Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment; defence counsel sought 6 months with credit for bail conditions.

The court imposed 10 months imprisonment followed by 2 years probation, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition for 10 years, and a no-contact order with co-accused.

The court balanced aggravating factors (two bank robberies, use of imitation firearm, vulnerable victims) against mitigating factors (youth, guilty plea, remorse, no prior record, family support, educational pursuits).

The reasons for judgment in this criminal matter are not available at this time.

The case involves a Crown prosecution against the accused Bedada in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The accused was charged with assault following an incident on March 10, 2018, at the home of the complainant.

The complainant answered the door to a stranger who claimed to be visiting a friend.

After several brief encounters, the lights went out and the complainant was attacked.

The two main issues were whether the Crown proved the accused was the assailant and whether the physical contact was intentional or accidental.

The court found that the complainant's account could only be interpreted as an intentional assault, ruling out accident.

The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the assailant based on the complainant's identification evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence including a taxi driver's near-contemporaneous observations and the accused's statements in the taxi.

At a preliminary hearing, the Crown sought committal on charges of importing a Schedule I substance (cocaine) under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The defendant, an international traveler transiting through Toronto International Airport from St. Lucia to the United Kingdom, was stopped by border officials who discovered approximately 3.9 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the linings of his checked luggage.

The defendant admitted the luggage was his, that he had packed it, and was aware of its contents.

The defendant resisted committal arguing insufficient evidence of possession (no proof of knowledge of the hidden drugs), insufficient evidence of mens rea for importing (arguing he was merely in transit and never intended to import into Canada), and insufficient evidence of possession for trafficking purposes (arguing lack of expert evidence regarding quantity thresholds).

The court found reasonable inferences could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence supporting committal on both charges.

The court addressed an ex parte communication from an unrepresented accused who objected to the pre-trial process and requested a further judicial pre-trial meeting.

The accused had failed to attend the Trial Co-ordinator's office following a judicial pre-trial conference and subsequently sent an unsigned letter to the court raising procedural objections.

The court rejected the accused's objections, finding the pre-trial process was properly conducted and that trial dates could be set.

The court reminded the accused that ex parte communications with the judge are prohibited and that all future communications must occur in open court on the record.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a traffic stop where the officer detected an odour of alcohol.

The defence raised multiple Charter breaches including sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no section 7 breach regarding lost in-car video evidence, no section 8 breach regarding the timing of the ASD demand, and no section 9 breach regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found a brief section 10(b) breach (8 minutes) regarding the failure to provide right to counsel advice immediately upon detention for investigation, but the accused was offered the opportunity to contact duty counsel at the roadside and did speak with duty counsel at the station before approved instrument testing.

The court applied the section 24(2) analysis and admitted the breath test evidence, finding all Grant factors favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

Following a finding of a section 8 Charter breach in a prior decision (R. v. Muhammad, 2018 ONCJ 468), the court addressed whether evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant should be admitted or excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The affiant's Information to Obtain contained misstatements regarding surveillance that had not been conducted and omissions regarding the accused's lack of criminal record, despite references to a "lengthy criminal past" involving weapons.

The court applied the Grant test, examining the seriousness of the breach, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court concluded that while the breach was serious, it did not rise to the level of egregious conduct, and the reliable evidence (drugs and firearm) was necessary for trial.

The evidence was admitted.

The defendant brought a motion to compel production of an Approved Screening Device (ASD) printout and notes from two police officers regarding the storage and handling of the ASD used during a RIDE program stop.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing the ASD printout was a third-party record governed by the O'Connor test and that the officer notes were not relevant.

The court found the ASD printout was a third-party record not subject to first-party disclosure obligations and dismissed that portion of the application.

However, the court ordered disclosure of the officer notes from the two assisting officers, finding they were potentially relevant to the defendant's ability to make full answer and defence, particularly given the anticipated evidence regarding ambient temperature conditions and the placement of the ASD prior to testing.

The appellant appealed her conviction for speeding (159 km/h in a 100 km/h zone) on the grounds that her paralegal agent entered a guilty plea without proper instructions and that her plea was uninformed.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of her affidavit and supporting documents.

The court dismissed the appeal on two grounds: first, the appellant's agent on appeal failed to follow the required protocol for allegations of incompetent assistance by not providing notice to trial counsel or conducting independent investigation; second, the proposed fresh evidence failed to meet the Palmer test for admissibility and actually supported the conclusion that the plea was voluntary and informed.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault and mischief.

The court accepted a joint submission and sentenced the accused to four months imprisonment on the assault charge (with credit for one and a half days of presentence custody), with the mischief charge resulting in a suspended sentence.

