Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The offender was found guilty of impaired driving.

As a repeat offender, he faced a mandatory minimum penalty of 30 days incarceration.

The court considered the availability of intermittent sentences and the practice of correctional authorities issuing Temporary Absence Passes (TAPs).

The court imposed a sentence of 60 days incarceration to be served intermittently, a 2.5-year driving prohibition, and 18 months probation, with a strong recommendation that no TAP be granted.

The defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his wife on three occasions and uttering a threat to cause her death or bodily harm.

The complainant alleged the incidents occurred during their arranged marriage, while the defendant denied the allegations and claimed they were fabricated after he requested a divorce.

The court found the complainant's evidence had a ring of truth but lacked sufficient detail to prove the sexual assaults beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also strongly condemned defence counsel's reliance on prohibited stereotypes and rape myths during cross-examination and submissions.

Ultimately, the court acquitted the defendant of all charges as the Crown failed to meet its burden of proof.

This decision addresses the sentencing of an offender convicted of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking within a custodial facility.

The court considered the seriousness of drug trafficking, particularly fentanyl, and the aggravating factor of the offence occurring in a detention centre.

The offender's extensive criminal record and his misconduct in fraudulently delaying sentencing proceedings were also significant factors.

The court applied a "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-trial conditions but limited the "Summers credit" due to the offender's deliberate attempts to obstruct justice.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault after stabbing the complainant, his cousin, during an altercation.

The defendant claimed self-defence.

The court assessed the credibility of the intoxicated witnesses, noting inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and his criminal record for assault with a weapon.

Applying the principles of self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defence, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a mixture of fentanyl and heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

At a Gardiner Hearing, the court found that the defendant believed he possessed only heroin and was not wilfully blind to the presence of fentanyl.

The Crown sought a sentence of four to five years imprisonment.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with electronic supervision, followed by three years probation.

The sentencing decision was grounded in exceptional circumstances including the defendant's genuine prospect for rehabilitation, completion of a residential treatment program, family reunification, and stable support from his step-grandmother.

Two young persons were convicted after trial of robbery with violence committed against a peer on the first week of school.

The offence involved a premeditated attack on an isolated location where the victim was lured, assaulted, robbed of personal items and marijuana, and left with bleeding feet after being forced to descend metal stairs barefoot.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of three months (two months secure custody followed by one month community supervision) followed by two years probation, finding that the seriousness of the offence, the degree of participation, the intentional and foreseeable harm, and the need for denunciation and accountability warranted custody despite the YCJA preference for non-custodial dispositions.

The accused was stopped while riding an e-bike and arrested for driving under suspension.

The arresting officer searched the accused's backpack incident to the arrest and discovered fentanyl and marijuana.

The accused challenged the arrest and search under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found the officer's explanations for the arrest and search lacked credibility, concluding the officer was likely conducting an unjustified general criminal inquiry.

The court held the arrest was unlawful and the search unreasonable, constituting flagrant Charter breaches.

The drug evidence was excluded under section 24(2), resulting in the accused's acquittal.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, following a single-vehicle accident on January 21, 2017.

The defendant challenged the arrest and breath demand on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10, and sought exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings.

The defendant also argued the Crown failed to prove he was the driver, that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable, and that the statutory presumptions did not apply due to uncertainty about the time of the accident.

The court found the defendant guilty, rejecting all Charter challenges and finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and that the breath demand was lawful.

Before the commencement of a joint criminal trial for assault offences arising from an altercation outside a nightclub, the court addressed a conflict of interest concerning defence counsel.

The lawyer for one accused also represented the co‑accused in unrelated ongoing criminal matters.

Applying the duty of loyalty principles from R. v. Neil, the court held that concurrent representation created a substantial risk that counsel’s advocacy would be materially and adversely affected by divided loyalties.

The possibility that one accused could implicate the other, or be cross‑examined by their own lawyer, created an unacceptable risk to the integrity of the proceedings.

Independent legal advice and waivers could not cure the conflict.

Counsel was disqualified from representing the accused at trial.

The accused was stopped by police after passing several vehicles at a high rate of speed and was found to be impaired by marihuana.

Police also discovered 18 grams of marihuana, for which the accused held a valid medical prescription.

The Crown argued that lawful possession became unlawful once the drug was used in the commission of impaired driving.

