ONTARIO CIVILIAN POLICE COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF The POLICE SERVICES ACT, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended
BETWEEN:
P.C. JOHN THOMAS LANGLOIS
Appellant
-and-
ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE
Respondent
DECISION
Panel: W. D. Drinkwalter, Q.C., Chairman
Raymond G. Leclair, Member
Hearing Date: Thursday, April 9, 1992
Hearing Location: Toronto, Ontario
Ontario Civilian Police Commission
250 Dundas Street West, Suite 605
Toronto, Ontario M7A 2T3
Tel: 416-314-3004
Fax: 416-314-0198
Website: www.ocpc.ca
Presiding Members:
W. D. Drinkwalter, Q.C., ChairmanRaymond G. Leclair, Member
Appearances:
W. Michael Temple, Solicitor for the AppellantDennis W. Brown, Solicitor for the Respondent
Hearing Date: Thursday, April 9, 1992
This is an appeal by Provincial Constable JohnThomas Langlois from his conviction of a major offence ofdiscreditable conduct contrary to Section 1(a)(1) of the Codeof Offences contained in Regulation 791 made under the PoliceAct, R.S.O. 1980, chapter 381 and from the penalty imposedupon him of the loss of 5 days' leave.
The charge sheet alleged that between June andSeptember, 1989, Constable Langlois supplied Mr. Paul Dinel,a civilian, with "two or more cases of beer through the backdoor of Jessey's Roadhouse Restaurant in Haileybury,Ontario." These exchanges took place on Sundays when beerstores are closed. Jessey's Restaurant in a licensed establishment and owned by the constable's wife, Joan Langlois.
Mr. Temple, argued that the case against his clienthad not been made out in a clear and convincing way in viewof the standard of proof adopted, the complainant's motiveand, the officer's reasonable explanation of the events uponwhich the charges are based.
The Standard of Proof:
It is clear that under the new Act, The PoliceServices Act, the standard of proof is now described as"clear and convincing evidence". The hearing herein appealedwas conducted under the former Act. We agree with Mr. Brownthat the standard of proof required is "the balance ofprobabilities", although there is a sliding scale depending on the severity of the probable penalty. Although thischarge was treated as a major offence, there is no indicationthat the constable's employment was ever at risk, in fact thepenalty recommended by the prosecution was the loss of fourdays' pay. We are satisfied that the adjudicator applied theproper standard in making his determination.
Credibility:
The appellant has pointed to the complainant'smotive in order to discredit his evidence. It is clear that there was a falling out between the complainant on one handand the accused and his wife on the other although theproblem was not clearly identified. It was also established that this motivated Mr. Dinel to complain to the police, butregarding some other matter, at which time the allegations inquestion cam to light.
Similarly, the Langlois' had much at stake. This trial could have led to a review of Mrs. Langlois' liquorlicense.
The trier of fact in the first instance is alwaysin a better position to judge the witnesses' demeanour andproperly weigh their evidence. The adjudicator has favouredMr. Dinel's evidence, partly because it was corroborated byMr. Bigras and the constable himself and we have not beenshown or found anything which would lead us to disturb hisfinding.
The Supply:
It was argued that the constable's conduct was notclearly established to be a sale in contravention of theLiquor License Act, but merely an exchange of beer amongstfriends. The adjudicator did not accept this argument, infact, the constable himself classified his relationship as,at best, that of acquaintances. In any event we are also notprepared to accept this explanation. The Liquor License Actdefines "sell" as "to supply for renumeration, directly orindirectly, in any manner by which the cost is recovered...".
An exchange would seem to be included. However, the chargeherein in not dependent upon the breaching of any criminal orregulatory statute.
The charge relates to an act "likely to bringdiscredit upon the reputation of the police force". We are quite concerned by the impression which can be created bythis conduct. This was demonstrated by Mr. Bigras' commentthat Mr. Dinel "had it made" when he could contact a policeofficer at times when beer would not otherwise be available in Ontario and obtain a case. The constable's conduct of supplying beer at the rear of a restaurant, on Sunday, left the impression in the public's mind that he was supplyingthrough the back door of the restaurant.
It was argued that his conduct was a mere lapse ofmoral judgment by a qualified professional person. In view of his years of experience as a police officer and thewarning he had received from his superiors when he requestedpermission to become engaged in the operation of the licensedrestaurant, we agree with the adjudicator that the constablehas brought discredit to this police force, and ought to haveknown that this conduct is unacceptable.
The Penalty:
considering Mr. Temple argued that it was the harsh the circumstances surrounding undulyallegedoffence. We find it interesting that he himself, before theadjudicator, recommended three to five days as beingappropriate. We accept Mr. Brown's argument that the progressive discipline doctrine was properly applied by theadjudicator. The previous penalty was three days imposed inDecember l988 following a minor conviction for discreditableconduct. In view of the fact that only five days was imposedwhen twenty days was the maximum, we do not consider thepenalty to be unduly harsh.
We therefore dismiss the appellant's appeal againstconviction and confirm the penalty imposed by the adjudicator.
DATED THIS 6TH DAY OF MAY, 1992.
______________________________________Raymond G. Leclair, Member
______________________________________W.D. Drinkwalter, Q.C., Chairman