Ontario Court of Justice
Citation: Felix Perez v. Samuel, 2026 ONCJ 53 Date: February 2, 2026 Court File No.: D42510/22
Between: Bilerky Felix Perez, Applicant
- and - Miguel Alejandro Samuel, Respondent
Counsel: Glenda Perry, for the Applicant Omar Rambhajan, for the Respondent
Heard: In Chambers Before: Justice S.B. Sherr
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
Part One – Introduction
1On December 29, 2025, the court released its reasons for decision regarding the respondent’s (the father’s) motion to change the child support terms contained in the court’s order dated November 8, 2022, relating to the parties’ two children (the children). The court ordered a minor reduction in the father’s monthly child support payments, starting on October 1, 2025, because the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines) table amounts had changed on September 10, 2025.1 Otherwise, the father’s motion to change was dismissed. See: Felix Perez v. Samuel, 2025 ONCJ 692.
2The court found that the applicant (the mother) was the successful party on the father’s motion to change and entitled to her costs. She made written costs submissions. She seeks costs of $17,342 and asks that the costs be enforced as a support order by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office (the Director).
3The father submits that that he should pay costs of $2,300 to the mother.
Part Two – General costs principles
4The Ontario Court of Appeal in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 set out that modern costs rules are designed to foster four fundamental purposes:
(1) to partially indemnify successful litigants; (2) to encourage settlement; (3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants and; (4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly under subrule 2 (2) (all references to rules in this decision are to the Family Law Rules).
5Costs awards are discretionary. Two important principles in exercising discretion are reasonableness and proportionality. See: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.
6Costs can be used to sanction behaviour that increases the duration and expense of litigation or is otherwise unreasonable or vexatious. In short, it has become a routine matter for courts to employ the power to order costs as a tool in the furtherance of the efficient and orderly administration of justice. See: British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, paragraph 25.
7An award of costs is subject to the factors listed in subrule 24 (14), subrule 24 (7) pertaining to unreasonable conduct of a successful party, subrule 24 (10) pertaining to bad faith, subrule 24 (12) pertaining to offers to settle, and the reasonableness of the costs sought by the successful party. See: Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, at paragraph 94.
Part Three – Bad faith
3.1 Legal considerations
8The mother seeks her full recovery costs pursuant to subrule 24 (10) that states:
Bad faith
24 (10) If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.
9Subrule 24 (10) requires a fairly high threshold of egregious behaviour, and as such a finding of bad faith is rarely made. See: Cozzi v. Smith, 2015 ONSC 3626; Scipione v. Del Sordo, 2015 CarswellOnt 14971 (Ont. SCJ).
10There is a difference between bad faith and unreasonable behaviour. The essence of bad faith is when a person suggests their actions are aimed for one purpose when they are aimed for another purpose. It is done knowingly and intentionally. See: S.(C.) v. S. (M.) (2007), 2007 20279 (ON SC), 38 R.F.L. (6th) 315 (Ont. SCJ).
11Bad faith is not synonymous with bad judgment or negligence; rather, it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Bad faith involves intentional duplicity, obstruction or obfuscation. See: Scipione, supra.
12Persistent refusal by a party to make accurate financial disclosure and reveal their true income may rise to the level of bad faith. See: DePace v. Michienzi 2000 22460 (ONSC); Kardaras v. Kardaras, 2008 ONCJ 616; Jones v. Hugo, [2012] ONCJ 381; Jansen v. DiCecco, 2025 ONCJ 256.
13A party who adopts “a catch-me-if-you-can approach to financial disclosure” demonstrates bad faith and breaches rule 13. See: Parry v. Parry, 2020 ONSC 3437.
14In Lewis v. Lynch, 2024 ONCJ 325, this court made a finding of bad faith against the father because he withheld financial disclosure and did not advise the mother of large increases in his income. This court wrote that to change behaviour, courts must make orders that send clear and strong messages to support payors, such as the father, that such conduct will result in significant financial consequences for them. This will not dissuade all dishonest payors. However, increasing the risks for such conduct may dissuade many more of them.
15A bad faith finding on some specific issue does not necessarily have a spill-over effect to other issues. See: Hunt v. Hunt [2001] O.J. No. 5111 (SCJ); Kardaras v. Kardaras, 2008 ONCJ 616; R.A.K. v. M.Z., 2024 ONCJ 2.
3.2 Analysis
16The court made the following findings of fact about the father in its reasons for decision:
a) He denied any knowledge of the original court proceeding when it was ongoing. He claimed he only learned about it when the Director executed a warrant of committal against him for non-payment of child support. This was not true. He had attended at First Appearance Court and at one case conference during the initial court proceeding. At both attendances, he sought and obtained extensions to file responding material. He filed nothing and the court found him in default.
b) He claimed he was unemployed and had no income. This was false. The mother produced a multitude of pictures and a video showing the father was working and running an interlocking business. The father did not dispute he was the person in the photos but dismissed them, claiming they were from 10 years ago. However, many of the photos were much more current, many in 2024 and even up to February 2025.
c) The father continued to run his interlocking business on a cash basis.
d) The father’s income tax returns bore no relation to his actual income.
e) The father tried to hide his income from the mother and the court.
f) The father has avoided his child support obligations.
