Herridge v. St. Thomas Police Service, 2007 CanLII 87216

OCCPS #07-05

ONTARIO CIVILIAN COMMISSION ON POLICE SERVICES

Citation: Herridge v. St. Thomas Police Service, 2007 ONCPC 5

REASONS FOR DECISION

STAFF SERGEANT CHRISTOPHER HERRIDGE

Appellant

ST. THOMAS POLICE SERVICE

Respondent

Presiding Members:

David Edwards, Member

Hyacinthe Miller, Member

Appearances:

Norman Peel, Counsel for the Appellant

David S. Thompson, Counsel for the Respondent

Hearing Date: February 12, 2007

Staff Sergeant Christopher Herridge pled guilty on December 15, 2005 to two counts of discreditable conduct contrary to section 2(1)(a)(xi) of Ontario Regulation 123/98 as amended (the “Code”) and one count of insubordination contrary to section2(1)(b)(i) before Superintendent M.B. Elbers (the “Hearing Officer”). He was also found guilty on January 27, 2006 of one further count of neglect of duty contrary to section 2(1)(c)(ii).

Staff Sergeant Herridge appeals the finding of guilt with respect to the charge of neglect of duty.

On March 3, 2006 Staff Sergeant Herridge received two penalties for these offences. He appeals both.

Specifically, for insubordination he was ordered to forfeit forty hours pay either by working on annual leave or rest days. This penalty was to be completed within a six-month period. For the remaining three matters he was demoted in rank to First-Class constable for a period of twelve months during which time he “shall not act as a Sergeant in a supervisory capacity”. Upon the completion of this period and successful performance evaluation the Appellant was to be “reinstated to the rank of Sergeant at the highest pay level.”

Background:

Staff Sergeant Herridge was initially charged with six disciplinary offences.

As noted above, the Hearing Officer found Staff Sergeant Herridge guilty of the three charges to which he pled and one further count of neglect of duty. As well, he was found not guilty of two other charges that are not the subject of this appeal.

The two discreditable conduct convictions concerned sexual relations between Sergeant Herridge and a female civilian member of the Service in a restricted area of the police station on November 26, 2004 and February 19, 2005.

The insubordination conviction related to Staff Sergeant Herridge using the St. Thomas Police Service internal e-mail system for sexually explicit communications with the same female civilian employee between September 17,

2004 and May 5, 2005 contrary to Service Policy PR - 21.

The neglect of duty conviction related to Staff Sergeant Herridge leaving his assigned duties to attend the home of the female civilian member of the Service on November 1, 2004.

The facts of this matter are straightforward. At the hearing on December 15,

2005, Counsel entered into evidence an Agreed Statement of Facts, which contained the following information.

1. On 17 May 2005 the St. Thomas Police Force commenced an internal investigation as a result of a complaint by an office clerk of harassment in the workplace. The complaint involved allegations of misuse of the internet/email system for the purpose of transmitting harassing emails and personal emails.

2. An audit was conducted on all the civilian clerical staff email activity for a two week period from 2 May/05 to 17 May/05.

3. On 18 May 05 S/Sgt. Herridge was advised by Inspector Driedger of the pending audit and the reasons for it.

4. The audit and the subsequent investigation provided the evidence described below concerning Officer Herridge.

5. In this audit, it was discovered that there was a large number of emails exchanged between CPIC clerk Anne Kopic and S/Sgt. Herridge that were of a personal nature.

6. On November 1, 2004, Staff Sergeant Herridge while on duty attended at the home of Anne Kopic. His attendance at Anne Kopic’s home was not required or authorized in the execution of his assigned duties.

7. The content of some of the emails indicated that Ms. Kopic and S/Sgt.

Herridge were involved in an intimate relationship and that they had met in a drug intelligence office that contained confidential information in the lower level of the police building for intimate purposes. That office has a coded door.

8. On November 26, 2004, Staff Sgt. Herridge let Anne Kopic into the drug intelligence office on the lower level of the police station while both were on duty. Their meeting lasted approximately 15 minutes. During that meeting Staff Sergeant Herridge and Anne Kopic had sexual relations in that office. The meeting between Staff Sergeant Herridge and Anne Kopic was not required or authorized in the execution of Staff Sergeant Herridge’s assigned duties.

