WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(2.1) of the Criminal Code. These subsections and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(2.1), read as follows:
486.4 (2.1) Victim under 18 — Other offences — Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(2.2) Mandatory order on application — In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order; and
(c) if an order is made, as soon as feasible, inform the victim of the existence of the order and of their right to apply to revoke or vary it.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2026 ONCJ 480
DATE: 2026 08 18
COURT FILE No.: 24- 15401175
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JASKIRAT SINGH
Before Justice C. Vanderhooft
Heard on June 25, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on August 18, 2026
R. Gill and J. Clouston...................................................................... counsel for the Crown
K. Jones............................................................. counsel for the defendant Jaskirat Singh
Introduction
[1] Following a trial, the accused Jaskirat Singh was convicted of two counts of dangerous driving causing death, and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.
[2] The Crown seeks a sentence of 9 years. Defence counsel suggests a conditional sentence order up to 2 years less a day.
[3] After carefully reviewing the principles of sentencing, the circumstances of the offence and the offender, victim and community impact, and the need to express this Court’s profound denunciation of dangerous driving that tears children from their family, I conclude that a penitentiary sentence of 6 years is appropriate.
Circumstances of the Offence
[4] The facts giving rise to these offences are outlined in my reasons delivered January 15, 2026 (R. v. Singh, 2026 ONCJ 23). Accordingly, I will not go into them in detail at this time. Briefly, on April 21, 2023, while operating a Dodge Charger, Mr. Singh chose to pass a line of slow-moving traffic on the Trans-Canada Highway east of Dryden, resulting in the death of Ca.J. and E.J., and bodily harm to their mother, S.J.
[5] Mr. Singh, travelling westbound, pulled into the oncoming lane of traffic in snowy and treacherous road conditions up a hill. As C.J. crested the hill travelling eastbound, he had seconds to take evasive action but could not avoid the collision because Singh was directly in front of him. The resulting collision spun the J. vehicle into a semi truck travelling westbound. The combined effect of the two collisions caused catastrophic intrusion into the J. vehicle and ejected their children onto the highway and injured his wife who was knocked unconscious. Both children died.
Circumstances of the Offender
[6] Mr. Singh is presently 28 years old. He was born and raised in Punjab, India. He described his upbringing as positive and described a close and supportive relationship with his parents and younger sister. Much of his youth was spent assisting his father on the family farm. In 2018, he immigrated to Canada alone on a student visa with the goal of improving his economic circumstances and providing financial support to his family in India. He later obtained permanent resident status in Canada.
[7] Since his arrival in Canada, Mr. Singh has maintained steady employment. His work history includes positions in warehouses, food production facilities, parcel delivery services, meat processing, and long-haul trucking. The evidence establishes that he is industrious and has consistently sought employment to support himself and his family. Prior to his arrest, he was employed as a long-haul truck driver. Following the laying of these charges and the resulting driving prohibition, he was no longer able to continue in that occupation and returned to part-time employment at a meat processing facility.
[8] Mr. Singh has no prior criminal record and no history of involvement with the criminal justice system. There is likewise no evidence of any prior driving-related record of significance. He has been described in letters of support and by those who know him as a quiet, hardworking, and generally prosocial individual.
[9] The evidence discloses that the consequences of these proceedings have had a profound impact upon him. The pre-sentence report records significant emotional distress. Mr. Singh reported difficulties sleeping, persistent feelings of guilt, remorse, and anxiety, and considerable concern about the consequences of his actions for both the victims' families and his own family. His close friend, Mr. Batth, described him as having been profoundly affected following the collision, appearing withdrawn, frequently crying, and becoming "a shell of the person he once was."
[10] At the same time, the pre-sentence report notes that Mr. Singh continues to characterize the collision as an accident and has had trouble discussing the offences and their impact. The author of the report expressed the view that Mr. Singh has not fully processed, or may be unable to fully comprehend, the extent of the harm suffered by the victims' family and community. Nevertheless, the report records that he displayed genuine emotional distress when discussing the events and their consequences.
[11] Mr. Singh's personal and financial circumstances have deteriorated considerably since the offence. He is no longer able to earn the income he once received as a commercial driver and has accumulated significant debt. He reported that he has been unable to provide financial assistance to his family in India, causing them hardship and resulting in additional borrowing to meet living and medical expenses.
