Brown v. Chatham-Kent Police Service, 2012 CanLII 102118

OCPC# 12-01

ONTARIO CIVILIAN POLICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE POLICE SERVICES ACT, R.S.O. 1990, C.

P.15, AS AMENDED

Citation: Brown v. Chatham-Kent Police Service, 2012 ONCPC 1

BETWEEN:

CONSTABLE THOMAS BROWN

APPELLANT

-and-

THE CHATHAM-KENT POLICE SERVICE

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Panel: Dave Edwards, Vice Chair Hyacinthe Miller, Member Zahra Dhanani, Member

Hearing Dates: July 25, 2011 by teleconference August 24, 2011 by teleconference November 28, 2011

Hearing Location: Toronto, Ontario

Ontario Civilian Police Commission

250 Dundas Street West, Suite 605

Toronto, ON M7A 2T3

Tel: 416-314-3004

Fax: 416-314-0198

Website: www.ocpc.ca

Appearances

Constable Thomas Brown, Self-Represented Appellant

Ian Johnstone, Counsel for the Respondent

Introduction

1. Constable Thomas Brown (the "Appellant" or “Constable Brown”) has been a member of the Chatham-Kent Police Service (the “Service”) since 1987. At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, he was 45 years old.

2. On February 2, 2010, the Appellant was found guilty of two counts of Discreditable Conduct contrary to the Code of Conduct set out in Ontario Regulation 123/98, as amended, enacted under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.15, as amended (the "Act").

3. On November 18, 2010, Superintendent M.P.B. Elbers (Ret.) (the "Hearing Officer") imposed a penalty of immediate dismissal from the Service.

4. Constable Brown is appealing this penalty. He has requested that we overturn the order for immediate dismissal and substitute a penalty of reduction in rank to Fourth Class Constable.

Summary Decision

5. For the reasons set out below, we dismiss the appeal.

Background

6. On January 4th, 2009, while off duty and intoxicated, Constable Brown pursued his teenaged son to a neighbour’s home, forced his way inside and laid hands on his son. In the evening of the same day, police officers from the Service attended the Appellant’s residence to arrest him on several Criminal Code charges. He was boisterous and verbally abusive. He actively resisted arrest and had to be tasered

before being handcuffed and forcibly taken into custody. As a result, Constable Brown was charged with two counts of discreditable conduct.

7. On July 27, 2009 the Appellant was given notice that if misconduct was proved on clear and convincing evidence, the penalty of dismissal or demotion may be sought.

The Disciplinary Hearing:

8. The disciplinary hearing began with teleconferences on July

24, 2009 and August 26, 2009. The matter continued on February 2, 2010. The statement of particulars read into the record was as follows:

Count #1:

On Sunday, January 4, 2009, at approximately

2:00 pm, Constable Brown knocked on the door of the F1 residence located at (address removed2), Chatham, Ontario. The victim, K F, answered the door and observed the accused in an intoxicated state. Constable Brown was visibly upset, demanding that his son come home. When Ms. F insisted that Constable Brown leave he pushed her back against the wall and made his way into the residence. Constable Brown located his son N in the next room, and attempted to pull him out of the residence. The police were called at this time. Constable Brown eventually let go of N and left the residence and went back to his own home. Police arrived a short time later and escorted and B, K, A and GF to Police Headquarters for the purposes of providing statements of their observations and involvement. Following these interviews, it was determined that Constable Brown could be located

1The names of the victims have been altered/omitted in accordance with Commission policy, and initials substituted.

2The address of the incident has been removed, to protect the identity of the victim involved.

and charged with Assault and Break & Enter and commit Assault.

Count #2:

At approximately 8:00 pm Sgt. Jim Biskey, along with assisting officers, attended at the residence of Constable Brown located at (address removed), Chatham, Ontario in an attempt to arrest Constable Brown. Sgt. Biskey spoke to Constable Brown, who was in a highly intoxicated state, at the door the residence. Sgt. Biskey placed Constable Brown under arrest for the offences of Assault and Break and Enter and commit Assault. Constable Brown began to actively resist arrest. He was forced to the ground in a controlled manner by the arresting officers. He continued to resist the officers attempts to the fact affect the arrest forcing the officers deploy the use of the Tazer. The officers eventually gained control of the accused. He was handcuffed and placed in the rear of the cruiser. At 8:25 pm Sgt. Biskey advised the accused of his right to counsel and cautioned him. He was then transported to Chatham-Kent Police Service Headquarters for booking purposes.