9. On 19 February 2005, Staff Sergeant Herridge was off duty. He attended at the St. Thomas Police Station when he had not been requested to do so. While there, he and Anne Kopic went into the drug intelligence office. Staff Sergeant Herridge and Anne Kopic had sexual relations in the drug intelligence office. While they were in the office, Constable Steve Bogart attempted to enter the office in the execution of his assigned duties. He was prevented from entering the office for approximately one and a half minutes until Staff Sergeant Herridge and Anne Kopic left the office. Staff Sergeant Herridge’s attendance in the office was not related to the performance of his duties. Anne Kopic had no access to that room alone.

10. The drug intelligence office where these meetings took place is located in the lower level of the St. Thomas Police Station. Entrance to the office is by means of a numeric code to be entered on the security lock to the office. Anne Kopic was not authorized to have this security code to enter that office. Only four St. Thomas Police officers, including Staff Sergeant Herridge, are authorized to have that numeric code for entrance to that office.

11. Officer Bogart had been called in from home on an off-duty day to dismantle and catalog evidence of a secured grow operation. S/Sgt. Herridge was not paged himself to be involved in this incident.

12. An audit of Staff Sergeant Herridge’s email was conducted. It was found that most personal emails were deleted.

13. On May 21, 2005, while the investigation was proceeding, Staff Sergeant Herridge called Constable Steve Bogart while Constable Bogart was off duty. Staff Sergeant Herridge asked Constable Bogart if he had been talking with anyone at the station and what he had said when he was called in by the Administration. At that time, Staff Sergeant Herridge was the Unit Commander of the Criminal Investigation Bureau, and Constable Bogart was an officer assigned to that Bureau.

14. The personal emails between S/Sgt. Herridge and Anne Kopic start on

17 Sept 04 and continued until 05 May 2005.

15. The emails show that S/Sgt. Herridge & Anne Kopic also communicated during that time through private email accounts, personal cell phones and S/Sgt. Herridge’s police pager.

16. S/Sgt. Herridge established a Yahoo email account for Anne Kopic under the name of Wendy Hood and a HotMail account for himself under the name Craig Bonet. Through those accounts they communicated through the police service communication system.

17. The emails are organized in an agreed set of books. Each book contains emails in tabs that are in the order of the charges. Within each tab, the emails are sorted in ascending date order. Copies of those emails form Exhibits (A-D). They can be considered to be original evidence.

18. Prior to being suspended, during the period from late May 23rd to July

6, 2005, S/Sgt. Herridge delivered letters of apology addressed to the attention of the Chief of Police and the Deputy Chief of Police. He also sent email apologies to both Inspectors. Apart from the call to Constable Bogart described in paragraph 13, he has co-operated with the investigation. A copy of these communications is Exhibit E. It can be considered to be original evidence.

19. The curriculum vitae of S/Sgt. Herridge is attached as Exhibit F. It can be considered to be original evidence.

On the question of penalty the Hearing Officer received information from Staff Sergeant Herridge’s personnel file including performance appraisals and letters of commendation; character references; an assessment from a forensic psychiatrist named Dr. Klassen; letters of apology; oral submissions; and various cases from both counsel.

Appellant’s Position:

Norman Peel acted as counsel for the Appellant. At the commencement of this hearing he withdrew a Motion that he had filed with respect to the issue of Staff Sergeant Herridge’s suspension with pay.

With respect to the finding of guilt for neglect of duty, Mr. Peel proceeded to argue that the Service was required to prove that Staff Sergeant Herridge had a specific duty that he either failed or neglected to perform. He asserted that the Hearing Officer did not identify a specific duty.

He also argued that the degree of neglect must cross the line from a mere performance consideration to a matter of intentional misconduct. He asserted that it was neither unreasonable nor neglectful for Sergeant Herridge to take a

‘noon break’ at the home of a civilian employee. He also took issue with the fact that the Hearing Officer drew aggravating inferences from the psychiatric report filed by the defence for other purposes, in support of his conclusions.

On these points he noted several cases including Soley and Ontario Provincial Police (1996), 3 O.P.R. 1098 (O.C.C.P.S.) and Carmichael and Ontario Provincial Police (1998), 3 O.P.R. (O.C.C.P.S.), Geske and Hamilton-Wentworth Police Service (1998), 2 P.L.R. 565 (O.C.C.P.S.).