[12] I also note Mr. Singh's conduct following the investigation. Defence counsel submits, and the evidence before me establishes, that after police contacted him regarding the outstanding warrant, he cooperated with authorities and returned to Canada, where he was arrested at the border.
[13] Finally, although Mr. Singh exercised his right to a trial and is not entitled to the mitigating effect of a guilty plea, I do not treat that fact as aggravating. He is a youthful first offender, enjoys the support of family and friends, has demonstrated a history of employment and community integration, and presents as a person with positive prospects for rehabilitation.
Victim Impact Statements
[14] Judicial comments on victim impact in dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm cases often talk about not being able to bring victims back, or they make attempts to express some level of understanding toward the families left to live with gaping holes in their lives. Those comments fall short, as will mine.
[15] What can be said to a father who held his dying children on the roadway? Or the mother that regained consciousness at the hospital only to be told by her husband that the children did not survive?
[16] The J.’s will not recover from this tragedy. They will learn to live with it, and their community and family will support them. There is no silver lining here. Because of a decision to pass in conditions that were obviously dangerous, the kind of decision that makes other drivers say, “that guy is going to kill someone,” the J. family lost their light, their legacy, and their hope for their children’s future.
[17] What I can say is that the J. family are remarkable people that raised remarkable children. A common thread throughout all the victim impact statements, song, pictures, and memorials was the immense pride they had in their children, and the incredible joy that their children brought to the world around them. From their ability in sports, to dancing, to just being proud members of their Indigenous community that represented a generation free from trauma and raised in a good way, E.J. and Ca.J. represented all that is good in this part of the world.
[18] As S.J. and C.J. put it in their own words, “E. and Ca. had so much promise – as the first generation not having to heal from the intergenerational impacts of residential school, they were going to give back and be positive change makers in the world.”
[19] E. and Ca.J. should not have died this way. S. and C.J. can only do what they can to live with their grief. I hope, and so does the entire community, that they can find a way to spread the kind of love they did to their children even though their hearts are broken.
Position of the Parties
[20] The Crown submits that a penitentiary sentence of nine years' imprisonment for the two counts of dangerous driving causing death is fit and appropriate, together with a concurrent sentence of four years' imprisonment for the count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The Crown also seeks a DNA order, a driving prohibition of ten years following the custodial sentence, and credit for presentence custody of 39 days (enhanced).
[21] The Crown emphasizes that sentencing must focus on the fundamental objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly in cases of dangerous driving causing death. Counsel submits that Parliament's increase of the maximum penalty for the offence from 14 years to life imprisonment reflects a clear legislative intention that sentences for this offence increase in severity. The Crown relies on authorities including Lojovic, Gomez, Trivedi, and Robertson in support of that proposition.
[22] The Crown submits that this offence involved a high degree of moral blameworthiness. Counsel characterizes the accused's conduct as an intentional course of risk-taking in which he attempted to pass traffic while travelling too fast for the road and weather conditions. The resulting harm was entirely foreseeable.
[23] The Crown identifies the following aggravating factors:
- Two children lost their lives.
- Their mother sustained injuries.
- The offence has had a profound and devastating impact upon the victims' families and upon the wider community.
- The consequences of the collision extended to others, including witnesses and first responders.
- The accused engaged in deliberate risk-taking behaviour notwithstanding the obvious dangers presented by the conditions.
[24] The Crown acknowledges several mitigating factors:
The accused has no prior criminal record.
The accused has no Highway Traffic Act record.
He is regarded as a person of good character.
[25] However, the Crown submits that these mitigating considerations are outweighed by the seriousness of the offence and its consequences. The Crown notes that the matter proceeded to trial and that the accused did not receive the mitigating benefit associated with a guilty plea.
[26] The Crown opposes the imposition of a conditional sentence order. Counsel submits that, given the gravity of the offence, the high degree of moral blameworthiness, and the extensive harm caused, a community-based sentence would be inconsistent with the principles of denunciation and deterrence.
[27] With respect to immigration consequences, the Crown submits that any impact on the accused's immigration status is collateral and should not materially affect the determination of a fit sentence. According to the Crown, a penitentiary sentence is warranted irrespective of such consequences.
