Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

This decision addresses the voluntariness of a statement made by the defendant, G.C., to police following his arrest for dangerous operation causing death related to a motor vehicle collision.

The court carefully analyzed the evidence from police officers and the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the delay in custody, the timing of informing the defendant of the fatality, and the failure to advise him of his imminent release.

Applying Supreme Court of Canada principles on voluntariness and credibility, the judge found a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant's statement was made with free will, rendering it inadmissible at trial.

B.N., a 77-year-old first-time offender, was sentenced for sexual assault, sexual touching, invitation to sexual touching, and exposing his genitals to his 7-year-old granddaughter.

The offenses occurred over three consecutive nights while he was in a caregiving role.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, citing R. v. Friesen for the need for increased sentences in child sexual abuse cases.

Despite B.N.'s age, poor health, and low risk of reoffending, the court found that only incarceration could adequately reflect the gravity of the offenses and the profound harm caused to the victim and her family.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate.

The court imposed a total sentence of two years' incarceration, followed by three years of probation, along with various ancillary orders including SOIRA registration and a weapons prohibition.

The defendant, Eldan Krcic, faced charges of theft, assault, and assault with a weapon arising from allegations of intimate partner violence.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant and the defendant, and photographic evidence of injuries.

The court assessed witness credibility and reliability, applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

While the complainant's testimony had some credibility issues and the defendant's testimony was largely untruthful, the court found that the prosecution failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt due to residual doubts about the complainant's testimony and the unauthenticated nature of the photographic evidence.

All remaining charges were dismissed.

The defendant brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 788 days (25 months and 25 days).

The court deducted 219 days attributable to defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 569 days (18.7 months), which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials under R. v. Jordan.

The Crown did not justify the delay.

The court found the defendant's s. 11(b) right was breached and stayed the charges.

The defendant, Nathaniel Dillon, was charged with two counts of breaching a no-attend term of bail.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the defendant.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, finding the complainant's evidence believable and accurate, while largely rejecting the defendant's testimony due to its performative aspect, flippant manner, and lack of plausibility.

The court found that the defendant intentionally remained in the complainant's presence on two separate occasions despite knowing he was breaching his bail conditions.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts.

The Defendant, Jeremiah Campbell, applied to withdraw his guilty plea for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, entered prior to sentencing.

The prosecution opposed the application.

The court, applying the principles that a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, found that while the plea was unequivocal and informed, and the defendant's testimony was largely unconvincing, a miscarriage of justice would result if the plea were maintained.

The court exercised its residual discretion, considering the defendant's age, first-offender status, potential penitentiary sentence, existence of triable Charter issues, and the defendant's belief in his factual innocence.

The application to strike the guilty plea was granted.

The defendant was charged with assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant, applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The court found the complainant's testimony truthful and accurate, supported by circumstantial evidence, and rejected the defendant's testimony as internally inconsistent, unreliable, and untruthful.

The defendant was found guilty of both charges.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and subsequently charged with impaired operation and having a blood-alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The court found that the arresting officer engaged in a prolonged and unfocused detention without providing rights to counsel, violating ss. 9 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The officer also failed to make a breath demand as soon as practicable, violating s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2).

Without the breath readings, and finding the officers' evidence regarding indicia of impairment unreliable, the court acquitted the accused on both counts.

The accused, a 21-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to weapons dangerous, robbery, and breach of bail.

The court considered his youth, lack of prior record, strong family support, and the impact of the pandemic on his life prospects.

Applying the principles of restraint and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, and noting the availability of a conditional sentence following R. v. Sharma, the court imposed a conditional discharge for the weapons offence, a 6-month conditional sentence for the robbery (along with 5 months deemed pre-trial custody credit for house arrest), and 7 days deemed time served for the breach.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion to permit the complainant and a nurse to testify remotely by videoconference under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defence opposed the complainant testifying virtually, arguing it would impede cross-examination and the assessment of credibility.

