Damiani v. Toronto Hydro Corporation, 2019 ONSC 284
CITATION: Damiani v. Toronto Hydro Corporation, 2019 ONSC 284
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 331/18
DATE: 20190110
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Lucy Damiani, John Damiani and Robert Damiani Appellants (Plaintiffs)
– and –
Toronto Hydro Corporation Respondent (Defendant)
Abba Chima for the Appellants Andrew McCoomb, for the Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: January 8, 2019
Backhouse, J.
[1] The appellants appeal the decision of Master Abrams dated May 11, 2018 in which she dismissed the appellants’ motion for leave to amend their statement of claim without prejudice to their right to amend their claim in accordance with her Reasons for Decision.
[2] At the outset of the hearing, counsel appearing for the appellants stated that he had no materials from the respondent and Lucy Damiani had advised that she had not been served with materials. He indicated that they wished to proceed with the appeal. He accepted my suggestion to adjourn a short time to permit him to read the respondent’s factum. The appeal then proceeded with no objection.
[3] In checking with the Divisional Court office after the appeal had been heard, my attention was directed to an affidavit of service affixed to the back of the court’s copy of the respondent’s factum deposing to the service by courier of the respondent’s factum and book of authorities addressed to the appellants at 38 Coulter Avenue Toronto and by sending a copy by electronic mail to Lucy Damiani at spiralcubes@yahoo.ca, both on September 21, 2018.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
[4] An appeal lies to a single judge of the Divisional Court from a final order of a master pursuant to s.19(1) and s.21(2)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O.1990, c.C.43.
[5] The Court can consider whether proposed amendments constitute an abuse of process, conform with the rules of pleadings and are, on their face, tenable at law. (National Trust Co. v. Furbacher, [1994] OJ No.2385 (ONSC) at para 6).
[6] Tenability of a proposed amended pleading is determined by application of the analysis under Rule 21.01(1)(b)-namely, whether the pleading raises no reasonable cause of action. As explained by Morden and Perell and cited in Brookfield Financial Real Estate Group Ltd. v. Azorim Canada (Adelaide Street) Inc., “it makes little sense to grant an amendment that will immediately be challenged as legally unsound, and the court may inquire into the merits to ensure that the amendment is tenable in law and compliant with the rules of pleading.” (2012 ONSC 3818 at para 23 citing Morden & Perell, The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, First Edition (Toronto:LexisNexis, 2010),pp.359-361)
[7] A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the acts pleaded to be true that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action. As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.: “another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success”. (2011 SCC 42 at para 17)
[8] For a party to successfully oppose a motion for leave to amend absent a finding that a pleading is untenable, a party must establish one of: (a) non-compensable prejudice; (b) issue estoppel; or (c) abuse of process. (Lucky Star Developments Inc. v. ABSA Canada International, 2017 ONSC 4787 [Lucky Star] at para35).
[9] Expiration of a limitation period creates a presumption of non-compensable prejudice: “conceptually it should be treated no differently than a new claim that attempts to advance a statute-barred claim”. (Lucky Star at para36, citing Frohlick v. Pinkerton Canada Ltd., 2008 ONCA 3, [2008] OJ No 17 (ONCA))
[10] The standard of review in an appeal from the order of a master is the same as that for an appeal from an order of a judge: correctness for an error of law, palpable and overriding error for an error of fact, and correctness or palpable and overriding error for a question of mixed fact and law, depending on whether there is an extricable legal principle.(Zeitoun v. Economical Insurance Group ONCA 415() at para.1;Wellwood v. Ontario(Provincial Police), 2010 ONCA 386 at para.28).
The Law
[11] Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure O.Reg.575/07, s.6. governs motions for leave to amend pleadings. The court shall grant leave on such terms as are just unless non-compensable prejudice would result.
Background
The Prior Application
[12] Lucy Damiani is a “conscientious objector” to the Ontario’s smart meter initiative which required installation of smart meters on customers’ properties. On September 25, 2014, after notice, the electrical service was disconnected to her property as a result of her refusal to allow a smart meter to be installed. On October 21, 2014, she initiated an application against Hydro-Electric System Limited (“THESL”) and the Ontario Energy Board (“OEB”) seeking an order that required THESL to reconnect electrical service to her home using the existing analog meter rather than a smart meter and seeking declaratory relief.
