CITATION: Watt v. HPARB, 2020 ONSC 7272
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: Watt v. HPARB
COUNSEL: Andrew Watt, self-represented Applicant
BEFORE: D.L. Corbett J.
IN CHAMBERS, IN WRITING
Background
1By notice given September 2, 2020, the applicant was asked to explain why this appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to R.2.1.01. The basis of this notice was set out in a brief endorsement from this court: 2020 ONSC 5258.
2The applicant responded to the court’s 2.1.01 notice, and by endorsement dated September 14, 2020 (2020 ONSC 5501), the court declined to dismiss the application “at this time” and directed that a case management conference be held. At the case management conference, the court directed the HPARB to file a Record of Proceedings and advised that the court would provide further directions after reviewing the Record.
3Having now reviewed the Record of Proceedings provided by HPARB, the court directs that notice be given to the applicant pursuant to R.2.1.01 for a second time for the reasons that follow.
Analysis
4The ICRC concluded that the appellant’s complaints “are essentially incapable of proof and are not credible”, that “[t]here is no information to support the … claims” and “[i]t appears likely… that the Complainant’s claims are related to faulty perceptions and a withdrawal from reality.” The HPARB dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the ICRC as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, essentially for the reasons given by the ICRC. A summary of allegations made by the complainant is set out in the decisions below and, on their face, are consistent with the ICRC and HPARB decisions.
5In his response to the first R.2.1.01 notice, the appellant provided a legal argument that is generally sound but which did not address the issues raised in the R.2.1.01 notice. He described one complaint that he said he had made against one doctor, which was not referenced in the reasons of the ICRC or the HPARB. He also referenced a complaint he has about the University not permitting him to continue in his study program. He acknowledged having been assessed as delusional respecting some complaints that he made many years ago but stated that he underwent treatment and assessment and was no longer suffering from delusions.
6In a supplementary response to the first R.2.1.01 notice, the appellant provided a copy of a letter he received from the University of Toronto. That letter was attached as confirmation that his delusions had passed, but the letter does not confirm this characterization of the assessment.
7Four complaints from the appellant are set out at pages 1-27 of the Record of Proceedings. These complaints are a series of bizarre and, at times, absurd allegations. Almost every allegation, on its face, could be explained as delusional. Taken together, they appear to provide an overwhelming basis for the conclusions reached below. Therefore, having read the appellant’s complaints, the court now requires the appellant to address why this case should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process pursuant to R.2.1.01, essentially for the reasons given by the HPARB. In legal terms, the appellant needs to address the court’s concern that the issues he raises:
(a) cannot possibly succeed: Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2018 ONSC 58, para. 42(ii)(a); Dyson v. AG, [1911] 1 KB 410 at 418; Beardmore v. City of Toronto; Smith v. City of London (1909), 19 OLR 139.
(b) are ones in which no reasonable person could possibly expect to obtain relief: Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2018 ONSC 58, para. 42(ii)(c); Lawrence v. Lord Norreys (1888), 39 Ch.D. 213, aff’d 15 App.Cas. 210.
Disposition
8Respondents shall not provide submissions unless this court subsequently directs otherwise.
D.L. Corbett J.
Date: November 25, 2020