The accused was placed on a two-year probation with conditions including a no-contact order with the victim (with limited exceptions for family court proceedings and contact arrangements regarding their child), a 200-metre non-association order, mandatory counselling and rehabilitation programs, DNA order, and a ten-year firearms prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code.

Two summary conviction surcharges of $100 each were imposed.

The defendant was charged with 31 counts of participating in the making of false or misleading statements in Records of Employment (ROEs) and Employment Insurance (EI) applications under the Employment Insurance Act.

The prosecution alleged that the defendant knowingly provided false ROEs to individuals so they could obtain EI benefits, knowing they had not actually worked for the businesses named in the ROEs, often in exchange for payment.

The defendant testified that he merely prepared the ROEs based on instructions and information provided by his employer, Jaspal Singh, without knowledge that the contents were false, and that he did not sign the ROEs.

After a lengthy trial involving multiple witnesses and documentary evidence, the court found the defendant guilty on 10 counts and acquitted him on 10 counts, with 11 counts withdrawn by the Crown during trial.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The defendant was charged with two counts of uttering a threat to cause death and one count of sexual assault against his wife.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's evidence, as she was the sole Crown witness.

The defendant testified in his own defence.

The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses and found the complainant's evidence to be credible, consistent, and logical, while finding significant gaps in logic and implausibility in the defendant's evidence.

The defendant's narrative failed to explain why the complainant would leave the home on two separate occasions if his version of events were true.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty on all three counts.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample for an approved screening device (ASD) contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The charge arose from a 911 call regarding an intoxicated woman in a parking lot near a vehicle.

The defendant's passenger was intoxicated and arrested for public intoxication.

The defendant was subjected to an ASD demand after the officer formed reasonable suspicion based on observing alcohol in the vehicle and smelling alcohol on the defendant's breath.

The defendant was given eight opportunities to provide a suitable breath sample over approximately eight minutes but failed to do so.

The defendant testified that he was attempting to comply but was too nervous and scared.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that the ASD demand was valid and made forthwith, and that the defendant intentionally refused to provide a sample.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and voluntariness voir dire.

The court found the defendant's statements in the breath room to be voluntary.

The defendant's evidence was rejected as implausible, illogical, and inconsistent.

The court found that while the eyewitness identification was unreliable, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the van involved in the collision.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that he intentionally refused to provide a breath sample.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

She was found intoxicated in a mall parking lot near her vehicle.

The court found the Crown did not prove she occupied the driver's seat, so the statutory presumption of care or control did not apply.

However, applying the Boudreault framework, the court found a realistic risk of danger that the accused would change her mind and drive, given her level of intoxication, possession of keys, and lack of a concrete alternative plan.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault by wounding and uttering a threat to cause death following an incident in which she stabbed the complainant twice.

The Crown's case relied on the evidence of the complainant and a witness.

The defendant testified that she acted in self-defence after being thrown to the ground and pinned down by the complainant, who was about to punch her.

The trial judge found credibility issues with all three witnesses but determined that the defendant's evidence, while not fully believed, left reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances of the incident and the availability of self-defence.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to his spouse, who suffered from advanced multiple sclerosis.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the accused failed to provide adequate nutrition and medical care, resulting in severe malnutrition, bedsores, and ultimately contributing to the spouse's death from sepsis.

The defence argued that the accused had been a devoted caregiver for many years and that the evidence contained inferential gaps.

The court found that the Crown met the committal test, as a reasonable jury could infer that the accused failed to provide necessaries of life and that this failure constituted a marked departure from what a reasonably prudent person would do.

However, the court acknowledged significant countervailing evidence and live issues regarding the spouse's capacity to refuse treatment.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in oxycodone.

The Crown sought 18-24 months incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 12-16 months followed by probation.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence followed by one year probation.

The court found that while general deterrence and denunciation are paramount in drug trafficking cases, the defendant's circumstances—including advanced age (73 years old), first offender status, small role in the trafficking scheme, motivation driven by personal oxycodone dependence, and significant pre-trial custody and house arrest—warranted a conditional sentence as a rare exception to the typical incarceration requirement.

A preliminary inquiry into charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana and cocaine, and weapons offences involving a loaded semi-automatic handgun.

The Crown sought committal on all charges including conspiracy counts.

The court found sufficient evidence for committal on the possession for the purpose of trafficking charges for both accused.

However, the court discharged the conspiracy charges and all firearm-related charges against one accused, finding that the inferences required to support these charges would be speculative rather than reasonably drawn from the evidence.