[28] The defence submits that a conditional sentence order followed by probation would constitute a fit and just sentence. The defence argues that such a disposition would satisfy the statutory requirements for a conditional sentence and would appropriately balance denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and reparation.
[29] Defence counsel emphasizes the tragic nature of the offence and acknowledges the profound loss experienced by the victims' families and the community. Counsel submits, however, that the Court must also consider the personal circumstances of the offender and the principle of proportionality.
[30] The defence relies upon the following mitigating factors:
The accused is a youthful first offender with no criminal record.
He has no prior driving record.
He is regarded as a person of good character and has substantial family and community support.
He cooperated with police following the issuance of a warrant.
He has expressed remorse and sorrow for the deaths of the two children.
He has experienced significant emotional and psychological consequences arising from his role in the collision.
[31] The defence submits that the accused came to Canada from India in 2018 to improve his circumstances and support family members. He has maintained employment and has otherwise been a productive member of society. The pre-sentence report assesses him as presenting no significant risk to public safety.
[32] The defence argues that, although the consequences of the offence were catastrophic, the circumstances of the driving itself place the case lower on the spectrum of dangerous driving causing death. Counsel submits that there was no alcohol or drug impairment, no racing, no road rage, no prolonged pattern of dangerous driving, and no prior driving history. The incident is characterized as a thoughtless error in judgment involving an attempt to pass in difficult road conditions that resulted in a loss of control.
[33] The defence further submits that Parliament's increase of the maximum penalty does not create a de facto minimum sentence and that the offence encompasses a broad range of conduct. Counsel argues that the sentencing jurisprudence demonstrates an exceptionally broad spectrum of outcomes and that parity considerations support a sentence significantly lower than that sought by the Crown.
[34] The defence contends that immigration consequences are a relevant collateral consideration. As a permanent resident, the accused may face serious immigration repercussions, including potential inadmissibility and removal from Canada, if a custodial sentence is imposed. While these consequences should not dictate sentence, the defence submits they are properly considered as part of the proportionality analysis.
[35] Finally, the defence submits that the fact the accused exercised his right to trial cannot operate as an aggravating factor and that restraint remains an important sentencing principle notwithstanding the need for denunciation and deterrence. Counsel therefore asks the Court to impose a conditional sentence order, followed by probation, together with ancillary orders as appropriate.
[36] Mr. Singh, for his own part, expressed condolences to the victims' family and stated that he was sorry for their loss and never intended to hurt anyone.
Principles and Objectives of Sentencing
[37] Section 718 of the Code sets out the objectives of sentencing as including denunciation of unlawful conduct; deterrence of the offender and other persons from committing offences; separation of offenders from society, where necessary; assistance in rehabilitating offenders; provision of reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community. Section 718.1 of the Code provides that a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718.2 of the Code provides that the court shall also take into consideration other sentencing principles including that a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender including those enumerated therein. A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. As well, ss. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Code provide an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders.
[38] The primary focus of sentencing involving dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm is denunciation and general and specific deterrence.
[39] The struggle families have in this context is understanding how these considerations can possibly be balanced with the harm done to the victims or to the community. That part of sentencing is often lost because the focus turns to the offender and seems to pay lip service to those left behind to bear the consequences. Denunciation, in this regard, requires the court to truly condemn this behaviour instead of putting the personal circumstances of the offender above other sentencing principles.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
[40] In determining a fit and proportionate sentence, I have considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating both to the offence and to the offender. Sentencing for dangerous driving causing death must focus not only on the tragic consequences of the offence, but also on the degree of moral blameworthiness associated with the offender's driving conduct. At the same time, the actual consequences of the offence remain highly relevant to assessing its gravity.
[41] The most significant aggravating factor is the devastating harm caused by the offender's conduct. Mr. Singh's dangerous driving resulted in the deaths of two children and serious bodily harm to their mother. Parliament has expressly identified the causing of death or bodily harm to more than one person as an aggravating circumstance in the dangerous driving provisions. Here, two lives were lost and a third victim suffered significant physical injuries.
