ODC 2010

A former probationary instructor at the Ontario Police College sought judicial review of his 2003 dismissal.

The moving parties brought a motion to dismiss the application for delay, as it was commenced nearly six years after the dismissal and perfected a year later.

The court granted the motion, finding the delay inordinate and excessive, the former employee's explanations inadequate, and that the delay caused prejudice to the moving parties given the remedy of reinstatement sought.

The respondent landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal from an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The tenants failed to order a transcript or perfect the appeal, and provided no explanation for the delay.

The court quashed the appeal for failure to perfect and also found it devoid of merit, noting that applying the Small Claims Court monetary cap to the payment of outstanding rent arrears to void an eviction order under section 74(11) of the Residential Tenancies Act would result in an absurdity.

The applicant, a licensed standardbred horse trainer and owner, sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission (ORC) decision that upheld Woodbine Entertainment Group's (WEG) refusal to allow him to enter horses to race unless he signed an Access Agreement.

The Divisional Court held that while WEG could impose track rules and require an Access Agreement, the ORC acted unreasonably in permitting WEG to insist on terms that purported to give WEG absolute unfettered power to exclude licensed participants without fault or procedural fairness.

The application for judicial review was granted in part, prohibiting WEG from excluding the applicant's horses solely for refusing to sign the current Access Agreement.

The employer sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award, arguing the arbitration board breached procedural fairness by considering post-hearing wage settlement data without allowing further submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board used the public information in a supplementary and confirmatory manner.

The court held that this approach was consistent with the flexible duty of fairness and the legislative nature of interest arbitration.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal to the Divisional Court on the basis that the appellant failed to comply with previous court orders requiring financial disclosure and payment of costs.

Applying the three-part test under Family Law Rule 14(23), the court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying appellant given her history of non-compliance.

However, recognizing the importance of the core issue on appeal, the court ordered that the appeal would be quashed only if the appellant failed to pay the outstanding costs and provide the required disclosure by specified dates.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding the ownership of $9,000 in a joint bank account held by the deceased and his niece, the respondent.

The trial judge found that the deceased intended to gift the balance of the account to the respondent through survivorship, thereby rebutting the presumption of resulting trust.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that the correct legal test was applied.

The appellant, a former employee of a Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) member, appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) which upheld a ruling by Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS).

The OSC found that the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) were enforceable against the appellant for conduct that occurred during his employment, despite his subsequent resignation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it reasonable for the OSC to conclude that the TSE validly adopted the UMIR and that RS had jurisdiction to discipline former employees for misconduct committed while they were employed by a TSE member.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding it discriminated against a black employee by requiring him to attend anger management counselling after a workplace dispute.

The employer argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by relying on a prior decision about anti-black racism without notice, and that the discrimination finding was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal could take notice of accepted social facts about racism without breaching procedural fairness.

The majority further held that the Tribunal's inference of racial stereotyping was rationally supported by the evidence, given the employer's rare and highly discretionary use of anger management referrals.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal denying him disability benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The appellant argued the Tribunal ignored evidence, applied the wrong legal test, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal did not fundamentally misapprehend the evidence, correctly applied the test for a 'person with a disability' as set out in Crane, and provided adequate reasons to permit appellate review.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that transferred the action's venue from Toronto to Belleville and required the plaintiffs to pay consulting fees into court pursuant to a security agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decisions on the venue transfer and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of section 67 of the Personal Property Security Act.

The court held that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of public importance.

The appellant sought to overturn a decision of the Vice-Chair of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission refusing to adjourn scheduled hearings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an appeal lies only from a final decision of the Board, not an interlocutory decision refusing an adjournment.

The court also noted that even if treated as an application for judicial review, it would be premature.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion to strike the statement of defence of the defendant corporation.

The plaintiff argued that because the corporation was dissolved, it was a non-entity and could not file a defence.

The Divisional Court agreed with the motion judge that it is implicit in the Business Corporations Act that a dissolved corporation permitted to be sued must also be permitted to defend itself.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, with the court also noting the motion was moot as the corporation had since been revived.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment regarding property damage caused by the defendants' construction.

The motions judge had dismissed the summary judgment motion with a one-sentence endorsement citing 'numerous conflicts in the evidence' without further explanation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order due to the inadequacy of the reasons provided and the failure to apply the newly amended Rule 20 for summary judgments.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of certiorari to quash a warrant of seizure and sale issued by the Minister of Revenue.

The warrant was issued more than six years after the tax assessment became binding.

The Divisional Court held that under Rules 60.07(2) and 60.07.1(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Minister was required to obtain leave to issue the warrant.

As no leave was obtained, the warrant was quashed.

The appellant chiropractor appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to attend a mandatory Record Keeping Workshop, and the resulting 60-day suspension.

The appellant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction because it did not require proof of a formal Council resolution making the workshop mandatory.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that official College notices were sufficient evidence that attendance was mandatory, especially since the appellant never opened his mail from the College.

The penalty was upheld as reasonable given the appellant's history of ignoring College communications.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision, affirmed by the Director's Delegate, awarding costs against him personally in a Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) arbitration.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review.

The court found no denial of procedural fairness, as the applicant had notice and an opportunity to respond.

The court upheld the arbitrator's finding that the applicant caused expenses to be incurred without reasonable cause, and dismissed the application with costs.

The applicant sought to introduce fresh evidence on an application for judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate, which had upheld an Arbitrator's decision.

The Director's Delegate had previously refused to admit the applicant's affidavit because it failed the Palmer test, as the evidence was available during the arbitration.

The Divisional Court agreed, refusing to admit the affidavit for the purposes of the application.

The court allowed certain other documents to be referenced on consent of the parties, but excluded the accompanying affidavit.

The appellant, the Travel Industry Council of Ontario, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal ordering it to reimburse the respondent $1,206.50 for the airfare portion of a cancelled travel package.

The Tribunal had rejected the appellant's documentary evidence of the airfare cost and instead accepted the respondent's evidence of comparable airfare prices.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal was entitled to accept the respondent's evidence as the best available.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Following a successful appeal from a Small Claims Court decision, the appellant sought costs of $23,800.

The court found this amount disproportionate to the $7,000 originally awarded at trial.

Applying the principles of proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed the appellant's costs at $500 for the trial and $5,000 for the appeal, for a total of $5,500.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission not to refer his complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the application for delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the 17-month delay was inordinate and unexplained.

Furthermore, due to legislative amendments, the court noted it no longer had jurisdiction to remit the matter to the Commission or the newly constituted Tribunal.