Megens v. The Ontario Racing Commission
[Indexed as: Megens v. Ontario Racing Commission]
64 O.R. (3d) 142 [2003] O.J. No. 1459 Divisional Court No. 127/03
Ontario Superior Court of Justice Divisional Court Lane, Brockenshire and Cameron JJ. April 1, 2003
Administrative law -- Judicial review -- Boards and tribunals -- Standard of review -- Procedural fairness -- Tribunal's failure to give adequate reasons for its decision on the merits and as to penalty grounds for judicial review.
After a hearing, the Ontario Racing Commission ("ORC") issued a ruling that upheld by a majority decision the order of the ORC's Deputy Director revoking the licence of Paul Megens on the ground that Megens had conspired with Timothy Brown and Grant Hollingsworth to fix a horse race at the Fraser Downs Racetrack in British Columbia. In reaching its decision, the majority noted that the most important evidence against Megens was the evidence of Brown, who had made a deal with the British Columbia Racing Commission to give evidence implicating Megens in return for a reduction in the penalty the BC Commission proposed to impose on Brown for his part in the conspiracy. The third member of the ORC panel dissented. He found it plausible that Brown had concocted his evidence to have his own racing privileges restored, and the dissenting member drew a negative inference from the ORC's failure to call as a witness a Mr. Hulan, who allegedly made the bets for the fixed race. Megens brought an application for judicial review of the ORC's ruling.
Held, the application for judicial review should be allowed.
The appropriate standard of review to be applied to a decision of the ORC acting within its jurisdiction is patent unreasonableness. However, where it is alleged that a tribunal fails to give a party natural justice, the court does not engage in an assessment of the standard of review but evaluates whether the rules of procedural fairness have been satisfied. The ORC did not act fairly in this case. One aspect of fairness is the duty to give reasons for the decision on the merits and as to penalty. There is a minimum standard that must be met, and the full extent of the duty to give reasons may vary depending on the circumstances including the operative statute, the importance of the decision to the party and how closely the tribunal process resembles the judicial process. The obligation to provide reasons is not satisfied by merely reciting the submissions and evidence and stating a conclusion. In the immediate case, the reasons of the majority utterly failed to grapple with numerous issues as to the importance of the principal witnesses and it was not possible to determine why Megens and his favourable witnesses were disbelieved and the uncorroborated word of Brown, an admitted liar with a motive to bear false witness, was preferred. The majority's reasons were deficient to the point of denying Megens natural justice and procedural fairness.
Further, the Commission erred in failing to consider, or at least record in its reasons, the alternative penalties that might have been imposed and rather simply adopted the Deputy Director's recommendation. The ORC's decision fell short of the standard of fairness required in making the punishment fit the offence. Accordingly, the application for judicial review should be allowed and the matter should be remitted to the ORC for such further action as it might deem advisable. [page143]
APPLICATION for a judicial review.