The court rejected this argument, distinguishing precedent on innocent possession becoming unlawful and holding that possession remained lawful because the substance had been validly prescribed and obtained.

As the admitted facts did not disclose the offence of unlawful possession under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the guilty plea on that charge was struck.

The defendant was charged with depriving her former husband of possession of their two children in contravention of a custody order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

She pled guilty to one count of parental abduction under section 282(1) of the Criminal Code.

The incident occurred on June 10, 2016, when the defendant removed the children from school to prevent the complainant from exercising his lawful access rights.

The defendant had previously breached the custody order on multiple occasions.

At sentencing, the court rejected the defence submission for a conditional discharge and imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months probation, including compliance with family court orders and restitution of $1,000.

The defendant was charged with "over 80" (care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol above the legal limit).

The Crown's evidence showed the defendant was stopped by police in an area known for prostitution and drug offences, based solely on the vehicle "circling" the area.

Following the stop, the defendant was subjected to a roadside screening device demand, which he failed, leading to arrest and breath samples showing 100 and 90 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood (legal limit: 80).

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the initial stop under section 9 of the Charter.

The court found the stop was arbitrary and violated the defendant's Charter rights, and excluded the evidence obtained as a result.

The prosecuting authority applied for an extension of time to appeal a sentencing decision following regulatory convictions against a corporate electrical contractor arising from a fatal electrical installation incident.

The proposed appeal challenged the sentencing court’s refusal to pierce the corporate veil to impose consequences on the directing mind and a newly incorporated entity allegedly created after charges were laid.

Applying the established factors for granting an extension of time to appeal, the court found a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period, a reasonable explanation for the delay related to transcript preparation and service difficulties, and arguable merit to the proposed grounds.

The court held that it was not frivolous to argue that a provincial offences court might possess implied jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances.

The extension of time to file the notice of appeal was therefore granted.

The defendant was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an offence following an armed robbery at a pharmacy.

The Crown's case relied primarily on a fingerprint found on a garbage bag left at the scene and surveillance photographs.

The defence argued that the fingerprint only proved contact with the bag at some unspecified time, not participation in the robbery.

The court found that while the defendant's fingerprint was on the bag, the timing of when it was deposited could not be established.

The surveillance photographs, when compared to the defendant's arrest photograph, could only establish that he could not be excluded as a suspect.

The court concluded that guilt was not the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the accused had a blood alcohol level of 210 mgs/100ml based on approved instrument tests at the station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, the delay in making the demand, the validity of the ASD test, and the adequacy of the right to counsel advice.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on the evidence.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was convicted of two indictable offences of possessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The first offence involved 49 accessible child pornographic images on a computer hard drive, discovered when the computer was brought in for repairs.

The second offence involved 30 hard copy photographs of preteen or young teenage females.

The court imposed a sentence of 8 months imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently, along with a 2-year probation order, a 5-year prohibition order under section 161, and a lifetime SOIRA order.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for an inflationary floor principle and the defence's argument for the minimum sentence, finding that 8 months was a fit sentence given the gravity of the offences and the offender's degree of responsibility.

The defendant, a university student and single mother, was charged with aiding and abetting trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown alleged that the defendant knowingly allowed her vehicle to be used for three cocaine transactions between her intimate partner and an undercover police officer, and that cocaine was found in her home.

The defendant testified she believed the meetings were related to her partner's party promotion business and that she had no knowledge of the drug transactions.

The court found the defendant guilty of three counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in cocaine but acquitted her of possession for the purpose of trafficking, finding that the cocaine found in her home belonged to her partner and that she had no knowledge he would leave it there.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter motion arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice was violated.

The arresting officer's field notes indicated the defendant asked for a specific lawyer, but her typed report stated he had no preference and was fine with duty counsel.

Due to the material inconsistency and the officer's lack of independent recollection, the court found a s. 10(b) violation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to section 145(3) of the Criminal Code, with alleged offence dates of November 14 and 16, 2011.

The Crown sought to admit an original information and a certified copy of a recognizance as evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of these documents on the basis that the Canada Evidence Act notice served by the Crown was deficient because it referred to an information with different offence dates than the one actually tendered.

The court ruled that while the notice was deficient under the Canada Evidence Act, both documents were admissible at common law as public documents and under the principled approach to hearsay established in R. v. Khan.