17The father’s conduct constitutes bad faith. The mother is entitled to full recovery costs.
Part Four – Analysis of the amount of costs
18Even if full recovery costs are triggered by the rules, the claim must still be reasonable and proportionate. It must also reflect, to some extent, the reasonable expectations of the paying party. See: Tintinalli v. Tutolo, 2022 ONSC 6276.
19The Rules do not require the court to allow the successful party to demand a blank cheque for their costs. See: Slongo v Slongo 2015 ONSC 3327 (SCJ). The court retains a residual discretion to make costs awards which are proportional, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. See: Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 1556.
20Subrule 24 (14) reads as follows:
24 (14) In setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider,
a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:
(i) each party’s behaviour,
(ii) the time spent by each party,
(iii) any written offers to settle including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18,
iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates,
v) any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates,
vi) any other expenses properly paid or payable; and
(b) any other relevant matter.
21This case was important to the parties.
22The mother acted reasonably.
23There are two components to the mother’s costs claim. She acted in person until she retained counsel to conduct the trial. She is claiming costs for her counsel for the trial step, and for her own time for the prior steps in the case.
24The mother’s counsel’s rates of $525 each hour are reasonable for a 1992 call to the bar.
25The father submitted that the mother’s bill of costs was excessive, unreasonable and disproportionate. The court considered the father’s submission that his bill of costs was under $5,000. However, the father was responsible for driving up the costs of the case because:
a) He failed to provide complete financial disclosure.
b) He lied about not working. The mother spent considerable time conducting social media searches to obtain the necessary evidence to disprove his claims.
c) He did not advise the mother’s counsel that he would only seek to change child support starting on April 1, 2025, until his opening submissions. The mother had to prepare for the case on the basis that he was seeking a retroactive change to support starting on January 1, 2021, and also seeking to rescind the support arrears.
d) He did not comply with trial directions. He did not provide a draft order. He did not upload his trial materials to Case Centre until a few minutes before the trial started.
26The court reviewed the mother’s bill of costs. The time spent, even with these additional challenges caused by the father’s conduct was high. This was a half-day hearing.
27The mother also claims $300 costs for each of her appearances as a self-represented litigant at the two First Attendance Court appearances and the two case conferences.
28In Thomas v. Saunchez, 2022 ONCJ 532, this court ordered costs for the attendance at First Appearance Court. These are appearances before a court clerk to ensure that the case is ready to send to a judge for a case conference. There should be no expectation that costs will be addressed at this step of a case. Also ordered in N.M. v. S.M., 2023 ONCJ 23. The costs claimed by the mother for these appearances is reasonable and proportionate.
29Trial courts are hesitant to order costs for prior conferences where costs are not reserved. See: Laidman v. Pasalic and Laidman, 2020 ONSC 7068. An exception is when the trial judge is in a better position than the trial management judge to assess costs. See: Berge v. Soerensen, 2020 ONCJ 265. The deference given to the case management judge to decide costs will also not be as germane when the trial judge and the case management judge, as was the case here, are the same.
30Here, the court was in a better position to assess the costs for the two case conferences after the trial. It crystallized the father’s deception and the lack of merit to his claim.
31The costs claimed by the mother for her preparation for and attendances at the two case conferences is reasonable and proportionate.
32The mother claimed HST for her costs as a self-represented litigant. This will not be ordered. She is not required to remit HST to the government. HST will be added to the costs awarded for her counsel.
33The court considered that the mother was unsuccessful in obtaining conditions for the father to obtain leave before bringing any future motion to change. However, she was successful in obtaining a leave order.
34The court considered the father’s ability to pay costs. See: MacDonald v. Magel (2003) 2003 18880 (ON CA), 67 O.R. (3d) 181 (Ont. C.A.). Ability to pay will be less of a mitigating factor when the impecunious party has acted unreasonably. See: Gobin v. Gobin, 2009 ONCJ 278; D.D. and F.D. v. H.G., 2020 ONSC 1919. It is even less of a factor when the court has made a finding of bad faith against that party.
35Those who can least afford to litigate should be most motivated to seriously pursue settlement and avoid unnecessary proceedings. See: Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3338; Balsmeier v Balsmeier, 2016 ONSC 3485.
36The court will order the father to pay costs to the mother of $12,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST. Pursuant to subrule 24 (10), the costs are payable immediately.
37The mother seeks an order that the Director enforce the costs as a support order. All the legal work was attributable to the child support issue. The court will make the order sought by the mother.
Part Five – Conclusion
38The court orders as follows:
a) The father shall pay costs to the mother of $12,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST. This amount is inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.
b) The costs are payable immediately.
c) This costs award is a support order within the meaning of section 1 (1) (g) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, and as such, it is enforceable by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office.
Released: February 2, 2026 Justice Stanley B. Sherr