[13] The prior application was settled on November 6, 2014 on the basis that THESL would reconnect Ms. Damiani’s electricity using her old analog meter immediately upon completion of an Electrical Safety Act Inspection. Ms. Damiani’s acceptance was conditional on THESL removing a pole that had been erected for the smart meter on the property adjacent to her home. Both parties claim the other breached the settlement. Ms. Damiani’s position is that THESL failed to take down the pole and restore the original wiring that was cut and changed. The position of THESL and Toronto Hydro Corporation (“THC”) is that Ms. Damiani refused to allow THESL to perform the safety inspection and abandoned the settlement of the application which required the safety inspection and dismissal of the application.
The Original Statement of Claim
[14] On June 29, 2016, the appellants (Ms. Damiani and her two children) commenced this proceeding by statement of claim (“the original statement of claim”) against THC. It seeks damages for negligence and/or breach of contract alleged to flow from the disconnection on September 25, 2014 of electricity to the appellants’ home, located at 38 Coulter Avenue in Toronto.
[15] The original statement of claim seeks general damages of $1 million, punitive damages of $1.5 million, plus interest and costs. It seeks no declaratory relief. The appellants’ damages claim includes:
(a) damages to 38 Coulter, “including the cost to demolish and rebuild the residence”;
(b) loss of reasonable enjoyment of 38 Coulter from September 25, 2014;
(c) other purported heads of damage.
[16] No breach of the prior application is pleaded in the original statement of claim. In paragraphs 49 and 50 a November 4, 2014 with prejudice offer from THC is but there is no reference to any settlement. Rather, it is stated in Paragraph 50 that as a result of Toronto Hydro’s ongoing behavior including installing the external pole in front of her neighbour’s residence, the appellants have been unable or unwilling to entertain or accept any solutions offered to them by Toronto Hydro. It is also pleaded that after October 31, 2014, there have been no further efforts on the part of Toronto Hydro or at all to resolve this outstanding impasse.
[17] In the statement of defence dated September 9, 2016, THC pleads that it is the parent company of THESL and that THESL is a local distribution company that carries on business distributing and supplying electricity and associated services in the City of Toronto. THC denied that it has ever distributed or supplied electricity and pleads that it had no contractual or regulatory relationship or any other kind of relationship with the appellants. It pleads that while the November 4th, 2014 settlement was offered by THESL, THC is entitled to the protection of the settlement as THESL’s parent.
Proposed Amended Statement of Claim
[18] On July 19, 2017, Ms. Damiani provided a fresh as amended statement of claim to counsel for the respondent for comment. The draft pleading replaced THC as defendant with THESL.
[19] On August 11, 2017, the appellants served a motion to amend its pleading with a further fresh as amended statement of claim (“the proposed amended statement of claim”) which was before the Master and is the subject of this appeal. It names both THC and THESL as defendants instead of replacing THC with THESL. The prayer for relief in paragraph 1 is expanded to include the following new requests that were contained in the prior application but not in the original statement of claim issued on June 29, 2016 against THC:
- (a) An order “declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to have the defendant Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited provide hydro-electrical services to her home at 38 Coulter Avenue through the existing analog meter and requiring the defendant Toronto Hydro to deliver such electrical service to her home.”
(b) An order “declaring that all rules, directive, by-laws and statutes promulgated pursuant to the Ontario Energy Board Act requiring the mandatory installation of a smart meter at her home located at 38 Coulter Avenue in the City of Toronto are in breach of the applicant’s entitlement of freedom of conscience as provided for in section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and to be in breach of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms providing for security of the person and preservation of her right to life.”
(c) An “interim and permanent mandatory order requiring the respondent Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited to reconnect electrical service to the applicant’s home at 38 Coulter Avenue in Toronto using the existing analog meter without an installation charge and maintaining it as long as payment is made.”
(d) An order “declaring all rules, directives and by-laws promulgated by the Ontario Energy Board requiring the mandatory installment of smart meters to be in breach or ultra vires of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998”.