[42] The victim impact evidence further establishes that the consequences of this offence extend far beyond the immediate victims. Numerous family members, friends, and community members provided victim impact statements describing the profound grief and lasting emotional consequences arising from the deaths of the children. The evidence also demonstrates that those who witnessed the aftermath of the collision, including professional drivers who were involved in or observed the collision, have experienced significant trauma.
[43] I also find that the offender's degree of moral blameworthiness is elevated by the nature of the driving itself. In my reasons for conviction, I found that Mr. Singh deliberately undertook a passing manoeuvre in objectively dangerous circumstances. He passed a line of vehicles while travelling in the oncoming lane of traffic, approaching the crest of a hill, in conditions described by multiple witnesses as snowy, slushy, icy, and treacherous. The lane markings were obscured by snow, and traffic had generally slowed because of the road conditions. I found that a reasonable driver would have foreseen the obvious risk associated with attempting such a manoeuvre and would simply not have attempted to pass.
[44] Although I acquitted Mr. Singh of criminal negligence, I found that his conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver. The collision was the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate and unnecessary act of risk-taking.
[45] Finally, while the matter proceeded to trial, I do not treat that fact as aggravating. However, Mr. Singh is not entitled to the mitigating credit ordinarily associated with a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility at an early stage of the proceedings.
[46] In mitigation, Mr. Singh was a young man at the time of the offence and has no prior criminal record. He also has no prior driving record or history of driving-related offences. Prior to this offence he was a productive and law-abiding member of society.
[47] The evidence before the court demonstrates that Mr. Singh came to Canada from India in 2018 in search of better opportunities and to provide financial support to his family. The pre-sentence report and the letters filed on his behalf describe him as hardworking, quiet, generous, and well regarded by those who know him. The letters also demonstrate the presence of a supportive family and social network.
[48] I accept that Mr. Singh has experienced significant emotional consequences because of his role in this tragedy. The pre-sentence report and supporting letters describe a man who has been profoundly affected by the deaths that resulted from his actions. Although remorse is somewhat complicated by the fact that Mr. Singh exercised his right to trial and continued to characterize the event as an accident, I nonetheless accept that he has genuine sorrow for the deaths of the two children and for the suffering caused to their family. His brief statement to the court expressing condolences and apologizing to the family is consistent with that conclusion.
[49] I also consider that Mr. Singh cooperated with police following the issuance of a warrant. He returned to Ontario and attended at the border knowing he would be arrested.
[50] Finally, I have considered the potential immigration consequences that may flow from sentence. Those consequences are collateral rather than primary considerations and cannot dictate the appropriate sanction. Nevertheless, they form part of the totality of circumstances relating to the offender and are properly considered in assessing the overall impact of sentence.
[51] Balancing all these factors, the sentence imposed must reflect the exceptionally grave consequences of the offender's dangerous driving, while also considering his otherwise positive background, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.
Analysis
[52] The Crown authorities establish that there is no fixed or rigid sentencing range for dangerous driving causing death. Rather, sentencing must be guided by proportionality, taking into account both the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of moral responsibility. However, recent appellate decisions demonstrate a clear trend toward higher sentences following Parliament's 2018 decision to increase the maximum penalty for dangerous driving causing death from fourteen years to life imprisonment. As the Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, the legislative change signals Parliament's intention that sentences for dangerous driving causing death increase and that five years should no longer be viewed as representing an upper limit for the offence.
[53] The authorities further establish that denunciation and general deterrence ordinarily assume primary importance in dangerous driving causing death cases. This is particularly so because such offences are commonly committed by otherwise law-abiding individuals whose conduct involves a conscious decision to engage in dangerous behaviour despite obvious risks. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that substantial custodial penalties are necessary to communicate society's condemnation of such conduct and to deter others from making similar choices.
[54] The most significant recent appellate authority is R. v. Robertson, 2026 ONCA 281, where the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a global sentence of 17 years' imprisonment imposed following convictions arising out of two separate episodes of dangerous driving, one of which resulted in the deaths of a mother and her three children. The Court emphasized that dangerous driving offences involve the creation of serious and unacceptable risks to public safety coupled with a significant degree of fault. It described the resulting loss of life as a central factor in assessing offence gravity and confirmed that, following Parliament's amendments, sentencing courts are justified in imposing substantially higher sentences than those historically seen for this offence. The Court also reiterated that prior cases provide guidance but do not constrain sentencing judges where aggravating circumstances justify a higher sentence.