9. Constable Brown pled guilty to both charges.

10. Following the guilty pleas, an Agreed Statement of Facts was entered into the record as Exhibit #3. That statement outlined a sequence of events involving the Appellant, his son, a neighbour, members of the Service and the circumstances under which he was placed under arrest. We have outlined the salient facts below.

11. On January 3th, 2009, Constable Brown had been drinking all day. He and his 15 year old son had an argument, which resulted in Constable Brown pushing his son into the tub several times. Constable Brown admitted to placing his hands around his son’s neck during the argument and

choking him. His son was able to free himself. The Appellant left the house. The young man decided that he wanted to kill himself and ingested 15 unknown pills from several bottles. He subsequently vomited several times, felt nauseated and dizzy, but he did not lose consciousness.

The next day, January 4th, at about 2 o’clock,

the

Appellant’s son returned to the neighbour’s residence.

He

told the neighbour that he did not want to return home as

he feared for his safety. He also reported that he slept with a knife under his bed.

13. The Appellant’s son had been in the neighbour’s home for approximately 15 minutes when Constable Brown arrived, demanding that he return home. The neighbour informed the Appellant that his son did not want to speak with him and tried to close the front door. Nevertheless, Constable Brown forced his way inside past the neighbour. He was intoxicated and swearing in a boisterous manner. He attempted to drag his son out of the residence. Constable Brown demanded that “N pick your fucking shit up”. N went to the kitchen and grabbed a knife for protection. The neighbour called 9-1-1. Constable Brown eventually let go of his son and left.

14. At about eight o’clock on the same day, following an investigation of the neighbour’s complaint, Sergeant Biskey and several officers from the Service went to Constable Brown’s residence for the purpose of arresting him for Assault, Break and Enter and Commit Assault.

15. Constable Brown answered the door in a highly intoxicated state. When the officers attempted to place the Appellant under arrest, he actively resisted. Seven officers at the scene used force to take him to the ground and control him. The Appellant continued to resist arrest. During the struggle, Constable O’Reilly tasered the Appellant. Before Constable Brown could be brought under control and handcuffed, the taser was again deployed. Another officer was accidentally tasered. During transport to police headquarters, the

Appellant was boisterous, agitated and verbally abusive to the arresting officers. In the booking area, six officers remained nearby until Constable Brown calmed down sufficiently for them to remove the handcuffs.

16. The Appellant was released on a Promise to Appear and Officer in Charge Undertaking with conditions. The conditions required that he report daily to the Service in the company of one of his two sureties, to refrain from having contact with certain individuals, that he was not to possess weapons or be in public without one of his sureties except when attending Homewood Health Centre and that he was to be amenable to the routine and discipline of the residence in which he resided. On January 13, 2009, he was suspended from duty. As a result of his actions, Constable Brown also faced an additional charge of Obstruct-Resisting Police Officer.

17. On February 2, 2010, following the reading of the Agreed Statement of Facts into the record and the Appellant’s guilty pleas, the Hearing Officer accepted that the facts provided clear and convincing evidence substantiating the charges against Constable Brown. The Hearing Officer found the Appellant guilty of two counts of Discreditable Conduct.

18. Counsel for the Appellant requested time to obtain a psychiatric and medical assessment to assist with the disposition process. The hearing was adjourned and a teleconference scheduled for April 1, 2010.

19. The hearing reconvened on June 22, 2010. Constable Brown did not attend. Instead, PH who was his surety in a criminal matter and who had been summoned to appear with Constable Brown, attended. He had with him a note the Appellant had obtained that morning from Doctor Dean Mathsusaki, dated June 22, 2010. The note requested that the matter be re-scheduled if possible, describing Constable Brown as “feeling overwhelmed and stressed due to recent events”. He was also described as “having trouble with his concentration and thought process.”

20. On September 20, 2010, the penalty phase of the hearing began. The Service presented two witnesses. Eleven exhibits were entered into the record. Constable Brown did not testify, nor did any witnesses testify on his behalf.

The Hearing Officer’s penalty decision was released

on

November 18, 2010. He ordered that the Appellant

be

immediately dismissed from the Service.