Cases referred to Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 243 N.R. 22; Boyle v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission) (1996), 1996 4829 (NB CA), 39 Admin. L.R. (2d) 150, [1996] N.B.J. No. 291 (Quicklaw) (C.A.); Erikson v. Ontario (Securities Commission), 2003 2451 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 593 (Quicklaw) (S.C.J.); Faryna v. Chorny (1951), 1951 252 (BC CA), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 171, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.); Gray v. Ontario (Disability Support Program, Director) (2002), 2002 7805 (ON CA), 59 O.R. (3d) 364, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 353 (C.A.); Heath v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ontario) (1997), 1997 14524 (ON SCDC), 6 Admin. L.R. (3d) 304 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Herman Motor Sales Inc. and Registrar of Motor Vehicles and Salesmen (Re) (1980), 1980 1580 (ON SC), 29 O.R. (2d) 431, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 370, 1989 C.R.A.T. 128 (Div. Ct.); Hickey v. Ontario (Racing Commission), [1997] O.J. No. 1230 (Quicklaw) (Div. Ct.); London (City) v. Ayerswood Development Corp., 2002 3225 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 4859 (Quicklaw), 167 O.A.C. 120 (C.A.); McNamara v. Ontario Racing Commission (1998), 1998 7144 (ON CA), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 99, 111 O.A.C. 375, 9 Admin. L.R. (3d) 49, [1998] O.J. No. 3238 (Quicklaw) (C.A.); Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. Edmonton (City), 1978 17 (SCC), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 684, 7 Alta. L.R. (2d) 370, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 23 N.R. 564; Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. The Queen (Ontario) (1984), 1984 2204 (ON SC), 45 O.R. (2d) 70, 2 O.A.C. 351, 5 D.L.R. (4th) 651 (H.C.J.) (sub nom. Ontario Public Service Employees Union et al. and Ministry of Correctional Services (Re)); R. v. Norman (1993), 1993 3387 (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 295, 87 C.C.C. (3d) 153, 26 C.R. (4th) 256 (C.A.); Remuneration of Judges of Provincial Court of P.E.I. (Reference re), 1997 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 121 Man. R. (2d) 1, 156 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 217 N.R. 1, 483 A.P.R. 1, 158 W.A.C. 1, [1997] 10 W.W.R. 417, 46 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 193; Service Employees' International Union, Local 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association, 1973 191 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 6; Stevens and Law Society of Upper Canada (Re) (1979), 1979 1749 (ON SC), 55 O.R. (2d) 405 (Div. Ct.) Statutes referred to Racing Commission Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 20 Authorities referred to De Smith, S.A., Lord Woolf and J. Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995)
Peter A. Simm, for applicant. Donald Bourgeois, for respondent.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
1LANE J.: -- This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Ontario Racing Commission ("ORC") issued October 25, 2002. The Deputy Director of the ORC issued a Notice of Proposed Order on April 4, 2002, proposing to revoke the licences of the applicant, Paul Megens ("Megens"). The ORC held a hearing, with prior disclosure and cross-examination, to review the proposed order and, by a majority, issued a ruling that revoked Megens' licences. The Deputy Director issued an order confirming the revocation on October 28, 2002. [page144]
2The applicant seeks an order quashing the order of revocation and the Notice of Proposed Order as well as an order expressly declining to remit the matter for any rehearing.
Background
3Megens, Timothy Brown and Grant Hollingsworth all drove standardbred horses in the seventh race at the Fraser Downs Racetrack in Fraser, B.C., on April 22, 1999. None of the horses finished in the top three, although Brown's had been one of the favourites. There was an investigation in B.C. into the possibility that the race result had been fixed involving Brown and Hollingsworth, and Brown's licence was suspended.
4The Deputy Director of the ORC issued a Notice of Proposed Order to Revoke Licence pursuant to the Racing Commission Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 20 on April 4, 2002. The reasons given were that:
The Deputy Director has reasonable grounds to believe that . . . Megens while carrying out activities for which a licence is required, will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest, having regard to his past conduct.
5In the particulars, the Deputy Director alleged that Megens conspired with Hollingsworth and Brown to fix the seventh race at Fraser Downs three years earlier. Essentially, the three were alleged to have agreed that none of their horses would finish in the top three and bets were placed on the triactor for that race in accordance with this conspiracy.
6In proceedings about this race before the British Columbia Racing Commission, Brown's licence was suspended for two years with a recommendation that he not be allowed to apply for reinstatement for a further five years. During the first suspension period, Brown approached the B.C. Commission and made a deal to give evidence implicating Megens in the fix in return for termination of his suspension, dropping the five- year recommendation, assurance that he would be allowed to race in B.C. and the expunging of four of the six charges from his record. He then testified at the Ontario hearing that Megens was part of the conspiracy. Brown stated before the ORC that he had given false statements under oath to the B.C. Racing Commission.
7The decision of the two members of the majority of the ORC noted that the "most important evidence against Megens comes from Brown". It also noted that Brown "both implicated and exculpated Megens in fixing the race in question on different occasions". The ORC majority concluded: "there are reasons to believe that Brown is now telling the truth about Megens", including the fact [page145] that Hollingsworth testified that Brown implicated Megens on the day of the race, long before Brown was under any pressure from the B.C. Racing Commission to implicate Megens. There are serious and unresolved inconsistencies between the actual evidence and the majority's limited review of it as will appear below.