[55] Although Robertson involved significantly more serious facts than the present case, including four deaths, police pursuits, drug consumption, and an extensive driving record, it is important because it confirms that dangerous driving causing death now occupies a sentencing spectrum extending well beyond the historical ranges that existed prior to 2018.
[56] In R. v. Gomez, 2026 ONCA 330, the offender accelerated his Corvette to 164 km/h in a 60 km/h zone after consuming alcohol and entered an intersection against a red light, killing one person and seriously injuring another. The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of six years' imprisonment for dangerous driving causing death and four years concurrent for dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The Court expressly stated that a sentence is not demonstrably unfit merely because it is unprecedented and noted that this principle is particularly important where sentencing courts are responding to Parliament's increased maximum penalties. The offender's pattern of dangerous conduct, excessive speed, alcohol consumption, and the devastating consequences of the collision justified a substantial penitentiary term.
[57] Gomez demonstrates that six-year sentences now fall comfortably within the acceptable range for highly dangerous driving involving a single death and one seriously injured victim.
[58] In Lojovic, the offender drove at extreme speed through Hamilton streets, travelled through red lights, drove the wrong way on one-way streets, struck and killed a pedestrian, failed to remain, and subsequently injured a police officer while attempting to evade arrest. The Court of Appeal reduced a ten-year sentence to eight years because the sentencing judge improperly treated the offender's bipolar disorder as an aggravating factor. Even after accounting for that error, however, the Court concluded that an eight-year global sentence remained fit. More importantly, the Court expressly stated that Parliament's 2018 amendment demonstrates that "five years should not be seen as the top of the range" for dangerous driving causing death.
[59] This observation is particularly significant because it provides direct appellate guidance regarding the effect of Parliament's decision to increase the maximum sentence to life imprisonment.
[60] In R. v. Trivedi, 2024 ONSC 3936, the offender drove his Audi at extreme speed on the Gardiner Expressway, weaving through traffic at speeds estimated between 150 and 200 km/h before colliding with another vehicle. One victim was killed and another sustained catastrophic injury. Mr. Trivedi also left the scene. Justice Molloy imposed a sentence of five years for dangerous driving causing death and three years concurrent for dangerous driving causing bodily harm. In arriving at that sentence, the Court stressed the offender's highly aggravating driving record, his prolonged course of dangerous conduct, and the importance of denunciation and deterrence. The Court expressly held that dangerous driving causing death and impaired driving causing death should now be treated as more closely aligned offences following Parliament's amendments.
[61] Of particular significance is Justice Molloy's conclusion that dangerous driving resulting in death should be viewed as serious criminal conduct rather than as a vehicular "accident", and that sentences imposed after 2018 must reflect Parliament's direction that such offences be punished more severely.
[62] In R. v. Park-Romain, 2023 ONCJ 302, the offender was an 80-year-old first offender who drove while affected by alcohol, repeatedly crossed the centre line, ignored warning signs and stop signs, and killed another motorist. Despite exceptional mitigating factors including advanced age, a guilty plea, substantial remorse, and a history of community service, Justice O'Donnell imposed a sentence of three years' imprisonment. The Court considered three years to be the absolute minimum fit sentence and stated that absent the offender's advanced age, a sentence of four years or more would have been warranted. The decision is particularly notable for its discussion of the continuing disparity between dangerous driving causing death and impaired driving causing death and its conclusion that sentences for dangerous driving causing death have not always fully reflected Parliament's intention in increasing the maximum penalty to life imprisonment.
[63] Park-Romain demonstrates that even highly sympathetic offenders with extraordinary mitigating circumstances may nevertheless receive substantial penitentiary sentences where dangerous driving has resulted in death.
[64] In R. v. Paypompee, 2025 ONCJ 295, the offender drove onto a sidewalk, struck two pedestrians, killed one, seriously injured the other, and fled the scene without rendering assistance. The offender had consumed crack cocaine and alcohol, had a prior impaired driving conviction, and was driving while suspended. The sentencing judge imposed six years' imprisonment for dangerous driving causing death together with a consecutive one-year sentence for failing to remain, resulting in a global sentence of seven years. Justice March emphasized that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing considerations and accepted that the offender's substance abuse issues did not materially reduce his moral blameworthiness.
