ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: Toronto (City) v. Mills, 2026 ONCJ 471
DATE: 2026 08 05
COURT FILE No.: 4862 999 24 24212515-00
BETWEEN:
THE KING (CITY OF TORONTO)
— AND —
CLEON MILLS
Before Justice of the Peace Beverly Brooks
Heard on July 23, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on August 5, 2026
N. Lee............................................................................................................... Prosecutor, MAG
Elizabeth Hewitson....................................................... Representative for the Defendant
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE BROOKS:
[1] I conducted this Part III trial under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.8 (the “HTA”).
[2] The defendant, Cleon Mills, was charged as follows:
(i) On or about the 13th of November, 2024, at the City of Toronto in the Toronto Region did commit the offence of drive a vehicle on Weston Road and when approaching a red traffic control light at the intersection of Northland Avenue failed to stop, contrary to Section 144, subsection (18) of the HTA.
(ii) On or about the 13th of November, 2024 at the City of Toronto in the Toronto Region did commit the offence of drive motor vehicle on 52 Northland Avenue and fail to surrender the permit or a true copy thereof for the said vehicle upon the demand of a police officer, contrary to Section 7 (5) (a) of the HTA.
[3] A plea of not guilty was entered by the defendant, Cleon Mills.
[4] I am satisfied that these are absolutely liability offences.
PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE:
[5] The Prosecutor relied on the testimony of Officer D. Marquis, badge number 11484, who stated that he investigated these matters on November 13, 2024.
Testimony of Officer Marquis
[6] Officer Marquis testified that he has worked for the Toronto Police Service for five years.
[7] He asked the court for permission to consult his notes. The court gave him permission to refer to his notes to refresh his memory. Officer Marquis stated that he had an independent recollection of the incident and that he has made no deletions or additions to his notes since he wrote them.
[8] The Officer testified that on November 13, 2024 he was driving a marked police vehicle and was travelling eastbound on Northland Avenue at Weston Road. The Officer observed a red Mazda sedan travelling southbound on Weston Road in the curb lane. The weather was clear, the roads were dry, there was natural lighting from the sunlight, and visibility was good. He stated that as this vehicle approached the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue, the traffic light turned red for northbound and southbound traffic. The Officer noted that the driver “slowed down as it approached the intersection” but did not make a “complete stop” i.e. did not stop for the red light and that the vehicle was “in motion all times” and then proceeded westbound on Northland Avenue.
[9] The Officer executed a traffic stop on a red 2016 Mazda 3 and approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. He noted that the licence plate number of the vehicle was CWSA013 and that the defendant was the sole occupant in the car. The Officer requested the defendant’s driver’s licence, permit and insurance documents. The Officer testified that the defendant provided his driver’s licence which had a name of Cleon Mills and an address of 55 Emmett Unit 2208 in the City of Toronto but did not produce his driver’s permit or proof of insurance. The Officer noted the driver’s birth date on the defendant’s driver’s licence, which was October 29, 1989. The number on the driver’s licence was M43781310891029. The Officer stated that he was satisfied that the driver’s licence enabled him to verify the identification of the driver as the photo on the driver’s licence bore a likeness to the driver in the vehicle.
[10] The Officer also testified that the defendant could not provide proof of insurance initially but that the defendant called his insurance company or broker during the traffic stop and was able to provide confirmation of an insurance policy for the vehicle. The Officer testified that once he had this confirmation he “spoiled” the charge for owner operate no insurance.
[11] The Officer testified that he then provided a summons to the defendant for the red-light infraction as well as for not surrendering proof of ownership of his vehicle i.e. a permit for his vehicle.
[12] The Officer testified when he stopped the defendant’s vehicle traffic was light, that he had a clear view of the intersection and the northbound and southbound traffic and that at no point did he lose sight of the defendant’s vehicle. The Officer also testified that he was facing the intersection and that his vehicle was pointed in the eastward direction. He stated that the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue is a T intersection and that the one cannot proceed eastbound through the intersection but only north or south.
