ONTARIO YOUTH COURT OF JUSTICE
WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
This is a case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and is subject to subsections 110(1) and 111(1) and section 129 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:
IDENTITY OF YOUNG PERSON NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.
IDENTITY OF VICTIM OR WITNESS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
NO SUBSEQUENT DISCLOSURE — No person who is given access to a record or to whom information is disclosed under this Act shall disclose that information to any person unless the disclosure is authorized under this Act.
Subsection 138(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply with these provisions, states as follows:
- OFFENCES — Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published) . . . or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) . . .
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
E.L. (A Young Person)
Sentencing Judgment
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on July 15, 2025, and January 26, 2026
Written Reasons released on February 4, 2026
E. Stimec counsel for the Crown
J. Pyzer counsel for E.L.
I. Introduction
1E.L, a young person, pleaded guilty to one count of willfully causing unnecessary suffering to a bird, namely a pigeon, by physical stomping, contrary to Section 445.1, subsection (1), clause (a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
II. Facts In Support of the Guilty Plea
2On September 16, 2023, at approximately 9:50 a.m., a citizen was walking in downtown Toronto. He observed E.L. approaching a pigeon and kick it 20 feet down the street. E.L. then stomped on the pigeon several times, ultimately killing it.
III. Background of E.L.
3I ordered the completion of a YCJA section 34 report on July 15, 2025. The preparation of that report was delayed by several months because CAMH staff could not locate E.L. He was unhoused and lacked a permanent address until recently. A full report was provided to the court on November 26, 2025.
4E.L. presented as polite and pleasant during the assessment process. He was forthcoming and shared all the requested information. He provided clear, coherent and insightful responses.
5E.L. was born in the Toronto area. His mother is Indigenous and Black, and his father is Black. He has a good relationship with his mother, but never really knew his father. His father was not involved in his upbringing.
6As a child, his family was financially secure. His mother cared for him and his siblings. He was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which may have made his education more challenging. He got into fights with students at elementary school.
7At 15, he chose to leave home and live in a shelter. He found school difficult and wanted more freedom. Over the next two years, he was without stable housing. When he was in school, he experienced racism and bullying. When living without a home, he faced more discrimination.
8Living outside his mother’s home was not easy. He was exposed to several traumatic events. He was threatened. He had inconsistent access to food and shelter. He lost weight. He made negative peer associations. He eventually ended up on the streets. There, he became involved with acquaintances who were involved in crime, substance use, and had access to weapons. He was concerned he might face violence himself if he did not do what they wanted. Most of these people were adults over 30. They clearly had a negative impact on him.
9After two years, he returned to live with his mother. He decided to separate himself from the people he met while he was without housing. He avoided areas he knew they were likely to be found. He continues to make efforts to completely disconnect himself from his former lifestyle.
10He has a couple of close friends at present. He has reenrolled in a new high school. That was not completed until late last year due to the required process with his local school board. He has been attending classes regularly. His grades are in the 80s and 90s. He has earned 20 credits (30 are required to graduate). He explained to the authors of the section 34 report that he feels better now and can focus more on his studies. A Vice Principal who was interviewed confirmed that he is an “easygoing student” who gets along well with his teachers. E.L. is committed to graduating.
11E.L. worked last summer at a camp and hopes to return there in the future. He enjoys this job opportunity greatly.
12E.L. and his mother both reported that E.L. rarely gets angry. He does not have any diagnosed mental health concerns. The authors of the section 34 report assessed him as being at a low risk of reoffending.
13Regarding the offence itself, E.L. stated that the pigeon clawed at him when he was eating food. He tried to get it to leave him alone. When it continued, he struck it. His actions were not planned. He does not feel good about what he did and knows that the pigeon did not deserve to die. He also knows what he did was wrong.