(e) A declaration “that the directives of the Ontario Energy Board requiring mandatory installation of smart meters is in breach of the purpose of the Ontario Energy Board, 1998 as well as the Electricity Act, 1998”.
(f) An order “declaring that the installation of a smart meter on the property of the applicant constitutes the tort of nuisance and an unlawful interference with the applicant’s entitlement of quiet enjoyment as well as interference with her property”.
[20] Near identical requests to the relief sought in the proposed amended statement of claim as set out in paragraphs 1(a)-(g) were claimed in the prior application in paragraph 1(a) - (g) which the parties agree was settled November 6, 2014.
[21] While the original claim sought general damages for “negligence and or breach of contract” the proposed amended statement of claim seeks general damages for “negligence, breach of contract, nuisance, invasion of privacy, interference with the plaintiffs’ entitlement to quiet enjoyment and interference with the plaintiffs’ property”. For the first time the appellants claim in the alternative to the declaratory relief sought, a declaration that the defendants are in breach of the settlement of the prior application and an order directing enforcement of the settlement made on November 6, 2014.
[22] Unlike in the prior application, the Ontario Energy Board is not named as a defendant in the proposed amended statement of claim.
The Reconnection Motion
[23] A reconnection motion was brought by Ms. Damiani within the prior application on October 31, 2014 which was adjourned and then not proceeded with.
[24] At a scheduling appearance for THC’s motion for summary judgment in this action in Civil Practice Court on January 31, 2017, Ms. Damiani requested an emergency order that power be restored at 38 Coulter. Justice Archibald declined to grant the order and adjourned the CPC attendance to February 14, 2017 to address scheduling of THC’s motion for summary judgment.
[25] On February 6, 2017, Ms. Damiani served a motion in this action for emergency relief to restore the power purportedly returnable on the scheduling motion date of February 14, 2017. On February 14, 2017, Justice McEwen scheduled the reconnection motion for March 8, 2017, observing that facta would be needed for an injunction motion.
[26] On March 8, 2017 the parties attended before Justice Myers and agreed to adjourn the motion to March 9, 2017 in order to explore the possibility of settlement.
[27] On March 9, 2017 the appellants sought a further adjournment of their motion in order to adduce additional evidence. Justice Myers adjourned the motion to April 20, 20187, peremptory on the parties.
[28] On April 9, 2017, Ms. Damiani advised THC that she would not be proceeding with the reconnection motion. On April 17, 2017, the appellants serviced a notice of discontinuance purporting to discontinue their reconnection motion before it could be heard on April 20, 2019.
[29] On May 25 2017, Justice Myers ordered costs of the abandoned motion payable in the amount of $25,000 in THC’s favour. In his costs endorsement, Justice Myers made the following observations:
Ms. Damiani is a very unfortunate litigant. She refuses to allow Hydro to re-connect her house power. She is on a quest to oppose Smart Meter and has thrown up issue after issue to impede her own motion to require reconnection. Her continual raising of new issues has led to grossly expanded factual issues to which Hydro had to respond. Despite the Court’s clear effort to try to push Hydro to re-connect Ms. Damiani could not find a way to let Hydro confirm that her old meter that had not been used in two years-was still in safe working order before re-connecting it as Hydro required. Instead, she raised issues about the process to determine meter safety, the right of Hydro to keep old meters on its financial books for rate-setting purposes-and about her concerns of radio frequency waves that are generated by Hydro meters.
I explained R.37.09 and invited her to provide a basis to depart from the Rule. She simply launched into her issues-the ones that she chose to abandon rather than have determined.
Hydro’s costs outline is very high. But I cannot fault Hydro in this case its rates are reasonable. Its hours were driven by Ms. Damiani’s continuing expansion of her grounds. I note that she had at least two counsel this year alone. She argues that Hydro did work after she told Glustein, J. that she was abandoning the motion. However, in light of her ever-changing positions, it was reasonable to do so until the notice of abandonment was served. She argues that Hydro is committing an offence under the Consumer Safety Administration Act, 1996 […] by failing to re-connect her power. I do not know if it has been charged. But that argument, too, if relevant civilly, has been abandoned.
