Court File and Parties

Court File No.: DC-07-428

Released: 2008/10/31

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

Re: James Arthur Goodfellow v. Town of Lincoln

Before: Marshman, Aitken and Swinton JJ.

Counsel: Sanj Sood for the Appellant Town of Lincoln J. Leigh Daboll for the Respondent James Arthur Goodfellow Christian Schulze, Q.C. for the Intervenor Municipal Property Assessment Corporation

Heard at Hamilton: October 31, 2008

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Section 46(1) of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31 permits an application to the Superior Court of Justice to determine any matter relating to an assessment except a matter that could be the subject of a complaint under s. 40(1). The classification of property is a matter enumerated in s. 40(1)(d). A complaint about classification is to be made to the Assessment Review Board under s. 40(1).

[2] The application of the Respondent, as initially framed, sought retroactive reclassification of his property. The Superior Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to give such relief. The Respondent withdrew that aspect of the application and instead sought a “fairness hearing” before the application judge.

[3] The Respondent argued that the Superior Court of Justice has equitable jurisdiction to deal with unfairness in municipal taxation and to remedy an unfair situation.

[4] The application judge held that he had inherent jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 and further jurisdiction pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Assessment Act to grant relief on municipal taxes. He ordered the Respondent’s taxes owing be reduced to $3,000.

[5] In granting equitable relief, the application judge made the assumption that the Respondent’s property had been incorrectly classified between 1991 and 2004 and he relied on that assumption in determining that the Respondent had been unfairly treated. The application judge had no jurisdiction to deal with classification, as s. 46(1) precluded him from dealing with matters that could be the subject of a complaint under s. 40(1)(d) respecting classification of property.

[6] Furthermore, s. 46(7) of the Assessment Act prohibits the court from altering an assessment or a classification so as to alter taxes for a taxation year before the year in which the application was made.

[7] The municipality had the authority to pass a by-law imposing penalties and interest for late payment of taxes pursuant to s. 345(1) of the Municipal Act 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25. The Town of Lincoln passed such a by-law and imposed such charges upon the Respondent pursuant thereto. Subsection 345(4) deems such charges to be part of the taxes owing.

[8] The application judge reduced the taxes owing to eliminate some of what he considered to be an interest and penalty component. Given that the Assessment Act and the Municipal Act provide a comprehensive statutory mechanism with respect to the assessment, calculation and collection of municipal taxes, the application judge did not have inherent jurisdiction to circumvent the statutory framework and order a reduction in municipal taxes.

[9] Therefore we allow the appeal. The decision of the application judge is set aside.

Marshman J.

Aitken J.

Swinton J.

Released: October 31, 2008