[13] The Officer stated that he initiated the traffic stop on Northland Avenue and stopped the defendant’s vehicle about 200 meters west of the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue. The Officer said that intersection of Weston Road and Northland is a T intersection and that one can not travel eastbound only north or south. He added that there is one lane on Northland Avenue to make a left hand turn to go northbound on Weston Road. The Officer testified that the defendant’s vehicle was approaching the intersection southbound on Weston Road.
Cross Examination of the Officer
[14] Ms. Hewitson asked the Officer since he had testified that at the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue, it is a T intersection, if a driver can not drive eastbound through the intersection? The Officer replied that there may be a commercial parking lot of a business if one drives through the intersection but that Northland Avenue ends at Weston Road.
[15] Ms. Hewitson stated that this is incorrect and the road runs between two businesses after one drives eastbound through the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue -- R&C Nails and a bar and lounge. She asked if this was not accurate. The Officer responded that it may be possible but that the highway does not continue and that it would be a private parking area.
[16] Ms. Hewitson then asked the Officer if he had some in-car footage that was provided in disclosure. The Officer testified that there was Police Cruiser In-car Camera (ICC) and body-worn camera footage of the incident.
[17] Ms. Hewitson then requested the court’s permission to show a video of the intersection. The Clerk of the court indicated that if a video is to be shown in court and marked as an exhibit, the defendant’s representative must obtain the court’s permission to show the video in advance of the hearing. The Clerk stated that since Ms. Hewitson had not obtained such permission, she could not show the video during the hearing and the video could not be marked as an exhibit. Ms. Hewitson then indicated that she could show a still photo of the Weston Road and Northland Avenue intersection based on the video footage and that she was fine with the court’s ruling that the still photo not being marked as an exhibit.
[18] On consent of Ms. Hewitson, the still image of the intersection was displayed on the screen but not marked as an exhibit. The Officer saw the still image of the intersection and described the parking lot, with no street name and stated that it was not a highway as defined by the HTA.
[19] The Officer noted that one can drive through the intersection but that the road is not a highway but rather a parking lot on the other side of the intersection. Ms. Hewitson maintained that this intersection is a four-way intersection. The Officer disputed her statement and testified that this intersection is a three-way intersection. The Officer emphasized that there was “no way” southbound traffic could drive through the intersection i.e. one could not drive through this intersection and reach other destinations because the traffic would then be in a parking lot.
[20] Ms. Hewitson then suggested that the defendant did stop his vehicle and made a valid right hand turn at the intersection but that the Officer did not observe the defendant stop. Officer Marquis indicated that he had observed the defendant drive through the intersection without stopping when the traffic light was red.
[21] The Officer stated that the only document that the defendant had showed him was his driver’s licence and that the defendant had not shown him his driving permit or proof of insurance. Ms. Hewitson then maintained that the defendant had shown the Officer proof of insurance but that the defendant’s insurance policy had expired. The Officer emphasized that “An expired insurance card would not satisfy me that on that date the vehicle was covered by an active policy”.
[22] The Officer testified that during the traffic stop with the defendant he had requested that additional officers attend at the point where he had made the traffic stop because the defendant was becoming “confrontational”. The Officer stated that the defendant accused him of conducting the traffic stop because he was black and called the Officer a racist.
[23] The Officer then stated that at the end of the vehicle stop the driver was able to provide him with proof of valid insurance documentation by calling his insurance company. The Officer then testified that he had torn up the charge of no proof of insurance.
[24] Ms. Hewitson then emphasized several times that the defendant had made a valid right-hand turn i.e. the defendant stopped his vehicle at the intersection, checked for oncoming traffic and then made a right-hand turn. The Officer, however, disputed this statement every time that the Defendant’s Paralegal made this claim and maintained that the defendant had not stopped at the red traffic light.
