Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused was charged with 23 offences arising from four armed robberies at gunpoint and firearm possession charges.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of each robbery as similar act evidence to establish identity.

The court admitted the similar act evidence, finding striking similarities across all four robberies including the use of the same firearm, vehicle, clothing, and modus operandi.

The court convicted the accused of three counts of armed robbery, one count of attempted armed robbery, four counts of pointing a firearm, four counts of disguising face with intent to commit indictable offence, four counts of possessing a weapon for purpose of committing criminal offence, four counts of breaching a release order, and three firearm possession offences.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the defendant Robert Montet’s Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in relation to breath sample evidence obtained following a roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) failure.

The Court found no breach of section 7 regarding alleged failure to provide fresh clothing, no section 8 violation as the warrantless breath demands were reasonable, no section 9 violation for alleged arbitrary detention despite a 6.5-hour hold post-breath sample, and no section 10(b) violation for delays in providing rights to counsel.

The breath sample evidence was admitted, resulting in a finding of guilt for driving with blood alcohol content over 80 mg per 100 mL under section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a drink-driving case involving Keith Maiato, focusing on alleged Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(a).

The court analyzed whether the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and whether the Defendant was properly informed of the reasons for detention.

The court found no breach of s. 10(a) or s. 9, concluding that the arrest was lawful and supported by reasonable grounds.

However, the court found the Defendant’s admissions to the Qualified Technician were not voluntary due to the manner in which the breath demand was explained, leading to exclusion of those admissions.

Without the Defendant’s admissions, the prosecution failed to prove identity and impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal.

This sentencing decision addresses the conviction of Cengiz Ay for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The court considered aggravating factors including dangerous driving towards a residential home, structural damage, evacuation due to gas smell, and high intoxication.

Mitigating factors included the isolated nature of the incident, no prior record, and family support.

The judge imposed a global conditional sentence of 90 days (60 days for impaired operation and 30 days consecutive for refusal), house arrest with specific exceptions, a 24-month probation period with conditions including ignition interlock and counselling, and a 27-month driving prohibition.

The decision balances public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

This sentencing decision by Justice A. A. Ghosh in the Ontario Court of Justice addresses the appropriate sentence for David Pusey, convicted of possessing a loaded firearm contrary to the Criminal Code, including possession contrary to a prohibition order.

The decision carefully analyzes the applicability of presentence custody credit, particularly rejecting the use of custody for an unrelated murder charge in sentencing.

It discusses sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant case law, including the impact of systemic racism and immigration consequences.

The ruling provides detailed guidance on sentencing ranges for firearm offences and the interplay with immigration law, making it a valuable precedent for sentencing in firearm possession cases involving complex collateral consequences.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention/overholding) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no arbitrary detention, but did find a minor breach of the right to counsel due to an 11-minute delay in providing the approved screening device demand.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the minor nature of the breach, minimal impact on the accused's interests, and strong societal interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Gregory Walton, was sentenced after being found guilty of failing to comply with his Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by testing positive for cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his criminal record and prior non-compliance with release conditions, and mitigating factors such as his stated commitment to rehabilitation and positive conduct under supervision.

The court emphasized the importance of the LTSO condition in managing the offender's risk of re-offence.

A sentence of 20 months incarceration (600 days jail) was imposed, with credit for pre-trial custody and an additional 50 days for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration.

A DNA order was granted, and the victim surcharge was waived.

The defendant, Shawn Rene Bansfield, was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of breaching probation.

The Crown dismissed two counts related to a February 11, 2020 incident.

For the remaining charges from February 10, 2020, the court found the defendant not guilty.

The key witness's testimony was deemed unreliable due to drug use, sleep deprivation, and inconsistent observations, and the video evidence was of poor quality, leading to reasonable doubt.

The court also addressed arguments regarding the necessity of proving the complainant's full name as particularized and the relevance of the relationship between the accused and complainant when consent is negated by unconsciousness.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his girlfriend's two daughters over a three-year period ending in 2004.

The complainants, now adults, testified that the accused entered their bedrooms at night while they slept and engaged in inappropriate sexual touching.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainants credible and reliable witnesses, rejected the accused's minimization of his presence in the home, and found him guilty on all four counts.

