Ontario Superior Court of Justice – Divisional Court

Cinderella Allalouf Ad-Hoc Litigation Committee v. Lucas

Date: 1999-06-08

Counsel: Anita Szigeti, for the applicant; Dennis W. Brown, Q.C., for Dr. Lucas; Eric R. Hoaken, for Mount Sinai Hospital and Nurses Foreman, Tice, Coward, Nairn; Richard Macklin, for moving party, Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office; Jane Langford, for Physicians; Peter M. Jacobsen, for Centre for Addiction and Mental Health Services.

(232/99)

Oral Reasons for Decision

[1] Swinton, J. [orally]: The issue in this application for judicial review is whether the coroner erred in refusing standing to the Cinderella Allalouf Ad-Hoc Litigation Committee (CAALC) at the inquest into the death of Cinderella Allalouf. CAALC is made up of the Queen Street Patients Council, Toronto Rape Crisis Centre/Multicultural Women Against Rape and two patients within the forensic mental health system. They took the position before the coroner that their application for standing was not severable, so that if one member of the coalition was not allowed to participate, the coalition would not participate.

[2] Cinderella Allalouf was a patient at the Queen Street Mental Health Centre, now the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health Services, Queen Street Division, held in custody on the Forensic Unit. She became pregnant and subsequently died after giving birth at the Mount Sinai Hospital on April 10, 1997. Pursuant to s. 41(1) of the Coroner's Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-37, the coroner shall designate an applicant for standing as a person with standing if the coroner finds that the person is "substantially and directly interested in the inquest". A decision of the coroner with respect to standing will not be quashed unless there is a serious error in principle Kingston Penitentiary (Range Representative on Administrative Segregation) v. Regional Coroner (Eastern Ontario) (1989), 33 O.A.C. 241; 38 C.P.C.(2d) 161 (Div. Ct.), at pp. 173-174 [C.P.C.].

[3] In his reasons for decision, the coroner, Dr. Lucas, properly distinguished between the private and public law tests for standing. He referred to the case of Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board et al. v. Young (Coroner) (1997), 98 O.A.C. 188 (Div. Ct.), at p. 214, which identified a twofold test for public interest standing: whether the applicant has a substantial special knowledge of issues that are within the scope of the inquest and whether the applicant brings a unique perspective to the issues different from other public interest groups applying for standing. Dr. Lucas determined that the interest of the two individual members of the coalition was not so acute as to constitute a direct interest, given that they were not patients in custody as was Miss Allalouf. While the Toronto Rape Crisis Centre/Multicultural Women Against Rape has knowledge and expertise, he held that many of the concerns they voiced would be shared by other parties with standing, and thus they failed the uniqueness test. Finally, with respect to the Patients Council, he determined that they did not have a direct interest and they did not satisfy the unique perspective test in this case, particularly given the participation of the Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office.

[4] Having considered the material filed before the coroner and his reasons for denying standing, we find that he made no serious error in principle in denying standing to the Coalition. He applied the correct legal tests. There was no error in principle in concluding that where an ad-hoc coalition seeks standing, all parts of the coalition must qualify. While the Toronto Rape Crisis Centre/Multicultural Women Against Rape has knowledge and expertise in matters of sexual abuse and sexual assault, the coroner concluded that they did not satisfy the uniqueness test. On the material filed, we see no error of principle in this decision.

[5] The Patients Council did not provide the coroner with material to show that it would provide a perspective on the issues to be canvassed at the inquest that was distinct from other parties granted standing that would make a difference to the jury's determinations. Therefore, there is no basis to interfere with the coroner's decision denying standing to the coalition. We note, however, that our decision is limited to the facts of this case. It will not be in every case that an advocacy group will be able to adequately present the unique perspective of the group served.

[6] The applicants argue, in the alternative, that they were denied natural justice because the coroner did not provide his full brief to the applicants for public interest standing before the standing hearing. Instead, they were given a summary of the facts and a list of witnesses with some indication of their testimony. The coroner is not obligated to provide the full brief in advance of the public interest standing determination. The applicants were given sufficient information to formulate their arguments with respect to standing, and there was no denial of procedural fairness.

[7] Therefore, the application for judicial review is dismissed. The endorsement on the back of the Application Record reads:

"For the oral reasons given by Justice Swinton, the application for judicial review is dismissed without costs."

Application dismissed.