IV. Allocution
14E.L. apologized for his actions. He explained that he was in a terrible place in his life at the time. He does not excuse his conduct, but wanted me to understand why it happened. He is now trying to lead a better life and be a positive, contributing citizen. He is eager to finish his education, continue working, and cooperate with the support systems identified by the authors of the section 34 report.
V. Positions of the Parties
15Mr. Stimec informed me that this case had originally been screened for a 30-day custody and supervision order by a member of his office. The theory of the Crown was that the offence should be characterized by an “exceptional case” pursuant to YCJA s. 39(1)(d). However, on the day the plea was entered, the Assistant Crown Attorney in court at the time (not Mr. Stimec) elected to proceed by way of summary conviction. As a result, Mr. Stimec recognized that for the Crown to rely upon section 39(1)(d) of the YCJA, the Crown is required to proceed by indictment.
16Instead, he submitted that a probation order would be appropriate, to ensure that E.L. was connected with appropriate programming and supervised by a youth probation officer. He also recommended E.L. complete community service hours to hold him accountable.
17On behalf of E.L., Mr. Pyzer advocated for a conditional discharge. He emphasized his client’s guilty plea, the dated nature of the offence, and the impressive rehabilitation efforts that E.L. has undertaken in the years since. He is now a young adult, who has reconnected with his family and built positive relationships. He is on his way to completing high school and has seasonal employment. His client is open to complying with all recommendations in the YCJA section 34 report, regardless of the sentence I impose.
VI. Youth Sentencing Principles and “Exceptional Cases”: YCJA s. 39(1)(d)
18A youth sentence must be “proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence”: section 38(2)(c). When arriving at an appropriate sentence, a youth justice court shall take into account the following factors pursuant to YCJA s. 38(3):
(a) The degree of participation of the young person in the commission of the offence;
(b) The harm done to victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable;
(c) Any reparation made by the young person to the victim or the community;
(d) The time spent in detention by the young person as a result of the offence;
(e) The previous findings of guilt of the young person; and
(f) Any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the young person or the offence that are relevant to the purpose and principles set out in [section 38].
19Parliament enacted the YCJA to reduce the “unacceptably high level of youth incarceration” that had been occurring in Canada under the Young Offenders Act: see R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., 2005 SCC 78, at para. 48. The preamble to the legislation states that the youth justice system should ensure “fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity”: see YCJA section 3(1)(b)(ii). Young persons are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability for their crimes as a principle of fundamental justice pursuant to section 7 of the Charter: see R. v. D.B., 2008 SCC 25.
20A youth justice court should impose a sentence that will hold a young person accountable for their actions through the imposition of “just sanctions that have meaningful consequences for the young person and that promote his or her long-term rehabilitation and reintegration into society”: see YCJA section 38.
21The Act emphasizes community-based dispositions and imposes restrictions on the availability of custodial sentences. Under YCJA section 39(1), a young person may only be sentenced to custody if one of the following subsections applies. I have edited them for brevity and clarity for the purposes of this judgment:
(a) the young person committed a “violent offence”, as that term is defined in the statute;
(b) the young person has previously been found guilty of an offence under section 137 in relation to more than one sentence;
(c) the young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has a history that indicates a pattern of either extrajudicial sanctions or of findings of guilt or of both; or
(d) in exceptional cases where the young person has committed an indictable offence, the aggravating circumstances of the offence are such that the imposition of a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles set out in section 38.
22The Crown’s original position for a custody and supervision order turned on the applicability of the final option, YCJA s. 39(1)(d). “Exceptional cases” for the purposes of this section have been held to mean those non-violent cases where any order, other than custody, would undermine the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in section 38 of the YCJA. They must be the “clearest of cases where a custodial disposition is the only disposition that can be justified”: see R. v. R.E.W., 2006 1761, at para. 44.