Preliminary Matters:

Respondent Motion to Dismiss - #1

July 25, 2011 Teleconference

22. The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal with the Commission on December 20th, 2011. He did not file his factum within the period required by our Rules.

23. The Service brought a motion requesting an order dismissing the Appellant’s appeal on the ground that the Appellant had failed to file his factum in accordance with our Rules.

24. On July 25, 2011 we heard oral argument on this motion from both parties via teleconference.

25. The Appellant had chosen to represent himself. We directed his attention to the relevant sections of the Act and the written resources contained on the Commission’s website. We also reviewed with Constable Brown the documentation and scheduling rules and requirements for a disciplinary appeal.

26. During oral argument, it became clear that Constable Brown wished to introduce new or additional evidence. He was advised that police disciplinary appeals are based on the record, unless an order is made to admit new or additional evidence in accordance with the Act and our Rules. Constable Brown was informed that he would have to submit

a motion to seek such an order, if indeed he wished to admit new or additional evidence.

27. Issues were also identified with respect to communications and compliance with the Rules for service of appeal documents on the Commission and all of the parties.

28. We adjourned the motion until August 24, 2011. Constable Brown was given until August 16, 2011 to file his factum in accordance with the Rules. The Service was directed to file its response within 30 days of receipt of the Appellant’s factum.

October 7,

2011 was agreed to

as

the date for the

Commission

to hear oral argument

on

the merits of the

appeal. Following the July 25, 2011 teleconference,

Constable Brown prepared and filed his factum on the merits of the appeal, as well as a motion to admit new or additional

evidence.

August 24, 2011 Teleconference

30. The Panel reconvened with the parties via teleconference on August 24, 2011 to deal with the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We also dealt with the Appellant’s motion to admit new or additional evidence.

31. It became apparent that there continued to be some confusion about what documents had been prepared and whether they were served in accordance with our Rules. After some discussion, we accepted that Constable Brown had filed his factum by the August 16th, 2011 deadline.

32. The Service’s motion to dismiss the appeal was therefore dismissed.

33. Mr. Johnstone proceeded to raise a number of issues with respect to the Appellant’s motion to admit new or additional evidence. He expressed concern that Constable Brown’s evidence was comprised of mere assertions without the

required substance and detail that would support them as facts. We reiterated to the Appellant that the disciplinary appeal was based solely on the record, and that, in accordance with the Rules, any request for introduction of new or additional evidence must be supported by a motion.

34. Constable Brown indicated that he wished to put forward the argument alleging that Mr. Donald, his legal counsel at the disciplinary hearing, did not represent him competently.

35. Mr. Johnstone submitted that, in order to effectively respond to such a serious allegation, he would require access to Mr. Donald’s files prepared for the Appellant’s defence.

36. Constable Brown agreed to waive his solicitor-client privilege with respect to Mr Donald and he agreed to confirm this in writing. Mr. Johnstone indicated that, once the written confirmation was received, he would request release of the Appellant’s file from Mr. Donald.

37. The Panel ordered that Constable Brown be given until September 2, 2011 to file materials in support of his motion to admit new or additional evidence. The Service was granted 30 days thereafter to file its factum in reply to the Appellant’s motion.

September 29, 2011 Endorsement

38. Constable Brown failed to file any supporting material by

September 2, 2011.

39. On September 29, 2011 the Panel dismissed Constable Brown’s motion to admit new or additional evidence. We also ordered that the oral argument on the merits of the appeal would be heard on October 7, 2011 at the Commission’s office in Toronto.

October 4, 2011 Endorsement

40. As of October 4, 2011, the Respondent had not filed a factum on the merits of the appeal. By an endorsement, the Panel ordered that the Service’s factum on the merits be filed by October 18, 2011. Constable Brown was permitted to file a response no later than October 25, 2011. Oral argument was re-scheduled to November 28, 2011.

41. The endorsement also stated:

Given the dismissal of the Appellant’s motion for leave to admit fresh evidence, the appeal will proceed on the record established at the hearing before the Hearing Officer, and the issues related to that record and the Hearing Officer’s decision as raised by the Appellant in his factum served on counsel for the Respondent on or about August 12,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss - #2

42. On September 22, 2011, the Service filed a second motion for an order dismissing the appeal due to the Appellant’s repeated and continuing failure to serve and file his materials in compliance with the Rules.

