ODC 2019

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order evicting her.

The eviction was based on an application for causing serious problems and committing an illegal act by interfering with the hydro supply to her unit after it was disconnected for non-payment.

The Board found she or someone on her behalf cut the deadbolt off the protected hydro switch to restore electricity, creating an extreme danger.

The Divisional Court found no error of law in the Board's reliance on circumstantial evidence, noting she was the only one to benefit from the restored electricity.

The appeal was dismissed, but the eviction enforcement date was delayed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision dismissing a national policy grievance.

The grievance alleged the employer's policy regarding the transfer of employees with permanent partial disabilities violated the collective agreement.

The union argued the arbitrator breached procedural fairness due to a five-year delay in rendering the decision and by relying on a provision of the collective agreement not raised by the parties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the delay did not cause significant prejudice and the arbitrator was entitled to consider the entire collective agreement.

The court also held the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and the duty to accommodate was reasonable.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a FSCO Director's Delegate decision which held that the insurer's notice letters seeking repayment of income replacement benefits were invalid.

The insurer had attempted to claw back overpayments after the respondent became eligible for CPP benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable for the Delegate to conclude the notices were defective for claiming beyond the 12-month statutory cap and for failing to be substantially correct.

The insurer was ordered to refund the clawed-back monies with interest.

The appellant, a dental hygienist, appealed the revocation of his license by the Discipline Committee after he provided dental hygiene treatment to his wife.

The Committee found this constituted professional misconduct under the Health Professions Procedural Code, which mandates license revocation for sexual abuse of a patient, defined to include sexual relations.

The appellant argued the mandatory revocation and public registry notation violated his and his wife's rights under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no section 7 violation as there is no constitutional right to practice a profession, and no section 12 violation as the mandatory revocation and registry notation did not constitute cruel and unusual treatment.

The court noted the harshness of the result but held it was bound by the legislation as the government had not yet passed a proposed spousal exemption regulation for dental hygienists.

The tenant brought a motion to stay an eviction order pending its appeal of a decision finding it failed to validly exercise its option to renew a commercial lease.

The court first determined that the appeal properly lay to the Court of Appeal, not the Divisional Court, and transferred the appeal.

Sitting as a Superior Court judge, the court then applied the RJR-MacDonald test and granted the stay, finding the appeal raised a serious issue, the tenant would suffer irreparable harm to its business if evicted, and the balance of convenience favoured the tenant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her wrongful dismissal and human rights claims following her failure to return to work after maternity leave.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding that an 8:30 a.m. start time was a fundamental term of her employment contract, and that the employer's insistence on this time constituted constructive dismissal and family status discrimination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the start time was an existing contractual term and that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination regarding her child care needs.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal setting aside a Notice of Proposed Order to revoke the respondent's horse racing licence.

The Registrar had proposed revocation after discovering the respondent's criminal convictions for selling regulated chemicals and his failure to accurately disclose them on his renewal application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues raised by the Registrar were questions of mixed fact and law, which are not appealable under the governing statute.

The Court also held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and within the range of acceptable outcomes based on the evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Law Society of Ontario's decision to close his complaint file against a lawyer who had represented the opposing party in a previous Small Claims Court action.

The Law Society closed the file because the applicant failed to disclose any allegations of professional misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant still had not identified any conduct by the lawyer that could be the subject of an investigation, rendering the Law Society's decision reasonable.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Tribunal for failing to cooperate with an investigation and produce requested documents.

The appellant argued that the Law Society was required to seek his response to the complaint before authorizing the use of investigative powers under s. 49.3(2) of the Law Society Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Law Society has no obligation to seek a response before authorizing an investigation, and that the appellant was obligated to cooperate.

The court also rejected arguments that the Law Society improperly delegated authority, fettered its discretion, or engaged in a fishing expedition.

The self-represented applicants sought judicial review of Landlord and Tenant Board decisions made in 2012 and 2013, and to stop enforcement of a Small Claims Court order.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering whether to dismiss the proceeding as frivolous or vexatious, noting the applicants failed to exhaust their appeal rights under the Residential Tenancies Act and were six years past the appeal deadline.

Finding the initial notice did not sufficiently identify these concerns, the court granted the applicants 15 days to provide further written submissions before making a final determination.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, acting for an incapable beneficiary, applied to require the estate trustee to pass accounts.