The court also addressed the admissibility of similar fact evidence and found no collusion between the complainants despite the opportunity for communication.

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of breaking and entering into dwelling homes contrary to section 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The offender committed a series of break-ins into residential homes over a one-month period, targeting vulnerable victims and stealing property of significant value.

The offender had an extensive criminal history including 12 prior break and enter convictions and was on parole at the time of the offences.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 years imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit, along with restitution orders totaling $28,076.54 and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public causing bodily harm contrary to s.249(3) of the Criminal Code, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm contrary to s.252(1.2) of the Criminal Code.

The incident occurred in a parking lot where the accused reversed his vehicle and struck the complainant with the left front quarter panel.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on both charges, finding that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew his vehicle had struck the complainant, and that the accused's driving did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the defendant was driving with a blood alcohol level of 131 and 124 (legal limit 80).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that police violated her right to counsel under section 10(b) by failing to advise her of this right during a five-minute delay between the approved screening device demand and the roadside breath sample.

The court rejected the Charter challenge, finding the demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the brief delay was justified to ensure an accurate test result.

The court also rejected other defence arguments regarding identity, the intoxilyzer procedure, and the approval status of the screening device.

The defendant was found guilty.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a single-vehicle accident in a shopping plaza parking lot.

The central issue was whether the defendant or his partner was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

An independent eyewitness testified that she observed the defendant exit from the driver's side door and subsequently saw both occupants switch seats before police arrived.

The defendant's partner testified that she had been driving.

The court found the eyewitness credible and reliable, rejecting the partner's account as far-fetched and incredible.

The defendant was convicted as charged.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused applied to exclude breath test results pursuant to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device sample and reasonable and probable grounds to demand an Intoxilyzer breath sample.

The trial judge found that the officer infringed the accused's section 8 Charter rights by making both demands without the requisite legal grounds.

The trial judge excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2), finding that the seriousness of the Charter breach and the impact on the accused's liberty interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Both charges were dismissed.

The offender was convicted of intimidating a justice participant and breaching a recognizance following his conduct at a preliminary inquiry.

While testifying as a witness in domestic violence charges against the offender, the victim was subjected to a cut-throat gesture and threatening words by the offender.

The court imposed a sentence of eight months custody on the intimidation charge and two months concurrent on the breach charge, followed by 18 months probation with strict conditions including non-association with the victim.

DNA orders and a lifetime firearms prohibition were also imposed.

The court emphasized the seriousness of offences against the administration of justice and the need to protect witnesses and the integrity of the judicial process.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood, impaired driving, and dangerous driving.

The Crown relied on expert toxicology evidence to establish the over 80 charge.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the assumption of no significant consumption of alcohol immediately prior to or during the time of driving.

The court found the over 80 charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt but acquitted on the impaired driving and dangerous driving charges due to insufficient evidence of impairment of ability to operate the vehicle and lack of proof of a marked departure from the standard of care.

The respondent was charged with driving a commercial vehicle not equipped with a working speed limiting system contrary to section 68.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario.

At trial, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing it infringed his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by preventing him from accelerating to avoid dangerous driving situations.

The trial justice found in favour of the respondent and struck down the provision.

The Crown appealed.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the speed limiter legislation deprived him of security of the person, and that the legislation was not arbitrary.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of continuing the appeal following the respondent's death, substituting his widow as respondent in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle at 149 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 407.

During trial, the Justice of the Peace amended the charge to reflect 153 km/h based on evidence presented.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: alleged interference by the trier of fact preventing full answer and defence, bias arising from the amendment of the speed charge, and misapplication of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility assessment principles.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error occurred at trial.

The defendant was charged with driving over 80 following an encounter with police in a shopping centre parking lot at approximately 12:45 am.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the detention and the legality of the procedures that followed, arguing that the defendant was subjected to arbitrary detention in violation of section 9 of the Charter and that the breath testing was unreasonable under section 8.

The court found that the defendant was not detained at the initial moment of police contact, or alternatively, that any detention was grounded in reasonable suspicion and therefore not arbitrary.

The court also held that even if arbitrary detention had occurred, it would be authorized by the common law.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.