23YCJA section 39(1)(d) states that the young person must be found guilty of an indictable offence. Cruelty to animals is a hybrid offence, and the Crown can proceed by summary conviction or indictment. Section 34 of the Interpretation Act, (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21), states:
Where an enactment creates an offence,
(a) the offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the enactment provides that the offender may be prosecuted for the offence by indictment;
(b) the offence is deemed to be one for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction if there is nothing in the context to indicate that the offence is an indictable offence; and
(c) if the offence is one for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment or for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction, no person shall be considered to have been convicted of an indictable offence by reason only of having been convicted of the offence on summary conviction.
24The Crown proceeded summarily on the date E.L. pleaded guilty. I agree with Mr. Stimec that tactical decision precludes the application of YCJA s. 39(1)(d). Pursuant to section 34(c) of the Interpretation Act, E.L. cannot be considered to have been convicted of an indictable offence. Therefore, no “gateway” to custody has been opened under YCJA section 39(1), and I am limited to the range of non-custodial sentencing options set out in YCJA section 42.
25Alternatively, even if the Crown had proceeded by indictment, I do not accept that this offence meets the criteria for an “exceptional case” as required by YCJA section 39(1)(d).
26The Crown’s original position was understandable. Without question, E.L.’s treatment of the pigeon was disturbing. Each of us has an obligation to treat animals with dignity and respect. They are sentient beings who can feel pain, fear, and suffering. They can also feel love and compassion. Kicking this bird to death demonstrates that E.L. had serious difficulties with anger management at the time and demonstrated a shocking degree of callousness towards a defenceless animal.
27Canadian criminal law has greatly evolved over the last twenty years regarding how seriously animal cruelty is taken. In 2008, Parliament passed An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals), S.C. 2008, c. 12. For adult offenders, the amendments increased the maximum penalty for animal cruelty offences when the Crown proceeds by summary conviction to 18 months’ imprisonment. In 2019, it was raised again to two years less a day. In R. v. Wright, 2014 ONCA 675, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code for this offence “signal an added determination by Parliament to deter and punish those who would engage in acts of cruelty to animals”: see para. 1. The Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Chen, 2021 ABCA 382, reviewed the history of the animal cruelty provisions and wrote that the “views of society with respect to animal cruelty and the harms caused by this conduct must continue to evolve”: see para. 21.
28Nevertheless, it is vital to remember that sentencing decisions issued pursuant to the applicable provisions of the YCJA cannot be directly compared to sentencing decisions made under the Criminal Code. Indeed, young persons are “constitutionally different” from adults for sentencing purposes: see R. v. M.W., 2017 ONCA 22, at para. 163. Every adult offender who commits the offence of animal cruelty may be sentenced to custody. But not every act of animal cruelty committed by a young person will meet the criteria of YCJA section 39(1)(d).
29I cannot conclude that the imposition of a non-custodial sentence for this offence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles set out in section 38 of the YCJA. The circumstances of this offence, while extremely troubling, do not rise to the level of one of the “clearest of cases where a custodial disposition is the only disposition that can be justified.” Parliament intended to dramatically restrict the availability of custodial sentences for youth. Youth justice courts must be very careful about expanding the availability of custodial sentences, even when the facts of some non-violent offences are extremely disturbing. Parliament’s intent must be respected.
30That does not mean that other cases of animal cruelty committed by a young person, different from this one, would be unable to meet the test contained in YCJA section 39(1)(d). It is easy to imagine cases that would. This case, however, must be decided on the facts presented as part of the guilty plea only.
VII. An Appropriate Youth Sentence
31The YCJA requires youth justice courts to hold a young person accountable for their offending behaviour. Accountability in this context requires a youth sentencing court to consider the normative consequences of the offence; the impact of the offence on any victims and the broader community; and the availability of appropriate rehabilitative and reintegrative supports within the youth justice system: see R. v. I.M., 2025 SCC 23, at para. 173.