On the question of penalty, he first argued that 40 hours for the finding of guilt for insubordination was harsh, not consistent with penalties for similar offences and structured in an impractical way.

On these matters he cited several cases including Sterling and Hamilton- Wentworth Police Service (1999), 3 O.P.R. 1356 (O.C.C.P.S.), Lang and Toronto Police Service (8 February, 2006, O.C.C.P.S.) and Wolfe and Ontario Provincial Police (16 November, 2005, O.C.C.P.S.).

Mr. Peel then turned to the penalty of demotion of two ranks. He asserted that the sexual activity was consensual and that Staff Sergeant Herridge posed no risk to the public if he retained his rank. He suggested that the Hearing Officer found risk in a passage of the psychiatric report that was taken out of context. In Mr. Peel’s view, there must be actual risk to prevent an officer from being reinstated automatically after a period of demotion.

He also suggested that Staff Sergeant Herridge is not a repeat offender who is incapable of rehabilitation. He argued that the loss of rank for non-criminal consensual misconduct was excessive. Ontario Ministry of Community & Social Services v. O.P.S.E.U. (1992), 1992 CanLII 7458 (ON CA), 11 O.R. (3rd) 558 and Gregg and Midland Police Service (2001), 3 O.P.R. 1522 (O.C.C.P.S.)

Mr. Peel argued there were a number of serious defects in the Hearing Officer’s decision. In particular, he did not properly consider the psychiatric assessment which substantiated Staff Sergeant Herridge’s remorse. The Hearing Officer accepted what he characterized as ‘troubling’ parts of the psychiatrist’s report but did not accept the positive parts. He failed to give proper weight to the opinion of the doctor. He failed to consider the officer’s voluntary disclosure of personal matters. He did not give sufficient weight to the fact that Staff Sergeant Herridge had cooperated throughout the investigation, which prevented a lengthy and embarrassing trial.

On these points he noted a number of cases, including R. v. Haines [1975] O.J. No. 251 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Sahaidak [1990] O.J. No. 2792 (Ont. Div. Ct.), Ontario Provincial Police and Silverman 2000 CanLII 29051 (ON SCDC), [2000] O.J. No. 2080 (Ont. Div. Ct.), Valois and Toronto Police Service (24 November, 2003, O.C.C.P.S.) and Re: Deputy Chief Kingston (Halton Police Service) (24 March, 2006, O.C.C.P.S.).

Mr. Peel asserted that the Hearing Officer speculated when he stated character references may not have been aware of Staff Sergeant Herridge’s past and found this to be an aggravating factor. The Hearing Officer incorrectly found that the concept of progressive discipline did not apply; rather, he imposed a substantially increased penalty for conduct of the same delict for which lesser penalties had been imposed. Mr. Peel argued that the officer’s misconduct could have been covered by one discreditable conduct charge. The combined effect of the two penalties is very severe.

Mr. Peel reminded us that this was not a complaint about the misuse of rank or uniform on a vulnerable member of the public seeking police assistance. Staff Sergeant Herridge’s misconduct surfaced without contest, during an internal investigation. He made a confession before the results of the investigation were known. He apologized. As the matter only became public at the time of the hearing, the Hearing Officer should not have found it to be an aggravating factor that the conduct of the officer became known to the police service members and the public.

Mr. Peel suggested that the past performance of the officer should have been given more weight as a mitigating factor. Also, the Hearing Officer did not give sufficient weight to rehabilitation, the positive character evidence from other police officers, or Staff Sergeant Herridge’s ability to lead. Mr. Peel acknowledged that demotion was an appropriate penalty but not to the unlimited extent imposed by the Hearing Officer. He cited a number of cases in support of that position.

He argued that consideration should be given to the fact that the officer had been suspended with pay for 219 days prior to the initial hearing and for 308 days since the filing of the appeal. Given the lengthy suspension with pay, Mr. Peel

suggested that Staff Sergeant Herridge should be demoted for 3 months by one rank with automatic reversion to his former rank.

He also requested that we issue an order that Dr. Klassen’s report be sealed, but he was unable to provide any authority by statute or otherwise granting this Commission that power.

Respondent’s Position:

Mr. David S. Thompson acted as counsel for the St. Thomas Police Service.