Re-examination of the Officer Marquis
[25] The Prosecutor asked the Officer if he saw the defendant travelling east after he reached the intersection. The Officer answered that the defendant was not travelling eastbound but rather the defendant was travelling southbound and made a right-hand turn.
Examination In Chief of Defendant Cleon Mills
[26] The defendant testified that he stopped at the red light at the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue, waited for a “couple of seconds” and then made a right-hand turn. He stated that he was returning from dog walking on November 13, 2024 and that he was headed to one of his clients’ houses with one of the dogs. In order to avoid pedestrians, he testified that, “I stopped, looked, then made my turn.”
[27] The defendant also testified that he is certain he came to a stop after he “took a scan” and made a right turn at the Weston Road and Northland Avenue. He saw the Officer watching him.
[28] The defendant testified that he provided the Officer with an expired insurance card when he was stopped but was unable to provide his permit as he could not find it.
[29] The defendant maintained that he was very familiar with the Weston Road and Northland Avenue intersection but he did not remember the names of the nearby streets.
Cross-Examination of the Defendant
[30] The Prosecutor asked the defendant what he meant when he stated that he “typically” makes a stop at the light? The defendant responded by stating that is what he does when driving.
[31] The Prosecutor asked the defendant if it was correct that the light was green when he was approaching the intersection and then turned red when the defendant reached the intersection. The defendant confirmed that he had made this statement.
[32] The Prosecutor suggested to the defendant that he did not fully stop his vehicle when he was at the intersection. The defendant denied that he did not stop.
[33] The Prosecutor then asked the defendant what colour the traffic light was at the intersection. The defendant responded that at the intersection the traffic light was red.
Submissions
Defence Submissions
[34] Ms. Hewitson submitted that a key element of failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144(18) has not been proven, since the Officer did not testify that the control signal was in a circular red position.
[35] She also argued that under Section 144(18) a driver must stop his vehicle when the traffic light is red. She pointed out that there is an exemption or exception to this rule under 144(19) of the HTA that “despite subsection (18) and subject to subsection 14 a driver after stopping his or her vehicle and yielding right of way to traffic lawfully approaching closely as to proceed would constitute an immediate hazard may turn to the right or turn to the left from a one-way street into a one-way street, without a green indication being shown.
[36] She then proceeded to submit that the charge being made, is the wrong charge if there was a right-hand turn being made i.e. if a right-hand turn was made then the defendant should have been charged under section 144 (19) and not under section 144 (18) of the HTA.
[37] Ms. Hewitson also emphasized that the Officer did not have an independent recollection of the incident and stated that the defendant appeared to be reading from his notes during the hearing rather than relying on his memory as he testified that he would do.
[38] She also pointed out that the Officer claimed that the Weston Road and Northland intersection is a T intersection but that this intersection was, in fact, a four-way intersection and that this was a roadway where drivers can make a “left hand turn and drive down”.
[39] Ms. Hewitson also pointed out that initially the Officer testified that only a valid driver’s licence was produced when, in fact, an expired insurance card was produced as well.
[40] Ms. Hewitson indicated that the defendant testified that he observed the traffic light was green and then turned to yellow and then red and that he had stopped for the red light and scanned the intersection. Ms. Hewitson then stated that the defendant made a right-hand turn after assessing that it was safe to do so.
[41] She submitted that his testimony was detailed and asked the court to take R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 742 into consideration when assessing his credibility.
The Prosecutor’s Submissions
[42] The Prosecutor stated that all the elements of the offences have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant made a right hand turn without coming to a full stop first. She stated that such action contravenes Section 144(18) of the HTA, which indicates that when approaching a red circular indication, the motor vehicle should come to a stop.
[43] In terms of whether the Prosecution has established that a red circular indication has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant admitted that the traffic light at the intersection was red. The Officer clearly testified that the defendant turned right without coming to a stop on a red light.
[44] The Prosecutor noted that Ms. Hewitson had advised the court that the Prosecution is proceeding on the wrong charge and that if that is the case then a motion to this effect should have been made prior to the hearing. The Prosecutor added that section 144(19) is an exception to section 144(18) and that it is not a charging section.