8The majority of the ORC was "not impressed with the demeanour of Megens" and found him to be "vague and uncertain" as well as "somewhat hostile and belligerent". In a case turning largely on matters of credibility, the ORC was "satisfied that there is clear and cogent evidence of Megens' involvement in the 'fix'".
9The third member of the ORC panel dissented from the majority. He found that there was insufficient clarity and cogency in the evidence such that revocation would be unwarranted. He declared the principal witness (Brown) to be "an admitted liar". He found that it was entirely plausible that Brown concocted the whole story in order to have his own racing privileges restored. The dissenting member also drew a negative inference from the fact that while the prosecution brought four witnesses from B.C. to Toronto, it did not call as a witness Mr. Hulan, apparently living in Mississauga, whom the prosecution alleged made the bets and unsuccessfully tried to cash in the winning betting slips. He was prevented from doing so by an order of the pari-mutuel authorities.
Standard of Review
10The appropriate standard of review to be applied to a decision of the Ontario Racing Commission acting within its jurisdiction is patent unreasonableness: Hickey v. Ontario (Racing Commission), [1997] O.J. No. 1230 (Quicklaw) (Div. Ct.) and McNamara v. Ontario Racing Commission (1998), 1998 7144 (ON CA), [1998] O.J. No. 3238 (Quicklaw), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 99 (C.A.). In McNamara, Abella J.A. found [at para. 33] that:
This is a specialized tribunal whose expertise is entitled to judicial deference. The applicable standard of review when the Commission is acting within its jurisdiction is, therefore, patent unreasonableness or clear irrationality.
Duty of Fairness
11It is only in rare circumstances that this court will interfere in a tribunal's findings of credibility. An application for judicial review is not a re-trial: Erikson v. Ontario (Securities Commission), 2003 2451 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 593 (Quicklaw) (S.C.J.). In that case, A. Campbell J. observed that nothing in the evidence or the reasons suggested any factual error or failure to consider a vital matter that might affect the result. The applicant before us [page146] contends that this is that rare case where there has been a failure to consider vital matters to the extent that the applicant has been deprived of procedural fairness.
12Where a tribunal is said to have failed to give a party natural justice, the court does not engage in an assessment of the appropriate standard of review, but evaluates whether the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness have been adhered to. The court assesses the specific circumstances and determines what safeguards were required to comply with the duty to act fairly: London (City) v. Ayerswood Development Corp., 2002 3225 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 4859 (Quicklaw), 167 O.A.C. 120 (C.A.) at para. 10.
13One aspect of the duty of fairness is the duty to give reasons. This duty applies both to the decision as to the merits and to any decision as to penalty. While the reasons of an administrative tribunal should not be scrutinized with the same scrupulous attention to detail as the reasons of a court, [See Note 1 at end of document] there is nevertheless a minimum standard that must be met. In 1984, the Divisional Court in Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. The Queen (Ontario) (1984), 1984 2204 (ON SC), 45 O.R. (2d) 70, 5 D.L.R. (4th) 651 (H.C.J.) dealt with an application for judicial review of the decision of the Grievance Settlement Board upholding the dismissal of certain employees in a correctional facility. The Board was required to determine if the force used by the grievors on an inmate was excessive and failed to decide how the fight started. The application was allowed and the award quashed. Commenting on the duty of the Board in a credibility case, O'Driscoll J. said at pp. 77-78 O.R., p. 659 D.L.R.:
A trier of fact may believe all, part or nothing of the evidence of any witness or any exhibit. However, a trier of fact cannot ignore nor fail to evaluate, nor forget a relevant portion or portions of the evidence. The trier of fact must consider all the evidence before deciding what is believed and what is rejected. If the trier of fact fails to carry out that fundamental responsibility, it results in a denial of natural justice as defined for the Supreme Court of Canada in Nipawin, supra. [See Note 2 at end of document]
The [Board] was faced with a fundamental conflict between the evidence of Barnes and the evidence of the applicants- grievors; it was a classic credibility case. In order to do natural justice to all concerned, it was the duty of the [Board] to decide what was to be believed and what was to be rejected; in doing so, the trier of fact was required to consider, evaluate and weigh all [See Note 3 at end of document] the evidence. [page147]
. . . [T]he majority award glossed over evidence, was selective in what evidence it considered, and failed to refer to, consider and evaluate a wealth of relevant, cogent evidence that should have weighed very heavily on the crucial question of credibility.