43. Oral argument was heard on this motion on November 28,

45. Mr. Johnstone pointed out what he called delays and departures from our Rules by Constable Brown. He noted that the Appellant’s documents did not follow the format prescribed in our Rules, making it more difficult for the Service to respond appropriately.

46. Mr. Johnstone noted the Panel’s authority to refuse to grant the requested remedy based on the Appellant’s non- compliance with Commission Rules and Orders. He argued

that dismissal of the Appellant’s motion to admit new or additional evidence was one consequence of his failure to comply. Further, he stated that the breaches of Commission Rules and Orders were so egregious that the entire appeal should be dismissed.

46. Constable Brown argued that, as his motion to admit new or additional evidence had been dismissed, he had already been penalized for his failure to file supporting evidence. He submitted that he had complied with our Rules and Orders to the best of his ability.

47. We reserved on the motion and heard oral argument on the merits of the appeal.

Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss - #2

48. The Panel has now had an opportunity to consider the

Service’s second motion to dismiss this appeal.

49. We are aware that the factum submitted by the Appellant includes statements and allegations which are not supported by facts in evidence. As noted in our October 4, 2011 endorsement, this Panel and the parties must rely solely upon the record.

50. While the appeal materials submitted by Constable Brown did not strictly adhere to the generally-accepted format, we are mindful that he is self-represented and that this is an appeal from a sentence of immediate dismissal.

51. However, we advised the Appellant that, during oral argument, he must limit the scope of his comments to issues found in the record.

52. We are also of the view that counsel for the Respondent should have been able to identify, and provide response to, the relevant issues contained in the Appellant’s factum. We do not believe that any variation from our Rules was prejudicial to the Respondent.

53. We therefore dismiss the Respondent’s second motion to dismiss the appeal.

The Appeal Hearing: Appellant’s Submissions

54. Constable Brown spoke on his own behalf.

55. He argued that his entry into the neighbour’s home was an action which he was entitled to take, as it was a matter of necessity, and that the matter of necessity should override a requirement for Criminal Code charges or formal deterrence. His rationale was that he feared for the safety of his son, and as a parent he was entitled to determine his well-being.

56. The Appellant further argued that in his decision, the Hearing Officer considered certain evidence about unrelated criminal charges that placed him at a disadvantage. As a criminal trial had not yet occurred with respect to the events of January 4, 2010, the Hearing Officer relied upon what were only allegations and not proven facts.

57. Constable Brown asserted that the Hearing Officer did not take into consideration his potential to be rehabilitated, nor was there any consideration of the duty to accommodate him by finding another position within the Service. He took the position that the Hearing Officer failed to recognize that alcoholism was a disability and did not take a fair view of his ability to recover.

58. He submitted that the Hearing Officer erred when he concluded that his continued employment would damage the reputation of the Service. He argued that he had the ability to reform, that his desire for consuming alcohol was under control and his disease was in remission.

59. Constable Brown asked us to consider three sentencing principles from Williams and Ontario Provincial Police

(December 4, 1995, OCCPS), namely; seriousness of the misconduct, the officer’s ability to reform and the damage to the reputation of the Service. He argued that there was no serious damage to the reputation of the Service and that entering the neighbour’s residence under the circumstances should be viewed as the exercise of his responsibilities as a parent.

60. Finally, he argued that the Hearing Officer’s penalty was unduly harsh. The Appellant asked us to consider that dismissal would place his family at a disadvantage with respect to loss of income and employment benefits.

Respondent’s Submissions:

61. Mr. Johnstone, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that numerous facts in the Appellant’s factum were not consistent with the Agreed Statement of Facts and, in his view, were misleading. He argued that it was irrelevant that the criminal charges had not been heard in court. Mr. Johnstone argued that, while some of the Appellant’s misquotes may have arisen from error or lack of familiarity with Commission process, not telling the truth about matters in evidence strikes at the core of his suitability to continue as a police officer.

62. He asserted that the Hearing Officer properly considered the relevant sentencing factors and that there were no errors of law. Termination of the Appellant was a severe penalty, but dismissal was warranted in consideration of the serious misconduct with which Constable Brown was charged.