[45] The Prosecutor referred to the defence submission that the intersection is not a 4-way stop but rather a T intersection. The Prosecutor pointed out that in the still photo of the video shown by Ms. Hewitson there were cars parked in the parking lot.
[46] With respect to failing to surrender a permit, the Prosecutor noted that the Officer had testified that the defendant had not provided a permit when requested to do so. Moreover, the defendant stated in his own testimony that he was unable to provide a permit to the officer. Thus, there is no evidence at this trial that the permit was provided.
[47] She further urged the court not to draw a negative inference about the Officer’s recollection of events based on the defendant’s testimony that he submitted an expired insurance card to him, since the Officer testified that no valid proof of insurance was provided, and an invalid slip is not such proof. Further, the Officer admitted that it was possible he was given an expired insurance card, and thus did not change his testimony.
[48] With respect to the credibility of the defendant’s testimony, the Prosecutor noted that the defendant could not recall the name of the route on which he was travelling. The Prosecutor also noted that the defendant made statements that were contradictory and pointed to the defendant’s testimony. Specially, the Prosecutor noted that the defendant testified that he did not notice the Officer until he made his turn and then during cross-examination, the defendant stated that he saw the Officer before he made his turn.
[49] The Prosecutor concluded that instead of coming to a stop at the red light the defendant made a “slow turn” and did not stop at all at the intersection contrary to Section 144(18) of the HTA and then failed to surrender his permit when the Officer stopped him.
Reply
[50] Ms. Hewitson maintained that there was no evidence that the traffic light turned red with a circular indicator as the defendant drove to the intersection at Weston Road and Northland Avenue.
[51] She also emphasized that the wrong charge had been made against the defendant i.e. that the charge should have been under section 144(19) not section 144(18) of the HTA.
[52] Ms. Hewitson stated that the Officer testified that he had an independent recollection of the incident but that he appeared to be reading from his notes during his testimony.
[53] She emphasized that the defendant drives this route all the time and implied that the defendant is familiar with the traffic rules governing this intersection.
[54] Ms. Hewitson pointed out that her client testified “confidently” that he did stop at the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue while travelling southbound on Northland Avenue.
ANALYSIS:
[55] I have considered the credibility of each witness, as set out below.
Credibility of Officer Marquis:
[56] I am relying on R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17 at paragraph 20 when assessing his credibility:
Assessing credibility is not a science. It is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events…
[57] I have considered the evidence of Officer Marquis very carefully. He testified that on the day in question, the weather was clear, the roads were dry, there was natural lighting from the sunlight, and visibility was good.
[58] He observed the defendant’s vehicle as it approached the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue and he watched the traffic light turned red for northbound and southbound traffic. The Officer testified clearly that the red Mazda 3 “slowed down as it approached the intersection” but did not make a “complete stop.” He testified that the defendant did not stop for the red light and that his vehicle was “in motion all times” and then proceeded westbound on Northland Avenue.
[59] When Officer Marquis stopped the defendant, the defendant was unable to produce his registration.
[60] I find Officer Marqis’ testimony to be highly credible. His testimony was clear, and unshaken during cross-examination. I find that Officer Marquis did have an independent recollection of these events, which was demonstrated by his recollection of destroying the charge of drive no insurance when the defendant called his insurer and obtained proof of same over the phone. Moreover, his testimony corresponded accurately to the still image of the video that I was shown at this hearing.
Credibility of Mr. Mills
[61] In assessing the credibility of the defendant, I am relying on the judgment of Cory, J. in R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), 1991, CanLll 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, where he held:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously, you must acquit.
Second, if you do not believe the evidence of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask your self whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.
[62] I have considered Mr. Mills’ evidence carefully. He testified that he stopped at the red traffic light at the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue and looked for pedestrians before he turned right. He admitted during cross-examination that the light was green when he was approaching the intersection but that it had turned red when he reached the intersection.