[65] The significance of Paypompee lies in its recognition that dangerous driving causing death resulting from impaired judgment, combined with a conscious decision to flee responsibility afterward, warrants a sentence in the six-to-seven-year range even after accounting for significant Gladue factors and personal mitigation.
[66] When the Crown authorities are considered collectively, several broad sentencing groupings emerge. Cases involving exceptional mitigation, advanced age, guilty pleas, no prior record, and conduct at the lower end of dangerous driving causing death appear to occupy a range beginning around three years' imprisonment, as illustrated by Park-Romain.
[67] Cases involving a single death, aggravated dangerous driving, serious moral blameworthiness, excessive speed, prior driving misconduct, or additional aggravating features such as flight from responsibility generally fall within a range of approximately five to seven years' imprisonment. Trivedi, Gomez, and Paypompee are representative of that range.
[68] Cases involving extraordinarily aggravated conduct, such as repeated dangerous driving episodes, police pursuits, multiple deaths, or exceptionally high moral culpability, extend well beyond that range and may properly attract sentences more than eight years, as demonstrated by Lojovic and Robertson.
[69] Two further cases were provided by the Crown: R. v. Romano, 2021 ONCA 211 and R. v. Kalejaiye, 2021 ONCJ 236. With respect, they provide limited guidance where the offender’s conduct is substantially more blameworthy as is the case for Mr. Singh. Romano was an unusually mitigated circumstance where an on-duty police officer struck a jay-walking pedestrian during a high-speed pursuit, and Kalejaiye did not involve fatalities. Even in those cases, however, jail sentences were imposed.
[70] Accordingly, the Crown authorities establish that the contemporary post‑2018 sentencing landscape for dangerous driving causing death is substantially higher than historical cases suggested. They support the proposition that a sentence in the range of five to seven years is now an ordinary and fit disposition for highly blameworthy dangerous driving causing a single death, particularly where there are additional aggravating features, while sentences exceeding that range are justified where the facts demonstrate extraordinary recklessness or multiple fatalities.
[71] The defence authorities advance a consistent theme: that dangerous driving causing death encompasses a broad range of conduct; that denunciation and deterrence do not invariably require penitentiary incarceration; and that where moral blameworthiness is comparatively low, a conditional sentence may remain available even when the offence results in death. At the same time, these authorities do not establish that a conditional sentence is presumptively appropriate. Rather, each turns upon a highly individualized assessment of the offender's culpability, rehabilitation prospects, and the precise nature of the dangerous driving involved.
[72] The defence's foundational authority is R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5. The Supreme Court confirmed that a conditional sentence is a sentence of imprisonment and not a lesser or symbolic punishment. The Court held that a conditional sentence can, in appropriate circumstances, achieve denunciation and deterrence while simultaneously advancing rehabilitation and restorative objectives. The Court expressly rejected the notion that offences emphasizing denunciation and deterrence automatically require incarceration.
[73] However, Proulx also establishes important limits. The Supreme Court held that where denunciation and deterrence are particularly pressing, incarceration may remain the preferable sanction. Significantly, the Court specifically identified dangerous driving and impaired driving as offences for which harsh penalties may plausibly achieve meaningful general deterrence because they are frequently committed by otherwise law-abiding individuals who are likely to respond to sentencing consequences. The Court further stated that dangerous driving causing death may, depending upon the circumstances, justify incarceration notwithstanding the availability of a conditional sentence. Accordingly, while Proulx supports the legal availability of a conditional sentence in dangerous driving cases, it does not diminish the importance of deterrence and denunciation in determining whether such a disposition is fit in a particular case.
[74] The defence also relies on R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, for the proposition that immigration consequences are relevant to sentence. The Supreme Court held that collateral immigration consequences may properly be considered as part of the individualized sentencing process and may justify selecting one otherwise fit sentence over another where the difference is marginal.
[75] At the same time, Pham expressly warns that immigration consequences cannot dominate the sentencing analysis. Courts are prohibited from imposing artificial or otherwise unfit sentences for the purpose of avoiding deportation consequences. The governing principles remain proportionality, parity, and fitness. Immigration consequences may influence sentence selection within the range of fit dispositions, but they cannot justify a sentence that is otherwise inappropriate.