63. There was no evidence of bias on the part of the Hearing Officer nor did the Appellant raise the issue in his factum. Monaghan and Toronto Police Service (May 1, 2003, OCCPS), R. v. R.D.S., 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] S.C.J. No. 84.

64. Mr. Johnstone noted that the argument of necessity was first raised in oral argument today. The facts do not support the Appellant’s contention that he was protecting his son. He

countered that the Agreed Statement of Facts identified that Constable Brown’s son wanted to escape from his father and sought refuge in the neighbour’s home. Further, the argument had no relevance to the misconduct which occurred when the Appellant actively resisted arrest.

65. Mr. Johnstone countered the Appellant’s argument that the Service had not accommodated his alcoholism, pointing to evidence that, over a period of ten years, Constable Brown had been granted time away from work to attend numerous professional treatment programs of varying duration. All of these programs were funded by the employer. No evidence was submitted to the Hearing Officer about the Appellant’s prognosis for recovery nor were there any submissions on the need for accommodation. Hall and Ottawa Police Service, (December 5, 2007, OCCPS).

66. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the ability of the Appellant to rehabilitate had been considered. The Hearing Officer had evidence before him that the most recent discipline was the fourth incident of alcohol-related misconduct committed by the Appellant. Following his guilty pleas and convictions on the second and third misconduct charges, the Appellant was faced with the possibility of dismissal and committed to changing his behaviour. Nevertheless, the Appellant failed to live up to his commitment or the conditions of his continued employment. Mr. Johnstone argued that speaks to honesty and truthfulness. Vaughan Evans and Toronto Police Service, (July 2008, OCCPS), Kelly and Toronto Police Service, (May

2005, OCCPS), Canada Safeway Ltd., v. United Food and

Commercial Workers Union, Local 401, [2007] A.G.A.A. No.

23, Be v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] I.A.D.D. No. 2184.

67. Mr. Johnstone noted that the Appellant’s employment record documents a history of misconduct. He pointed out that there was considerable local interest in and media coverage of Constable Brown’s disciplinary proceedings and argued that the seriousness of the misconduct, the involvement of

fellow police officers in his arrest and the negative impact on those officers, were all matters put before the Hearing Officer.

68. He requested that we dismiss the appeal.

Reasons for Decision

69. Constable Brown appealed the penalty of immediate dismissal imposed by the Hearing Officer.

70. The standard of review for the Commission with respect to a hearing officer's interpretation of the law is correctness. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Neinstein (2010), 2010 ONCA 193, 99 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).

71. The standard of review for the Commission with respect to factual findings is reasonableness. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9 at para 47.

72. The application of these principles to an appeal from a penalty decision means that the Commission’s role is “to review...[the]... decision to determine whether the conclusions reached are reasonable, reflect a correct understanding and application of the law, are based upon clear and cogent evidence and are articulated in a logical manner”. Barlow and Ottawa Police Service, at paragraph 45 (August 15, 2011, OCPC).

73. By statute, an appeal to the Commission is an appeal on the record. New or additional evidence may be admitted on the appeal, but only following an order obtained in accordance with our Rules and the Act. The Appellant’s motion to admit new or additional evidence was dismissed due to his failure to provide the facts required to support bald assertions.

74. We are of the view that any deviations from our Rules by Constable Brown occurred due to a less than perfect understanding of the Rules. The inclusion in the Appellant’s factum of facts which do not coincide with the Agreed

and do not constitute an attempt to mislead or deceive this

Panel.

75. At the disciplinary hearing, Constable Brown was represented by counsel. With the consent of both parties, an Agreed Statement of Facts was entered as an exhibit. The officer acknowledged before the Hearing Officer that he understood the charges. He pled guilty. These facts form part of the record.

76. Leaving aside the issue of whether the Appellant may raise the defence of necessity at this stage of the proceeding, the facts are quite clear. The Agreed Statement of Facts is unequivocal. Constable Brown’s son feared for his safety. The threat to his safety was Constable Brown. There is no factual support for an argument that the Appellant’s actions at the neighbour’s home were those of a concerned father seeking to protect his son. Further, the Appellant did not provide us with any evidence to substantiate the existence of such a legal principle. Finally, this claim of necessity has no application to the misconduct arising from the Appellant resisting arrest.