The estate trustee relied on a release signed by the beneficiary before she was declared incapable.

The application judge ordered the passing of accounts, finding 'red flags' regarding the beneficiary's capacity.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the application judge erred in applying s. 2(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act by failing to consider what the estate trustee actually knew about the beneficiary's capacity at the time the release was signed.

The appeal was allowed and the order to pass accounts was set aside.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision ordering the revocation of its Class 1 Transfer Service licence.

The revocation followed an incident where the appellant directed a contractor to transport human remains in an inappropriate and undignified manner.

The tribunal found that the appellant's day-to-day operations were managed by an unlicenced individual, contrary to regulations, and that there were reasonable grounds to believe the business would not be carried on in accordance with the law and with integrity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the tribunal's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that refused to discontinue the respondent worker's Future Economic Loss benefits.

The worker had returned to full-time work 17 years after his injury, but his benefits had been locked-in after the statutory 60-month review window.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of the legislation and policy directives—that benefits could not be reviewed after 60 months absent specific exceptions—was reasonable and respected the legislative objective of finality.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to refuse to renew his commercial trapping licence for a specific trapline and to allocate it to an Indigenous trapper.

The applicant had initially been allocated the trapline, but the Ministry later determined it had erred in rejecting the Indigenous trapper's claim of ancestral connection to the area.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's discretionary decision was reasonable, intelligible, and transparent.

The court also held that the applicant was afforded adequate procedural fairness, as he was kept informed and had no substantive property right to the trapline.

The applicant mother moved for an extension of time to serve and file her notice of motion for leave to appeal an interim access order, and requested that the motion for leave be heard orally by a single judge.

The court granted the extension of time, finding the mother had a bona fide intention to appeal and a reasonable explanation for the short delay.

However, the court dismissed the request for an oral hearing before a single judge, holding that Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires leave motions to be heard in writing by a panel of the Divisional Court.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondent father for the procedural issue.

The appellant mortgagee appealed multiple orders, including a finding of contempt for attempting to sell a property under a power of sale in violation of a court order, and a finding that the respondent's construction lien had priority over its mortgage.

The Divisional Court dismissed all appeals.

The court held that the appellant was bound by its formal admission of contempt made during sentencing, and the Apology Act did not apply to admissions made under oath or by counsel in court.

Furthermore, the court upheld the finding that the construction lien had priority because the appellant failed to prove any funds were actually advanced under its mortgage.

The appellant moved for an extension of time to perfect an appeal from a small claims court decision.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the appeal lacked merit.

The court granted the extension, applying the principle that the merits threshold on an extension motion is exceedingly low.

The court found the proposed appeal was not so completely devoid of merit that the appellant should be denied the right of appeal.

The appellant pharmacist appealed the liability and penalty decisions of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists.

The Committee had found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct, including improper solicitation and misusing confidential patient information, and imposed a twelve-month suspension.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no error in the Committee's credibility assessments or application of the burden of proof.

However, the Court allowed the penalty appeal in part, finding the Committee erred in law by treating the appellant's exercise of his right to a hearing as an aggravating factor.

The suspension was reduced from twelve to ten months.

The plaintiff sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal after missing the deadline by one day.

Her underlying Small Claims Court action against the City for property damage caused by falling tree branches had been dismissed.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay was minimal with a reasonable explanation, and there was no prejudice to the City.

The court also found potential merit in the appeal because the trial judge appeared to have overlooked a letter from the plaintiff regarding the trees' history of falling branches.

The plaintiffs were beneficial owners of a property held in trust by the defendant Bertrand, who was the registered owner.

Bertrand sold the property to 670 without the plaintiffs' consent and signed a false affidavit to clear executions against his name.

The trial judge found the transfer was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act, declared it void, and ordered rectification of the register.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in law.

Bertrand was not a 'fictitious person' and did not forge the transfer, as he was the true registered owner with legal authority to convey the property.

Furthermore, 670 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, protected by s. 62(2) of the Act, which states that describing an owner as a trustee does not constitute notice of a trust.

The appeals by 670 and the Director of Titles were allowed, confirming 670's ownership, while Bertrand's appeal against the findings of fact was dismissed.

The matter was remitted to the trial court to assess damages against Bertrand.