14A more recent exposition of this duty is found in Gray v. Ontario (Disability Support Program, Director) (2002), 2002 7805 (ON CA), 59 O.R. (3d) 364, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 353 (C.A.) where the claimant and her doctor testified that she was unable to work. Although it found her a credible witness, the tribunal disallowed her claim. The Court of Appeal set aside the order and remitted the matter for reconsideration. It observed that the tribunal's reasons did not suffice. At pp. 374-75 O.R., p. 364 D.L.R.:
The obligation to provide adequate reasons is not satisfied by merely reciting the submissions and evidence of the parties and stating a conclusion. Rather the decision maker must set out its findings of fact and the principal evidence upon which those findings were based. The reasons must address the major points in issue. The reasoning process followed by the decision maker must be set out and must reflect consideration of the main relevant factors.
and also:
It is simply unclear what relevant evidence the Tribunal accepted and what it rejected.
15While Gray was a case of a statutory duty to give reasons, the same requirement now exists at common law. In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, the Supreme Court dealt with the judicial review of the decision of an Immigration officer to refuse the applicant permission to remain in Canada, where she had resided illegally for 11 years, upon humanitarian grounds. In discussing the content of the duty of fairness, the court observed that requirements could vary with the circumstances including how closely the nature of the tribunal process resembled the judicial process, the statute within which it was operating and, at pp. 838-39 S.C.R., p. 212 D.L.R., the importance of the decision to the party:
The more important the decision is to the lives of those affected and the greater its impact on that person or those persons, the more stringent the procedural protections that will be mandated. This was expressed for example by Dickson J. . . . in Kane v. Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia, 1980 10 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105 at p. 1113, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 311:
A high standard of justice is required when the right to continue in one's profession or employment is at stake . . . A disciplinary suspension can have grave and permanent consequences upon a professional career. [page148]
16The court went on to consider the role of reasons in the fairness analysis, reviewing previous authorities [See Note 4 at end of document] and concluding at p. 848 S.C.R., pp. 219-20 D.L.R.:
In my opinion, it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision. The strong arguments demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest that, in cases such as this where the decision has important significance for the individual, when there is a statutory right of appeal, or in other circumstances, some form of reasons should be required. . . . It would be unfair for a person subject to a decision such as this one which is so critical to their future not to be told why the result was reached.
17This passage applies to the present case, which is just as crucial to the applicant's future as was her case to Ms. Baker. He has the right to be told why his case was decided as it was. The content of this right was discussed by Bastarache J., then of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, in Boyle v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission) (1996), 1996 4829 (NB CA), 39 Admin. L.R. (2d) 150, [1996] N.B.J. No. 291 (Quicklaw) (C.A.), where at p. 156 Admin. L.R. he said:
I am of the view that, in the absence of a true analysis of the evidence, the appeal process is frustrated and that the duty to give reasons cannot be met simply by listing the evidence considered.
And at p. 158 Admin. L.R.:
As mentioned in De Smith at p. 467, [See Note 5 at end of document] a consideration of the purpose of the duty is sufficient to establish the nature of the requirement. Reasons must explain to the parties why the Tribunal decided as it did; it must avoid the impression that its decision was based on extraneous considerations or that it did not consider part of the evidence. Reasons must also be sufficient to enable the Court of Appeal to discharge its appellate function; the Tribunal must therefore set out the evidence supporting its findings in enough detail to disclose that it has acted within jurisdiction and not contrary to law.