… In light of the fact that Ms. Damiani has had a number of lawyers, she knows or ought to have known that the expansion of the motion was leading to a very big pile of written material-all of which has a cost. In fact, Ms. Damiani confirmed that it was the complication of the motion that led her to abandon it. …
The Master’s Decision
[30] In dismissing the appellants’ motion for leave to amend their statement of claim without prejudice to their right to propose a new/different form of draft amended claim, the Master found that the problems with the proposed amended statement of claim are manifold. Specifically the court held:
(a) The plaintiffs sought relief against the proposed defendants in respect of matters to which only the Ontario Energy Board (“OEB”) could respond, despite the fact that the OEB is not a proposed party to this action;
(b) The proposed amended statement of claim pleads evidence;
(c) The proposed amended statement of claim introduced new causes of action and added a party in relation to events taking place in September, 2014. No delay in discoverability having been pled, these claims are statute barred.
(d) There is an inherent conflict between paragraph 24 of the proposed amended statement of claim and paragraph 50 of the original claim.
(e) The proposed revival of the claim for reconnection of electrical service is an abuse of process.
(f) The bald allegation that THC was responsible in law for the conduct of THESL is without foundation.
The Appellants’ Submissions
[31] The appellants raised the following issues on the appeal:
(a) The Master erred in her Reasons for Decision that Ms. Damiani commenced the prior application in August, 2014. Rather, the prior application was commenced on October 21, 2014.
(b) The request for reconnection of electrical service in the prior application was never abandoned and is not an abuse of process. Rather, it was resolved through a settlement on November 6, 2014 which THESL then breached.
(c) The critical amendment in the proposed amended statement of claim was in regard to the breach of the settlement of the prior application which continued to December 21, 2016 when ESA completed its safety inspection and directed THESL to reconnect. Accordingly, there is no limitations issue.
(d) If there was inherent conflict between the original claim and the proposed amended statement of claim, subsequent events took place including a breach of the settlement. The allegations that the appellants have been unable or unwilling to entertain or accept any of the solutions offered to them by Toronto Hydro and that Toronto Hydro made no further efforts after October 31, 2014 to resolve the outstanding impasse contained in the original claim and referenced by the Master as conflicting were not incorporated into the proposed amended statement of claim.
(e) The Master erred in holding that the declaratory relief claimed in paragraph 1(d) of the proposed amended statement of claim (“that rules, directive, by-laws and statutes promulgated pursuant to the Ontario Energy Board are in breach of her constitutional and other rights”) was untenable against THC and THESL. Ms. Damiani submits that it is sufficient to plead that THC and THESL followed the Minister’s directives. In paragraph 44 of the statement of defence it is admitted that OEB was directing THESL to resolve the matter on the basis of re-electrification of the existing analog meter subject to the ESA inspection which occurred on December 21, 2016 and resulted in ESA instructing THESL to immediately re-electrify her home.
(f) THC and THESL have no separate vehicles, have the same board of directors and use the same website. THC, THESL and OEB have the same lawyers. The corporate veil should be pierced. The appellants should be permitted to argue that THC was an alter ego of THESL and that the activities of THESL were completely dominated by THC which unjustly deprived the appellants of their rights.
(g) Paragraphs 13, 14, 17, 21 and 26 of the proposed amended statement of claim constitute material facts and not evidence which the Master incorrectly found contravened Rule 25.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Analysis
The Appellants’ submissions
(a) The Master erred in her Reasons regarding the date the prior application was issued
[32] The Master states in her Reasons for Decision that the prior application was issued in August 2014 when the correct date was October 21, 2014. The Master relied upon the proposed amended statement of claim where the appellants pleaded the August, 2014 date rather than the correct date of October 21, 2014. In any event, nothing turns on this point.
(b) The request for reconnection of electrical service in the prior application was never abandoned
[33] Ms. Damiani never proceeded with her request for reconnection in the prior application. The record shows that the appellants’ motion for reconnection in this action which was adjourned a number of times was made peremptory on the parties. The appellants then served a notice of discontinuance shortly before the date scheduled for the hearing. Justice Myers who had the matter in front of him on 3 occasions determined the costs application where he observed that Ms. Damiani has refused to allow Hydro to re-connect her house power.
