appeal.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his application for judicial review of a family arbitration award.

He argued that recent amendments to the Family Law Act meant family arbitrators exercise a statutory power of decision, giving the court jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, affirming that family arbitrators derive their authority from private consensual agreements, not statute, and therefore do not exercise a statutory power of decision.

The applicants sought relief under the Arbitration Act and judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to challenge an arbitrator's award.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, as such applications must be brought before the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court also held that judicial review is a public law remedy unavailable to challenge a private consensual arbitrator's award.

The application for judicial review was quashed, and the remaining relief was referred to the Superior Court.

The appellants, having been successful in their appeal which struck the respondent's counterclaim and third-party claim, sought their costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court fixed the costs for both appellants but declined to include any fees or disbursements related to a voluntary mediation.

The court held that voluntary mediation is not a step authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a matter of policy, the costs of voluntary mediation should be borne equally by the parties to encourage settlement efforts without fear of increased costs if unsuccessful.

The applicant applied for judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of mediation and settlement materials.

The materials had been prepared for the mediation of ongoing litigation between the applicant and the respondent.

The Divisional Court granted the application, holding that the records were exempt from disclosure under both the common-law settlement privilege and section 19 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court emphasized that the public interest in encouraging settlement trumps the public interest in transparency of government action in these circumstances.

Following a mandatory mediation, the parties reached a settlement.

A dispute arose over whether one of the defendants was a party to the settlement agreement in his personal capacity.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce the settlement and obtained an order compelling the mediator to testify about the mediation communications.

The defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, applying the Wigmore conditions to find that the communications during the mediation were privileged and the mediator could not be compelled to testify, as the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the mediation process outweighed the interest in disclosure.

The applicant sought to set aside or vary an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court, which had quashed its application for judicial review of an arbitration award administered by a voluntary dispute resolution corporation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with the single judge that jurisdiction to set aside the arbitration award lies exclusively with the Superior Court of Justice under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

Furthermore, the court noted the motion was out of time under Rule 61.16(6) with no grounds justifying an extension.

The applicant sought to appeal or judicially review a family law arbitration award regarding spousal and child support in the Divisional Court.

The court held that the Arbitration Act provides a comprehensive code for reviewing arbitral decisions, precluding an application for judicial review to sidestep that regime.

Finding that the application to set aside the award under s. 46 of the Arbitration Act was brought in the wrong court, the Divisional Court exercised its discretion under s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to adjourn the matter to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash an arbitration award that ordered it to pay the respondent $5 million pursuant to a share purchase agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Arbitration Act and the parties' agreement, which explicitly prohibited appeals, barred the application.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to pursue any potential statutory appeal rights within the prescribed time limits.

On the merits, the court found the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was not patently unreasonable and the process was procedurally fair.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motions judge's order dismissing an application for judgment in accordance with minutes of settlement reached at mandatory mediation.

The settlement required the execution of a license agreement, but the parties could not agree on whether it should include an indemnification provision.

The motions judge found the settlement unenforceable as there was no agreement on essential terms.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and that a decision would be of significant benefit to the profession.

The minority shareholder applicant brought an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act after being dismissed from the respondent corporation.

The shareholders' agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a specific mechanism for valuing and redeeming the shares of a departing employee.

The motions judge allowed the applicant's motion to have the dispute heard in court rather than by arbitration, relying on the Weber principle to avoid a potential deprivation of ultimate remedy.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the Weber principle does not generally apply to voluntary private arbitration agreements and that the parties must be held to their freely chosen dispute resolution mechanism.