[76] Thus, Pham supports consideration of the immigration consequences that may follow conviction and sentence, but it cannot independently justify reducing a sentence that is otherwise required by the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility.
[77] The defence authorities predating the 2018 amendments are of limited assistance in determining the modern sentencing range.
[78] In R. v. Areco (G.) (1999), 1999 CanLII 3799 (ON CA), 126 O.A.C. 338 (Ont. C.A.), the offender crossed the centre line and caused a head-on collision that killed one person and injured two others. The Court of Appeal allowed the balance of a one-year custodial sentence to be served in the community, emphasizing that although the consequences were catastrophic, the actual driving conduct fell toward the lower end of the dangerous-driving spectrum and the offender possessed substantial mitigating features including youth, no criminal record, stable employment, and family responsibilities.
[79] Similarly, in R. v. Duchominsky, 2003 MBCA 19, the offender, while operating a highway department truck, entered an intersection against a red light causing two deaths and three serious injuries. The Manitoba Court of Appeal substituted a conditional sentence for a custodial disposition. The Court stressed the absence of alcohol, excessive speed, or other aggravating features beyond the collision itself, and emphasized that sentencing must focus not merely on consequences but also on the nature of the conduct that produced them.
[80] These decisions reflect an earlier sentencing era and predate Parliament's decision to increase the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing death to life imprisonment. Consequently, their value lies more in illustrating the importance of assessing moral blameworthiness than in establishing contemporary sentencing outcomes.
[81] The defence's strongest authorities are the recent post-amendment cases that demonstrate that conditional sentences remain available in exceptional dangerous-driving cases notwithstanding Parliament's legislative changes.
[82] In R. v. Linton, 2022 ONCJ 197, the offender attempted to pass a line of vehicles in a no-passing zone while travelling at excessive speed around a curve with restricted visibility. The resulting head-on collision killed one person and permanently injured two others. Justice Schwarzl nevertheless imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day. The decision turned on the offender's lack of any criminal or driving record, genuine remorse, complete acceptance of responsibility, exceptional community support, youthfulness, and strong rehabilitation prospects. The Court also emphasized the absence of aggravating factors commonly found in more serious dangerous-driving cases, such as impairment, prolonged bad driving, professional driving obligations, or prior driving misconduct.
[83] In R. v. Beedawia, 2024 ONSC 3247, the offender, an experienced commercial truck driver, failed to stop at a controlled intersection and caused a fatal collision resulting in one death and one serious injury. Justice Mitchell expressly acknowledged the 2018 legislative amendments and Parliament's intention that dangerous-driving sentences increase. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the offender's moral blameworthiness remained comparatively low because his dangerous driving consisted primarily of negligence and inattention rather than a conscious or deliberate decision to endanger others. The offender had no criminal or driving record, was deeply remorseful, had exceptional community support, and presented no meaningful risk of recidivism. A conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by probation was imposed.
[84] A central theme in Beedawia is the distinction the Court drew between negligent conduct and deliberate endangerment. The Court relied heavily upon prior appellate authority observing that the more the conduct reflects deliberate endangerment of others, the more likely a significant prison sentence becomes necessary. Justice Mitchell concluded that Beedawia fell at the lower end of that spectrum.
[85] Similarly, in R. v. Kandola, 2024 ONCJ 659, the offender, aged eighteen, drove at extreme speed through an intersection and collided with a vehicle making a left turn, killing one occupant. Despite speeds far more than the limit and tragic consequences, Justice Bernstein imposed a conditional sentence of imprisonment for two years less a day together with lengthy probation and a driving prohibition. The Court placed substantial weight on the offender's youth, lack of record, extraordinary remorse, positive background, counselling efforts, and prospects for rehabilitation. The Court also recognized that a conditional sentence could satisfy deterrence and denunciation where sufficiently restrictive terms were imposed.
[86] Finally, R. v. Singh, 2026 MBKB 22, involved a commercial truck driver who failed to stop at a stop sign and caused a fatal collision. The Court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be comparatively low because there was no speeding, impairment, or deliberate risk-taking. The offender was genuinely remorseful, had no criminal or driving record, enjoyed broad community support, and faced serious immigration consequences. The Manitoba Court of King's Bench imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.