[34] The appellants’ position that rather than being abandoned the motion was resolved through a settlement on November 6, 2014 which THESL then breached is incorrect. The many occasions on which the motion for reconnection in this action was before the court occurred in 2017, long after the settlement of the prior application and then was withdrawn by the appellants.
(c) and (d) The critical amendment in the proposed amended statement of claim is in regard to the breach of the settlement of the prior application so there is no inherent conflict with paragraph 50 of the original claim
[35] The appellants seek to amend the original statement of claim to add THESL as a defendant and to plead, among other things, that there was a settlement of the prior application on November 6, 2014 which was breached by THESL not taking down the pole which was erected October 31, 2014 on property adjacent to the plaintiffs’ property. There is a clear inconsistency between paragraph 50 of the original statement of claim and paragraph 24 of the proposed amended statement of claim. Paragraph 50 of the original statement of claim states that there were no further efforts by Toronto Hydro to resolve the matter after October 31, 2014 and does not plead a settlement of the application or breach of the settlement. Paragraph 24 of the proposed statement of claim claims a breach of the settlement by THESL. I do not read the Master’s reasons as finding that this, in and of itself, is a reason not to allow the amendment. Rather it supports her finding that there are new causes of action being raised against THC which are statute barred.
[36] The appellants’ submission that there is no limitations issue because the breach of the settlement of the prior application continued to December 21, 2016 when ESA completed its safety inspection and directed THESL to reconnect which it did not do is not pleaded in the proposed statement of claim. Accordingly it could not be taken into account by the Master.
(e) The Master erred in finding that the declaratory relief sought in paragraph 1(b) and 1(d-g) is not tenable against THC and THESL
[37] Before a declaration can be sought that legislation, rules, directives, by-laws and statutes promulgated by the OEB are in breach of the appellants’ constitutional and other rights, the OEB must be a party and be given an opportunity to defend it. It is not sufficient to say that THC and THESL followed the Minister’s direction and that Ms. Damiani has been subject to Board mandates. As paragraph 1(b) and 1(d) to (e) in the proposed amended statement of claim stands, they are not tenable claims.
(f) THC and THESL are alter egos
[38] Counsel for the appellants in his submissions gave evidence orally as to similarities between THC, THESL and the OEB. The only fact pleaded in the proposed amended statement of claim regarding the allegation of alter ego is that THC “is equally responsible in law for the conduct of…THESL…” The Master was correct that this is a bare pleading and untenable.
(g) Paragraphs 13, 14, 17, 21 and 26 constitute material fact
[39] At paragraph 13, the appellants plead that disconnection occurred “notwithstanding public and scientific reports and evidence including statements from the Fire Marshal of Ontario to the effect that smart meters installations have caused multiple fires in Ontario.”
[40] At paragraph 14, the appellants plead that smart meters “have inherent design flaws that have caused various jurisdictions to ban their use as a result of constituting fire hazards”.
[41] At paragraph 17, the appellants plead “that no Canadian agency has certified smart meters as being safe.”
[42] At paragraph 21, the appellants argue that they have good reasons to oppose smart meters which “arose from scientific and technical articles detailing fire hazards associated with the manufacture of smart meters as well as with respect to health issues and concerns arising from radio frequency emissions. Health issues and concerns in these articles often focused on cancers that arose with increased frequency following the installation of, inter alia, smart meters and electrical wires installed adjacent to residential dwellings”.
[43] At paragraph 26, the appellants plead “they rely on all standards set out in applicable regulatory statutes as conclusive evidence of the standards that the Defendant was required to abide by and meet and which it failed to abide by and meet as set out in the claim herein.”
[44] Only material facts can be included in a pleading, as distinct from the evidence by which those facts are intended to be proven. For example, the material facts are those that:
• Explain who the parties are
• Identify the event or events giving rise to the claim;
• Explain why each party has been sued, by listing what each has done or failed to do to cause or contribute to their damages; and
• Detail the damages suffered and the ensuing losses.
(Witten v Bhardwaj et al, 2008 20994(ON SC))
[45] The Master found that the impugned paragraphs plead evidence. I agree. Accordingly, they are a clear breach of Rule 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Did the Master Err in finding that Paragraph 1(b),and 1 (d)-(g) are untenable because OEB is not a party?
