ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: R. v. Chandrasekera, 2026 ONCJ 482
DATE: 2026 07 29
COURT FILE No.: Newmarket 998 25 91102893
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
SALIYA CHANDRASEKERA
Before Justice Michael Perlin
Heard on April 20 and July 24, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on July 29, 2026
Tharziha Ganeshamoorthy.............................................................. counsel for the Crown
Carlos Rippell............................................................................... counsel for the defendant
[1] The complainant and the defendant were married, living together with their young daughter. The complainant alleges that he assaulted her on February 21 and March 19, 2025, and threatened to kill her on March 20, 2025. He denies the first alleged assault and the threat. With respect to alleged assault on the March 19, he testifies he acted in self-defence, physically restraining the complainant in response to her physical aggression. His version does not account for some of the bruising, evident in photos, which she attributes to the assault.
I. Legal principles
[2] I must decide whether the Crown has proven any of the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty, although it is much closer to that degree of certainty, than it is to proof on a balance of probabilities. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense that arises logically from the evidence or an absence of evidence. In essence, to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, I must be sure he is guilty.
[3] In deciding whether the Crown has met its burden, I must not simply select a version of events that I prefer. Rather, if I believe the defendant’s denials, I must find him not guilty. If I don’t believe his denials, but they leave me in reasonable doubt on whether he committed the offences, I must find him not guilty. If I am not left in reasonable doubt by his evidence, I will find him guilty only if I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence that I do accept that he is guilty.
[4] With respect to the second alleged assault, the defendant claims he acted in self-defence. Where there is an air of reality to self-defence, the defence will result in an acquittal unless the Crown can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (i) did not believe on reasonable grounds that he was being attacked, (ii) did not apply force to defend against that attack, or (iii) did not respond to that attack reasonably in the circumstances.
II. Credibility findings
[5] The complainant was not a credible witness. She denied ever threatening to kill the defendant, leaving him a WhatsApp message in which she threatened to kill him, or insulting him by reference to his and his family’s social status under the Sri Lankan caste system. She described herself as measured and having always matched the defendant’s tone during their arguments.
[6] This evidence was inconsistent with audio recordings the defendant had secretly made of some of their fights. In these recordings, she threatened to kill him, insulted his family’s caste, and was clearly enraged at times when he appeared calm.
[7] I do not believe the recordings are a reliable indicator of the dynamics of all their apparently frequent fights. Since he knew some fights were being recorded, but she did not, and he made the recordings to create a record to be used against her, I find it is likely that he moderated his behaviour during the fights he chose to record. The important point, however, is that these unbalanced fights occurred, while she suggested they had not.
[8] I find that the complainant deliberately portrayed herself inaccurately in her testimony. She also had a strong motive to fabricate allegations against the defendant: a burgeoning family-law dispute with respect to her desire to take their daughter out of Canada came to a head on the very day that she reported the allegations to police. Her dishonesty with the court and motive to fabricate the allegations leave me unable to rely on her evidence. I cannot be confident that she testified honestly about the allegations.
[9] The defendant was also not credible. Like the complainant, he portrayed himself inaccurately. He implausibly disputed that a comment he had made to her insinuated that she was having an extra-marital affair; that was its clear meaning. He also implausibly suggested that a recorded comment from her that their daughter was not his biological daughter was the first time this idea had occurred to him. It was clear from the surrounding context that this was something they had discussed before while fighting, perhaps frequently. I do not believe the recordings he made are accurate representations of typical fights between them. He claimed he mainly tried to deescalate their fights; it is clear that he also provoked her. I agree with the Crown, on a balance, it is likely that his conduct in the recordings was constructed to downplay the extent to which he was also an aggressive participant in their arguments.
III. Analysis of the three charges before the court
[10] With respect to the first alleged assault and the alleged death threats, the only evidence comes from the complainant. Her evidence is insufficiently credible to prove these charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
[11] There is additional circumstantial evidence regarding the alleged assault on March 19. Photographs of the complainant disclose significant apparent bruising to her leg and arm consistent with her having been assaulted in the manner she described: with her arm grabbed and her leg kicked. The defendant’s version of events does not account for all the bruising evident in the photos, particularly to the complainant’s leg. The photos appear to corroborate the complainant and contradict the defendant.
[12] In the absence of any other explanation for her injuries, I am satisfied it is probable that they occurred during the altercation with the defendant. But I do not know how those injuries occurred. The evidence also suggests that, in this conflict, the complainant was an aggressor. The complainant acknowledged tearing the defendant’s shirt during the incident but suggested improbably that this happened accidentally. Beyond these points, I am unable to make any findings regarding their altercation that day. I cannot rely on either witness’s account.
[13] This factual backdrop cannot prove the defendant is guilty of the March 19 assault. I cannot exclude the possibility that the complainant was bruised through force applied by the defendant in self-defence within the meaning of s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Her injuries suggest but do not prove that the defendant used his physical advantage over her to apply a disproportionate degree of force, which pushes somewhat toward a finding that his conduct was unreasonable: see ss. 34(2)(e) and (g). But the evidence does not establish the nature of the threat she posed, its imminence, any other options he had in the circumstances, his role in the incident, or whether a weapon was used by her (as he alleged): see ss. 34(2)(a)-(d). There is audio of her threatening to kill him and kill herself, but no reliable evidence of him having threatened her: ss. 34(2)(f) and (f.1). The evidence leaves me unsure whether the defendant was acting to defend a threat he reasonably perceived, and whether he acted reasonably to defend against it. I cannot find that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that any element of the defence was absent. That defence succeeds with respect to the second alleged assault.
IV. Disposition
[14] Since the evidence does not allow me to conclude what happened, I cannot say that any of the charges have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I find the defendant not guilty of the three charges before the court.
Released: August 14, 2026
Signed: Justice M. Perlin