32Accountability can never be equated solely with retribution, and the rehabilitative potential of the young person must always be considered when crafting a just sentence. As explained by the Supreme Court in I.M., at para. 171:
Accountability under the YCJA reflects an equilibrium between different purposes: [translation] “Rather than adopting a strictly punitive approach, the YCJA favours accountability aimed at transforming the young offender through measures tailored to their development and their capacity for reintegration” (Destrempe Rochette, at p. 72). For example, the YCJA requires sentencing judges to consider, in measuring the proper sanction to be imposed, the harm caused to victims (ss. 3(1)(c)(ii) and 38(3)(b)), alongside rehabilitation and reintegration into society, which are all understood to “contribut[e] to the long-term protection of the public” (s. 38(1)). The rules in the YCJA are different from those that apply to adult offenders, recognizing, as one scholar noted, an understanding that “children cannot be viewed merely as chronologically younger than adults, but rather as inherently vulnerable and immature human beings whose behavioural development and character formation remains ongoing” (Jones, at p. 97).
33E.L. was going through a very difficult time in his young life when the offence occurred. Much has changed for him over the past two and a half years. He has not reoffended and has complied with the terms of his release order. He returned to living with his mother. He has re-enrolled in school and has some new, close friends who are a good influence on him. He is no longer associated with the negative peer group he became involved with while he was without housing. He understands how his former peer group was impacting his behaviour.
34When sentencing a young person, youth justice courts must not place undue emphasis on the objective gravity of the offence. In I.M., the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that while this factor remains relevant to assessing the sentencing outcome necessary to hold a young person accountable for their actions, “the seriousness of the offence as an abstract matter” must be approached with caution: see para. 141. The Supreme Court recognized that young persons have diminished moral culpability regardless of the offence committed. As one scholar cited by the majority noted, a young person either has or does not have diminished capacity “whatever their crimes.”1
35Young persons may commit offences for all manner of reasons. Sometimes those reasons will demonstrate heightened culpability. But in many cases, such as this one, placing undue emphasis on the nature and circumstances of the offence could result in a sentence that distorts E.L.’s moral culpability and fails to respect the YCJA's distinct sentencing principles. Those principles must be applied on an individualized basis, reflecting what is learned about the young person’s development, background, and needs, as well as the reasons for his committing the offence.
36What E.L. needs now is stability and positive adult connections. The authors of the section 34 assessment noted that E.L. “demonstrated emotional resilience once he returned to a safe home.” He is motivated to move forward in life, complete his education, and find long-term employment. E.L.’s rehabilitation will be further promoted by an order of this court releasing the YCJA section 34 assessment to professionals who offer him their care in the future. I will also release the psycho-educational component of the report to his current school to assist in developing an appropriate educational plan to meet his unique needs. That, too, will help ensure his educators are better able to support his future success through a learning plan tailored to his specific cognitive needs.
37E.L. has indicated his willingness to voluntarily cooperate with appropriate service providers. Further state supervision of E.L. is simply not necessary through a probation order or even a conditional discharge. Any youth sentencing order should promote the young person’s long-term rehabilitation and reintegration. E.L. has already begun that process on his own. He has a support network in the community. He is motivated to change. In addition to returning to school, he has gained work experience through both a summer job and a co-op placement.
38I emphasize that he has not re-offended in over two years. This is a significant period in a young person's life, characterized by rapid cognitive and psychosocial development. E.L. has changed greatly in this time, and youth justice courts must be cautious to “avoid punishing young persons for 'who they used to be'”: see R. v. K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55, at para. 54.
39When a young person would benefit from supervised counselling or therapy and may need to be incentivized to comply, a probation order or conditional discharge may be appropriate. For E.L, the authors of the section 34 report concluded that there are “no significant, persistent concerns regarding E.L.’s anger, aggression or oppositionality.” His antisocial behaviour arose from him being unhoused and being exposed to negative influences, repeated trauma, food insecurity, and a lack of guidance. In his current environment, he has not engaged in antisocial behaviour. Indeed, he is actively trying to avoid it. He has taken, and continues to take, his rehabilitation very seriously. I conclude he does not present any danger to public safety.