[63] He also admitted that he was unable to produce the registration certificate for the Officer.
[64] I find that Mr. Mills falls within the third part of the test in W.(D.).
The Relevant Legislation:
- Permit, etc., required
(5) Permit to be carried – Subject to subsection (6), every driver of a motor vehicle on a highway shall carry,
(a) the permit for it or a true copy thereof;
(b) where the motor vehicle is drawing a trailer, the permit for the trailer or a true copy thereof,
and shall surrender the permits or copies for inspection upon the demand of a police officer.
144(18) Red light – Every driver approaching a traffic control signal showing a circular red indication and facing the indication shall stop his or her vehicle and shall not proceed until a green indication is shown.
144(19) Exception – turn – Despite subsection (18) and subject to subsection (14), a driver, after stopping his or her vehicle and yielding to the right of way to traffic lawfully approaching so closely that to proceed would constitute an immediate hazard, may,
(a) turn to the right; or
(b) turn to the left from a one-way street into a one-way street,
Without a green indication being shown.
Have the Actus Reus of Each of the Offences Been Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
[66] The court must keep in mind that it is not enough to believe that the defendant is probably or likely guilty because proof of probable or likely guilt is not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[67] I must also remember that it is nearly impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty and the Prosecution is not required to prove its case to the degree of absolute certainty because absolute certainty is a standard of proof that does not exist in law.
[68] I must also apply the direction from the SCC in R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] S.C.J. No. 40 at paragraph 242 that "the reasonable doubt standard ... falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities."
[69] Finally, I must remember that the reasonable doubt standard is a tough standard and is tough for good reason. It is because as Justice Cory stated in R. v Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, at paragraph 13, "[t]he onus resting upon the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt ... is one of the principal safeguards which seeks to ensure that no innocent person is convicted."
[70] Based on all the evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mills was driving on a highway when he was stopped by the Officer and a demand was made for his registration permit.
[71] I am also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence of both the Officer and Mr. Mills that he was unable to produce it.
[72] Section 7(5)(a) has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[73] In terms of section 144(18), I have considered several issues.
[74] First, it is clear from a plain reading of subsection 144(19) that this is an “exception” to the proceeding provision and is not a charging section. Thus, I dismiss the argument that Mr. Mills was charged under the wrong section of the HTA.
[75] There is no dispute that the defendant turned right on a red light at the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue, nor is there any dispute that the light had been green when the defendant was approaching this intersection. The only dispute is whether the defendant completed a full stop when the light was red, prior to turning.
[76] I prefer the testimony of Officer Marquis that the defendant did not stop at the red light prior to turning right, since he was directly observing the defendant’s vehicle at the time and the road conditions were clear and dry. Officer Marquis’ evidence was clear about the lane in which the defendant travelled, whereas the defendant’s evidence was much less credible. For example, he maintained that he was very familiar with the Weston Road and Northland Avenue area but could not recall street names during his testimony. Moreover, I am taking judicial notice that maps of the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue corroborate Officer Marquis’ testimony that it is a T intersection and not a four-way intersection.
[77] Since the defendant testified that he turned right on a red light, the fact that the Officer did not describe the “circular red indication” in precisely those words does not negate the fact that the defendant’s evidence corroborates that of the Officer’s evidence, that the light was red at the time the turn was made.
[78] As such, I am satisfied that the actus reus of the charges before me, namely that the defendant failed to stop at a red traffic light at the intersection of Weston and Northland Avenue and that the defendant failed to surrender a permit when asked to do so have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
ORDER
[79] For the reasons noted, the defendant is guilty as charged of failing to stop at a red light at the intersection of Weston Road and Northland Avenue contrary to Section 144(18) and he is guilty of failing to surrender a permit upon the demand of a police officer, contrary to Section 7(5)(a) of the HTA.
Released: August 5, 2026
Signed: Justice of the Peace Beverly Brooks