77. During oral argument, we urged the Appellant to focus on the Hearing Officer’s decision and provide us with the specifics of perceived errors. He was unable to do so.

78. We are of the view that the Hearing Officer assessed the relevant factors in reaching his decision on penalty, namely:

• the nature and seriousness of the misconduct;

• the officer's ability to reform and rehabilitate;

• damage to the reputation of the Service;

• the officer’s employment history and experience;

• the officer’s recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct;

• the need for general and specific deterrence; and

• consistency with prior disciplinary decisions.

analysis leading to his conclusions and meets the standard of reasonableness. On the issue of rehabilitation, it was clear that the Hearing Officer was aware that the pattern of disciplinary action resulting from the Appellant’s use of alcohol began in 1999. His decision referenced the evidence that Constable Brown had attended several employee assistance and substance abuse treatment programs.

80. Constable Brown was convicted of serious misconduct in

2003 and faced dismissal. At that time, the then hearing officer took the unusual step of adjourning the matter for one year, to provide Constable Brown a period of time within which he should be of good behaviour. While the hearing officer was unable to order that he abstain from alcohol, he stated that the Appellant should consider the adjournment a

‘last chance’ and use the year to complete a treatment program and rehabilitate himself.

81. We heard that in 2009, Constable Brown again was convicted of two counts of misconduct, the fourth such conviction. Alcohol was a factor. The ‘last chance’ opportunity was not taken. We find that, based on Constable Brown’s history of progressive discipline and previous failed promises that he would remain sober, the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that there was little likelihood of rehabilitation is reasonable.

82. The Hearing Officer noted that Constable Brown’s employment record contained letters of appreciation and commendations. He stated that “[h]e appears to be a conscientious employee when he does come to work, however, he has lost many days of work due to suspensions relating to police misconduct issues” (penalty decision, page

11). The Hearing Officer found it “remarkable also, that I have no character evidence presented to me to assist with the disposition decision” (penalty decision, ibid).

83. The Hearing Officer also considered the need for specific and general deterrence. He referenced Schofield and Metropolitan Toronto Police Service (1984), 2 O.P.R. 613 (O.P.C.), noting that: “Consistency in the discipline process is often the earmark of fairness. The penalty must be consistent with the facts and consistent with similar cases that have been dealt with in earlier occasions.” His decision referenced the Appellant’s history of progressive discipline which began in 1999 with a 24-hour deduction of banked time, followed by a demotion for one year to second class constable in 2002, with provision for rehabilitation and performance reviews and the adjournment sine die for one year.

84. This Commission stated in Hall, supra, at page 19, that: There is a duty to accommodate. However, it is

not bottomless or a licence to breach statutory duties. Given Constable Hall’s history, the nature of his misconduct and the evidence of

Superintendent Erfle it was certainly open to the

Hearing Officer to conclude that accommodation in this situation would cause undue hardship on the Service.

85. Constable Brown’s alcohol-related misconduct spans twelve years and includes seven formal charges. He received progressive discipline and has been granted several ‘second chances’. The Service has accommodated the Appellant, supporting his attendance at recognized professional alcohol abuse programs offered at Brentwood, Homewood and other organizations. We find that the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that while the Service has met its duty to accommodate, Constable Brown has not met his own duty to comply with the conditions of his discipline or maintain his sobriety, is reasonable. Renaud v. Central Okanagan School District No.

23 (1992), 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), 2 S.C.R. 970 at page 7, para 3.

86. The Hearing Officer’s consideration of the damage sustained to the reputation to the Service is appropriate and reasonable. The Appellant admitted to being intoxicated on January 4, 2009, to putting his hands on his son and forcing his way into a neighbour’s residence. He was boisterous and abusive. When members of the Service arrived to arrest him, he actively resisted arrest, he had to be tasered and restrained. His interactions have received considerable media coverage and became public knowledge. The Hearing Officer quoted from Williams, supra: “These actions, afforded the opportunity of reasoning, indicate a serious lack of moral and judgmental qualities required in a police officer. It is doubtful that an opportunity for rehabilitation would correct what appears to be a fundamental character flaw.”

87. The Hearing Officer’s decision on penalty is reasonable, reflects a correct understanding and application of the law, is based upon the clear and cogent evidence contained in the record, and is articulated in a logical manner.

88. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.