He drew to our attention, a number of cases speaking to the question of the standard of review to be adopted by the Commission on appeal. These included Williams and Ontario Provincial Police (1995), 2 O.P.R. 1047 (O.C.C.P.S.), Carson and Pembroke Police Service (9 March, 2006, O.C.C.P.S.) and Hassan and Peel Regional Police Service (8 September, 2006, O.C.C.P.S.).

He argued that the finding of guilt for neglect of duty was supported on the evidence. Staff Sergeant Herridge testified he was on duty when he attended the personal residence of Ms. Kopic. He admitted his attendance was not required or authorized. Those facts alone support the finding of guilt.

The Hearing Officer also relied upon the evidence contained in Dr. Klassen’s report and the letter written by Staff Sergeant Herridge to Deputy Chief Pinnell in which he admitted to attending Ms. Kopic’s house for the purpose of carrying out their personal relationship. However, given the officer’s admission, that evidence was not required for a finding of guilt.

As to penalty, Mr. Thompson asserted that the Hearing Officer considered the relevant factors as previously enumerated by this Commission. In addition to the Agreed Statement of Facts, the Hearing Officer relied upon the letters written by Sergeant Herridge after his conduct was discovered, as well as the psychiatrist’s report. He properly characterized the character references and made a fair observation when he asked, “how much does the person writing the reference know of the charge? It is sufficient to say the answer is unknown”.

Mr. Thompson argued that the state of mind of Officer Herridge is shown through the letters he wrote after his conduct was discovered, in which he said that he was “very wrong” and had “no problem accepting responsibility and punishment”. He characterized the Appellant as one who made mistakes in the past, realized them, yet continued. He suggested that the Appellant followed only those rules he wished to and disregarded those he did not wish to follow.

Mr. Thompson asserted there are reasons to doubt the Appellant’s ability to resume his rank and lead. Even in the letter to Deputy Chief Pinnell, in which he acknowledged his guilt, Staff Sergeant Herridge asked that his rank be spared.

He wanted the matter covered up by his superiors and requested that no one be told of the incidents. In Mr. Thompson’s view, this raises questions about the Appellant’s leadership and morals, all of which is consistent with the Hearing Officer’s decision and the evidence. He suggested that the case law is clear that the higher the rank, the higher the standard of performance is expected of the officer. These types of misconduct by a Staff Sergeant damage the reputation of the Service. There needs to be a period of time during which the Service can assess the Appellant’s suitability to lead.

Further, management acted appropriately by suspending the Appellant once the investigation was underway and suspending him until the decision at the first level. If the matter had concluded, Staff Sergeant Herridge would have returned to work as a constable. Once the Hearing Officer’s decision was appealed, however, it was incumbent upon the Service to suspend the Appellant until the matter was resolved and his rank clarified.

Mr. Thompson argued that the Hearing Officer fairly classified Dr. Klassen’s report as helpful and troubling with respect to the Appellant’s leadership ability. The Hearing Officer properly characterized the reference letters when he stated that they were a mitigating factor while acknowledging that he could not tell whether the letter writers were aware of the incidents in question.

As to the request to seal Dr. Klassen’s report, Mr. Thompson indicated that he was not aware that this Commission had any power to do so.

Decision:

The first question before us concerns the Hearing Officer’s finding of guilt on the charge of neglect of duty.

Our role on appeal of a finding of guilt is clearly set forth in Williams and Ontario

Provincial Police supra., at page 1058:

Our role or function in such matters is not to second-guess the decision of the adjudicator. In certain limited cases, it would be open for us to reach a different conclusion from the trier of fact. However, that must be based on the strongest ground. In other words, there can be no other determination than the conclusions of the adjudicator, as to the credibility of witnesses, cannot be reasonably accepted. The question to be asked in this case is, are the conclusions of the adjudicator void of evidentiary foundation?

In Wilson and Ontario Provincial Police (20 November, 2006, O.C.C.P.S.) at page 7 this concept was expanded upon:

This can be a difficult test for an Appellant to meet. The words “void of evidentiary foundation” clearly contemplate that appellate interference with evidentiary findings will be exercised sparingly. Norris v. Loranger (1998), 2 P.L.R. 493 (Ont. Bd. Inq.)

How do these principles apply to the finding of guilt for neglect of duty?