[87] Viewed together, the defence authorities reveal a consistent analytical framework. None suggest that the death of another person is itself insufficient to justify incarceration. Rather, each focuses on the offender's degree of moral blameworthiness. The conditional-sentence authorities all involve offenders who:
had little or no criminal or driving history;
were genuinely remorseful;
accepted responsibility;
had strong rehabilitative prospects;
posed little future risk to the public; and
were found to have engaged in negligent or misguided conduct rather than deliberate, sustained, or conscious endangerment of others.
[88] Indeed, a recurring distinction in the defence cases is between conduct arising from inattention, distraction, fatigue, misjudgment, or negligence, and conduct involving deliberate risk-taking or reckless indifference to obvious danger. The former category was consistently treated as attracting lower moral blameworthiness and therefore potentially permitting a conditional sentence notwithstanding fatal consequences.
[89] The defence authorities do not challenge the modern appellate principles emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and Parliament's 2018 increase of the maximum penalty. Rather, they demonstrate that a conditional sentence remains legally available even in dangerous driving causing death cases where the offender's moral blameworthiness is comparatively low and rehabilitation remains a dominant consideration.
[90] The ultimate force of those authorities therefore depends upon where the present offence falls on the spectrum identified in those cases. If the conduct is properly characterized as negligence or misjudgment like Beedawia or Singh, those authorities support a community-based sentence. If, however, the conduct is better characterized as deliberate risk-taking and conscious disregard of obvious danger, the more recent Crown authorities become more persuasive comparators.
[91] The crux of the question in this case, then, is whether this driving was negligence or misjudgment or deliberate risk-taking and conscious disregard of obvious danger?
[92] Without a doubt, Mr. Singh’s driving was deliberate risk-taking and a conscious disregard of obvious danger. He crossed into the oncoming lane of traffic to pass slow moving vehicles in dangerous winter weather. It was not his first such passing in these conditions, yet he persisted. If he could not see the double yellow solid line indicating that he should not pass, that is dangerous. If he could see it, and passed anyway, that is dangerous. Either way, he had to know he was closest to the shoulder of the oncoming lane of travel and going up a hill. He created an obviously dangerous risk to oncoming motorists.
[93] Mr. Singh’s driving was not just an attempt to pass followed by a sudden loss of control. It was a deliberate act to pass on a snow-covered highway, in slippery conditions, with slow moving traffic, uphill. C.J. had 5 seconds or less to do everything he could to avoid Mr. Singh but he could not. That Mr. Singh lost control of his vehicle when confronted with oncoming traffic is due to putting himself in that exceedingly dangerous position. I conclude that Mr. Singh’s driving was deliberate risk-taking behaviour and a conscious disregard for obvious danger that other drivers on the road at the exact same time took measures to avoid by slowing down, driving single file, and driving according to conditions.
Conclusion
[94] Having regard to all the circumstances, I am satisfied that a penitentiary sentence of six years will appropriately denounce Mr. Singh’s conduct and generally deter others. A four-year sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm will be served concurrently. His driving was dangerous, but a nine-year sentence sought by the Crown would require some additional aggravating factors like fleeing the scene, drug or alcohol use, or a prior record.
[95] I reject a conditional sentence as Mr. Singh’s moral blameworthiness puts his driving conduct outside of the “substantial inattention” cases or simple misjudgment or momentary negligence. In my view, a sentence of two years less a day would not reflect a denunciatory sentence involving the driving conduct here that resulted in the death of two children.
[96] I acknowledge that this decision will likely have immigration consequences for Mr. Singh. I emphasize, however, that this is not a marginal case where two years would be a fit sentence in any event.
[97] In addition to the six-year sentence, less enhanced credit for 39 days time in custody, I also impose a 10-year driving prohibition and a primary DNA order.
[98] I understand that this discussion of the law, and the resulting sentence, will not do anything to heal the J. family or the community. But for the many people in this region who drive on the main highway connecting Eastern and Western Canada it may serve as a warning to obey the signs along the highway that repeatedly warn drivers to “Drive According to Conditions.”
Released: August 18, 2026
Signed: Justice C. Vanderhooft