ONTARIO CIVILIAN POLICE COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF the Police Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 381, and Amendments thereto and Regulations thereunder;
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IN THE MATTER OF an Appeal to the Ontario Police Commission by:
PETER BRIDGES AND STEPHEN BRIDGES Applicants
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HALTON REGIONAL POLICE COMMISSION Respondent
DECISION
Panel: John P. MacBeth, Esq., Q.C.
Hearing Date: Monday, November 7th, 1983
Hearing Location: Toronto, Ontario
Ontario Civilian Police Commission 250 Dundas Street West, Suite 605 Toronto, Ontario M7A 2T3 Tel: 416-314-3004 Fax: 416-314-0198 Website: www.ocpc.ca
1This is an application by counsel on behalf of both Peter Bridges and Stephen Bridges, police officers with the Halton Regional Police Force for an order quashing the charges against them under the Code of Offences, Regulation 791 of the Police Act. The application was made under Section 11 of the said Regulation on the basis of undue delay. The application also is made under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 1Kb) contending that there has been a denial of the right to be tried "within a reasonable time".
2As a result of an altercation on the 24th of April, 1982 in "Kelsey's Roadhouse Tavern" in Burlington, Ontario, charges under Section 1 (a)(i) of the Code of Offences under the said Regulation 791 were laid against bothPeter Bridges and Stephen Bridges. Charges were dated the 12th of May, 1982. These charges will hereafter be referred to as the first set of charges.
3Criminal Code charges arising from the same incident were also laid against the said officers. On the 13th of May, 1983, the Honourable Judge W. D. August in Provincial Court in Milton, Ontario convicted both officers with the charge of Assault Causing Bodily Harm.
4On the 27th of June, 1983, sentences by way of fines were imposed for the criminal convictions.
5The first Police Act charges came before Staff Inspector Taylor on the 27th of May, 1982. A series of adjournments followed, during which the Honourable Judge Quinlan of the Judicial District of Halton was designated with his agreement to hear the charges.
6On the 17th of August, 1983, Judge Quinlan withdrew his consent to hear the first set of Police Act charges and in his ruling set out the reasons for the various adjournments and delays in proceedings. He stated in part "I met with Counsel and designated a date to speak to the matter this August after the sentencing was completed".
7The usual practice in Ontario, where both Criminal charges and police disciplinary charges arise out of the same circumstances is to postpone proceedings on the disciplinary charges until the criminal proceedings have been completed. As Judge Quinlan notes this was the practice followed in this matter.
8No serious challenge was made to this postponement save that counsel for the applicants had expressed a wish to proceed with two procedural arguments. They, however, were likewise adjourned, to be heard at the same time as the main issues.
9Although the practice of postponing the Police Act disciplinary charges often leads to lengthy delays in having these charges heard, such postponement is often at the request of the officer charged and is generally thought to be for the officer's best interest so that the criminal trial will not be prejudiced by the disciplinary trial.
10Upon reading the decision of Judge Quinlan and taking the established practice into consideration, I find no undue delay up to the 17th of August, 1983.
11On the 18th of August, 1983, however, disciplinary charges were laid against both applicants, under Section HaMvii) of the Code of Offences of the said Regulation 791. These charges will be referred to as the second set of charges.
12Thereafter, an application was made by both Peter Bridges and Stephen Bridges to the Divisional Court of the Supreme Court of Ontario for an order prohibiting an officer of the rank of Inspector or higher from hearing the second set of charges on the grounds that such a hearing officer would not be independent or impartial and also that the charge sheet did not comply with Section 6 (1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, Chapt. 484.
13On the 18th of August, 1983, however, disciplinary charges were laid against both applicants, under Section HaMvii) of the Code of Offences of the said Regulation 791. These charges will be referred to as the second set of charges.
14Thereafter, an application was made by both Peter Bridges and Stephen Bridges to the Divisional Court of the Supreme Court of Ontario for an order prohibiting an officer of the rank of Inspector or higher from hearing the second set of charges on the grounds that such a hearing officer would not be independent or impartial and also that the charge sheet did not comply with Section 6 (1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, Chapt. 484.
15This application has not as yet been heard.
16On the 14th of October, 1983, the Honourable Judge W.E.C. Colter convened a hearing and set the 25th of November, 1983, at Milton, Ontario as the date and place to hear the second set of charges. It would appear that the basis for the Divisional Court application has now been satisfied by the designation and acceptance of Judge Colter to hear the charges and by his setting of a date.
17Counsel for the applicants submitted that since Judge Colter has only been designated to hear the second set of charges that the first set of charges are in "limbo" with no provision made or date set for hearing them.
18He contended that undue delay was occurring insofar as the first set of charges were concerned and that they should be quashed by reason of the provisions of Section 11 of the said Regulation 791.
19Although, there are presently no definite arrangements to proceed with the first set of charges counsel for the respondent indicated that he expected Judge Colter would consider them at the hearing on the 25th of November next.
20In reply counsel for the applicant stated that he had no notice or knowledge that Judge Colter would consider the first set of charges at that time.
21The last three lines of Section 11 of the said Regulation 791 reads as follows: "may order that the charge be quashed and thereupon the person charged shall be deemed to have been acquitted of the charge".
22I have found no undue delay to the 17th of August, 1983.
23Since that time the matter has not been dormant in view of the Divisional Court application, Judge Colter's appointment, and his setting of the 25th of this current month to hear the second set of charges. At that time the first set of charges will probably be taken into consideration one way or another. If the first set of charges were to be now quashed it might be prejudicial to the hearing of the second set of charges. I therefore believe that it would not be in the interest of justice to grant the present application.
24Counsel for the applicants referred to the case of Regina vs. Coghlin (38 O.K.) (2d) 1983 at page 609 dealing with Section 11 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
25Similar to the cited case I find that there was no attempt by the respondent to delay any of these hearings, the delay was caused by the existing practice to postpone police disciplinary charges until criminal procedures have been disposed of. After the 17th of August, 1983 the delay was the result of intervening court motions and the difficulty of finding an available judge and suitable date to hear the disciplinary charges.
26I now believe that these matters will be heard "within a reasonable time" under the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
27I, therefore, dismiss this application without predjudice to the applicants' right to renew it at some subsequent date.
DATED at the City of Toronto in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, this 10th day of November, 1983.
John P. MacBeth, Q.C.
Vice Chairman