We have reviewed the record and the Hearing Officer’s decision of January 27,

2006. The Hearing Officer quoted paragraph 6 of the Agreed Statement of Facts which states that: “On November 1, 2004, Staff Sergeant Herridge, while on duty attended at the home of Anne Kopic. His attendance at Anne Kopic’s home was not required or authorized in the execution of his assigned duties.”

The Hearing Officer also noted Staff Sergeant Herridge’s letter to Deputy Chief Pinnell and Dr. Klassen’s report, both of which were exhibits at the disciplinary hearing. In both documents Staff Sergeant Herridge acknowledged having sexual relations at various times at Ms. Kopic’s home.

Specifically, the report of Dr. Klassen referred to the visit to Ms. Kopic’s home in November. It read: “He [Staff Sergeant Herridge] was on duty at that time and stated he was nervous and was aware that he should not have been there.”

Staff Sergeant Herridge was on duty. He left his place of business to go to Ms. Kopic’s house. He was aware that he should not be there. Given the above, it certainly cannot be said that the Hearing Officer’s finding of guilt with respect to the neglect of duty cannot be reasonably accepted or was void of evidentiary foundation.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as it pertains to the finding of guilt for neglect of duty.

The Appellant also appealed the two penalties imposed by the Hearing Officer. The role of the Commission on appeal of penalty is clear and well established. As was noted in Carson and Pembroke Police Service supra., at pages 14 and 15:

The factors to be taken into account when assessing a suitable penalty are well established. In Williams and Ontario Provincial Police this Commission identified three key elements. They include the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the ability to reform or rehabilitate the officer, and the damage to the reputation of the police service that would occur if the officer remained on the force.

Further considerations can include the need for deterrence, provocation or concerns arising from management’s approach. Other factors can be relevant, either as mitigating or aggravating a penalty, depending on the conduct in question. These include the

officer’s employment history and experience, recognition of the seriousness of the transgression and handicap or other relevant personal considerations.

In addition, when imposing a penalty, it is important to take into account prior disciplinary cases dealing with similar types of misconduct. This is to ensure consistency.

Our function in a disciplinary appeal is not to second-guess the hearing officer or substitute our own opinion. Rather, it is to assess whether nor not the hearing officer fairly and impartially applied these principles and properly considered all relevant matters. Where there is a manifest error in principle or the proper factors are ignored, we may vary the disposition. This is not lightly done.

We must apply these principles to this case.

There is no suggestion that the Hearing Officer failed to address the appropriate criteria for assessing penalty. What is asserted is that the Hearing Officer either failed to give appropriate weight to mitigating factors or gave too much weight to aggravating factors.

In his decision, the Hearing Officer considered three key elements of penalty: the nature and seriousness of the conduct, the ability to reform or rehabilitate the officer, and the damage to the reputation of the police service that would occur if the officer remained on the force.

In our view, he adequately considered the nature and seriousness of the conduct as they relate to the conviction for neglect of duty. We believe that the penalty of forty hours forfeiture was within the range of appropriate penalties.

There are a number of factors distinguishing Staff Sergeant Herridge’s misconduct from the lesser penalties identified in Sterling and Hamilton- Wentworth Police Service and Lang and Toronto Police Service. Neither case dealt with abuse of internal e-mail for sexual purposes. Sterling concerned use of the CPIC system for personal purposes. Lang concerned the use of police resources to pursue a public complaint against members of another police service. Neither case dealt with the conduct of a supervisor.

However, we do have concerns about the condition imposed on the forfeiture. Specifically, that the penalty be completed in six months. In Wolfe and Ontario Provincial Police supra., the Commission considered a penalty of forfeiture of days that was also to be satisfied by working on annual leave or rest days. That penalty was to be completed within one month.

At page 14 of that decision, the Commission stated:

A Hearing Officer would normally not have any direct knowledge of an officer’s schedule, commitments or the operational requirements of the particular unit where the officer is employed. Accordingly, to our mind the question of the timing of the satisfaction of the penalty is a matter best left to the officer’s unit commander.

We believe the same logic would apply to this case and accordingly we vary the penalty for neglect of duty to the following: Staff Sergeant Herridge will forfeit forty (40) hours pursuant to section 68(1)(f) of the Act, to be served from annual leave or rest days.

This brings us to the demotion of two ranks for a period of one year for the remaining three convictions.