Analysis
18Applying these principles to the reasons of the majority in the present case, I turn to the applicant's complaints. These focus on the failure of the reasons to refer at all to certain evidence that had a tendency to exculpate Megens. Given that the evidence against Megens was all either given by Brown, or originated with him, his credibility was the central point of the case. The witnesses [page149] who tended to exculpate Megens also tended, by the same token, to damage Brown's credibility.
19The ORC majority reasons stated:
It is clear that Brown exchanged information about Megens, in part, with the B.C.R.C. in return for an earlier reinstatement of his licences in B.C.
20Four witnesses gave evidence exculpatory of Megens. The majority reasons referred to three of them as follows:
MacKay, Leak and Crimeni testified that Brown told them that in order to get his licences back from the BCRC he would have to implicate Megens even though Megens was not involved in the fixed race.
21That is an accurate summary of their evidence. MacKay and Crimeni heard Brown make those statements at the same party at Crimeni's house. Crimeni confronted Brown saying "you are not really going to do that?" to which Brown responded: "I have no choice. I have to save myself" and also "they want me to blame Paul, so I am going to have to bring Paul Megens into it." Brown also repeated to Crimeni that Megens had absolutely nothing to do with the fix. Some time later, Crimeni encountered Brown and said: "you went ahead and did it" to which Brown replied: "Yes. I didn't have a choice. I just had to save my ass."
22Ms. Leak was an ex-girlfriend of Megens and the mother of two children by him. She is also a good friend of Brown, whom she described as like an uncle to her children. Brown stayed with her for a month while recuperating from surgery and he told her he was under pressure to implicate Megens even though Megens had nothing to do with it.
23Despite the importance of this evidence in exposing Brown's motivation to falsely accuse Megens, the sentence quoted in para. 20 above is the sum total of the references to these witnesses in the majority reasons. The majority must have disbelieved them, but why? The dissenting member found their evidence credible -- "no more or less believable than Brown's declarations" -- yet the majority gives no reason for disbelieving them. A fourth exculpatory witness was William Megens, Paul Megens' father, who spoke with Brown on the telephone. He said that Brown told him: "You know, Paul is not involved." The majority does not mention this evidence, much less give its reason for not accepting it. This is particularly odd when they did accept his evidence on another point. When the majority, at para. 19, sums up on credibility, it refers only to the evidence of Brown, Hollingsworth and Megens.
24The majority clearly considered the evidence of Hollingsworth to be of great importance. When it turned to the reasons [page150] for thinking that Brown was finally telling it the truth, the first reason given was Hollingsworth's testimony. The majority said that Hollingsworth testified that Brown had told him that Megens was in on the fix. The majority said it was important that Brown was under no pressure to implicate Megens at the time, but in the next sentence it observes that Brown "may have been" lying to induce Hollingsworth to join the conspiracy. It makes no finding about this very plausible possibility, but leaves the matter dangling. It approaches this evidence as if it was somehow independent verification of Megens' involvement, whereas it is just Brown's version recycled through Hollingsworth. Hollingsworth acknowledged at the hearing that he had never discussed this race with Megens and that anything he learned about the race came from Brown.
25One witness who could have cast light on Megens' involvement, if any, was Ken Hulan, the man who placed the bets. He was interviewed by the Commission investigator, but was not called, even though he had admitted to some recollection while claiming to have been drunk. The dissenting member recognized that an inference could be drawn against the Commission case, but the majority did not. In the absence of Hulan, the only evidence that Hulan met with Megens before the race came from Brown. Megens knew Hulan and said that he lunched with him the next day, but denied meeting before the race or discussing any problem with cashing winning tickets. Hulan was an important witness and failing to call him after interviewing him was a serious omission in the case against Megens.
26Another aspect of the case involving Hulan is the fact that the bets he placed were inconsistent with the scheme to which Brown testified. That scheme required that the #7 horse driven by Hollingsworth be omitted from the bets, but Hulan included that horse. There was also evidence that one Ken Skiba made the precise bets which Brown's scheme called for and there was no evidence linking him with Megens; rather he was a friend of Hollingsworth. None of this is mentioned in the majority reasons.
27The videotapes of the race, taken from several angles, were screened at the hearing. The Commission investigator gave no testimony that any aspect of the way the race was run implicated Megens. There is no mention of this in the reasons.