[46] As stated in Paragraph 37 herein, the Master was correct in finding that Paragraph 1(b) and 1(d)-(g) are not tenable pleadings in the absence of the OEB as a party to the action.
Did the Master err in concluding that Paragraphs 13, 14, 17, 21 and 26 pleaded evidence?
[47] This was not a final order and there is no right of appeal. In any event, in order to provide direction for any new redrafted claim, as stated in Paragraphs 44 and 45 herein, the Master was correct in finding that the impugned paragraphs plead evidence and are a clear breach of Rule 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Did the Master err in finding that the claim for nuisance, invasion of privacy, interference with the appellants’ entitlement to quiet enjoyment and interference with their property arising from steps taken by THESL and/or THC in September 2014 are, on their face, statute barred?
[48] The motion to amend was not served until August 11, 2017. A similar proposed amended claim was provided to the respondent for consent in July 2017. The Limitations Act, 2002 sets out a limitation period of two years that begins to run from the day on which a claim is discovered. Using the earlier date of July, 2017, subject to discoverability, new causes of action arising before July 2015 are presumptively statute barred.
[49] As the Master noted, some of the relief now sought is also relief sought in the prior application commenced on October 21, 2014 which therefore had to be known to the appellants before July 2015 (eg. disconnection of the electricity on September 25, 2014). With respect to Ms. Damiani’s argument that the amended claim arises out of THESL/THC breaching the settlement by not reconnecting the power immediately after the December 21, 2016 ESA inspection and accordingly is not statute barred, there are no facts pleaded in the proposed amended statement of claim regarding this or indeed about anything that happened after the date of the settlement, November 6, 2014.
[50] As the Master noted, a delay in discoverability was not pled nor does there appear to be any basis for it. The Master notes that the decision not to make THESL a defendant in the original statement of claim was a decision that was deliberately taken which would have to be the case, given that THESL was a named respondent in the prior application and given Paragraph 2 of THC’s statement of defence.
[51] The facts relied upon in the appellants’ submissions as to why the limitation period has not expired are not pleaded in the proposed statement of claim considered by the Master. Based on the proposed amended statement of claim¸ Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the reasons are correct.
Did the Master err in finding that the request for reconnection is an abuse of process?
[52] The appellant took the motion brought in this action for reconnection to the brink of the hearing date, requiring THC to be ready. The material exchanged was extensive. The motion was before Justice Myers on three occasions before he made it peremptory on the parties. Although denied by the appellants, the evidence is clear that the motion was then abandoned by them as set out in Paragraphs 33 and 34 herein with Justice Myers observing that Ms. Damiani refused to allow Hydro to reconnect her house power. The Master’s finding is correct that attempting to re-litigate an issue that a party advanced so many times before the court and then abandoned is an abuse of process.
Did the Master err in finding that the appellant’s proposed plea in paragraph 6 of the proposed amended statement of claim that THC is equally responsible in law for the conduct of THESL is a bare plea and therefore untenable?
[53] The Master is correct that as pled, this is a bare plea and untenable.
Conclusion
[54] In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Ms. Damiani shall have 14 days from the release of these reasons, which she indicated would be sufficient time for her, to deliver a new draft amended claim.
[55] The respondent shall advise whether it consents to the new proposed amendments within 2 weeks thereafter. If there is no consent, the appellants shall bring a motion within 2 weeks of being advised of the respondent’s refusal to consent. Otherwise, pleadings shall be deemed closed.
[56] The respondent shall make written submissions on costs not to exceed 3 pages within 14 days from the release of these reasons. The appellants shall have 14 days thereafter to respond with written submissions on costs not to exceed 3 pages.
Released: January 10, 2019
___________________________ Backhouse, J.
CITATION: Damiani v. Toronto Hydro Corporation, 2019 ONSC 284
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 331/18
DATE: 20190110
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Lucy Damiani, John Damiani and Robert Damiani Appellants (Plaintiffs)
– and –
Toronto Hydro Corporation Respondent (Defendant)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Backhouse, J.
Released: January 10, 2019