According to the evidence presented during the hearing, Staff Sergeant Herridge has performed at a very high level for sixteen years. His Performance Evaluations show that he met or exceeded standards. He has many positive letters of appreciation and recognition for his professional expertise, loyalty and work ethic. There are no prior disciplinary infractions on his record. The Hearing Officer described the conduct as “out of character”.

We note Mr. Peel’s submissions with respect to the fact that Staff Sergeant Herridge has been suspended with pay since May 25, 2005. While it may be challenging for a police officer to be suspended for a period of time, suspension from duties is an option available to police management under section 67 of the Act when an officer has been charged with and/or convicted of serious misconduct. The purpose includes removing an officer from his duties during a period of uncertainty with respect to his continuing rank and duties. A suspension is not a penalty subject to appeal to this Commission.

There is no question that Staff Sergeant Herridge’s actions represented serious misconduct that was unacceptable. However, his actions do not rise to the level of seriousness apparent in cases of sexual assault, sexual harassment, stalking or sexual coercion directed at citizens. Rather, it was, as the Hearing Officer noted “consensual sex with a willing civilian employee. The error … [was] the location and timing of these sexual encounters.”

This speaks to the heart of the matter. While the relationship with Ms. Kopic was consensual, some of their sexual interactions did occur while the officer was on duty and/or on police property. This is inexcusable, particularly for a supervisor. The Hearing Officer was correct in stating that a strong message must be sent by way of a penalty that is both a general and specific. Certainly, this can encompass a demotion of a significant period.

That being said, we feel that the Hearing Officer overstated the damage to the reputation of the police service and erred in his consideration of evidence

concerning the ability of the officer to reform and his ability to be accepted as a productive member of the Service. Any penalty must not be so unduly harsh as to violate the principles of fairness and consistency.

As well, the Hearing Officer did not give sufficient consideration to the fact that the officer admitted his misconduct and showed remorse. Staff Sergeant Herridge acknowledged that his career progression has likely come to an end. He has participated in counseling for his marital problems.

Dr. Klassen indicated in his report that Staff Sergeant Herridge does not pose a risk if he were to be returned to duty. The Hearing Officer noted Dr. Klassen believed Staff Sergeant Herridge could resume his duties in a leadership function, but then questioned that conclusion without any specific evidentiary foundation.

Rehabilitation should be a key factor where the officer had such a lengthy and exemplary service.

As to consistency of sentence, the Hearing Officer concluded that none of the cases provided to him were directly on point. He identified various cases and noted the similarities and differences to the current fact situation.

With respect to the magnitude of demotion, we agree that the case law presented was not particularly helpful, as it deals with misconduct committed by constables, not leaders. In the case such as this, we must consider three aspects of suitability continuum: is Staff Sergeant Herridge able to serve as a police officer; is he capable of serving but not leading; or, is he capable of serving and leading?

Past performance, ability to be rehabilitated, remorse and leadership abilities are mitigating factors in assessing penalty. As to the three convictions in question, we are persuaded that the Hearing Officer erred by not giving enough weight to the mitigating factors referred to in his decision.

We hereby revoke the original penalty of demotion of two ranks and order that Staff Sergeant Herridge be demoted to one rank to sergeant for a period of twelve months. The penalty will take effect on the date of this decision. At the end of the twelve-month period and completion of a performance evaluation that demonstrates he has successfully met the standard performance criteria as a sergeant, he will be re-instated to the rank of staff sergeant at his current grade.

With respect to the request from Mr. Peel that we order Dr. Klassen’s psychiatric report sealed, we agree with Mr. Thompson that we do not have the express or implied authority to do so. As an administrative tribunal, the Commission is bound by the provisions of the Statutory Powers Procedures Act R.S.O. 1990. c. S.22 as amended and is not a court of justice. It would be improper for us to exercise powers that cannot find their foundation in law.

Granted, the psychiatric report contains sensitive information relating to Staff Sergeant Herridge and his family, but that information was submitted by the defence for a specific purpose. In the evidence we reviewed, we could find no request for matters to be heard in camera in the first instance. Rather, Staff Sergeant Herridge’s disciplinary hearing was held in public, consistent with the principle that the public has an interest in knowing how police discipline is carried out.

DATED AT TORONTO THIS 3RD DAY OF MAY, 2007.

David Edwards Hyacinthe Miller

Member, OCCPS Member, OCCPS