28Finally, the majority relied on Megens' demeanour alone to disbelieve him. While actually seeing the witnesses in the box is an undoubted advantage possessed by the trier of fact, demeanour alone is a weak reed upon which to base an adverse [page151] credibility finding in an important case. [See Note 6 at end of document] Surely some analysis of Megens' evidence was necessary, giving some examples of the vagueness and uncertainty about straightforward matters on which the majority relied.
29For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the reasons of the majority utterly fail to grapple with numerous issues of importance as to the credibility of the principal witnesses. They are deficient to the point of denying the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness. He, and this court, simply do not know why he and the witnesses favourable to him were disbelieved and the uncorroborated word of an admitted liar with a huge motive to bear false witness was preferred.
Penalty
30It was submitted that the Commission erred in failing to consider, or at all events, to record in its reasons, the alternative sentences that might be imposed rather than simply adopting the Deputy Director's recommendation.
31The need for reasoned sentencing is summarized by Cory J., then a judge of the Divisional Court, in Stevens and Law Society of Upper Canada (Re) (1979), 1979 1749 (ON SC), 55 O.R. (2d) 405, where at p. 411, he said:
Ever since the development of the concepts of crime and punishment, mankind has struggled with uncertain success to make the punishment fit the crime. That is one of the factors that should be considered by every court that has the awesome duty of imposing sentence and every tribunal confronted with the difficult task of meting out punishment.
Any sentencing involves an onerous exercise of will that involves a conscious act of balancing and comparison. How bad is the wrongdoer presently before the tribunal compared, first to the non-wrongdoer and secondly to other wrongdoers. Sentencing requires a consideration of the accused and the facts of the case presently before the court. A conscious comparison should be made between the case under consideration and similar cases wherein sentences were imposed. If the comparison with other cases is not undertaken, there may well be such a wide variation in the result as to constitute not simply unfairness but injustice. Considerations of such a nature should have as great a significance for professional discipline bodies with the power to impose onerous penalties as they do for courts of appeal and of first instance dealing with sentences upon conviction of criminal offences.
32While the decision of the Commission refers to the balance between the protection of the public interest and the desire of [page152] individuals to participate in racing, it is devoid of any reference to having considered any alternative penalty short of the confirmation of the Deputy Director's proposal for revocation of Mr. Megens' licence. The decision therefore falls short of the standard of fairness required of sentencing authorities as outlined by Cory J. in Stevens, supra.
To Remit or Not?
33It was submitted by the applicant that we should dismiss the matter entirely because the evidence of Brown could never amount to a case of clear and cogent evidence against Megens. In my view, given that there was evidence available that was not called, that is not a decision that this court should make in this case.
Disposition
34I would allow the application for judicial review, quash the order of the Commission dated October 25, 2002, and the order of the Deputy Director dated October 28, 2002, and remit the matter to the Commission for such further action as it may deem advisable. If there are further proceedings, they will be before a panel differently constituted.
35The parties will endeavour to resolve the issue of costs, failing which they may make written submissions as to costs, the applicant within 20 days and the respondent within ten days thereafter.
Order accordingly.
Notes
Note 1: See Herman Motor Sales Inc. and Registrar of Motor Vehicles and Salesmen (Re) (1980), 1980 1580 (ON SC), 29 O.R. (2d) 431, 1989 C.R.A.T. 128 (Div. Ct.).
Note 2: Service Employees' International Union, Local 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association, 1973 191 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 6.
Note 3: Emphasis in the original.
Note 4: In particular Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. Edmonton (City), 1978 17 (SCC), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 684, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 161; Remuneration of Judges of Provincial Court of P.E.I. (Reference re), 1997 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
Note 5: De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
Note 6: Faryna v. Chorny (1951), 1951 252 (BC CA), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 171, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Norman (1993), 1993 3387 (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 295, 26 C.R. (4th) 256 (C.A.); Heath v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ontario) (1997), 1997 14524 (ON SCDC), 6 Admin. L.R. (3d) 304 (Ont. Div. Ct.)