40Section 42(2) of the YCJA stipulates that upon finding a young person guilty of an offence, a Youth Justice Court may impose any one of, or a combination of, various sanctions. One of the options available in sentencing a youth is a judicial reprimand: section 42(2)(a).
41E.L. has shown insight into what he has done. This incident was completely out of character for him. I find his moral culpability diminished by the difficult conditions he faced while unhoused. Furthermore, he has been held accountable, in part, by the lengthy justice process itself, which has included arrest, fingerprinting, release on conditions, multiple court appearances, and being found guilty by a judge: see R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, at para. 33.2 He underwent a lengthy evaluation and assessment to complete the section 34 report. He respected every aspect of this process and fully cooperated with everything asked of him.
42A judicial reprimand is often described as a “formal rebuke, a scolding and a stern lecture”.3 A judge who imposes a reprimand is expected to discuss the offence with the individual and express their disapproval.4 A judge is also expected to stress that the youth will not reoffend.
43A reprimand may be imposed for any offence where the youth justice court deems it appropriate. The nature of the offence itself does not preclude a reprimand from being considered. For example, in R. v. T.B., [2017] O.J. No. 7233, the young persons pleaded guilty to robbery and being unlawfully in a dwelling house. The youth justice court concluded that the young persons understood that what they had done was wrong and did not see the need for further supervision through a probation order. A reprimand was imposed. In R. v. R. (T.D.), 2015 NSPC 25, the young person pleaded guilty to a series of older break-and-enter charges. Even though valuable property had been taken, the youth justice court concluded that a reprimand was an appropriate sentence.
44Of note, the Crown appealed the trial judge’s sentencing decision in T.B. and argued that it was manifestly unfit. The Court of Appeal disagreed, deciding that the sentence was legally available and the trial judge’s decision was subject to deference: see R. v. T.B., 2017 ONCA 746. Wide latitude is available to youth justice courts to craft an appropriate sentence. The Court of Appeal explained that the trial judge considered the seriousness of the offence, but also the circumstances of the offenders, including that they had taken “substantial rehabilitation measures on their own”: see para. 3.
45Finally, the retention period for any youth records associated with a conditional discharge is three years: YCJA s. 119(2)(f). A reprimand brings another benefit to the young person – a much shorter retention period of only 60 days: YCJA section 119(2)(c). E.L. may be able to soon apply to post-secondary education and continue to pursue appropriate employment opportunities. A youth record with a lengthier retention period might needlessly hinder those efforts. For example, YCJA section 125(6) permits the disclosure of a youth record to a school board or educational institution when certain criteria are met. That is an unavoidable collateral consequence in some cases. But the record retention periods aligned with different sentencing options should always be considered by a youth justice court, especially when a young person has made tremendous progress in their life.
VIII. Conclusion
46This was an unusual case of animal cruelty committed by a young person during a very difficult time in his life. There is no reason to believe he will ever commit such an offence again. He has proven his commitment to his long-term rehabilitation and understands what led him to commit this offence. He is already connected to the support networks he needs in the community and has demonstrated his commitment to his education. His expressions of remorse are genuine.
47I impose a judicial reprimand.
48Portions of the section 34 report will be released to appropriate service providers as requested by counsel.
Released: February 4, 2026
Signed: Justice Brock Jones
Footnotes
- M. E. Vandergoot, Justice for Young Offenders: Their Needs, Our Responses (2006), at p. 119
- C. J. Tulloch’s remarks in Habib were centred on young adults in the criminal justice system. They are even more persuasive when applied to young persons and the youth criminal justice system.
- Justice M. Bloomenfeld, Youth Criminal Justice Act Manual (Thomson Reuters), section 6.56
- See the discussion of reprimands contained in Youth Criminal Justice Law, 3rd Edition (Irwin Law: 2012), authored by Prof. N. Bala of Queen’s University and Justice S. Anand.