The court granted the motion, finding that virtual testimony would reduce COVID-19 transmission risks and could actually enhance the assessment of demeanour compared to an in-person trial with masks and plexiglass.

The defence's subsequent application for an adjournment to allow for a future in-person trial was dismissed.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a stationary vehicle on the shoulder of Highway 401.

Police arrested him for impaired driving and demanded breath samples, which registered over the legal limit.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed the ss. 8 and 9 claims, finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found a s. 10(b) violation because a breath technician asked the accused standard booking questions with investigative value before he could consult duty counsel a second time.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the breath samples under s. 24(2).

The accused was found guilty of impaired operation and operating over 80.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample after his truck was found in a ditch.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, unreasonable search due to cell video surveillance, and overholding.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds, the cell surveillance was balanced by the offer of a privacy blanket, and the release timing was appropriate.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, concluding he was slightly impaired, in care or control of the vehicle, and feigned attempts to provide a breath sample.

The offender, a 22-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his 14-year-old cousin.

The offences involved digital penetration while the victim was sleeping, constituting an opportunistic breach of trust.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime SOIRA registration and a 10-year section 161 prohibition.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay after his trial was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The total delay was 23.7 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the delay caused by the pandemic and the subsequent phased reopening of the courts constituted an exceptional circumstance, reducing the net delay to 16.2 months.

The court concluded the defence failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's only witness, a police officer, testified that he read the accused an approved instrument demand under s. 254(3) rather than the required approved screening device demand under s. 254(2)(b).

The defence conceded all elements of the offence except whether a proper demand was made.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish that a proper demand was made and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) relating to investigative detention at the hospital and the Over 80 charge was dismissed.

The trial proceeded on the impaired driving charge.

The court found that civilian witnesses provided credible evidence of the accident, the accused's identity as the driver, and indicia of impairment including stumbling, smell of alcohol, and unresponsiveness.

The court concluded that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and that the Crown proved all essential elements of impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conviction was entered.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on five counts of robbery with an offensive weapon against both defendants, with additional charges against Moore for disguising with a bandana and possession of a weapon.

The central issue was identification of the perpetrator(s) based on circumstantial evidence.

The Crown's theory was that Moore committed the robberies with Stanojevic as the getaway driver.

The court admitted similar fact evidence regarding the robberies and found sufficient circumstantial evidence linking Moore to all robberies.

Moore was committed to trial on all counts.

Stanojevic was committed on the August 21 robbery but discharged on the August 12 robbery, as there was insufficient evidence linking her to that incident.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on March 9, 2014.

The court addressed multiple Charter issues including arbitrary stop, reasonable and probable grounds, and rights to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 9 (arbitrary stop), no breach of section 8 (reasonable and probable grounds), and a breach of section 10(b) (rights to counsel) but excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused raised a section 258(1)(d.1) defence (last drinks consumed) but the court rejected the accused's credibility and found the defence not established.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown proved both charges based on breath readings of 186 and 191 mg% obtained approximately 2.5 hours after the accident, expert toxicology evidence establishing the accused's BAC at the time of driving, and observations of impairment indicators by police officers at the scene.

Although the court found a Charter violation regarding the right to counsel, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, the officers acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable and necessary.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following observations of erratic driving on Highway 401 and subsequent breath samples showing more than three times the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the accused's Charter rights were breached: a strip search violated s.8 rights, and the lack of an interpreter violated s.10(b) rights.

The court found the impaired driving charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of evidence including poor driving, physical signs of impairment, and odour of alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under s.24(2) due to the Charter breaches, resulting in acquittal on the over 80 charge.

For the impaired driving charge, the court declined to stay proceedings despite the serious Charter violations, finding this was not one of the clearest cases warranting a stay.

Instead, the court imposed a nominal $1 fine and the mandatory one-year driving prohibition to reflect the seriousness of the illegal strip search while protecting the public interest.